

THE EXPOSITOR

VOL. XIX.

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
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# THE EXPOSITOR

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## *CHURCH HISTORY : ITS SCOPE AND METHODS.*<sup>1</sup>

It is with considerable trepidation that I appear before you to deliver the Inaugural Lecture at the opening of the College session, though the task assigned be honourable, and one not lightly to be evaded.

It is with no less reluctance that I comply with the tradition and, I imagine, the invariable custom, of the occasion, in directing your thoughts to some general observations bearing on the subject of the Chair to which I have been appointed, on the scope and the methods of the study of Church History, and the tasks that lie before those who would prosecute that study to any purpose to-day. In part this reluctance arises out of personal considerations, and is due to the fact that what little mastery of the subject I once conceived myself to possess seems to have taken flight in the excitements and changes of these last five years. It may turn out in the end that there are compensating gains, but the immediate effect, as many of you whose studies have been similarly interrupted must have experienced, is to produce a feeling of comparative helplessness on what was once familiar ground.

But in part also the reluctance is due to the fact that one may have a great and growing love for a subject, one's mind may have been occupied with it in a greater or less degree, to the exclusion of many other competing interests, and yet an explanation of its nature and its processes may not come trippingly to the tongue or flow easily from the pen. We find frequently that there is a distinct cleavage

<sup>1</sup> Inaugural lecture at New College, Edinburgh, Oct. 9, 1919,

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between those who are engaged in the furtherance of any study, and those who are competent to explain its rationale, its philosophy, and to analyse its logical procedure. Some of the most learned and illuminating expositions of the scientific processes which lie behind all historical investigation and presentation have come from thinkers who have rarely exercised themselves at all in the processes they describe with such minuteness and exactitude. On the other hand, there are those who have absorbed the methods and constantly employ them without being able, in any fully adequate way, to explain to others their precise nature. As has been recently pointed out, "After about twenty years' experience, the editor of the Dictionary of National Biography attempted to explain what biography was: his effort was much less successful than the biographies he wrote."

For these reasons, it was my first intention to avoid to-day the obvious duty of dealing with the general subject, and to direct your thoughts to some minor phase of the long history to which the incidents of these last years had lent interest for myself, but the tradition of the occasion has proved too strong.

Church history, then, as a theological discipline is absent from the course of study of no well-equipped Theological College, and with whatever degree of stringency we interpret its scope, from the point of view of its multitudinous material and its manifold aspects, it covers probably the widest expanse of any subject in the whole curriculum.

In wide circles in the past its content was regarded as more ample than the recognised limits to-day, and the teacher of Church History made more manifest encroachments on the preserves of the representatives of the other theological disciplines. Time was when it was considered a mutilation of the subject to restrict oneself to



the Christian Era, to begin with the Day of Pentecost as the birthday of the Church, or even with a survey of the life and times of our Lord Himself: nothing would suffice but a full consideration of the Divine preparatory movement in the history of the Chosen People from the very dawn of revelation. Abraham, Moses, David, and the prophets lent lustre to the history of the Church quite as effectively and quite as directly as Paul and Peter, Augustine and the Reformers. From a Dutch scholar of the early eighteenth century there comes a definition of its province which held the field for long. He divided all history into civil and ecclesiastical and allocated their respective spheres as follows:—"The first (civil history) reports the actions of Commanders of Kingdoms and Cities, or of Kings and Nations: and the last (ecclesiastical) the affairs which passed formerly among the *Hebrews*, and since our Saviour's birth among the Christians, as far as religion is concerned in them." The last conspicuous survival of this poaching tradition was in the case of Dean Stanley, who delivered his picturesque lectures on the History of the Jewish Church not from a chair of Old Testament but from a chair of Ecclesiastical History.

But while it is undeniable that the mission and growth of the Church cannot be fully understood apart from its roots in the history of Israel, and while it is also true, as Professor Oman has pointed out, that "the Church, as the highest and widest fellowship among mankind, was prepared for, in some degree, by every form of human association," for practical purposes, and as a decent division of labour we do limit the scope of Church History to-day to the Christian era; we no longer regard it as co-extensive with that great History of Redemption which one of the earliest and soundest Church historians in our denominational record, John Brown of Haddington, so urgently desired to see undertaken and executed.

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The past history of this study, however, is even more fertile in examples of the way in which its field has been unduly narrowed. For a long time it was the method of practically every writer on Church History to dispose of his material under a series of rubrics—all of them ecclesiastical in the most limited sense of that word. If a fact could not be brought under the head of Doctrine, or Heresy, or Schism, or Church Government, or Worship, if it did not form the subject of some *ex cathedra* pronouncement of a Pope, or the decision of an Ecclesiastical Council, it was at once rejected as hopelessly irrelevant. Thomas Fuller felt that the brief reference to the Spanish Armada in his Church History of Britain stood in need of some explanation. He knew that men would ask why he intruded on the field of political history, and even on that of naval warfare. "Let not," he pleads, "the mentioning of this deliverance be censured as a deviation from the Church History of Britain; *silence thereof being a sin*. For had the design taken effect, neither Protestant Church in Britain had remained, nor history thereof been made at this present."

With the growing sense of the solidarity of human history, and of "the impossibility of isolating ecclesiastical phenomena" this limited view of our discipline is coming to an end. The matters that occupy the attention of Church courts and officials are never the only matters, and very often not the main matters, that absorb the thoughts of Christian people, and fill their activities. The true significance of an age in its real contribution to the Christian development is likely to be missed by those who confine their attention mainly to official records. It is with full justification that Dr. Hatch has pointed out the futility of this way of dealing with the Christianity of the past, by a comparison with the effective Christianity of the present. "If we had," he said in 1885—"If we had to write the



ecclesiastical history of England in the latter half of the nineteenth century,—not as men who live within it, and ourselves form part of its movement, but as spectators from outside—if, in other words, it were part of past history, to be ascertained from documents, and not from personal experiences, or living testimony, we should have to recognise the play and reciprocal action of all discoverable forces and phenomena, and we should find the materials for our purpose far less in what are sometimes exclusively called ecclesiastical documents, than in a file of the *Times* newspaper. We should have to take account not only of resolutions of Church Congresses, but also of Acts of Parliament : not only of sermons, but also of socialistic addresses : not only of the succession of the Archbishops of Canterbury, but also of the succession of Chancellors of the Exchequer : not only of contemporary theology, but also of contemporary poetry : not only of statistics of Missions, but also of statistics of the price of wheat. We should have to consider, in short, the whole mass of contemporary forces and phenomena, and we should have to do so, moreover, not as affording interesting illustrations of the work of Christian communities, or of the obstacles which they have to face, but rather as powers which co-operate with them, influence their movements, shape their institutions, and account for their new modes of activity.”

This vital way of regarding the history of the Church was eminently characteristic of the revered teacher to whom I owe more than I can ever hope to express, Principal Lindsay. He sought constantly to appreciate the contemporary conditions as a whole, not only in themselves, but in their impact upon the faith and work of the individual believer and the Christian community : and in every age to hear the beat of the living heart of the Church. One of his last plans was that of a history of the Christian people with this



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end in view. "Whereas," he wrote, "Church histories usually devote about 75 per cent. to institutions and to doctrines, and 25 per cent. to the social influences of the Christian religion, I wish the proportion to be reversed." What he himself did for the understanding of the Reformation by his intimate analysis of the religious and family life of the generations immediately preceding it, he wished might be done for the Church throughout the centuries. And all who read or heard part of what was to be his own contribution to the series—a reconsideration from this point of view of the first period of the Church—must have a deep regret that the scheme had to be abandoned.

It is a task that still awaits us, for indubitably the Church History of the past has paid too little attention to the Christian habits and Christian thoughts which have sustained the ordinary believer in his common life and activity: the glimpses of central truth which have nourished his inner life: the contemporary problems which have given form and shape to his endeavours, and the visions which inspired him as he and the Christian community to which he adhered have gone on to meet new needs with new developments and to demonstrate the "vitality of Christian life by changes in the modes of its energy."

Church history can never be regarded as a convenient pigeon-hole in which to place and to arrange a certain set of facts which are distinctly and markedly ecclesiastical: it is, if you do not press the words too closely, what Gwatkin has called it, "the spiritual side of universal history."

If the sphere of Church History be thus intimately bound up with the whole complex history of humanity, it follows that its method can never be one peculiar to itself. Its sole duty is to arrive at historical truth, and that by the use of the same historical method as is applied to every other department of human activity. It would serve no

good purpose to attempt here any detailed analysis of the historical method; but I would like to draw your attention to certain broad features of it and to illustrate them with examples old and new.

All historical work must rest upon the critical study of genuine sources. During the last fifty years the materials for Church History have been accumulating with great rapidity, and that not only in the actual recovery of lost documents, and the excavation of ancient and forgotten sites, nor yet in the collection of scattered inscriptions, till then accessible only to a very few, but also in the re-handling, in the light of new facts, of works which have been the common property of the student for centuries. We have been passing through what may be called a "documentary" age, which has realised, as perhaps never before, the importance of building upon a critical study of genuine sources.

But we must not be tempted to interpret the word "genuine" too stringently, for, to take the most extreme case first, even a manifest forgery may be a genuine source. It can often be made to yield an ample reward to critical study. Its testimony may be worthless and altogether misleading as to the situation with which it professes to deal, but it may tell us much of the thoughts and ideals and schemes of the circle in which it first saw the light.

Further, even an obviously legendary writing may be a genuine source. Naturally it must be used with caution and discrimination. Some are incapable of interpretation, for they are, to use a classic description, "a mirage produced by an invisible object according to an unknown law of refraction." And in such a case it is not permissible, as Professor Collins rightly insists, "to neglect the fantastic or marvellous elements as untrue and accept the rest, for the evidence for one part of the story is at any rate no worse and no better than that for the other : and such a process

would be like rejecting Puss-in-Boots and accepting the Marquis of Carabas as an historical character."

At first sight an Apocryphal writing of the character of the Acts of Thomas would seem to belong to this class of which nothing can be made. It is not so long since those within whose purview it had come might have been separated into the two classes—the credulous, who swallowed the marvels in whole or in part, from the division by lot of the countries of the earth among the Twelve Apostles, down to its final scene when the dust from the martyred hero's grave effected, through the miraculous cure of a son, the conversion of the unbelieving and persecuting king—and the incredulous who neglected the story altogether as too legendary to waste time upon. Yet Professor Burkitt has been able to find in it, behind the fantastic machinery of the tale, especially in the sermons and prayers it contains, "an original and characteristic product of early Syriac-speaking Christianity" and to lead us through it into a truer understanding of the early ideals of that fascinating and still mysterious branch of the Christian Church whose chief centre was Edessa on the upper waters of the Euphrates.

Further, there are documents free from all suspicion of forgery, and untouched by the merely fantastic, which still seem unworthy to be regarded as genuine sources. May I introduce those of you who may never have encountered him, in the pages of Hodgkin or elsewhere, to a comparatively unknown cleric of the ninth century, by name Agnellus, the author of the lives of the Bishops of Ravenna. I need hardly remind you that Ravenna had been a very important city in the days when the West was slipping away from the Empire, and it stood as the main rampart of the old order in a dissolving world. At times its Church was convinced that it was no whit behind even Rome itself. And yet there was no worthy record of what its local patriotism considered the

great and glorious succession of its ecclesiastical chiefs. By the ninth century it was obvious that, if the task was ever to be accomplished, it must be undertaken at once. His antiquarian interests, and the fluency of his pen, made his brethren fix upon Agnellus as the one marked out for this work. They besought him to make the attempt. He consented reluctantly, and we have his book to-day. But what were the principles on which he wrote? He expounds them himself with the most engaging candour. "When," he says, "I have not found any history of these Bishops, and have not been able by conversation with aged men or inspection of the monuments to obtain information concerning them, in such a case, that there might not be a blank in the series, I have composed the life myself, with the help of God and the prayers of the brethren."

Shall we take advantage of his frankness and peep over his shoulder as he sits at work? More than once he is kind enough to give us the opportunity and, indeed, almost to invite us to do so. For example, when he comes to the life of Aurelian, Bishop of Ravenna from 520-521, he thus begins: "He was an eminent man, young in years, old in wisdom, mild towards the people, courteous towards his flock. . . . (Here he pauses to remonstrate with his brethren.) But, my dearly beloved, that you may know what heavy burdens you have imposed upon my neck, I have not been able to learn any facts about this man except that he acquired certain property for the Cathedral in the territory of Comacchio, and that a monastery was built in his time. But on account of your prayer that this man's history may not appear too short I will, with Divine help, relate boldly what my human intellect is quite unable to declare. . . .

"Now (he continues) you wish that I should proceed. But I am very sick and weak in body, and can do nothing more to-day. To-morrow, with the Creator's help, I will begin."



But he never does. When the morrow dawns, he has come to the conclusion that the most honourable way of bringing the biography up to the required standard of length is to utilise the space thus providentially provided to elaborate a theory of his own as to the meaning of an obscure passage in one of the Psalms.

Now, what are we to make of a document compiled on methods so loose as these, and so openly avowed? Can we regard it as a genuine source? Can we expect to find in it any reliable guidance in regard to anything except the elasticity of the historical conscience in the early Middle Ages? And yet with all its defects, this history of Agnellus is of great and permanent value. For one thing, it is not difficult to discover the points at which Agnellus begins to exercise his convenient and not over-vivid imagination. It is always in the case of undistinguished men whose episcopate was short and uneventful. And for another, Agnellus was perhaps the very first who made systematic use of the monuments around him as a source of history, and his accuracy in regard to those that still remain inspires a considerable degree of confidence in his treatment of the greater number that have persisted.

I have brought sources of this kind before your notice, because the manifestly genuine are more familiar and the problems they present are simpler and yield to less drastic treatment.

From the critical study of genuine sources is gathered the raw material of Church History, and it remains now to ask, "What is the student's attitude to the data ascertained from a thorough and impartial scrutiny of all the available material relevant to the task in hand?" I have no intention of inflicting on you a technical description of the processes of synthesis by which, through an imaginative reconstruction of the past tested and retested, a convincing picture



of the epoch or phase selected is gradually evolved. But here again there are certain general considerations which suggest themselves.

Without question the Reformation gave a tremendous impetus to the study of Church History. In the first beginnings, research was mainly directed to the evidence of Scripture, and the scattered hints elsewhere which bore upon the Church of the Apostolic and sub-Apostolic age. It exalted primitive Christianity "and awakened a new and enthusiastic interest in all the earliest documents of the Church, with an energetic effort to reproduce its spirit and its institutions." But, "in the course of controversy with Rome, Protestantism found it desirable and necessary to wrest from its opponent not only the Scriptural argument, but also the historical, and to turn it, as far as possible, to the side of the evangelical cause." At times deliberately, and at times unconsciously, the protagonists in the struggle on both sides ransacked the immense and almost untrodden storehouses of the past in a polemical spirit, approaching them as arsenals on whose racks and shelves were stored weapons of offence and defence which might serve them in their immediate needs. Now, despite the immense service all this amazing industry rendered in elucidating the knotty problems of the past, the result could hardly be called scientific Church history. Indeed, one does not wonder at the advice given by Selden to study the exaggerated statements of Baronius on the one hand, and of the Magdeburg centuriators on the other, and be "your own judges."

We may not look to the past of Christianity only for the confirmation of our own opinions, or the establishment of our own contentings. To put it bluntly, it serves no scientific purpose to set out with a cast-iron philosophy of history and then proceed to force all the facts which are capable of such pressure into the rigid scheme. It is equally

fatal whether that philosophy spring from a naturalistic scheme of the Universe, or whether it claim to be evolved from prophecy and apocalypse, or even from what seems to ourselves the only legitimate interpretation of certain parables of our Lord. The history of Christianity is more varied than all our petty systematising, and has taken a course which no flight of human imagination could have contemplated. As Charles Marriott said: "Whoever enters on the study of Church History must be prepared for many surprises." To embark upon its consideration with our minds made up, with a set of foregone conclusions, however reasonable, is altogether to miss its meaning and to lose its message. But, even where the polemic intention does not intrude, we have no lack of examples of that evil thing, "history with a purpose." It is evident in the process popularly known as "whitewashing"—the attempts of historians to find excuses for all the traditional criminals of history.

Thomas Fuller saw the tendency in his own day, and with his inimitable plainness and quaintness of speech he described it and traced it to what is still a dominant motive in many who practise the art. He has come to the reign of Richard III. when he thus interrupts the flow of his narrative: "Duke Richard was low in stature, crook-backed, with one shoulder higher than the other, having a prominent gobbertooth, a warlike countenance which well enough became a soldier. Yet a modern author, in a book by him lately set forth, eveneth his shoulders, smootheth his back, planeth his teeth, maketh him in all points a comely and beautiful person. Nor stoppeth he here; but, proceeding from his naturals to his morals, maketh him as virtuous as handsome, which in some sense may be allowed to be true; concealing most, defending others, of his foulest facts, wherewith in all ages he standeth charged on record. For mine own part, I

count it no heresy to maintain a paradox in history, nor am I such an enemy to wit as not to allow it leave harmlessly to disport itself, for its own content, and the delight of others. . . . But when men shall do it cordially, in sober sadness, to pervert people's judgments, and therein go against all received records, I say, singularity is the least fault can be laid to such men's charge. Besides, there are some birds, 'sea-pies' by name, who cannot rise except it be by flying against the wind, so some hope to achieve *their advancement* by being contrary and paradoxical in judgment to all before them."

The "sea-pie" is not yet an extinct species: nor is the "evening" of shoulders and "planing" of teeth a process of which the knack has been irrevocably lost. Frequently the history of our discipline has seen astonishing reversals of judgment, but they have seldom come through the investigations of those who have set out with the deliberate intention of "whitewashing." However arresting the result may be, the process is not over-difficult: it is certainly easier than a full and impartial survey. If we are in search of evidence of one particular kind, we have no difficulty in finding it, and so making out some kind of a case for ourselves. "Work of this kind," says Professor Collins, "is common enough, and it is unfortunately specially common in ecclesiastical history. But wherever it may be, it is bad. Certainly the great historians who have reversed the judgment of scholars, and supplied the clue to what was previously dark and confused did not start in ways such as these."

We need to beware, therefore, of every lurking temptation to succumb to the spirit of the partisan. What above all vitiates the work of a historian is "unfairness in collecting and sifting evidence, and anxiety to win a verdict by misrepresentation of it" or by suppression of some essential

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feature of the whole case as he has it, or ought to have it before him.

While such a spirit is the most deadly of sins, it does not follow, as has sometimes been supposed, that face to face with the facts of Christian history we are to make any pretence of divesting ourselves of our own Christian faith and hope. As Canon Bright has said: "If our object is truth, we must not begin by being untrue: and affectation or unreality is untruth." "We are to study a great phenomenon in the spiritual order: and we shall not see it properly unless we are at home within its range. There is a truth represented by one of the sayings attributed (by Clement of Alexandria) to our Lord: 'My mystery is for me, and for the sons of my house.' We must be in sympathy with what we are to appreciate . . . it is not outsiders who will best understand what the Church of the New Testament claimed to be." What our Lord said of Himself may be fitly applied to His Church: "He that loveth Me . . . I will manifest Myself to him." It is our part to stand with sympathetic insight before all the ascertained facts of Christian history, and then with all the scientific skill at our command to paint the picture of the whole we see.

From these broad and elementary considerations with which we have been dealing, let us turn in closing to certain particular encouragements in our study of Church History at this time and in this place.

First of all, we are not entering upon a study on which the final word has been spoken. For no single period or phase can such a claim be made. It is true that, in the past, masters in this subject have been heard to complain that there were no more worlds to conquer. But their complaint has been premature. There are plenty of regions imperfectly explored, and that even in the story of our



own land and Church : and there are lines of approach emerging which may yield a rich harvest even in the most trodden field. We are entering on a living and progressive study each assured result of which will tend to a truer understanding of the present, and of the well-nigh incredible variety of God's dealings with men.

Further, we are entering upon it in a College whose record in this subject is one of early and continuous distinction. I do not wish to speak of the living, but it must be rare indeed for one to be inducted to a College where so many of his colleagues have made substantial contributions to the literature of the very subject he comes to teach. And my predecessors in this chair have all been men of the most outstanding qualities. Two of them belong even more to the history of the Church itself, than to the history of Church history, but their contribution to the understanding of the past was hardly less marked than their contribution to the Church they served.

It is constantly said that no Church History can possibly be used as a textbook more than twenty years after it is written, but Principal Cunningham's Historical Theology holds such a place of honour in more than one College still : and it has weathered almost three times the allotted span. It is not for us who have entered into his labours to indulge in vain regrets that so much of Principal Rainy's strength went to the making of Church History rather than to the teaching of it. If Christian Scotland thereby missed a superlative historian, its loss was outweighed by its gain. But, despite the many tasks that were laid upon him, his class-room here was an inspiration to students for more than a generation : and his published works, alike the early and the late, sound notes too often missed by lesser men.

In Dr. MacEwen this College had a scholar who would



have made his name in almost any department of learning, and one who possessed in a marked degree the gift of teaching (which does not always go with scholarship). It would be hard to over-estimate what he actually accomplished for his chosen subject and in his chosen field. In the matter of acquaintance with its ecclesiastical history, our land may be said to occupy a somewhat unique position. No country in Europe, not even Germany, has so great a proportion of its Christian people who are familiar with the great names and facts of the Reformation, and of the centuries since the Reformation, and probably no country can number such a proportion who have only the very vaguest notions, and even these generally erroneous, of that history in pre-Reformation times. Many educated Scottish people would, for instance, put down all they know of Scottish Christianity from David I. to James IV. on the proverbial half-sheet of note-paper. It will be largely due to Dr. MacEwen's work if that reproach is speedily wiped away. For in his *History of the Church of Scotland up to the Reformation* we have a work which is not only THE authority for this generation, but one so securely based on research, so lucid in statement, and so free from the merely provincial outlook, that it can be placed with confidence by Scotsmen alongside the more monumental works in which the history of the Church in other European countries has been embodied within recent years. We may have to wait long enough for a similar service to be done for post-Reformation history. Historians of Dr. MacEwen's quality are not, alas! to be found in every generation.

To me, it is a thought at once inspiring and appalling that I stand in this succession, but to you who are to study this subject within these walls it ought to be an unmixed stimulus and incentive that from this College there has issued work of such sterling worth,

Finally, it ought to be an encouragement that we are living in a day when Church History is obviously in the making. The challenge of a new day is upon us, and whatever fogs and mists beset the present, it is full of promise in the deep searchings of heart, evident in every Christian community. And if there is one thing more than another that the whole record of the past has to impress upon us, it is this:—that if we go forward in living loyalty to the Church's Head, holding high our conception of the Church's mission, and seeking to achieve it with a whole heart, the way will clear before us, and we shall be led into new and ampler fields of service.

I close with some wise and sober words of Gwatkin: "Not by unreasoning worship of the past, nor by ignorant contempt of it, nor yet by partisan distortion of it, but by critical and sympathetic study, we shall learn something of the grandeur of our own time, and of the meaning of the mighty questions which lie before (us and) our children."

HUGH WATT.

*REASONS WHY NERO SHOULD NOT BE FOUND  
IN REVELATION XIII.*

AMONG the treasures of the Rylands Library is a richly pictured manuscript of the Commentary on the Apocalypse by Beatus. A Spanish scribe of the twelfth century has spent his skill to embellish the text with the fancies awakened in his imagination by the incidents or figures of the book. But he was also a careful student of Beatus, as his diagrammatic summary (fol. 155b) of its comments on the 13th chapter will shew. He has arranged the folio page as if one of the great windows of his monastery, or it may be of the scriptorium in which he was at work, had invited him to its reproduction. It was a high and graceful window with eight lights—a proper feature in a building which owed its style to a Spanish architect who could think in Arabic. At the top of each light he wrote a name, and down the left side of the partitioning stone between each light, he wrote the letters of the alphabet from A to T. These unusual transparencies were caused by what he read in the comments of Beatus. For that industrious man had gathered a number of names which either he, or others before him, had fitted to the number in the Dreamer's statement ; “and his number is 666.” Some of the names are as old as Irenaeus ; others are later attempts at exegetical algebra. Were Beatus and his predecessors doing only so little for the interpretation of the difficult passage ? The scribe's window can give the answer, and by the first four lights ; for the power of the second four to admit light is no more than theirs. In them then the names which are honoured are : Antichristus, Teitan, Dielya, or as it is in the text of the Commentary Dielyas, and Genseric. These names are now split up letter by letter, down the length of the lights and a numeral

value put to each letter, so that the analysis shall make the total of DCLXVI. Because some of the names, even in these first four, have letters in them which are repeated; and because the total must be made right, the letter T is given again, at the end of the valuing alphabet, and its second value is according to the amount needed to render the correct total. Of the eight names which are the eight lights, Antichristus and Teitan, seem to be the favoured ones; for they are inscribed on the sills of the windows. The scribe of this manuscript did more than add decorations to his work when he gave diagrammatic form to the comments of Beatus; he made plain, as well the futility of the algebraical mode of dealing with the problem in the Apocalypse. The guile of the repeated letter, with its charity towards whatever quantity could not be placed in the literal analysis, and the evident desire of the whole process to force one result, ought to have awakened early commentators to the opinion that nothing was right in what they were doing. But tradition rules over writers of commentaries, and Patristic writers of the Middle Age continued in the old way. There is both honour done, and danger incurred by, the era-old tendency of commentators to copy one another. Just as in the case of the earlier writers a diagrammatist arose, who, while he was summarising efforts in interpretation, unconsciously exposed the interpretative method, so also another diagrammatist of another order came, in a big hour of the world's history, and with the same faith summarised the mediæval writers, and so with the same simplicity shewed up the faults of the mode. The Abbé Wurtz, who was a commentator in the ancient diocese of Irenæus, wrote in the very early days of the eighteenth century a book with the title *Les précurseurs de l'Antichrist*. He did not illuminate it as the twelfth century scribe of Beatus, but his black and white diagrams are as

illuminating as those of the Spanish artist. These are two of them :

<i>A</i>	1	<i>M</i>	40
<i>II</i>	80	<i>A</i>	1
<i>O</i>	70	<i>O</i>	70
$\Sigma T$	6	<i>M</i>	40
<i>A</i>	1	<i>E</i>	5
<i>T</i>	300	<i>T</i>	300
<i>H</i>	8	<i>I</i>	10
$\Sigma$	200	$\Sigma$	200
<hr/>		<hr/>	
666		666	

The simple intrigues of these two diagrams are too clear that they could point to any other conclusion than that to which the Spanish caligraphist should have brought the mind—namely, the algebra of the commentators is fantastic and wrong.

Since the time of Beatus and his disciple, and that of the Abbé Wurtz, has come the revolution of the critical study of the New Testament. It might be thought that such an event would at least have put aside the Patristic way with this difficulty for interpretation in the Apocalypse. It appears not to have done so. For the question has need to be answered, whether any advance in method has been made by changing the Greek for the Hebrew alphabet. The matter now works out that 666 equals נרון כסר—that is to say, the number covers the name of Nero Caesar. This, for example, is Bousset's solution ; and is held to be one of the settled points in the interpretation of the New Testament writing. When that which is said to be a variant of the accepted number, 616, is dealt with, the Hebrew alphabet has to give place to the Greek, and the reading of Tyconius, Cod. C and cursive 11, comes out as *Γαίος Καισαρ*.



There can be no doubt that the modern is more according to knowledge than the old method. It is dealing with sources; and it is framed in agreement with the current theory of Hebrew Apocalypses being behind the one ill-knit and written Greek Apocalypse. Let these things be [as they may, it is legitimate to suggest that the method of criticism is algebraic, even though it uses Hebrew. Is this result different from those which came by uncritical means? The matter upon which the latest students work is better than that upon which the Fathers worked; but the method seems to be identical. Nero is a first-century figure. His is a dark presence in the *Sybilline Oracles*, a work that is composite in date and authorship. This, however, does not constitute a reason why he should of necessity be found in the Apocalypse; nor can that fact be allowed to be in any sense an inspiration for the turning of Greek into another language before the semblance of his name can be found. There are most excellent arguments why the problem should be treated as one in Greek, without the adventitious or suppliant use of any other language. Among them are these: (1) The problem of the Greek of the Apocalypse is not yet a settled matter; (2) The panoply given to the figure in this particular problem of the Revelation fits rather a cult-figure than Nero, even with all his pretensions. The problem of the language cannot here be dealt with, but the belief must be recorded which rests upon a study of the Greek text of the Apocalypse, that the meaning of the book is not to be found by turning its hard things into Hebrew. The grounds of that view will be made public. Concerning the second argument, the attempt is now to find a more tremendous and menacing Antichrist than Nero ever could have been or was. This has been found, it is believed, for the *Ascensio Isaiae*.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> These results will appear shortly in the *Journal of Theological Studies*.

The reflex effect on the *Ascensio* of finding the same figure in the Apocalypse is sure to be marked. It is of the largest importance for the future of New Testament studies that an understanding should be reached of what were actual hopes and fears and burdens in the first century.

The first Christian people were content to conceive of the Antichrist as either the embodiment of evil and the inimical world, or as the embodiment of the religious views and practices which were most in opposition to Jesus Christ. In the second century the hold on these abstract beings became less strong ; and the embodiment of ideas fell away into the person of a prominent ruler with whose avarice or cruelty or paganism the abstraction, which once was the Antichrist, might be confused. Irenaeus,<sup>1</sup> for instance, does that, and his lineage is long. In a little later time, Origen<sup>2</sup> does the same. Thus, even he who was so much at home among the infinites, showed his liking for bringing them to earth. We, of much later days, have always found ourselves more at ease with the tangible Caesars, than with the intangible Antichrists of either the Letter to the Thessalonians or of the *Ascensio Isaiae*. Apart from this need in our day to materialise those beings compounded of ideas which were real to the first century, there is another reason why the deed of materialisation should have been carried out. A tiny but potent error in translation is that reason. It is only a Greek article, but already such a microscopic mouse has brought forth its mountains of wrong notions. In this instance, from the Apocalypse, the article has been made to precipitate a Roman Emperor from a title which belongs to Jesus Christ. This gross result, for it is Nero, comes about by rendering *ὁ ἄνθρωπος* as "a man" instead

<sup>1</sup> *Adv. Haereses*, v. 28, 2 ff.

<sup>2</sup> Schol. xxxviii.—Diobouniotis : *Der Scholien-Kommentar des Origenes zur Apokalypse Johannis* (Harnack : *Texte und Untersuch.* 1911).

of as "The Man"—that is, by rendering the sentence thus : "for it is the number of a man" rather than thus : "for it is the number of 'The Man.'" If then the phrase "a man" is read, it is certain that a man will be sought who is black enough to fill the part; but if the phrase "The Man" is read it should be a reason why regard should be paid to the first-century view of a sinister spiritual essence to which had been appropriated the things which belonged to Christ, that is an Antichrist.

But it may be asked, Was there such a title for Jesus Christ to be appropriated? It is suggested that there was, and that it is excellent Greek for the Aramaism which is usually rendered "the Son of Man" (ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου). Semitists of note, like Wellhausen<sup>1</sup> and Bevan,<sup>2</sup> have long held the view that this was what Jesus called Himself. Syriac manuscripts of the New Testament, and writers like Isaac of Antioch, give their unimpeachable support. Paul also can be called as a primary witness. Beatus too, in his rather muddled style, knew that the name of the beast was "the name of Christ." This line of understanding rehabilitates the older view of the Antichrist. At this point no other virtue need be claimed for it. The horrible Emperor goes; the menace in potencies remains. Daniel is one book; the Apocalypse is another, and each is to be interpreted according to its own demands.

In relation to this title of "The Man" it is enlightening to notice that it was in use in some early circles which, if they do not appear to have been struck from the great centre, have certain claims to be called Christian. Some sections of the Naasenes, for example, had this usage.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Skizzen und Vorarbeiten*, 1890, 195 and 197, *Israelitische und Jüdische Geschichte*, 1901, 387-389.

<sup>2</sup> *The Critical Review*, 1899, 149-150.

<sup>3</sup> Hippolytus, *Philosophoumena*, v. 8 (157) ff.

Baruch the Gnostic<sup>1</sup> shews that for him the title υἱος ἀνθρώπου was a synonym for the more vivid ὁ ἄνθρωπος, and a descriptive of Christ's appearance in the world. Others, like Marcus and his followers, come into verbal touch with the statement in the Apocalypse. But they, as it were, have shown the problem on its two sides by means of double-edged reminiscence. They are taken up with the mystic number "six" and with the fact that it represents Him; then with these two memories they shear away the two sides of the difficulty by making the number agree with the letters in the Greek form of the name Jesus, Ἰησοῦς.<sup>2</sup> These matters agree to demonstrate that a title for Jesus Christ "The Man" was known and used, and thus it could be appropriated for the panoply of a first century Antichrist; and also that there is evidence that some early Christians used the number "six" as representing Jesus Christ. What here are hints with interpretative quality are valuable; while it must be allowed that the title "The Man" rests on excellent evidence.

Now if the figure in the Apocalypse is an embodiment of first century cult ideas inimical to Jesus Christ and His teaching, then there is wanted witness to shew that this name for Him was given to such a figure as could have for the Dreamer on Patmos, and the world of his time, the significance of Antichrist. The line of least thought for the establishment of this union would be to take a few items from the Attis cult. He is described by Hippolytus, for instance, as ὁ ἄνθρωπος,<sup>3</sup> or in another place as ἀρχάνθρωπον<sup>4</sup>—the god whom Eisler<sup>5</sup> makes far too old by describing him as "Urgott Attis—Ἀνθρωπος." Persius calls Nero "Bere-

<sup>1</sup> Hippolytus, v. 26 (228); cf. v. 18 (206).

<sup>2</sup> Hippolytus, vi. 45 (312), 49 (325); cf. Irenæus, i. 15, i. (74), i. 15, 2 (76).

<sup>3</sup> Hippolytus, v. 1.

<sup>4</sup> Hippolytus, v. 8.

<sup>5</sup> Eisler: *Weltenmantel und Himmelzeit*, 1910, ii. 524.



cynthius Attys.”<sup>1</sup> Let the Hebrew algebraic manner of dealing with the problem of the number stand, it might seem from this evidence that a Q.E.D. should be written down. But this answer would be gained by being true on one side to the first century need for an abstract Antichrist, and on the other side to the later centuries’ need for a dense imperial materialisation. It is plainly unsatisfactory to attempt to answer the problem both ways. Therefore, though Attis as “The Man” would, on the literal phase, fulfil what it is asked a cult might do; and Nero as divinised into Attis, on the same phase, might play the part he is set by some scholars: there are more objections than the one just named against that solution. These are cult and linguistic objections. For clearly the terms of the problem can only be worked out, for cult, as they manifest what would be true to the writer of the Apocalypse; and for language, as they manifest recognition of the fact that the book was written in Greek. The cult figure must belong to the near Asian world; and the language in which the number is to be solved must be Greek: it is not even Aramaic, though the title “The Man” has been described as an Aramaism.

One of our great authorities on Greek cults, Dr. A. B. Cook,<sup>2</sup> has expressed the opinion that the mystic number in the Apocalypse represents the secret name which was revealed to initiates into the Dionysos-Attis cult, and that they bore “the mark” of this cult on their foreheads.<sup>3</sup> This was a big step forward in the understanding of the passage. At first, it would seem as if the link had been found to chain together the hints of the case for Nero. But this opinion offers certain difficulties, the most formidable among them

<sup>1</sup> *Satyr*: i. 93.

<sup>2</sup> *Transactions of the Third International Congress for the History of Religions*, 1908, ii. 194.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. 3. *Maccab.* ii. 29.

being that the evidence for this use of the number or name, contemporary with the writing of the Apocalypse, is difficult to find. There is, however, evidence beyond question for its use in a greater cult, one which included, or was creatively related to, the Dionysos-Attis cult. Dr. Cook has marked out the way investigators should follow ; and as well he has indicated that the problem is a Greek one.

For its solution then the “ἐξήκοσιο, ἐξήκοντα ἑξ” has to be treated as a numeralised form of a very ancient divine symbol, as also has its nominalised forms in Mnaseas of Patara,<sup>1</sup> ἀξίερος, ἀξιοκέρσα ἀξιόκερος: that is to say, both forms are to be reduced to their two initial letters, ἐξ or αξ. It was Time which lengthened out the first simplicity. This is a frequent discovery in the History of Religions. An amulet found at Vindonissa<sup>2</sup> manifests a first condition of the nominal form, for it has on its surface AXI three times. This elementary form has then a final vowel ; and it is to be accepted that the original simplicity ended with a vowel. This name, to which the long nominalised form has been reduced, belongs to the three Kabeiroi ; so also is the later and longer form of the original, their names. There is little call to go to any other witness than that of Philo of Byblus to understand how fundamental a part these played in Near Asian religion. The suggestion will be made at once, that however true such a statement is, the Apocalypse problem does not want three divine beings and three names, for clearly if the epithet “The Man” is equal to the number, one being is wanted and one name. It will be shewn that at the time of the writing of the Apocalypse the three Kabeiroi had become one Kabeiros. But before shewing that most important side of the investigation, it will be proper to answer the question which may be phrased : “Is Attis in

<sup>1</sup> *Frag. Hist. Graec.*, 1849, iii. 154 (27).

<sup>2</sup> Roscher : *Lexikon*, i. 742.

Kabeiros ? ” Yes, just as a branch can be said to be in the trunk of the tree. This means that the At- of the name Attis or Atys is but a variant of the Kabeiric name  $\alpha\xi$ - or  $\epsilon\xi$ -. There is, for example, in Lydia the variant  $\alpha\xi$ -.<sup>1</sup> These several variants have come either by the influence of dialect, or by slight changes in sound made upon the original root sound, which appears to have been most like that now found in the fourteenth letter of the Greek alphabet,  $\xi$ . If Attis is in Kabeiros, it has still to be shewn that in the first century Kabeiros was one and not three. There is also one other step to be taken before that is done, and that is to explain that the  $\epsilon\xi$ - form is a variant of the  $\alpha\xi$ - form of the divine name. Aeolic inscriptions<sup>2</sup> tell us that  $\epsilon\xi$ - belongs to their dialect of Greek. Many authorities agree that the  $\alpha\xi$ - form is Cretan. That in the Apocalypse the Kabeiric name should appear in a lengthened numeralised form, is not any more a cause for wonder than the lengthened nominalised form which has been dwelt upon. Nor should the change from name to number cause any misgiving as to the final equivalence of the two forms.

Old first values do become dim ; and new modes of initiations into ancient beliefs do create quaint mutations of these dimming first values. The place of the one Kabeiros in Near Asia of the first century will confirm that number and name are the same.

If the pages of Macdonald's Catalogue of coins in the Hunterian Collection at Edinburgh are turned over, many coins will be found on which is the single Kabeiros in name and figure. These coins belong to Thessalonica ; and they range from the first to the fourth centuries. From these and other evidence it has been shewn in the Study already

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Leemans : *Grieksche Opschriften uit Klein-Azië* (Letterkunde Verhandlingen der Kon. Akademie, 1888) 13 and Plaat ii. 7.

<sup>2</sup> Hofmann : *Die Griechische Dialekte*, 1893, ii. 509.

referred to that this is the figure which affects the imagination of the writer of the *Ascensio Isaiae*. And, too, though this may at first sound strange because the evidence is not here, the same figure has fired the pen of the one who wrote what now is an opening passage in the First Letter to Timothy. When to the side of Macdonald's Catalogue is brought Daremberg and Saglio's *Dictionnaire*, and its article entitled *Cabire* is turned to, an astonishing piece of evidence for the presence of the Kabeiros in first-century Near Asia is to be found ; for there is reproduced a coin bearing the head of Nero, and inscribed round about it is the name *KABEIPOΣ*. This may look as if the Hebrew algebraic way of interpreting Revelation xiii., with its result in the name of Nero, has been put away for another, and perhaps better, way of arriving at the same result. But a little reflection should cause other conclusions. These facts cannot be too heavily underlined, that the Apocalypse needs Near Asia and not Rome for its understanding ; and that if, as we have to go to Thessalonica for instance, to find Nero initiated into the Kabeiric cult, or made to be the bearer of Kabeiric honours when he appears on Thessalonican coins, it is then the cult that matters and not the notorious Emperor—it is the Antichrist of belief and practice in Near Asia which is “ the beast ” whose name is “ The Man ” and whose number is the equivalent of that name, and not the cruel dilettante in religions, Nero.

VACHER BURCH.



## PHILEMON AND ONESIMUS: MASTER AND SLAVE.

THERE is a peculiar modernness about the problems raised by Paul's Letter to Philemon. Professor Frank Granger showed in the September EXPOSITOR that early Christianity faced the chasm between master and slave and sought to bridge it. He rightly insists on the use of the word "slave" for *δοῦλος* in the New Testament. There has been a curious squeamishness in the use of this word in modern English versions of the New Testament. Professor Granger sees clearly also that Paul's words, addressed to slaves, do not apply in all respects to modern workmen. It is time to make a fresh study of the whole subject.

### 1. *The Letter to Philemon not an Epistle.*

Deissmann is right in contending that "Paul's letter to Philemon is no doubt the one most clearly seen to be a letter. Only the colour-blindness of pedantry could possibly regard this delightful little letter as a treatise 'On the Attitude of Christianity to Slavery.' In its intercession for a runaway slave it is exactly parallel to the letter, quoted above (pp. 205-6), from the Papas of Hermupolis to the officer Abinnæus. Read and interpreted as a letter this unobtrusive relic from the age of the first witnesses is one of the most valuable self-revelations that the great apostle has left us: brotherly feeling, quiet beauty, tact as a man of the world—all these are discoverable in the letter" (*Light from the Ancient East*, p. 226). It cannot be admitted that Paul's other writings are "letters" in the same sense that Deissmann shows to be true of the one to Philemon. "The letters of Paul are not literary; they are real letters, not epistles; they were written by Paul not for the public and posterity, but for the persons to

whom they are addressed. Almost all the mistakes that have ever been made in the study of St. Paul's life and work have arisen from the neglect of the fact that his writings are non-literary and letter-like in character" (*ibid.* p. 225). And Deissmann has made another mistake in trying to make all of Paul's epistles to be of the same mould. We do not have to think that Paul was thinking of posterity. He certainly was not posing. He wrote to meet immediate need by applying the principle of Christianity to actual problems in specific cases. But he wrote for the public beyond a doubt. He wrote for Churches or for groups of Churches and expected his epistles to be read in public and to be passed on from Church to Church (Col. iv. 16). He gave instructions for testing the genuineness of his epistles (2 Thess. ii. 2 ; iii. 17). He expected his commands in his epistles to be obeyed (2 Thess. iii. 14). And even the Letter to Philemon includes a message to Apphia, to Archippus, and to the Church in his house. Paul makes his appeal to Philemon, but he has in mind in the background the group of disciples who met in the hospitable home of Philemon. It is an utter under-estimate of Paul's epistles to treat them as merely personal and casual. Paul took them seriously and meant for them to be received as earnest attempts to influence the lives of the readers. But to Philemon Paul did write a distinctly personal letter about a domestic and social problem, not concerning ecclesiastical or doctrinal issues as in the Epistles to Timothy and Titus.

It is true, then, that the Letter to Philemon is not a formal Epistle like that to the Church at Rome, nor is it a treatise on the attitude of Christianity to slavery, though the treatment of slavery by Christianity is involved, for Paul writes with this very fact in mind. There is this difference, therefore, between Paul's Letter to Philemon and the little letter of Caor, Papas of Hermupolis, to Flavius

Abinnæus, A.D. 346, concerning a runaway soldier by the name of Paul: "I would have thee know, lord, concerning Paul the soldier, concerning his flight: pardon him this once, seeing that I am without leisure to come unto thee at this present. And, if he desist not, he will come again into thy hands another time."

"This little letter is one of the finest among the papyri," Deissmann adds (p. 205). The situation does in a way resemble the case of Onesimus, though "the Papas is not fit to hold a candle to St. Paul."

The chief reason is that Caor is merely pleasant and playful and makes no effort to grapple with the real issue involved in the soldier's desertion.

Much more pertinent is the letter to a friend by the younger Pliny (Pliny, *Ep.* ix. 21), in which this "noblest type of a true Roman gentleman" (Lightfoot, *Commentary*, p. 317) in purest diction pleads for pity on the grounds of common humanity. "Your freedman, with whom you had told me you were vexed, came to me, and throwing himself down before me clung to my feet, as if they had been yours. He was profuse in his tears and his entreaties; he was profuse also in his silence. In short, he convinced me of his penitence. I believe that he is a reformed character, because he feels that he has done wrong. You are angry, I know; and you have reason to be angry, this also I know; but mercy wins the highest praise just when there is the most righteous cause for anger. You loved the man, and, I hope, will continue to love him; meanwhile it is enough that you should allow yourself to yield to his prayers." So Pliny proceeds to plead for his youth, for his tears, for a spirit of gentleness, for a second chance. There is no need to depreciate the nobility of Pliny's plea. Only we must note how unusual this note of pity for the slave is in the Roman world. Pliny passes

Paul in the graces of rhetoric, but Paul's spirit strikes deep into the heart of this open sore of the world and searches for the only real cure for the case of Onesimus and for all slaves.

## 2. *The Value of the Letter to Philemon.*

Lightfoot claims that "as an expression of simple dignity, of refined courtesy, of large sympathy, and of warm personal affection the Epistle to Philemon stands unrivalled" (*Commentary*, p. 317). But this high estimate of the letter has not always been held. In the fourth century there was considerable depreciation of the letter on the ground that it was unworthy of Paul to write about a runaway slave. These critics, concerned chiefly about Christological theories, denied that Paul wrote the letter, since it concerned neither doctrine nor ecclesiastical problems. "Of what account was the fate of a single insignificant slave, long since dead and gone, to those before whose eyes the battle of the creeds was still raging?" (Lightfoot). Even Marcion had retained it in his canon and Baur in the last century praised the noble Christian spirit of the letter, while denying that Paul wrote it. But the hyper-orthodox critics of the fourth century, like the radical Baur in the nineteenth, were wrong. Jerome, Chrysostom, and Theodore of Mopsuestia ably championed the genuineness of the Letter to Philemon. The arguments that they produced have never been answered. The failure to appreciate the issue at stake in the case of Onesimus is precisely what has made so many nominal Christians ineffective. It is more concern for creed than for conduct, the failure to apply Christianity to the actual conditions of life. Modern Christian scholars, with the exception of Baur and Van Manen, have seen the spirit of Christ in Paul's plea for Onesimus. Luther terms it a "right noble and lovely



example of Christian love." Calvin speaks of the "life-like portrayal of the gentleness" of Paul's spirit as seen here. Franke says that "the single Epistle to Philemon very far surpasses all the wisdom of the world." Ewald notes the commanding spirit and tender friendship of Paul "in this letter, at once so brief, and yet so surpassingly full and significant." Sabatier glows with enthusiasm. "We have here only a few familiar lines, but so full of grace, of salt, of serious and trustful affection, that this short epistle gleams like a pearl of the most exquisite purity in the rich treasure of the New Testament." It is needless to quote other writers, though Renan calls it "a veritable little masterpiece of the art of letter-writing." We may admit that Paul wrote many personal letters like this that breathe the spirit of Christ. Some of them may yet be found. But we can at least be grateful that the Letter to Philemon has been preserved, that it still carries the message of Christ to the modern world which is in the throes of a social revolution that will never be settled till it is settled right, in harmony with the teaching of this little letter.

### 3. *The Date of the Letter.*

It is certain that Paul was a prisoner at the time when he wrote, for he speaks of himself as "Paul the aged, and now a prisoner also of Christ Jesus" (verse 9). The word *presbutes* apparently here means "aged" and not "ambassador." A number of scholars (Reuss, Weiss, Hilgenfeld, Holtzmann, Hausrath, Meyer) have argued for Caesarea rather than Rome as the place. Some even contend for Ephesus. But it is clear that the latter was sent at the same time as that to Colossae, since Onesimus (Philemon 10, 13; Col. iv. 9) is the bearer of both along with Tychicus who is also bearer of the Epistle to the Ephesians or Lao-

diceans (Col. iv. 7, 16 ; Eph. vi. 21). The arguments in favour of Caesarea are quite indecisive. The nearness of Caesarea to Colossae is really an objection, since Onesimus could hide in Rome better than in Caesarea. The plan of Paul for going to Macedonia (Phil. ii. 24) does not weigh against Rome, since Paul could go on to Colossae from Philippi or the reverse. It is not necessary to decide whether Philippians precedes or follows Philemon, though Philippians probably comes first. At any rate all four epistles come within the period of Paul's first Roman imprisonment (A.D. 60-3). If Paul was born about the beginning of the century, he would be about sixty years old. But he had endured almost incredible hardships and persecutions (2 Cor. xi.) that probably made him show his age in a marked degree. Certain it is that he writes as one thoroughly familiar with conditions in the Roman Empire. He writes out of a full heart from the centre of Roman life to a city in a far distant province, but the subject of slavery touches one of the nerve centres of Roman life.

#### 4. *The Picture of Philemon.*

We know nothing of Philemon except what this letter tells us. The Apostolical Constitutions represent him as bishop of Colossae and pseudo-Dosotheus (sixth century) as bishop of Gaza. Greek Martyrology tells that he, Apphia, Archippus, and Onesimus were all stoned before Androcles the governor in the days of Nero. The Latin Martyrology likewise agrees with this story. In the *Menea* for November 22 he is called a "holy apostle." But all this may be passed by as legendary. Philemon was a citizen of Colossae (Col. iv. 9 ; Philemon 11). He was a convert of Paul : "Thou owest to me even thine own self besides" (Philemon 19). It is probable, therefore, since Paul had not been to Colossae (Col. ii. 1), that Philemon

was converted in Ephesus during Paul's three years there when the gospel spread over the province of Asia (Acts xix. 10). There was easy and constant communication between Ephesus and the Lycus Valley by one of the Roman roads that linked the great cities together. It is not certain that Philemon was a preacher. He may have been simply an active layman. Paul speaks of him as "our beloved and fellow-worker" (Philemon 1), but *sunergos* can apply to a layman. He had a church in his house (Philemon 2), though here again we cannot tell whether it is the whole Church in Colossae that met with Philemon because he was the elder (or one of the elders) or merely a church group that met in his house for convenience. In either case it is plain that Philemon was a man of some property and standing to afford a house large enough for this purpose. Besides, he had slaves, of whom Onesimus had been one, and a family. It seems that Apphia was his wife, and Archippus their son. Paul speaks affectionately of her as "our sister," and of Archippus as "our fellow-soldier." It is suggested by Zahn that he was the reader of the Church, and by Abbott (*Int. Crit. Comm.*) that he was a presbyter in the Church or at least an evangelist. It is even held from Colossians iv. 17 that Archippus was elder in the Church of Laodicea: "And say to Archippus, take heed to the ministry which thou hast received in the Lord, that thou fulfil it." At any rate we have the picture of a delightful Christian home, where all were active in Christian service.

As to Philemon Paul has the kindest words of praise (Philemon 4-7) for him. Paul offers for him one of the great prayers of all time. This prayer for Philemon follows the usual order, but it is full of passion and power. He makes mention of Philemon in his prayers and he is always grateful because of what he has heard, probably through Epaphras (Col. i. 7, 8; iv. 12), concerning the love which

he had for all the saints and the faith which he had toward the Lord Jesus. And yet Paul has "love and faith" together as if both of them were exercised toward the Lord Jesus and towards the saints. Certainly both words can be so employed, though not with quite the same content. First come love for and faith in the Lord Jesus, then love for and faith in the saints. Paul had experienced (*eschon*, effective aorist) much joy and consolation in the love of Philemon, "because the hearts of the saints have been refreshed (same verb in Matt. ii. 28, "I will give you rest") through thee, brother" (Philemon 7). Philemon evidently was liberal and active in his beneficence, just the sort of man to cheer a preacher's heart. He was on the look out for opportunities of doing good. So then (ver. 6) Paul prays "that the fellowship of thy faith may become effectual in the knowledge of every good thing which is in you, unto Christ." The fellowship (*koinonia*) is the common word for contribution or more exactly partnership. The word for "effectual" (*energes*) is our word energy (at work). Paul's prayer, therefore, is that Philemon's generosity may become really effective, that he may know it himself, that God may carry him on in service for Christ. The prayer itself is a tribute and shows that Paul considers him worthy of the great things that he means to ask of him.

Paul has a genuine affection for Philemon, as is manifest. He is "our beloved and fellow-worker" (2); he speaks of "thy goodness" (14); "if then thou countest me partner" (17, *koinonon*, like our "pal"; cf. Luke v. 10. James and John were "partners with Simon"); "I hope that through your prayers I shall be granted unto you" (Philemon 22). Paul plainly feels a close bond of fellowship with Philemon. In all probability Philemon had come to be one of his chief helpers in Asia while Paul was in Ephesus. He is thus at liberty to address Philemon upon any topic.



### 5. *The Conduct of Onesimus.*

It had been very bad. In plain English, he was a runaway slave and a thief besides. Paul would hardly have said, "But if he hath wronged thee at all or oweth thee aught" (ver. 18), unless it were true. Paul states the matter delicately and *hypothetically* as a debt, but his meaning is clear. Onesimus was, of course, still a heathen when he ran away and defrauded his master of his services. He may, indeed, have seen Paul in Ephesus on a visit with his master Philemon, but it seems clear that he was not converted till coming to Rome. Evil men, Tacitus says, flocked to Rome, gladiators, soldiers, soothsayers, slaves. Among the Jews slaves were very few, but in Athens there were four times as many slaves as citizens. Wealthy Roman landowners sometimes possessed twenty thousand slaves. It is not known how many slaves were in the Roman Empire, probably six or seven million. These slaves were sometimes very degraded people, sometimes people of culture and former wealth, victims of war and rapine. Freedmen like Epictetus often represented the highest culture of the community and were the school-teachers and philosophers of the time. Roman law gave the slave no rights and no protection. Not till Constantine's time did they have any rights as husband and wife. Even Aristotle spoke of the slave as a "live chattel" or property (*Pol.* i. 4) or a "live implement" (*Eth. Nic.* viii. 13). "The slave was absolutely at his master's disposal; for the smallest offence he might be scourged, mutilated, crucified, thrown to the wild beasts" (Lightfoot, p. 319). A Roman senator, Pedanius Secundus, had been slain by one of his slaves in anger. In revenge four hundred slaves were executed. The populace rebelled and tried to prevent the tragedy, but Roman soldiers lined the road as the slaves were led to execution. Rome lived over a volcano and each man had "as many enemies as slaves." Onesimus was not

merely a runaway slave and a thief, a representative of " the least respectable type of the least respectable class in the social scale " (Lightfoot, p. 309), but he was also a Phrygian slave. The Phrygians were despised most of all, and Onesimus had lived up to the bad reputation of his race and of his class. His name, forsooth, was good enough (meaning " useful " ), but he had proved " unprofitable " (Philemon 11) to Philemon. Paul makes the pun upon his name after his conversion when he had proved true to his name. Many slaves and freedmen bore the name Onesimus. Paul does not try to conceal the crime of Onesimus. He had sunk to the bottom. He had come to Rome and wallowed in this cesspool of humanity as one of the offscourings of humanity. He was in no sense a hero, not even with Paul. One is reminded of the " underground railway " before and during the Civil War in the United States, when the runaway slaves escaped over the Ohio River to freedom. It is a dark picture even as Paul draws it with his delicate and sympathetic pen.

#### 6. *The Problem before Paul.*

We do not know why Onesimus came to Paul, who was himself a prisoner under military guard, though living in his own hired house. It may have been Epaphras who recognised Onesimus and who brought him to Paul. It may have been one of the soldiers whom Paul had won to Christ. It may have been the memory of the words of Philemon or of others at the gatherings in Colossae ; it may have been the lashings of a guilty conscience ; it may have been sheer want from hunger or even desperation (Lightfoot). Of this we cannot tell. The famous Rescue Mission worker, Rev. Melvin Trotter, was on the way to commit suicide in Lake Michigan, when he was drawn into the Pacific Garden Mission in Chicago and converted. The hour of man's

extremity is God's opportunity. Somehow Onesimus came under the spell of Paul's influence and was won to Christ. The conversion was genuine and Paul was sure of the result. But what should Paul advise Onesimus to do? Legally he was still the slave of Philemon, who could put him to death for his crime. Certainly Philemon, as a Christian, would not do that. But should Onesimus go back at all and re-enter the life of slavery now that he was Christ's freeman? The answer is not an easy one. "Onesimus had repented, but he had not made restitution" (Lightfoot). D. L. Moody used to preach the duty of restitution with great vigour. Onesimus could not offer to make restitution without going back under the yoke of slavery. Shall Paul send him back? That is the problem. If he does not send him back he has wronged both Onesimus and Philemon. If he sends him back he may likewise wrong them both if Philemon continues to treat Onesimus merely as a slave as if nothing had changed their relations with each other. So Paul chooses the latter alternative. He will send Onesimus back to Philemon under the guard of Tychicus (Col. iv. 7-9), but with a powerful appeal to Philemon for forgiveness towards Onesimus. Did he do right? Should he have done more? Should he have attacked slavery as an institution? Should he have aroused the slaves in the Roman Empire to revolt? Did Paul wink at slavery?

#### *7. Paul's Plea for Onesimus.*

It is not admitted by all that Paul recognised slavery to be an evil. He does urge Christian slaves to be indifferent to their bondage (1 Cor. vii. 21), "but if thou canst become free, use it rather" (margin of Revised Version), that is, "become free." Certainly Paul means (vii. 22 f.) that our relation to Christ is the main thing. The slave can be Christ's freedman. That is the chief thing. But Paul

taught the Christian doctrine of liberty that works against all autocracy and oppression : " There can be neither Jew nor Greek, there can be neither bond nor free, there can be no male and female ; for ye are all one man in Christ Jesus " (Gal. iii. 28). That is absolutely revolutionary doctrine, as I have tried to show in my book, *The New Citizenship*. That leaven began to work in the first century as the result of Paul's preaching. " The old world was parted by deep gulfs. There were three of special depth and width, across which it was hard for sympathy to fly. These were the distinctions of race, sex, and condition " (Maclaren, *Colossians and Philemon*, p. 224). We do not have to say that Paul thought out the full development of this platform of freedom. The important thing is that he had proclaimed it. He had urged Christian slaves to be good servants, but he had insisted that Christian masters be just and merciful to their slaves. Paul was not unconcerned about the social wrongs in the world of his day. He attacked those wrongs courageously and with consummate wisdom.

In the letter to Philemon Paul applies his principle of freedom in Christ to the specific case of Onesimus. He is in the realm of the concrete, and is not a mere doctrinaire reformer. It is to be noted at once that Paul deals with Onesimus as a man and as a brother. There were occasional instances of pity for slaves on the part of masters, as in the case of the younger Pliny (Ep. viii. 16), but as a rule there was an utter lack of regard for the slave as a man at all. Aristotle thought that one should have no friendship with a slave as a slave, but might deal with him as a man. No such subtle philosophy troubled Paul. Paul took Onesimus " both in the flesh and in the Lord " (Philemon 16), " as a brother beloved " (16), as his very " child " (10), as Paul's " very heart " (12). We know from the papyri that many slaves became Christians. The Letter to Philemon makes it



plain why it was true. Here alone, in Christianity, were slaves treated as human beings. Here they were called "brothers." Here they could find usefulness and promotion. Many of the slaves became pastors of the Churches. The millions of slaves in the Roman Empire saw in Christianity their one ray of hope. They were right. Christianity is still fighting the battles of race, class, and sex. The great war that is just over gathered up all these issues. They will be fought to a finish in accord with the Spirit of Christ.

Paul does not leave the case there. He does unhesitatingly and frankly take Onesimus to his bosom and heart as a brother in Christ. But he does more. He boldly asks that Philemon shall do the same. But not without restitution. Paul gives his note of hand to that effect. "I will repay it" (ver. 19). "Put that to mine account" (ver. 18). Paul uses the technical language for debt that is so common in the papyri. But that is merely to clear the path for the real test. Paul asks that Philemon take Onesimus back, without punishment, to be sure. Paul has sent him back reluctantly because he had found him useful (vers. 12 f.). But he wishes Philemon to have the privilege of being generous with Onesimus (vers. 14 f.). Paul claims the right as an apostle to enjoin (give military orders, *epitassein*, ver. 8) upon Philemon what is befitting. Moral propriety (cf. Col. iii. 18 for this same word) brings moral obligation. Paul wishes Philemon to have the chance to come up of his own accord, willingly and as a matter of judgment, not of necessity under pressure from Paul (ver. 14). Hence Paul appeals and exhorts by reason of love as the true principle by which to act. He adds also the fact that Paul who pleads for Onesimus is the aged (or the ambassador of Jesus) and a prisoner of Christ, and has a right to be heard by reason of the scars of service that he bears (cf. Gal. vi. 17).

Paul does not wish Philemon to think that he is trying to

push off on him a tough case that is in his way. On the contrary, he has found positive pleasure in the service of Onesimus, and could wish to keep him both for his own worth and to take the place of Philemon who is so far away (vers. 12, 13). It is a delicate compliment to both Philemon and Onesimus. The essential refinement of Paul's nature appears at every turn in this charming and courteous and ennobling letter. Paul appeals to the best side of Philemon's nature. He assumes that his being a slaveholder had not debased his humanitarian feelings. The tendency was in that direction, as *Uncle Tom's Cabin* showed. But it was not necessary for a Christian man to yield to the brutalising influence of mere power, as the lives of Washington, Lee, and Jackson abundantly prove. The nobler side of the institution of slavery in the South is well shown in Mrs. Smede's *The Southern Planter* and in Thomas Nelson Page's *Marse Chan* and other Virginian stories. But the peril of slavery was and is that the slave was at the mercy of a conscienceless master who could hold him down and even ruin his life.

Paul treats with Philemon on the basis of humanity and Christianity. He admits all the technical legal claims upon Onesimus, but boldly begs for his reception by Philemon not merely as a pardoned runaway slave who is restored to his former status. That is only the first step. Paul dares to go further and to ask that Philemon receive him "no longer as a slave, but more than a slave, a brother beloved, specially to me, but how much rather to thee, both in the flesh and in the Lord" (ver. 16). Imagine a slave in the home who is no longer a slave, but a brother beloved! It is a revolutionary request, possible only on the plea of love. "For perhaps he was therefore parted from thee for a season, that thou shouldest have him for ever" (ver. 15). Could anything surpass this turn in interpreting God's overruling providence?

Paul is fully aware that he has gone pretty far with Philemon. But he means to go farther. "If then thou countest me a partner, receive him as myself" (ver. 17). He expects Onesimus to be treated in all essentials as Paul would be in social and religious privileges. It is clear that Onesimus was a man of parts in spite of his conduct and his Phrygian blood. There was the making of a man in him. Paul wants him to have his chance. He is expecting to come to see Philemon when, through his prayers, he is released from bondage in Rome, and he confidently asks that his lodging be gotten ready (ver. 22). All this adds to the piquancy of the request for handsome treatment of Onesimus, as if Paul had already come. It is the perfection of courtesy and dignity and courage. Paul is sure that Philemon wishes to make him happy: "Yea, brother, let me have joy of thee in the Lord: refresh my heart in Christ" (ver. 20). The very word for "have joy" (*onaimēn*) is the same root as the name Onesimus, itself a playful plea for the Christian slave. The word for "refresh" is the one already employed concerning Philemon in verse 7. The word for "heart" is here the third time in the letter (7, 12, 20), and is a very tender emotional word of strong feeling.

Surely St. Paul has finished his plea. But no, he has one more word before he closes. It is plain enough that, if Philemon accedes to Paul's request, Onesimus will be "no longer a slave." He must be set free. And yet Paul hesitates to write that word. He means it, and he makes Philemon see it staring at him all through the letter, but he wishes Philemon to spell it voluntarily, "that thy goodness should not be as of necessity, but of free will" (ver. 14). Freedmen were common enough in the Roman Empire. Sometimes freedom was won by some deed of heroism. The slave occasionally saved money and bought his own freedom. The master sometimes voluntarily freed a slave.

Sometimes a man of generous impulses paid the price of a slave and set him free. The papyri and ostraca furnish many illustrations of Paul's very language on this point (Gal. v. 1, 13). Christ paid the price of our bondage with His blood and set us free. This is the language of Paul and Peter and of John. "For freedom did Christ set us free" (Gal. v. 1). Paul will not use the word "freedom" to Philemon, but he ventures to hint it so clearly that there can be no mistake. "Having confidence in thine obedience, I write unto thee, knowing that thou wilt do even beyond what I say" (ver. 21). Beyond what Paul had said, but not beyond what he had meant. Paul is sure that the sense of duty in Philemon will compel obedience to the highest things. *Noblesse oblige*. The very nobility of Philemon's character as a Christian will compel him to set Onesimus free. So Paul rests his plea. The word for freedom has trembled on his lips all through the letter, but out of considerations of respect for Philemon it has not escaped. But Philemon was bound to know what Paul meant.

Did he set Onesimus free? We do not know. "It cannot be imagined that this appeal in behalf of Onesimus was in vain" (Rutherford). Tradition (*Apostolical Canons*, 82) relates that Philemon forgave Onesimus and manumitted him. All sorts of rumours gained currency about Onesimus. One is that he became bishop in Berœa (*Apost. Const.* vii. 46), another that he journeyed to Spain, another that he was martyred in Rome or at Puteoli. E. A. Abbott has written a fictitious story of what might have happened to him in his *Onesimus*.

#### 8. *Christianity in the Market Place.*

Why did not Paul attack slavery as an institution? Did he mean to imply that slavery is wrong *per se*? These questions are easier to ask than to answer. Advocates of



slavery have claimed that Paul in the Letter to Philemon condones slavery as an institution. Enemies of slavery argue that he shows himself the foe of slavery. Vincent *Int. Crit. Comm.*, p. 165) thinks that "it is more than questionable whether St. Paul had grasped the postulate of the modern Christian consciousness that no man has the right to own another." It was not necessary for him to see that. But Paul was bound to be conscious of what he was doing. He definitely and boldly took the side of liberty in this plea for Onesimus as he had fought for and had won the freedom of Titus from Jewish legalism (Gal. ii. 1-10). The whole issue was summed up in each instance in a concrete case. "The letter to Philemon is the first indication in Christian literature that the problem of the relation of master to slave must be seriously affected by the new conception of the brotherhood of man, which Christ's apostles had set themselves to proclaim" (Bernard). A little leaven would in time leaven the whole lump. It seems a long step and a long time from Paul's gracious words to Philemon to Lincoln's blunt assertion that the Union cannot continue half-slave and half-free. But it is safe to affirm that Paul made possible Lincoln's emancipation proclamation.

Paul was not an anarchist, as is plain from Romans xiii. 1-7. He believed in government, and taught obedience save where conscience was attacked. Then he was not slow to assert his rights. The slave was quick to see the help that Christianity offered him. The slaves flocked to Christ in large numbers. Christianity had to show that its adherents could make good citizens of the Roman Empire as well as good members of the kingdom of heaven. That issue is still a vital one. Christ and Cæsar are still rival claimants for our loyalty. Some men have not learned how to be true to both. "Whatever may have

been the range of Paul's outlook, the policy which he pursued vindicated itself in the subsequent history of slavery. The principles of the gospel not only curtailed its abuses, but destroyed the thing itself ; for it could not exist without its abuses " (Vincent, p. 167). Paul insisted on the duty of the master to be just to the slave (Eph. vi. 9, Col. iv. 1). Christians learned the habit of freeing their slaves. " Sepulchral paintings often represent the master standing before the Good Shepherd with a band of slaves liberated at his death, pleading for him at the last judgment " (Vincent, p. 168). Christian slaves sat side by side with the master in church and partook of the communion together. Slaves became presbyters. " The Christian teachers and clergymen became known as ' the brothers of the slave,' and the slaves themselves were called ' the freedmen of Christ ' " (Brace, *Gesta Christi*). From Constantine to the tenth century laws were passed to help the slaves.

One may grow impatient that it took so long for the shackles to be loosed from the slaves of the world even in so-called Christian lands. One has to reckon with the grip of money and selfishness and love of power and pleasure. Even Christian men relax their hold upon privilege and power slowly and reluctantly. But the principles of love and equality in the Letter to Philemon was in the end bound to destroy slavery. " It was only a question of time " (Lightfoot).

There have been times when Christianity was called a dead letter because slavery was allowed. It has even been justified by Christian preachers. But the chivalry of the gospel was at work. Social prejudices received a wound when slave girls like Blandina in Gaul or Felicitas in Africa became martyrs and were celebrated in festivals (Lightfoot). The day came when Britain turned upon slavery as an

accursed thing. "The abolition of slavery throughout the British Empire at an enormous material sacrifice is one of the greatest moral conquests which England has ever achieved" (Lightfoot, pp. 326 f.). In the United States we were not so wise, and it cost blood and treasure untold to set the negro free. But it was done in Britain and America in response to the Christian impulse. Lightfoot dares to claim that the era of liberation for mankind came as a result of the Letter to Philemon. The heaven had finally done its work.

But all men are not yet free. The gospel of liberty must still be proclaimed on the housetop and in the market-place. Paul met the philosophers in the market-place at Athens. He did not hesitate to come to close grips with them. He likewise joined issue with human greed and love of power over other men in the case of Onesimus. He did not shrink from the issue, and squarely put the matter up to Philemon. Paul was a mystic and a transcendentalist. He taught other-worldliness as a blessed hope, as the mainstay of the life that now is. But Paul was a practical idealist. He had no patience with putting up with ills that could be cured. There were plenty to endure that were beyond relief. Paul was a social reformer who cut at the root of current abuses. He did not try to tear down the whole structure of human society at one blow. He preached principles that would inevitably make a heaven out of earth if men had the courage to put them into practice. He did not preach a kingdom of heaven that concerned only the future life. His real citizenship was in heaven even while on earth, but this conception involved living on earth like a citizen of heaven—member of a colony of heaven on earth.

In the end slavery has gone down in response to Paul's interpretation of the gospel of Christ. The grip of alcohol

is likewise now loosened. America has gone ahead of Britain in the abolition of this slavery of the soul and body. Sex prejudice is slowly giving way, more rapidly in Britain than in America. Race prejudice is still alive in spite of the League of Nations. The great war has not slain this dragon, that is already again raising his head over the world.

But Christianity cannot shirk the issue. It is in the market-place. It is in the midst of the fight to rescue men like Onesimus who have become the victims of human greed, to set women free from man's lust, to give children a chance to grow into the full stature of manhood in Christ Jesus. The Letter to Philemon is the *Magna Charta* of the human spirit. The only real freedom is that in Christ. When the Son sets us free, we are free in reality, free to do right to other men, free to fight the cause of liberty for all nations, for all classes, for both sexes. The foes of freedom are not dead, but liberty is winning its way. The star of democracy is in the ascendant, and the star of autocracy is at last going down in defeat.

A. T. ROBERTSON.



## THE PHILIPPIAN INTERPOLATION—WHERE DOES IT END?

RECENT British scholarship has shown great unwillingness to be convinced by the arguments of those who deny the integrity of the Epistle to the Philippians. Kennedy, for example, while admitting that "there is no *a priori* reason why the letters or fragments of letters to the Philippians should not, by some accidental circumstances of which we know nothing, have been combined," yet fails to discover a sufficiently strong basis for the interpolation-theory in the Epistle itself.<sup>1</sup> Moffatt is doubtful whether "the attempts to analyse the Epistle have proved much more satisfactory than the similar movements of literary inquiry into the first Philippic of Demosthenes, where criticism has swung back in the main to a conservative position."<sup>2</sup> Mackenzie, again, the writer of the admirable article on Philippians in Hastings' *Dictionary of the Apostolic Church*, quotes with keen approval the words in which van Manen maintains the unity of the Epistle,<sup>3</sup> while Maurice Jones in his recent Commentary thus sums up his discussion of the question: "The literary evidence is, therefore, overwhelmingly in favour of the integrity of our Epistle. Not only is the spirit of the remainder of the letter discernible in the so-called interpolated section but the very phrases which constitute the keynote of the letter as a whole occur repeatedly in it, giving to the whole document a unity and self-consistency which the arguments we have adduced are powerless to destroy."<sup>4</sup> My countryman, Isfryn Hughes, in his

<sup>1</sup> *Expositor's Greek Testament*, iii. p. 409.

<sup>2</sup> *Introduction to the Literature of the N.T.*, p. 176.

<sup>3</sup> *Dict. of the Apos. Church*, ii. pp. 221, 2; the quotation is from *EBi.* col. 3708.

<sup>4</sup> *Philippians* in *Westminster Commentaries*, pp. xlvii., xlviii.

thoughtful Welsh "Esboniad" on the Epistle also ranges himself with those who are not convinced by the reasons advanced in support of the theory of interpolation.

The monotony, however, is broken by Kirsopp Lake, who in an article on the "Critical Problems of the Epistle to the Philippians," in the *EXPOSITOR* for June, 1914, maintained that the section extending from the words τὰ αὐτὰ γράφειν in iii. 1 to the end of iv. 3 was an interpolation—a "genuinely Pauline" passage it is true, but still an interpolation in its present context—the removal of which would give the following sequence: "Finally, my brethren, rejoice in the Lord, rejoice in the Lord alway: again I will say, Rejoice" (iii. 1a, iv. 4). The article was not allowed to go unchallenged, provoking as it did a speedy and vigorous reply from the pen of the Rev. Gerard Ball, which appeared in the *EXPOSITOR* for the fateful month of August, 1914.

Several views have been advanced by recent writers on Philippians which, if sound, would go far to render unavoidable a verdict for the integrity of the Epistle; they prove, however, upon examination, to be untenable. Take, for example, the assertion made by Ball that the "deep undercurrent of anxiety and distress" which he rightly sees in the first two chapters prepares us for the abrupt manner in which the "dogs" are introduced at the beginning of chapter three; <sup>1</sup> such a statement will not receive the endorsement of many readers. It may be true to say of the unexpected outburst of indignation that "for all its abruptness, it is no more than a passionate cry—in a louder tone and a higher key—characteristic of the writer and comparable to other exclamations found elsewhere in his writings"; <sup>2</sup> but to say this does not explain the abruptness—and it is the abruptness that constitutes the problem.

<sup>1</sup> *EXPOSITOR*, August, 1914, p. 151.

<sup>2</sup> Page 152.

Neither does there seem to be any warrant for Mackenzie's attempt to establish a connexion between chapter iii. and i. 27 ff. The passage in which he makes the attempt is not directly concerned with the question of the integrity of the Epistle, but if the alleged connexion could be demonstrated it would have a powerful bearing upon that question. Of the "adversaries" of i. 28 Mackenzie says: "Who these enemies were we are not told, but it is reasonable to believe that they are referred to in chapter iii., because there we have illustrations of their (i.e. the Philippians') opponents, as in chapter iv. we have illustrations of the perils which threaten their inward unity. These passages are the illustrative exemplifications of the double warnings conveyed in i. 27-ii. 5. They were Jews and libertines."<sup>1</sup> True, we have Jews and libertines in chapter iii., but are they to be found in i. 28? The obvious impression conveyed by i. 27 ff. is that the ἀντικείμενοι are chiefly, if not altogether, the pagan opponents of the Philippian Christians. "Who are their adversaries?" asks Kennedy, and his answer to the question is: "In verse 30 he speaks of them [the Philippians] as having the same conflict as *he* had when at Philippi and now has at Rome. In both these instances, most probably, his opponents were heathen. Further, when warning his readers against Jewish malice, what he usually fears is not that they will be terrified into compliance, but that they will be seduced from the right path. And, as Franke points out, the conflict here is for the πίστις, not for the ἀλήθεια of the Gospel. . . . Probably therefore he thinks chiefly of their heathen antagonists, as, in any case, Jews seem to have formed a very small minority of the population. The pagans of Philippi, on the other hand, would struggle hard against a faith which condemned all idol-worship, for the extant remains at Philippi and in its

<sup>1</sup> *Dict. of the Apos. Church*, ii. p. 225b.

neighbourhood show that they were an extraordinarily devout community.”<sup>1</sup> Kennedy rightly adds that “at the same time we cannot exclude the possibility that he had non-Christian Jews in his mind as well”; but even thus it is scarcely possible to think that chapter iii. is an “illustrative exemplification” of the warning conveyed in i. 27-30.

Equally unconvincing is Jones’s attempt to show that “the so-called interpolated section” “offers a most striking parallel” to “the great Christological passage in ii. 5-11.”<sup>2</sup> Paul does of course perceive a parallelism—and perhaps more than a parallelism—between the experience of the believer and the experience of his Lord; he may have had this correspondence in his mind in iii. 10; but that the Apostle should draw a comparison between his own self-emptying and that of his Master in which his period of Pharisaic privilege and honour is made to correspond with Christ’s existence ἐν μορφῇ θεοῦ is to me highly improbable if not unthinkable. Jones also seems to discover a point of contact between chapter iii. and the early part of chapter ii. in the use of the verb φρονεῖν in iii. 15 and ii. 2. “There are two expressions,” he says, “which mark the very spirit of the letter, ‘lowliness of mind’ and ‘be of one mind’ with its variant ‘be of the same mind’.” Later, after calling attention to “the most winning humility” which shines through the autobiographical passage in the third chapter, he proceeds: “The whole passage closes with an exhortation to the Philippians to cherish the same humble but confident disposition (iii. 15), and the keynote is once again sounded in the phrase ‘be thus minded’ and is repeated in the following verse ‘if ye be otherwise minded’.” It goes without saying that if the readers cherished the disposition which Paul sets before them as his own in chapter iii. they

<sup>1</sup> *Expositor's Greek Test.*, ad loc.

<sup>2</sup> *Op. cit.* pp. xlvi. ff.



would share his humility, and if they *all* became of that mind there would be unity among them ; but the sentences in which *φρονεῖν* occurs in iii. 15 do not directly inculcate the virtues of humility and unity ; *φρονεῖν* is a common word and is not unusual in Paul ; in ii. 2 it is the words *τὸ αὐτό* and *τὸ ἐν* that give character to the phrases in which they occur. In iii. 15 Paul is speaking of accepting or not accepting the view of Christian progress which he had just sketched. To infer a close connexion between ii. 2 and iii. 15 because *φρονεῖν* is employed in both verses is a strange procedure. How disparate the two verses are becomes clear when they are read in Moffatt's translation : " I pray you to give me the utter joy of knowing you are living in harmony, with the same feelings of love, with one heart and soul " (ii. 2) ; " For all those of our number who are mature, this must be the point of view ; God will reveal that to any of you who look at things differently " (iii. 15). It is possible that in iii. 21, as Jones points out, Paul has in mind the great words he had written in ii. 6 ff.—we shall have occasion to touch upon this point again—but I do not find in the account of his renunciation earlier in chapter iii. the requisite evidence that the great passage in chapter ii. was in his thought as he wrote.

All these suggestions, even if they could be accepted, would leave the abrupt change of tone and subject in the first verse of chapter iii. as unexplained as ever. There is no gainsaying Holtzmann's well-known dictum : " Das aufrauschen aller Wasser der Kritik an dieser Stelle lässt vermüthen, dass hier eine Klippe verborgen ist " ;<sup>1</sup> and Lake asks, pertinently enough, " Is it natural to say ' rejoice in the Lord always [*sic*]' and then suddenly say ' Beware of dogs ' ? " <sup>2</sup> Indeed so marked is the " seam " in the first

<sup>1</sup> Quoted by Moffatt, *Historical N.T.* p. 634.

<sup>2</sup> *EXPOSITOR*, June, 1914, p. 485.

verse of chapter iii. that some who affirm the integrity of the Epistle admit that if only there were to be found a corresponding suture later in the letter they would be willing to accept the theory that it contains an interpolation. "One of the strongest arguments against the 'interpolation' theory," says Jones, "is that while the break at the beginning of the third chapter is clear enough it is impossible to point out definitely where the alleged interpolation ends. The blend is so complete and the sequence so natural as to make the supposition of an interpolation at this point very difficult to accept."<sup>1</sup> Lake also could wish the end of the interpolation were as clearly marked as its beginning. "The point," he remarks, "at which the beginning of the interpolation—'Beware of dogs'—is reached is clear, but it is not so easy to say where we ought to put the end of it. After the beginning the text seems to run smoothly until it merges in the end of the Epistle, and to refer to the same circumstances as those to which allusion was made at the beginning—the help that was being sent by the Philippians. If we could draw a line sharply at the end as at the beginning, the theory of interpolation would be nearly certain."<sup>2</sup>

Lake himself, then, is not over-confident as to the point at which the interpolation ends. He "personally inclines" to place the end at iv. 3. My objection to his view is that it ignores what I regard as a much more suitable ending, and by so doing attaches to the interpolation certain verses which by all means should be taken with the remainder of our Epistle, i.e., with Philippians proper. We need only glance at the first three verses of chapter iv. to see how glaring is this defect in Lake's theory. Further, as we have seen, it is possible to argue—I would not put it more strongly than that—from the phraseology of iii. 21, which contains

<sup>1</sup> Op. cit. p. xlvi.

<sup>2</sup> Op. cit. pp. 485, 6.

the words μετασχηματίζω, ταπείνωσις, σύμμορφος, δόξα, that the passage ii. 6-11 was in Paul's mind when he wrote it, in which case another link is forged between the Epistle proper and a paragraph which Lake regards as part of the interpolation.

Of those who hold that there is a break at the beginning of the third chapter, some would divide our Epistle at that one point into two separate and almost equal portions. The drawbacks of this view have often been remarked. Others see an interpolation ending at iv. 9. Others again favour more complicated solutions of the problem. Of these last some regard all the sections into which they divide the Epistle as from Paul, whereas others discover in it spurious matter and a redactor's connecting links, along with genuine Pauline material. Into the details of these various theories it does not behove us to enter.

Among these manifold attempts to subdivide and to rearrange the text of our Epistle, however, I have not come across one that puts a break of any kind at the place where it seems to me the interpolation comes to an end. Perhaps if my search had been more extensive I should have found confirmation for my theory in the agreement of some previous student; it was, however, as thorough as the works within my reach made possible. I will not pretend that this failure to discover any hint of my view does not create in my mind a certain amount of diffidence with regard to it, but at the same time it does seem to me to point out the place at which the interpolation comes to an end, and it is largely because the second seam is to my mind not much less clearly defined than the first that the presence of an interpolation in Philippians is to me so indisputable. I will state my view and give my reasons for holding it.

If one reads on from the break at the beginning of the

third chapter no disturbance of the logical sequence of the thought is noticed until one is suddenly held up by the *γάρ* in iii. 20. That the original reading is *γάρ* admits of no dispute, and it is equally certain that it was felt to be awkward by many of the Fathers and early translators, as a mere glance at Souter's critical note will show ; there we are told that *δὲ* is the conjunction found in, or read by, 436, the Old Latin authorities, the Vulgate, the Peshitta, the margin of the Harklean, the Armenian, the Gothic, the Ethiopic, Irenaeus (Latin), Clement of Alexandria, Origen, Eusebius, Athanasius, Cosmas Indicopleustes (in three out of five citations), Cyprian, Hilary, "Ambrosiaster," etc. To render verses 19, 20 as does Moffatt, "Destruction is their fate, the belly is their god, they glory in their shame, these men of earthly mind ! But we are a colony of heaven," or to paraphrase as does Gibb, "These men mind earthly things ; but the citizenship of the Christian is in heaven,"<sup>1</sup> is either to adopt a manifestly inferior reading or else to obscure the force of the authentic conjunction.

Now the view which this paper advocates is that the interpolation which starts with the words *τά αὐτὰ γράφειν* in iii. 1 ends with the words *οἱ τὰ ἐπίγεια φρονούντες* in verse 19. The opening words of verse 20 will, therefore, follow immediately after verse 1a, giving the sequence : *Τὸ λοιπόν, ἀδελφοί μου, χαίρετε ἐν Κυρίῳ, ἡμῶν γὰρ τὸ πολίτευμα ἐν οὐρανοῖς ὑπάρχει, κ.τ.λ..* This sequence has only to be suggested and its fitness is immediately apparent ; the *γάρ* clause supplies the reason for the injunction of verse 1a ; frequently in the New Testament the ground on which a command is based is introduced by *γάρ*, as, for example, in ii. 12, 13 of our Epistle : *τὴν ἑαυτῶν σωτηρίαν κατεργάξασθε, θεὸς γὰρ ἐστὶν ὁ ἐνεργῶν ἐν ὑμῖν, κ.τ.λ.* The sudden change from the second to the first person entailed

<sup>1</sup> Hastings' *D.B.* iii. p. 842b.



in the proposed re-arrangement of the text is quite in Paul's manner. Often when addressing his readers in the second person he suddenly turns to the first person so as not to exclude himself from some responsibility or privilege ; a good example is seen in 1 Corinthians v. 7 : " Purge out the old leaven, that ye may be a new lump, even as ye are unleavened. For our passover also hath been sacrificed, even Christ." Moreover, the new arrangement provides an adequate explanation of the emphasis there is on the ἡμῶν : " We," Paul seems to imply by the emphasis, "—we surely have the right to rejoice in the Lord, for we are the ones whose citizenship is in heaven."

Let us now inquire how the clause ἡμῶν γὰρ τὸ πολίτευμα κ.τ.λ. is usually connected with the words which precede it in the traditional text. The A.V. treats verses 18, 19 as a parenthesis, and finds in verse 20 a ground for the injunction of verse 17—a by no means unsatisfactory way of effecting the connexion ; it does not seem, however, to commend itself to recent expositors. Ellicott, Lightfoot, Kennedy, Vincent, Jones do not even refer to it. They all connect verse 20 with the last clause of verse 19, οἱ τὰ ἐπίγεια φρονούντες, though Jones is inclined to regard it as a still more satisfactory solution to take verse 20 " as a protest against the whole conception of the Christian life delineated in the preceding paragraph." As to the connexion with the last clause of verse 19, Jones furnishes no explanation of the γὰρ by saying " in contrast to ' mind earthly things.' " The remark would have been quite as apposite—perhaps more so—if verse 20 were introduced by " but " ; neither does Kennedy explain the conjunction when he says : " The thought is certainly suggested by ἐπίγεια φρονούντες in verse 19 (this is the force of γὰρ)." What is the force of γὰρ? Lightfoot supplies a missing thought to establish the connexion : " Their souls are mundane and grovelling.

They have no fellowship with *us* ; for *we* are citizens of a heavenly commonwealth." Ellicott—who has not been equalled by any of his successors in penetrating analysis of the language and thought of the Epistle—brings verse 20 into direct connexion with the last clause of verse 19, at the same time furnishing an explanation of the γάρ ; he finds in the opening words of verse 20 a " confirmation of the foregoing by means of the contrasted conduct of St. Paul and his followers (ver. 17), ἡμῶν being emphatic, and τὸ πολίτευμα ἐν οὐρανοῖς in antithesis to τὰ ἐπίγεια φρονεῖν." Similarly Vincent, who explains the γάρ thus : " As in Galatians iii. 10, v. 5, confirming the statement concerning the one party by showing the opposite course or character of the other." Now if verse 20 is to be taken with the words οἱ τὰ ἐπίγεια φρονούντες, this is the only [satisfactory way of effecting the connexion. It is undoubtedly possible to regard the clause introduced by γάρ as supplying *e contrario* a justification of the description given in the last clause of the preceding verse ; as if Paul had said, " I am surely right in saying that these men are of earthly mind, for it is *our* citizenship that is in heaven." But if I think this explanation possible, I am far from regarding it as satisfactory. The kind of argument which Paul is alleged to be using here, though not strictly logical (for you cannot argue that A is B because not-A is not-B) is nevertheless under certain conditions a legitimate and intelligible argument. It requires two nicely balanced clauses, the subject and predicate of one being the evident opposite of the subject and predicate of the other. It is an argument which Paul does sometimes use. Vincent, as we saw, refers to Galatians iii. 10, and v. 5. The former of these two passages contains an excellent example of the argument : ὥστε οἱ ἐκ πίστεως, εὐλογοῦνται σὺν τῷ πιστῷ Ἀβραάμ· ὅσοι γὰρ ἐξ ἔργων νόμου εἰσὶν ὑπὸ κατάραν εἰσὶν (verses 9, 10)—they who are

of faith must be blessed inasmuch as all who are of the works of law are under a curse. The other Galatian example (v. 4, 5) is not quite so nicely balanced : *κατηργήθητε ἀπὸ Χριστοῦ οἵτινες ἐν νόμῳ δικαιούσθε, τῆς χάριτος ἐξεπέσατε. ἡμεῖς γὰρ πνεύματι ἐκ πίστεως ἐλπίδα δικαιοσύνης ἀπεκδεχόμεθα*. But as *ἐκ πίστεως* is virtually a description of the *ἡμεῖς* (being equal to *οἱ ἐκ πίστεως δικαιούμενοι*) the argument is sufficiently well balanced to be perfectly intelligible. But what of the Philippian passage we are discussing ? Is it at all likely that if Paul had been arguing *e contrario* the argument would have been expressed in the words of the last clause of verse 19, and of the opening clause of verse 20 ? Would the first clause of the argument have been a mere adjectival clause loosely attached to the preceding words—"these men of earthly mind" (Moffatt) ? And would not the *γάρ* clause have been expressed in a way that would more evidently relate it to the statement of which it supplied the proof ? It is highly significant that *δέ* is read by men like Clement and Origen. They can scarcely have been unacquainted with the reading *γάρ*, but it does not seem to have struck these keen and learned *Greek* Fathers that the clause *ἡμῶν γὰρ τὸ πολίτευμα ἐν οὐρανοῖς ὑπάρχει* furnished *e contrario* a justification of the description of the "enemies of the cross of Christ" as *οἱ τὰ ἐπίγεια φρονοῦντες* ! Is not this fact in itself enough to discredit the exegesis which finds in the first clause of verse 20 a confirmation of the last clause of verse 19 ?

It is possible to confirm the suggestion that iii. 20 should be attached to iii. 1a in an interesting way. The notion once common that Paul had no interest in the earthly life and teaching of Jesus is being set aside ; he was keenly interested in all that concerned his Master, and we may be sure that the itinerant Apostle would be peculiarly interested in the words spoken by Jesus to His followers just before or just

after the missionary tours on which He sent them. He would know of the conversation recorded by the "beloved physician" in Luke x. 17 ff. He may have learned of it from the Evangelist himself, for if Sir John Hawkins's conjecture is correct that Luke may have drawn up the "travel-document" (ix. 51—xviii. 14) "with some special purpose before he knew of, or at least before he began to found a Gospel upon, the Marcan *Grundschrift*,"<sup>1</sup> it may well be that the Evangelist was acquainted with the material incorporated in that part of his Gospel before the Apostle's death. Now the sequence *Τὸ λοιπόν, ἀδελφοί μου, χαίρετε ἐν Κυρίῳ, ἡμῶν γὰρ τὸ πολίτευμα ἐν οὐρανοῖς ὑπάρχει* immediately reminds us of the words of Jesus addressed to the Seventy: *χαίρετε δὲ ὅτι τὰ ὀνόματα ὑμῶν ἐνγέγραπται ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς* (Luke x. 20). The words of our Lord in turn take us back to the Old Testament phrase "book of life." This expression, or some equivalent, occurs more than once in the old Testament, meaning (as Charles puts it) "a register of the citizens of the Theocratic community." "To have one's name written in the book of life implied the privilege of participating in the *temporal* blessings of the Theocracy, Isa. iv. 3, while to be blotted out of this book, Exodus xxxii. 32; Psalm lxix. 28, meant exclusion therefrom. In the Old Testament this expression was originally confined to *temporal* blessings only, but in Daniel xii. 1 it is transformed through the influence of the new conception of the kingdom, and distinctly refers to an immortality of blessedness."<sup>2</sup> We find the phrase with the same reference in the Apocalyptic books. In the book of Enoch we read: "And in those days I saw the Head of Days when He had seated Himself on the throne of His glory, and the books of the living were opened before Him, and His whole host which is in heaven

<sup>1</sup> *Oxford Studies in the Synoptic Problem*, pp. 55, 56.

<sup>2</sup> Charles, *Book of Enoch*, note on xlvii. 3 (pp. 131, 2).



above and around Him stood before Him ” (xlvii. 3); and again, “ I swear unto you, that in heaven the angels are mindful of you for good before the glory of the Great One : your names are written before the glory of the Great One ” (civ. 1). From the Apocalyptic literature the phrase passed into the New Testament. As used by our Lord it describes membership in the Kingdom of Heaven. The idea is clearly the same in Luke x. 20 and Philippians iii. 20. As quaint John Trapp remarks in his comment on the former of these two texts, to have their names written in heaven was to be “ enrolled burgesses of the New Jerusalem.” A few sentences later in our Epistle Paul reverts to the same idea, employing the very phrase whose history we have just outlined—*ὃν τὰ ὀνόματα ἐν βίβλῳ ζωῆς*, iv. 3—and it is deeply significant as bearing upon the argument of this paper that the use of the phrase leads him immediately to repeat the injunction to rejoice : *χαίρετε ἐν κυρίῳ πάντοτε· πάλιν ἔρῳ, χαίρετε* (verse 4). It is difficult to avoid the inference that the words of Jesus, as recorded in Luke x. 20, are in his mind. Moreover, it is possible that the Apostle was led to speak of the *ἐνέργεια τοῦ δυνᾶσθαι αὐτὸν καὶ ὑποτάξαι αὐτῷ τὰ πάντα* (iii. 21) by recollection of the same conversation ; for the Seventy say, “ Lord, even the demons are subject (*ὑποτάσσεται*) unto us in Thy name ” ; and in His reply the Master says : “ Behold, I have given you authority to tread upon serpents and scorpions, and over all the power of the enemy : and nothing shall in any wise hurt you ” (Luke x. 17, 19). And in the Exultation of Jesus which Luke reports in immediate connexion with the return of the Seventy, Jesus says : “ All things have been delivered unto Me of My Father ” (verse 22). It is possible, too, that the emphasis on *σωτήρα* in Philippians iii. 20 is due, not, as Vincent suggests, to the implied contrast between the coming of Jesus as Saviour and His coming as Judge, but to the

recollection by Paul of the Master's statement that He had watched Satan fall ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ. From that heaven Paul waits for a *Saviour* !

Objection may be taken to the theory advocated in this paper on the ground that the words τὸ σῶμα τῆς ταπεινώσεως ἡμῶν in iii. 21 refer back to verses 18, 19, where we read of those "whose god is the belly, and whose glory is in their shame." Most commentators establish a connexion between verse 21 and verses 18, 19. But I am very doubtful whether a valid connexion can be shown to exist. The emphatic first personal pronoun in verse 20 refers to the believers, and ἡμῶν in verse 21 must also be taken of the believers, and not of men in general. It is the body of the believer that Jesus at His Coming will transform. The words ταπεινός and ταπεινώσις connote the very opposite of evil in all their New Testament occurrences. As a matter of fact there is absolutely nothing in verse 21 to suggest the persons spoken of in verses 18, 19. If, however, iii. 1b-19 be regarded as an interpolation, then verse 21 is brought into close proximity to the latter part of chapter ii., where we read of Epaphroditus, who had been "sick nigh unto death," "hazarding his life" in his devotion to the Apostle. It was the serious illness of the faithful envoy of the Philippians that led Paul to think of "the body that belongs to our low estate," soon however at the Coming of the Saviour to be transformed "till it resembles the body of his Glory" (Moffatt).

There can be no doubt as to the Pauline authorship of the great passage iii. 1b-19 ; but for whom it was first written and how it came to be embedded in the letter to the Philippians are questions which will never be answered. If it had come to us as an isolated fragment no one would ever have dreamed of regarding it as a portion of Philippians. "This passage," says Gibb, "does not harmonise either in substance or in tone, with the rest of the Epistle. It almost

looks as if it had been torn out of its connexion in the Epistle to the Galatians, or in the 2nd Epistle to the Corinthians. It has certainly more kinship with those Epistles than with the Epistle in which it stands."<sup>1</sup> The passage would appear to be earlier in date than Philippians ; it seems to belong to the time when the controversy with the Judaisers was at its height. By the time our Epistle—the latest of the Captivity Epistles—came to be written that controversy had largely subsided. Can it be that the interpolated section was originally part of some communication from Paul to the saints at Rome the remainder of which has not survived ? Did Epaphroditus find it in Rome and carry it back to Philippi along with the letter entrusted to his care by Paul ? Perhaps ; for even if Epaphroditus had known that there was no likelihood of the Church at Philippi being imperilled by the inroads of Judaisers he may well have carried back with joy the precious fragment, for it contains some of the great Apostle's sublimest utterances. Produced in the heat of controversy, it reads a lesson that is timeless and imperishable.

J. HUGH MICHAEL.

<sup>1</sup> Hastings' *D.B.* iii. p. 843b. Gibb is speaking of iii. 1b-20.

## WHAT IS THE "THEOLOGY OF EXPERIENCE"?

It is quite a commonplace to say that the theology of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries is distinctively the theology of experience. While the older theology based itself on the authority of the Church, or the authority of scripture, or on "rational" or "natural" grounds, the growing tendency during the last hundred years has been to base theology upon what is known as "religious experience." It is indeed remarkable how in our generation that phrase "religious experience" has come into vogue, and is used where an earlier generation would have spoken of "religious belief," or simply of "religion." For example, when a scholar writes a book on the religion of ancient Rome, he calls it "The Religious Experience of the Roman People."<sup>1</sup> When a scholar writes a book on the religion of Paul, he calls it "The Religious Experience of St. Paul."<sup>2</sup> Most influential of all upon the current terminology of our day is the case in which a psychologist, investigating religious phenomena, calls his book "The Varieties of Religious Experience."<sup>3</sup>

It would be interesting to discover where and when this phrase, which is certainly a modern one, came into common use. Apart from theology it appears to have been current in the eighteenth century in certain evangelical and pietistic circles. But in connection with theology the phrase and the idea are usually traced vaguely to the schools which sprang from Schleiermacher, who is regarded as the founder of the Theology of Experience.<sup>4</sup> And yet in Schleier-

<sup>1</sup> Dr. Warde Fowler's Gifford Lectures.

<sup>2</sup> Prof. Percy Gardner.

<sup>3</sup> Prof. W. James' Gifford Lectures.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Wernle: "die von Schleiermacher glänzend eröffnete Erfahrungstheologie" (*Einführung in das theologische Studium*, p. 297.



macher's own expositions of the nature of religion and the basis of theology the phrase "religious experience" never occurs. He speaks rather of the religious "self-consciousness" or "consciousness," which latter is the very word used by his great antagonist Hegel. And if in our own times those who more or less follow Schleiermacher's method prefer the phrase "religious experience," they certainly have no monopoly of it. It is used by writers who have no affinity with Schleiermacher's outlook, including the most typical neo-Hegelians (as, e.g., Prof. J. B. Baillie who in his volume on *The Idealistic Construction of Experience*, having dealt with the other planes of experience in succession, crowns his argument with a treatment of religion as "Religious Experience"). Thus it would appear that the phrase has become especially current in our own day, and while it doubtless indicates a general tendency to regard religion as an experience rather than as doctrine or cult, it is apparently used by thinkers who belong to very different schools. And indeed, as the present writer considers, the phrase covers a large amount of confusion in theological and philosophical thought. In fact much of the ambiguity and confusion which the troublesome word "experience" has carried with it through the course of the history of philosophy in general seems to have been re-introduced in theology by the loose use of the phrase "religious experience." Everybody is using the phrase nowadays, and the idea is common property that theology, or religious belief, is based upon religious experience. But what does that mean? What is religious experience? And what is the theology of experience? These are the questions which appear to the present writer to be in need of a careful examination. In different senses the above statement might be subscribed to by thinkers of very different schools—by Ritschlians, by Hegelians, by "radical

empiricists " like James and Höffding. But what does it mean in the mouths of those who more or less follow " the theology of experience " in the sense in which it may be traced back to Schleiermacher ? And how much light does it throw upon the theological problem ? Let us endeavour to answer these questions.

The bearings of the problems may best be realised if we begin by asking : Does belief come before experience in religion ? Or does experience come first ? All are agreed that religion is in some sense a matter of experience, and also that there must be a belief connected with it. But which comes logically first ? Which is based on the other ? According to the older view, whether Roman or Protestant, belief was logically prior. Belief was based upon the authority of the Church or of the Bible ; and then, when a man had this belief ready-made, the next step was to realise the belief in religious experience. This may not indeed be a fair account of the best thought of either the scholastics or the reformers : certainly the reformers taught that the authority of scripture depended on the witness of the Spirit in the hearts of believers. But the above account of the logical relation of belief and experience, and of the basis of belief, will be recognised as at least of great influence in the older theology. And a quite frank and thorough-going statement of this simple view may be found in the eighteenth century theologian Gottfried Arnold, whose position in his book *Theologia experimentalis* (1715) is described by Höffding as follows : " The whole significance of experience, in his eyes, lies in the fact that it affords a field for the practice of the doctrines of scripture. Experience is not a ground but a consequent and fruit, and must be judged ' according to the Word of God.' With the clearness which distinguishes him, Arnold then goes on to draw from this the conclusion that experience must occupy

a different place in religion from what it holds in science : in religion it follows after belief, in science it precedes it."<sup>1</sup> It is essentially the same view as this which Lutheran orthodoxy in Germany exhibits when (as described and criticised by Herrmann)<sup>2</sup> it breaks up religious faith into three stages, *notitia*, *assensus*, *fiducia*, and holds that the first (a knowledge of the truths of religion) and the second (an assent to, or acceptance of, these truths) come *before* the third (which is the saving kind of faith, or the actual experience of religion). That view ("first belief, then experience") is a perfectly clear one. And it is not only in these older orthodoxies that it is found. It exists in another form in rationalistic theology; only with this difference, that the belief (which is prior to religious experience) is held to be established not on the authority of Church or Bible, but on natural or rational grounds. In all these theories belief comes first, and then the superstructure of actual religious experience.

It was in opposition to this type of view that the experience-theology developed.<sup>3</sup> According to the school of experience, instead of "first belief, then experience," it is rather a case of "first religious experience, then belief in the doctrines founded on that experience." It was felt that religion was not primarily a matter of assent to doctrines, that it was largely independent of doctrines, being rather a matter of practical experience. And above all it was felt that the doctrines which a religious man believes must not have their foundation outside of his religious experience, but in it. And thus a kind of parallel came to

<sup>1</sup> Höffding, *Philosophy of Religion*, tr., p. 103.

<sup>2</sup> *Communion with God*, tr. pp. 217 ff.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Schleiermacher (speaking of his thesis that religion is the feeling of absolute dependence): "Our thesis is intended to oppose the view that this feeling of dependence is itself conditioned by some previous knowledge about God" (*Glaubenslehre*, i. 4).

be drawn between religious experience and other departments of experience, regarded as data for the respective sciences. Just as our knowledge of the external world and our natural science are based on our sense-experience, just as our æsthetic judgments and theory are based on our immediate experience of beauty, just as our ethics is based on our moral experience, so our religious beliefs, or our doctrines, or our theology, must be based on our religious experience. It is unnecessary to trace the various modifications of this idea which have been worked out in the realm of theology since the time of Schleiermacher. The general idea is familiar to the veriest tyro in theology, and is constantly referred to or taken for granted as a perfectly clear and obvious theory. "Why do you believe these doctrines of religion?" "Not simply because scripture teaches them, nor because church or creed teaches them, nor because I can prove them rationally or philosophically, but because I have proved them in experience. My belief is based on my religious experience."

Is that, then, a perfectly satisfactory view of the matter?

To the present writer it appears to be full of confusion. The real leaders of the experience-theology are indeed largely free from that confusion (as indeed they make little use of the phrase "religious experience" which causes it). But many of the camp-followers use the phrase without knowing what they mean by it, and express themselves vaguely in the sense indicated above without knowing the implications of their words. For example, Professor Percy Gardner tells us that "properly speaking, religious doctrine is the formulation in terms of intellect of the results of religious experience."<sup>1</sup> Apart from the unfortunate looseness of the phrase, "the results of religious experience," the whole sentence would seem to imply that the intellect plays no part what-

<sup>1</sup> *Exploratio Evangelica*, 2nd ed., p. 45.



ever in religious experience itself, and that neither does doctrine : a view which, be it noted, is only compatible with the purely Schleiermacherian view of religion as Feeling alone—to which Professor Gardner certainly does not mean to commit himself).<sup>1</sup> But the same thing comes out in any statement of the matter which puts experience first and belief second, the belief being founded on the experience. That may be a coherent view for those who hold Schleiermacher's view of religion unmodified (though Schleiermacher himself never uses language just like that); but surely those who hold a more normal view of the nature of religion and the place of belief in it ought to see that for them the above statement is absurd. For what kind of religious experience can that be which is absolutely prior to all religious belief? How can there be any religious experience, any religion, until there is some religious belief? "He that cometh to God must believe that He is." That seems obvious and elementary. And surely when one glibly makes the statement that religious belief is founded upon religious experience, one is simply using that latter phrase in a mechanical way, without ever asking what religious experience *is*. For how can one have experience of religion, or of the objects of religion, except *through* belief, or through faith which includes belief? All the possible religious experiences which a man may have are bound up with a believing attitude of his mind. When a religious man in some hour of sorrow experiences God's comforting, that means that he believes in and by faith rests upon God's love and wisdom. It may be said that he does not believe in these things, but experiences them. Well, he certainly experiences them: yet how can he experience them except by believing in them? This does

<sup>1</sup> It is not Prof. Gardner's own view, but his language, which is here criticised.

not mean that the whole affair is merely an artificial product of his own beliefs. Psychologically, of course, the comforting is a psychical fact, and to the psychologist it proves nothing in the way of theological realities. But the religious man believes that he is experiencing a real God. Only how can he experience God but by believing in God ? We cannot conceive of a man's spiritual contact with God as being like the contact of one material body with another. Mystics might hold some such view (though it is notorious that the religious experiences of mystics are largely dictated, at least as far as concerns their form and setting, by the theology which they hold). But certainly the typical Christian view of religion would give us quite a different conception of religious experience. It is by faith that a man draws near to God, and it is through a man's faith that God draws near to a man. And though faith may be more than belief, it cannot be less. It is a kind of belief, or it has an element of belief inherent in it. And so, however inexplicit, however unselfconscious, however pictorially-clothed, this element of belief may be, it remains true that a man can only experience the objects of religion by believing in them. This does not mean a deistic view of a distant God whom we believe in but do not experience. God is certainly to be conceived as near us, about us, around us, not far from every one of us (though this is perhaps partly a matter of words and does not properly describe the issue with the "deistic" way of thinking). But in any case it is only by faith that we can get religiously near to Him and have religious experience of Him. And while faith may be largely independent of belief in expressed dogmas, it certainly implies or includes an element of belief. So that it cannot be correct to say : First, religious experience ; then religious belief, founded on the experience.

Then does this mean that we are driven back to the older

view, that belief comes first (founded on something else), and then experience as an application or fruit? Then we should again be faced with the question what religious belief is ultimately based on, since it precedes religious experience. And we surely cannot accept as final any of the older answers to that question. For, however large a place we may be prepared to give to the authority of the Church, or the authority of scripture, we cannot accept these as absolute external authorities to which one has only to refer in order to obtain belief ready-made. And neither can we agree to base religious belief on "natural" or "rational" grounds. In fact we cannot accept any view which deliberately bases belief outside of the experience of the religious man. Thus we now seem to have rejected the view that the experience is based on the belief, and also the view that the belief is based on the experience. And that is indeed precisely what we have done. And we are left with the only view which is true to the religious consciousness, viz., that the experience and the belief *are one*. To speak of them separately is to deal in abstractions, and to forget, in the unreality of theological jargon, what every Christian child knows, that religion is faith. Religion may, of course, be spoken of in a wider sense, so as to include the emotions connected with faith, and the cultus which it inspires, and even the moral life to which it leads. But the inner religious experience is faith. It is indeed an experience of God. But it is by faith that man experiences God. It is by believing in God, in the inward intimate personal sense, that man experiences God. The belief does not precede the experience, nor the experience the belief, but belief and experience are one.

In fact the controversy as to whether religious belief is based on experience seems to be to some extent a repetition, in the realm of theology, of the old philosophical con-

troversy, "Is all our knowledge derived from experience?" The error of the old empiricists who answered that question in the affirmative was their falsely abstract conception of experience. It was, of course, sense-experience that they were dealing with, and they treated it as something purely given, to which the mind contributed nothing, but which was furnished ready-made to the *tabula rasa* of the mind. What they had to learn was that there is no such thing as a purely given experience. That is an abstraction. Of course there is no knowledge prior to experience, and of course in the wide sense all knowledge comes from experience, or rather *in* experience. But the experience is not a mere datum. The experience itself involves judgment. Every perception is a judgment. Thus the question whether all our knowledge is derived from experience vanishes into thin air. In one sense it is meaningless, in another it is a truism. All that is very familiar to students of philosophy. But now surely the same confusion has entered into this discussion whether religious knowledge (or belief or doctrine) is derived from religious experience. Certainly there is no religious knowledge apart from religious experience altogether. That is true as against every theory of a purely external authority, and as against theological "rationalism." But on the other hand there is no such thing as a religious experience which is simply "given," involving no judgment and prior to all belief. Such an idea is meaningless and unthinkable, and is but a repetition, in the theological sphere, of the old confusion which the word "experience" carried with it in philosophy. And indeed, whatever we think upon the general philosophical question, it is independently quite clear that the *religious* experience must not be conceived in that mechanically immediate way. That is the way of superstition, and not the way of faith. If religion is rightly conceived as faith, then religious experience can-



not precede the judgment of faith. Whether or not sense-experience is rightly conceived as a complex of perceptual judgments, or rather a process of perceptual judging, it is plain that religious experience is fundamentally a process of faith-judging.

It may be objected that a man may make these judgments without having any experience of religion, that "intellectual assent" to the truths of religion does not make a man religious. With the intention of this last statement we are, of course, in hearty agreement, though perhaps its wording is not unexceptionable. This "intellectual assent" of a man who has no practical interest in religion is not faith at all. And what then is the difference between this assent and the real judgment of faith? To this we may reply that there is an important difference between what a man thinks he believes (perhaps merely because he has been brought up to it, or because others believe it) and what he really believes; and that when a man without any living religion of his own assents "intellectually" (as he thinks) to the truths of religion, it is not really the truths of religion which he has assented to, but certain metaphysical or quasi-metaphysical statements. The truths of religion cannot be even understood, much less assented to, by an irreligious man. There is in them an incommunicable element which can only be *symbolised* by dogmas, however excellent, and which is only apprehended in the actual experience of religion, i.e., in personal religious faith. It is somewhat as though a colour-blind man were to believe, on the strength of his companion's statement, that a certain book was green, another one red. That is "intellectual assent," but the colour-blind man does not really know what red and green are, and his intellectual assent, or belief, is a very different thing from the perceptual judgment of the man who sees. So "intellectual assent" to dogmas is not religion. But

that does not mean that *faith* is not religion, and in no way invalidates our simple and obvious contention that religious experience is a process of believing, i.e., of believing in the inward personal religious sense which is connoted by the word "faith."

It is of course a further question what the precise nature of that faith is, and how it arises, and we need not now enter upon that. Our purpose has been simply to examine the idea of "religious experience," and especially the idea *that belief is based on religious experience*—an idea which we have now found to be inaccurate, confused and misleading, because the belief and the experience are really one.

For the statement, however, that *theology* is based upon religious experience, we can find a perfectly clear and true meaning. That means simply that the ultimate source and norm of our theology must not be found in any external authority nor in general principles, but in the religious life, in the realm of religion (scriptures and creeds being used as outstanding evidences of the contents of that realm). But if this is the meaning of the statement that theology must be based upon religious experience, it might equally well be expressed by saying that theology must be based upon religious *belief* or religious *faith*. It is certainly permissible and suggestive to say "religious experience" instead, but then the emphasis of the statement should be as much on the word "religious" as on the word "experience." The point is that theology must be based upon *religious* facts, not upon any outside facts, whether these be mechanically conceived authorities, or natural or rational grounds. And this is the real point of the experience-theology, which is so often inaccurately understood. The task of theology is to analyse religious experience (which, as we saw, is a faith-process), discover the doctrines which are inherent in it, and reduce them, as far as possible, to a system. Just as

natural science analyses sense-experience and reduces to a system the perceptual judgments (as we might call them) which compose it ; just as ethics analyses our moral experience and reduces to a system the moral judgments which are inherent in it ; just as æsthetics analyses our experience of beauty and reduces its artistic judgments to a system ; so theology has to analyse our religious experience (our faith), and state as clearly and systematically as possible the beliefs which are inherent in it.

We need not stop to inquire how the theologian is to discriminate among the great variety of beliefs which may claim to be religious. That is a further question of method.

But it may be worth while very briefly to examine the relation of this view of theology to other views which make play with the word "experience." For "the theology of experience" is a title which various very divergent schools might claim with some reason, those philosophical schools which are described as empiricist. There is (*a*) Empiricism of the Humian type, according to which our theological knowledge (if any), like the rest of our knowledge, is derived from experience. But this has, of course, no kinship whatever with the view we have been elaborating above, but is as directly opposed to it as anything could be. For in this case it is simply sense-experience <sup>1</sup> that is intended, which is the reason why this empiricism cannot yield a positive theology at all ; while the point of our view is that theology must be based on *religious* experience. This empiricism has nothing to do with the true experience-theology : as Professor Paterson remarks, "for theology Empiricism and philosophical Rationalism come under the same rubric of

<sup>1</sup> For the earlier English empiricism this, of course, included the "inner sense" as well as the outer, but that was never anything more than a source of confusion, and does not help empiricism to any more solid conclusions.

Rationalism in so far as either claims to speak the last word on religious problems."<sup>1</sup> Then there is (b) the "Radical Empiricism" of writers like James and Höffding, which, while claiming to be thoroughly empirical, takes into its reckoning not only sense-experience but all departments of experience, and for the purposes of theology, very specially religious experience. And how then does this view or method differ from our own? When James in his Gifford Lectures seeks to arrive at theological conclusions from a contemplation of the varieties of religious experience, wherein does that empiricism differ from what we hold to be the true theology of experience? In this, that instead of taking its stand *within* the experience and endeavouring simply to discover what its essential utterances are (as the true experience-theology does), the empiricism of James starts with a merely psychological contemplation of a variety of religious phenomena from the outside, and endeavours to get a theology out of psychology itself, endeavours to *prove* (whether with certainty or only with probability) some modicum of religious truth by collating and comparing a multitude of phenomena which do not seem to the psychologist entirely explicable without some such hypothesis. Surely that attempt must be as futile as if one were to endeavour to prove the axioms of geometry by an impartial contemplation of our space-experience (just because one wished to be radically empiricist). The geometrician does not prove the axioms, but simply finds them, by analysis, as the fundamental rules of that spatial realm or order with which he starts. And so the theologian starts with the religious realm, and seeks by analysis to discover its genuine principles, which he does not further question. And it is futile to imagine, as James does, that one can get anywhere, in a theological direction, by a mere psychological comparison of religious phenomena and

<sup>1</sup> *The Rule of Faith*, p. 93.



beliefs. It is in criticism of this type of empiricism that Troeltsch develops his well-known idea of the "religious *a priori*." Just as in our knowledge of the sensible world we could never get anywhere by a purely "empirical" procedure, starting from a multiplicity of data without any *a priori* element in the Kantian sense, so in theology we could never get anywhere by a mere psychologism. We need a "religious *a priori*." This means simply that however important and valuable the psychological study of religion may be to the theologian, he must start with a religious principle or he cannot start at all. In other words, we can never prove any religious truth from non-religious facts (and in this sense even psychological descriptions of religious phenomena are really non-religious facts: they are merely psychological facts, observable by the most irreligious man). The Radical Empiricism which does make the attempt to get theology out of psychology ends with the vague and meagre probabilities of James' book. But the true theology of experience does not attempt to prove the truths of religion to the outsider. It appeals only to moral and religious conviction. It takes its stand not without but within the religious life. Accepting the realm of religion as a real realm it endeavours to determine by a process of immanent criticism what the truth of religion at each point really is, what genuine religion has to say. Thus the true theology bases itself on religious experience in the sense that it sets itself simply to discover and formulate and systematise the judgments which faith is constrained to make.

D. M. BAILLIE.

### THE LUCAN NARRATIVE OF THE NATIVITY.

*Audi alteram partem.* The paper on a similar subject in the October number was chiefly remarkable for the fact that the author, writing against the "Virgin Birth" of our Lord, quotes with approval some early Christian document in his support,<sup>1</sup> but fails to quote one line from the physician to whom, with a suitableness all of us instinctively recognise as so appropriate, was committed the esoteric side of the Virgin Birth.

Had the writer confined himself to St. Matthew it might have explained his avoidance of St. Luke; as it is, it is not so easy to do so.

An important point is raised in St. Matthew i. 18 which, though quoted by the author, is entirely avoided; and that is, who is supposed to be the author of the pregnancy? To suggest Joseph, or still worse some other man, seems alike impossible to either probability or decency, for in this first case one can hardly picture such baseness in Joseph (a righteous man) while the latter is also beyond thought. The question, however, only remains unsolved to rejecters of the Virgin Birth.

The world-wide tradition of partheno-genesis to which the writer alludes as a notion belonging to the ancients is true, but he does not say whence they got it. As a matter of fact it was known to them all, through the sign of Virgo in the Zodiac,<sup>2</sup> in which sign the sun stood over Bethlehem at the birth of Christ. This virgin holds a Branch in her right

<sup>1</sup> The Acts of St. Thomas. Though even this throws doubt on the paternity of Joseph.

<sup>2</sup> For "there is no speech nor language where their voice is not heard" (Psalm xix. 3).

hand. There are twenty Hebrew words for branch, but this was always "*Tsemech*," a word used four times over in the Prophets for Christ alone. Even one of our own poets, Shakespeare by name, has alluded to the small constellation by the side of Virgo shewing the actual child in the woman's arms, in *Titus Andronicus* (iv. 3) as "Good boy, in Virgo's lap." We read in St. Luke i. 78, "Through the tender mercy of our God, whereby the dayspring (or '*branch*' A.V. margin) from on high hath visited us."

It is true, as the writer on St. Matthew says, "*almah*" does not necessarily mean a virgin. At the same time the Septuagint renders the word *παρθένος*, and some of us may recall Luther's offer of a hundred thalers for a single instance<sup>1</sup> of its application to a married woman; though he adds rather pathetically, "God only knows where I can find the money."

Turning to St. Luke i. 14, we find, as usual, in the East, the word is spoken to the father. No word, however, was addressed to Joseph, all was to Mary. Why? Here were two supernatural births, for one "naturally" (St. Luke i. 18) was too late, the other (St. Luke i. 27) was too soon. The bestial stories of heathen mythology afford no parallel to the Virgin Birth. They were perversions of nature, this was supernatural and unique. Luke i. 31 (*lit.*) is "thou art now conceiving," that is "before marriage" (the historic present), as verse 36 shews, "*she also hath conceived.*"

St. Luke i. 35 gives the only instance of one who was holy before birth (see R.V. margin).

St. Luke i. 38 is an undesigned coincidence of great beauty, "Behold the female slave (*δούλη*) of the Lord." This expression is only found elsewhere in Psalm lxxxvi. 16, where the Spirit of Christ says, "Save the son of thy female slave (*παιδίσκη*)," and one other Messianic Psalm (cxvi. 16),

“I am thy servant, the son of thine handmaid (παῖδίσκη).”  
No father is named. Why?

There is no other reason than that which Scripture gives, and this governs that unique concept in Genesis iii. 15, “her seed.” Elsewhere it is the seed of the man.

Comment seems superfluous.

Lastly, all thoughtful Churchmen must have seen in the Benedictus and the Magnificat a convincing proof of the Virgin Birth. They were both sung (St. Luke i. 46, 68) at the supernatural birth of these two sons: the one, as was natural, by the father, the other, *mirabile dictu*, by the mother! Joseph is absolutely silent. Let the writer of the article on St. Matthew, who is so familiar with the customs of the near East, explain this extraordinary fact, so eloquent of the Virgin Birth.

I lay no claim to such intimate knowledge, nor to the scholarship which has made the writer's name so well known; but I have devoted some years to the study of the subject, and can see no alternative whatever to the Virgin Birth, if we accept those Scriptures which Professor Sanday regarded as the oldest and most authentic parts of the Gospels.

A. T. SCHOFIELD.



## *MENTAL AND MORAL SANITY*

THE student of the later methods of investigation into the causes and treatment of insanity can hardly fail to observe the close connexion that exists between mental and moral sanity. The theologian, who happens to be a psychologist, would at once recognise in the line of approach of the recent Schools of psycho-therapy towards insanity the most helpful suggestions in his method of the treatment of moral pathology. It is the purpose of this paper to trace the resemblance that exists in the symptoms of insanity to the manifestations of moral evil in the personality and also to indicate that the methods employed are of value in both cases. It is not here proposed to discuss the question of moral responsibility, still less to attempt to estimate the degree of responsibility, if any, that devolves upon the insane, but it is here contended that what makes for moral and spiritual sanity is precisely similar to that outlook upon life that is induced by the methods employed by some of the most recent specialists in their treatment of the insane, and in the cases of neurasthenia and shell-shock.

There are, of course, different methods of investigation pursued by the various schools of thought, determined largely by their general attitude towards pathological phenomena. Many eminent experts still adhere to the older methods and view the whole subject from the standpoint of physiological or even materialistic principles. Some of the best writers on the subject seem to content themselves with the observation and classification of the varying con-

ditions, manifestations or symptoms, as indicating the condition of the brain, such as dementia praecox, paranoia and senile deterioration. All the forms of melancholia, exaltation, hallucination and delusion are thus exhaustively analysed and classified and the treatment suggested according to the type represented as if it were a matter of nerves and brain. The Psychological School, as it is termed, regards all mental phenomena from the psychological point of view, and, far from dismissing the abnormal mental phenomena as unintelligible and unrelated ravings due to a disordered brain, they analyse their content so as to unravel the bewildering tangle of prepossessions, obsessions and extravagances of those who are mentally afflicted as to discover the underlying cause of the perversion of the intellect and thus to find some "method in their madness." Having discovered by the most heroically patient investigation the cause of the derangement, the remedial measures consist largely of good advice and the suggestion of healthy and helpful thoughts and the force of "moral suasion." These measures are of no use until the cause of the perversion is discovered.

Some specialists go farther, it is true, and make free use of hypnotic suggestion, but the School to which I am referring in every way prefers the "moral" method, or suggestion without the trance-state on account of the possibility of dangerous reactions when hypnotism is employed, and they regard it as being too crude and too superficial to produce permanent results. It is true that many recent cases of shell-shock, as it is called, have been quite satisfactorily treated by hypnotism in reviving repressed complexes, but on the other hand many of the best experts have been wonderfully successful in the employment of psycho-analysis alone.

Permit me, then, to state at the outset that it is a great

gain in the interests of knowledge that Psychology should be thus reinstated as the science of mental states or personal "experience," as Professor Ward would say, and not as a mere adjunct to biology or physiology, and that its principles should be brought to bear upon mental pathology. It is a fact that is little known outside the medical profession that the brains of lunatics are generally normal, where insanity is not obviously due to malformation, organic disease or injury, or as in dementia paralytica, and the physical cause in the organism is readily traceable. But even in these cases it is possible to obtain really good results through the mind itself. On the other hand post-mortem examinations reveal in a large majority of cases no modification of the nerve tissue in the brain nor traces of abnormality that any known method of investigation can detect. Practically all insane persons have normal brains, excepting where the cause is obviously a physical one, induced by arrested development, lesion or cerebral injury. The disease is therefore a matter of perversion, wrong thoughts, feelings, desires or impulses, and, generally and especially, wrong or foolish choices. This is the reason for applying the remedy through the mind itself. One eminent authority has stated that "Insanity is a matter of personality. It is dependent on purely individual factors, wishes, aspirations and secret conflicts."<sup>1</sup> Hence the feeling of utter helplessness and hopelessness that we have in the presence of this dread disease is largely removed when we realise that it is not necessarily a "fixed" condition by some natural and inevitable physical cause.

We have now to consider how these perversions arise. The patient is found to be living in a set of mental complexes which are imaginary, distorted and untrue to the acknow-

<sup>1</sup> *The Pathogenesis of a Delusion*: Henry Devine, M.D. *Journal of Mental Science*, July, 1911.

ledged order of things. He lives and moves and acts like a dreamer, in a world of his own, which has no properly adjusted relation to the world of realities. Unable as he is to relate his life to his circumstances or to adapt them to his liking, he finds himself engaged in a conflict, in which he has to defend himself against reality (defence psychoses). Hence the condition of the paranoiac.

All men have their romantic ideas, their day-dreams and their visions of the conditions of things in which they find themselves in possession of much coveted wealth or power, and they enjoy living in this imaginary world. Women, even the poor little girl in the workhouse, deformed and unprepossessing, all have their dreams of being attractive and possessed of the power to bring the world to their feet. Normal persons will seek, as Thoreau advises, to build foundations for their "castles in the air" so far as they are able, and endeavour by honest labour and in all legitimate ways to make the realisation of their dreams possible and thus to contribute to the proper ends of life. If these imaginary conditions are impossible of attainment, persons of common sense will accept the situation, and their desires will be held in check or directed to more reasonable objects. The requirements of "the daily round, the common task" will prove to be a wholesome corrective to an exuberance of fancy or the construction of the delusional phantasy. Now should there come in whilst under the influence of the imagination some compromise of principle, or an act that the person believes or knows to be wrong or with regard to which he has some secret misgiving, in the pursuit of the cherished end, and especially if the false step is persisted in, or where there is failure to meet the demands of present duty or the acceptance of facts as they are, then the mischief begins and the mental balance comes to be disturbed. The evil lurks in the subconscious mind as the patient



tries to forget or to ignore it and the disturbing element becomes a haunting spectre that plays havoc with the reason and the due proportion of things. Often it perverts the judgment and leads to illusions and the patient begins to attribute wrong motives or finds false explanations, sometimes with considerable ingenuity, and thus the world becomes to him an antagonistic and spiteful world. Hence the defence against reality, as it is termed. He becomes morbid and considers himself a persecuted man, misunderstood and maligned; at times he is terribly and incurably melancholy, at other times he is unduly elated and is touched with megalomania, and when by reason of his obsessions the man comes to think that the world and everything in it conspire to do him wrong, he is tempted to commit acts of violence, and finally, it may be, he attempts his own life. At that stage it is necessary to put him under restraint.

It may be objected at this point that there are so many exceptions to this outline of the advance of mental disease, that the explanation offered will not entirely hold good. It has been thought that some terrible and sudden shock is largely accountable for cases of insanity, as experienced by thousands in the barrage of the battlefield. It would seem as if the horrors and the terrible sights, sounds and smells would produce insanity on a large scale. Facts, however, do not seem to bear out this view. Unhappily there are only too many shell-shock patients, and various forms of neurasthenia and nervous disorders, but it is held by the authorities generally that under these exceptional conditions partial or temporary derangement of the nervous system may be produced, but practically an ordinarily healthy person is not rendered permanently insane by a nervous shock, such as is experienced on the battlefield. Even shell-shock patients are often those in which there has been already some mischief wrought by mental anxiety

or conflict, which has caused the subconscious mind to work an explosive effect when the shock has come. At any rate they readily yield to the treatment of psycho-therapy that we are endeavouring to expound.

Unfortunately for purposes of illustration, the cases of paranoia described in the Bible, which seem to be exactly parallel to the mental condition that has been explained, are all more or less complicated with the theory of demoniacal possession. Whilst we would not deny the possibility of evil spirits acting upon the false complexes in the abnormal mind, the question is whether this theory of mental complexes may not wholly account for the phenomena under consideration. We may select the instance of King Saul as that of paranoia, even though "an evil spirit from the Lord troubled him." His career after he became king, notwithstanding the fact that some of his work was distinctly valuable, was that of a man who was gradually and consciously losing his hold upon moral values, and he knew himself to be inferior, wrong and unhappy. Under the influence of this impression his subconscious self worked him into a state of melancholia and in consequence an unreasoning suspicion, jealousy and murderous hate toward his young rival, David, became in him increasingly an obsession. For a time in the early stages of his disorder the music of David's harp and his singing proved a diversion and soothed his darkened soul. The fascination of music exercised a marvellous power over his subconscious mind, as music always does in persons of artistic temperament. It soothed, but could not cure him, because it did not succeed in bringing him into consistent harmony with facts nor into right relations with his God, and thus the root of the mischief was not removed. The struggle against reality led to his downfall, and although he did not put an end to his own life, it was at his request that in the moment of failure "the

young man out of the camp" ran him through with his sword.

In touching upon the subject of demoniacal possession as we find it recorded in the New Testament, we feel that we must exercise some restraint and speak with reserve and in a somewhat tentative manner. The instances that we meet with practically all exhibit in their various symptoms the phenomena of the different forms of paranoia, dementia, or it may be neurasthenia. The morbid state of mind, the false complexes in which the afflicted person lives with less and less frequently alternating periods of sanity or lucid intervals would naturally give rise to the impression that the person is possessed by some sinister influence or an evil spirit, inasmuch as he is in these complexes utterly unlike himself. The condition may be accompanied by dumbness, deafness, blindness or epilepsy or combinations of these, as we witness in cases of shell-shock to-day. The method of exorcism by rebuking the unclean spirit, or in the days of the infant Church the pronouncement of the name of Jesus would of course not be similar to the recent methods of psycho-analysis, but it may be urged that the power of suggestion or perhaps hypnotism and the ascendancy of a strong and authoritative personality over a weak and disordered mind would be sufficient to effect a cure and the word of command would startle the morbid patient out of the false complexes, and this would be followed up by sound religious teaching and true moral reform. It would thus appear that the whole of the phenomena in question may be explained on the ground of the neurotic condition combined with an abnormal state of the mind and a set of distorted complexes.

The main difficulty remains of accounting for our Lord's acceptance of the doctrine of possession and by the fact of His using methods of exorcism. If these cases are

considered as strictly historical in the Ministry of Christ, there would be the need of postulating some theory of "accommodation"; or if this be not acceptable, it would seem to many thinkers that our Lord's knowledge was in this matter limited by the current beliefs of His time.

Even though it might be possible to account for all the symptoms of demoniacs as those of insanity in some of its various forms yet one does feel free to deny that evil spirits, if such exist, may in some way influence or even control those peculiarly nervous and morbid persons whose subconscious states of mind are open to such agencies. We are probably susceptible to many unknown influences in the subconscious part of our mental life and we are affected by other minds in a way that we do not understand, and the question is whether discarnate spirits may not also enter and take possession of that mysterious part of our being, especially when the complexes are perverted.

What is of more practical importance for us at the moment is to outline the method of treatment which the Psychological School employs in the treatment of mental disorders. The impulse and inspiration of these new methods are undoubtedly due to Freud, although they seem in no small degree to be a reversion to the ancient practice of uniting the functions of medicine-man and priest, in operating through the mind itself. English practitioners as a rule do not wholly follow the teachings of this exceedingly brilliant but somewhat weird professor, especially where he traces all morbid phenomena to repressed sex-impulse. Nevertheless they do, as a matter of fact, adopt his theories of dreams and of the unconscious, and are prepared to utilise his psychological principles generally. In the development of his investigation the word-reaction scheme as elaborated by Jung has been distinctly valuable in eliciting secret information from the patient and in unlocking the mysteries of the subcon-



scious self, where the root of the trouble lies, and surprisingly good results have followed. According to this scheme a number of disconnected words are mentioned in succession to the patient, and he is required to mention another word as quickly as possible which occurs to him. It is then discovered that hesitation or failure to respond indicates some train of ideas connected with the complex that is causing the trouble. In the repetition of the series the reaction-time will be changed, as probably the "sore spot" will have been touched and suspicion aroused.

The theory of psycho-therapeutics assumes that the patient has found refuge in a false world of his own, romantic and alluring, it may be at first, remote from the ordinary and hard facts of life and normal conditions. Failure to actualise these romantic states of consciousness by proper and legitimate means constitutes a temptation to omit some plain duty or to lapse into some questionable mode of conduct, on account of which the patient feels himself to be blameworthy. The *faux pas* may be in thought merely, or it may be a pardonable mistake that is exaggerated into an enormous vice by an over-scrupulous mind. Whatever the *faux pas* may have been the consciousness of its occurrence sets up an inward struggle in which the better self is not wholly successful, and, instead of frankly facing the issues, the patient fights against the realities of life and is put on his defence, with the result that the subconscious mind becomes a prey to distorted views of things and ultimately delusional phantasy is set up. We all know that the subconscious mind in dreams invests the most ordinary stimuli with fantastic imagery: it is just the same trick that is played upon the mind when an evil, or supposed evil, lurks within the subconscious realm. Weird and wild connexions take place and thus the set of false complexes is formed. There is some truth in Freud's contention that

the effort to forget the trouble leads to that form of repression which works incalculable mischief in a great variety of ways in the subconscious mind.

The primary object of the treatment is therefore to get the patient to face the issues, and to remember exactly and vividly the past mischance or misdoing. To this end every means is resorted to, the word-reaction system, the analysis of dreams and all the ravings and apparently incoherent wanderings of paranoia are closely investigated and pieced together. In shell-shock cases the patient is induced to live through all the horrors that occasioned the disorder, with the view to bring the subconscious states into full consciousness and thus to be properly dealt with. In thus inducing the patient to retrace his steps he is brought face to face with reality, and where there has been a departure from the true course of morals or of reason, the exact point is discovered and the patient is helped to begin again on right lines. It has been termed a process of re-education by means of which the defensive delusions are broken down and an endeavour is made to enable the patient to see how delusions were formed and how absurd they have been. In this manner persons have been brought to converse about the *verae causae* of the hallucinatory states by which they were obsessed. Shell-shock cases, although they are not to be classed with paranoia or dementia, readily yield to the same treatment. These are generally not so simple as might be supposed, nor are they the mere results of concussion or of nervous shock. There is usually some predisposing factor, anxiety or dread of some hidden and secret thing in the memory, which the shock upon the battlefield releases with explosive force amongst the states of subconsciousness.<sup>1</sup> For this reason hypnotic treatment is

<sup>1</sup> Prolonged strain on the battlefield may itself prove to be a predisposing condition; the shock then comes as "the last straw."

regarded in such cases as attacking symptoms rather than reaching the root of the evil, and in consequence there remains the danger of the disorder breaking out in another, perhaps a more mischievous form. Suffice it to say that psycho-analysis has achieved some remarkable results in these cases.

The analogy between these methods of treatment and the proper treatment in moral pathology immediately becomes apparent. Not that insanity is to be considered as necessarily an immoral state or that it is induced by immoral acts. At the same time a sinful life is never far removed from insanity, and on the other hand a life of moral worth and true spiritual interests is essentially sane. That being so, moral methods and the treatment of the spiritual life must in a great measure be beneficial and work in the direction of complete sanity, if only the sufferer will submit himself to be treated by the methods of true soteriology.

It will help us in this analogy to study a little more closely the agencies employed in this process of mental healing. The first requisite on the part of the physician is, of course, sympathy. It is not, however, the indiscriminate and injudicious sympathy of friends that is needed ; this may only tend to aggravate the evil. But it is essential that the healer should gain the confidence of his patient in order that the investigation into his past life may not be viewed with suspicion as if it were a detective or a cross-examining counsel endeavouring to discover secrets which the sufferer is anxious not to give away and that he fears might be used to his disadvantage. The practitioner must be regarded as a true and trusted friend if his treatment is to be of full value. Sympathy will lead to the process known as catharsis, which may roughly be described as confession and absolution, which obviously leads to the relief of strain and undue mental tension. It is not generally the habitual offenders

or the hardened sinners who suffer most from mental anguish : on the other hand it may be intensely sensitive and generally conscientious persons who have only once lapsed from virtue, or perhaps have never lapsed at all excepting in thought, feeling or desire, or indeed in imagination merely, who are in need of help. The patient may have been shocked and alarmed by the general trend of evil in which he had been only indirectly concerned. To induce him to take a calm and dispassionate view of his own responsibility in the movement will go a long way in the direction of his restoration. Then follows what is known as autognosis, in which the afflicted person comes to know himself and, helped by suggestion, contributes his own share towards recovery, and thus assist in remedying his own mental distress. Another step is to be taken, which is perhaps the most important of all, in the direction of recovery. This is termed "sublimation," which consists in controlling and directing the passions and cravings of a non-social or anti-social character into channels that are at once healthy and beneficial. So many offences against society are occasioned by sex-impulses and appetites, repression of which may lead to mental trouble, as Freud affirms. The process of sublimation leads these passions into those directions where their exercise can only afford the highest satisfaction. According to some writers healthy occupation in the arts and crafts of life may provide scope for sublimation ; but it is generally acknowledged that religion above all, with its functions, activities and interests, is of immense value in inspiring and developing these processes of sublimation.

These are some of the agencies that are employed in psycho-therapeutics, which are brought into play by means of suggestion. One can readily trace the similarity of treatment on the part of medical experts to those employed by skilful and experienced pastors and teachers in dealings



with cases of moral pathology. The need of repentance which involves the act of facing the evil and bringing it into the full light of consciousness and the moral ideal, the value of confession, the exercise of faith in the Divine forgiveness, the assurance of help in the grace of God, with its sublimating and consecrating forces—these agencies are all suggested by the remedial measures of psychotherapeutics.

The same objections are urged against these methods in both spheres, that it is unwise to "rake up the past": but the same justification holds good in both cases, that in the interests of sanity it is necessary that the evil should be properly and exactly diagnosed and dealt with in the full light of intelligence and reason, and that there is a chance at least of removing the mischief which otherwise would rankle and produce distortions and perversions in the subconscious sphere. There is no danger that is more to be apprehended than that which arises from the lurking of a wrong within the mind that can only at best be partially suppressed.

Sanity lies in the condition of the mental complexes. These complexes can only be normal and healthy when they are brought into properly adjusted relations with the realities of life. If, as we have seen, they are false, distorted and out of harmonious association and connexion with the realm of facts, the call of duty to men and things as they are, the demands of the times and circumstances in which we are called upon to live, not only are these complexes misleading, but they are liable to give rise to all kinds of perverted ideas and illusions and even to faults and sins. In fact they produce a conflict which robs the mind of its serenity, calm and stability. The world in which we are placed forms a continual challenge to us for our best endeavours, and the challenge needs to be met in the spirit of true knowledge, of confidence and of courage. Life's problems have to be

faced and its realities accepted, always with reference to "the spirit of the whole" and the ultimate good.

It will, of course, be urged that reality is relative to our powers of apprehension and our subjective conditions, that we are living in a world of appearances and that the great problem remains unsolved as to what objective reality is. For all practical purposes, it is argued, the real world is the world as it exists for us all, and its objectivity is attested by the collective consciousness. We are therefore sane and normal if men generally acknowledge us to be. This rough and ready way of viewing the matter is not sufficient for philosophic thought, it is like cutting the Gordian knot, inasmuch as it is the question for all time to attain an adequate knowledge of objective and concrete reality.

Nevertheless, though we may have to assume that there are degrees in Reality and that it is an Ideal, yet there are values presented to the mind which may be apprehended and of which we are aware, by the immediacy of faith, and in the light of which we are called upon to live. The right orientation of one's mental powers with reference to that objective in such a respect that one feels its impact upon the consciousness will impart poise, balance and sanity to the soul, and in consequence harmful and pernicious illusions will fall away.

The thought will occur to some minds that the present world-conditions ought not to be accepted as they are, and that those who throw themselves out of connexion with circumstances, the dreamers and the visionaries, as they are termed, are the saving element in the world, even though they may be deemed by the men of their day and generation "mad." Paul was considered "mad" by Festus because he moved in a sphere and set of interests and complexes that his judge could neither understand nor appreciate,

that only served to daze and bewilder him. Even our Lord Himself was regarded by His own immediate relatives as "beside Himself," eccentric, moving in a circle that was divorced from their common and ordinary conceptions and judgments. The answer to this contention is that there are objective values in the realm of the moral and the spiritual and that these values are intuited and appreciated by persons of pure vision and prophetic spirit when ordinary minds fail to understand them and account them to be delusions. In truth it is the objective character of these intuitions that is the guarantee of sanity, and subsequent experience justifies the conviction that these so-called "visionaries" possess, that they are speaking the words of "truth and soberness." In the judgment of all the ages the personality of Jesus Christ, by reason of its being interpenetrated by the very soul of Reality, was the most completely sane and well-balanced, healthy as it was perfect.

The conclusion to which we are driven is that sanity in the ordinarily accepted mental sense is allied to sanity in morals and religious experience, and that the converse is truer than we have been disposed to imagine. At all events, sanity is the right outlook upon life and properly-adjusted relationships to reality, in so far as that reality can be grasped and accepted. In the last resort the surrender of the will to the Supreme Reality must constitute the highest sanity, and so far from unfitting men for the ordinary and commonplace duties of life, must impart balance and poise, worth and meaning to the whole personality and thus contribute in a measure towards the restoration of health and sanity to a weary and distracted world.

With this object in view we may venture to put in a plea for closer co-operation between the two Faculties: on the one hand the mental experts whose methods are so

largely moral, and on the other the religious teachers and pastors and priests whose aims are distinctively spiritual, so that by a fuller understanding of our respective aims and methods we may be in a better position and more perfectly qualified to realise the objects for which we are working each in our own peculiar sphere. The Reunion of the Churches is an ideal which may be enlarged and enriched by reference to the sum total of all the forces which make for the well-being of humanity. J. G. JAMES.

### *THE PLACE OF JESUS' ETHICAL TEACHING IN MODERN CHRISTIAN LIFE.*

Θάλασσα δέ ἐστιν ὁ κόσμος, ἐν ᾧ ἡ ἐκκλησία ὡς ναὺς ἐν πελάγει χειμάζεται μὲν ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀπόλλυται . . . παρέπονται δὲ αὐτῇ καὶ ἀγκυραὶ σιδηραῖ, αὐτοῦ τοῦ Χριστοῦ αἱ ἀγαὶ ἐντολαί, δυνατὰ οὔσαι ὡς σίδηρος.—Hippolytus, *De Antichristo.*, 59.

A PROMINENT theologian is said to have stated recently that the war had brought us no new theological problems. While strictly speaking this statement is true to fact, there is yet an important sense in which it is not true. The war has not created any new problems; but it has invested certain problems with an importance and an urgency that are out of all comparison with what they were formerly thought to have. One such problem I take to be that suggested in the headline, viz. What is the exact relation between the ethical teaching of the historical Jesus, as recorded in the Synoptic Gospels, and the practical life of the modern Christian?

By way of a start let us call to mind three typical views that have in recent years been taken in regard to this relation—two extreme views, and an intermediate one.

Firstly, there is the literalist extreme, represented—in its full logical baldness—probably by no one, but more or less closely approximated to by Tolstoy and (less noticeably



perhaps) by modern admirers of the literal-minded Francis of Assisi. This view would take the theory of verbal inspiration seriously, so far as the Gospels are concerned, and would treat the collection of imperatives they contain like the clauses of an Act of Parliament, the whole of which is equally binding and which needs the sanction of no authority beyond itself.

Secondly, and at the opposite pole of the theological firmament, is the view that reduces the practical importance of the precepts of the historical Jesus to a minimum, and puts forward some sort of a reasoned theory for so doing. As representatives of this position, we can take three modern Christian writers of some eminence. The first of these is Professor Wilhelm Herrmann of Marburg, a man who before the war enjoyed an immense reputation in this country as a noble Christian thinker and prophet.<sup>1</sup> Herrmann's view—given in *Essays on the Social Gospel*<sup>2</sup>—is that, now we have learnt that Jesus expected the world to come to an end within a few years and was mistaken in that expectation, we are emancipated from the duty of attempting to obey absolutely His traditional words in our rule of life to-day (p. 182). He says: "Endeavours to imitate Jesus in points inseparable from His especial mission in the world, and His position—which is not ours—towards that world—efforts like these, lacking the sincerity of really necessary tasks, have so long injured the cause of Jesus, that our joy will be unalloyed when scientific study at last reveals to every one the impossibility of all such attempts" (p. 181). "As a result of that frame of mind whereby we are united with Him, we desire the existence of a national

<sup>1</sup> See, for instance, Dr. Mackintosh's eulogy of Herrmann, quoted in *Public Opinion* for January 9, 1914, p. 51.

<sup>2</sup> By A. Harnack and W. Herrmann. English Translation, published by Williams and Norgate, 1907 ("Crown Theological Library").

State, with a character and with duties with which Jesus was not yet acquainted; we will not let ourselves be led astray, even if in this form of human nature various features are as sharply opposed to the mode of life and standpoint of Jesus as is the dauntless use of arms" (pp. 217 f.).<sup>1</sup> The next exponent of this view that I select is Dr. H. H. Scullard, of London. Dr. Scullard, in an article on "The Originality and Finality of Christian Ethics" in *The Hibbert Journal* for January, 1917, says: "When men point to the Sermon on the Mount, or rather to parts of that Sermon—for that, I think, is what is generally done—when men point to parts of that Sermon, torn from their context in the Sermon itself, in the Synoptist teaching generally, and also in the whole revelation which Jesus Himself brought and was to men, they are likely enough to misinterpret those fragments which seem so clear to their self-restricted vision. Even the whole of the Synoptist teaching is only a first draft, a kind of interim ethic, eternal as every word of God is, but awaiting its final interpretation, expansion, and completion in the glorification of the Teacher and the opening of the Kingdom to all believers. In the transition period represented by the Synoptists, when the minds of the disciples were filled with carnal or at least theocratic notions of the Kingdom, how was it possible for them to comprehend fully the ethics of that Kingdom? It was only when they had risen together with Christ and were sitting with Him in the heavenly places that they understood. So it is to Peter after his conversion, to John after his illumination, and to Paul after he had been initiated into the mysteries of the Kingdom of Grace that we turn for the fuller exposition of the mind of Christ," and so on.<sup>2</sup> Lastly, I quote a

<sup>1</sup> A similar view is taken by several English scholars; see, e.g., Kirsopp Lake, *The Stewardship of Faith*, pp. 30-36, 71.

<sup>2</sup> *Hibbert Journal*, January, 1917, pp. 242 f.

few lines from Dr. P. T. Forsyth's *Christian Ethic of War* (1916): "Christianity is not chiefly loyalty to a Master but life in a Redeemer, i.e. life on the principle of His Redemption, i.e. in the *Holy Spirit*. . . . If we have been insisting on the supreme authority of the teaching of Jesus we cannot be surprised that our pupils turn Quakers. But as Evangelical Christians we ought not so to insist. We have been rearing our neophytes wrong. The teaching of Jesus is not the foundation of Christian ethic but is to be interpreted by that which is—namely the Redemption of the Cross as the moral crisis of the world and the creator of the new conscience in historic conditions" (p. 193: there are many similar passages throughout the book).

Thirdly—and intermediate between these two extremes—comes the position of the average earnest and thoughtful Christian, a position appearing in countless different forms, but generally characterised by a most depressing vagueness. The historical Jesus on this view is not sharply distinguished from the Christ of theology and of Christian experience; He is genuinely revered as the Saviour and Guide of men; His teaching as a whole is admitted to be authoritative for Christians at all times; His words are reverently expounded from the pulpit and in the Bible-class, and attempts are made to shape life according to them. But these attempts are confined within somewhat narrow limits, out of respect for a host of other indefinite authorities—common sense, fashion, patriotism, protection of society, denominational loyalty, and what not: and the trouble is—not so much that limits should exist—as that those who recognise them can rarely or never give a reasoned account of them or relate them rationally to that authority of Jesus, for which they profess in the abstract such unbounded deference.

Here then are three divergent views: and it must be our endeavour to extract from each of them, if we can, the

element of truth in it, to the exclusion of whatever error is associated therewith. Let us begin with a criticism of the two extremes, and firstly that of the literalist.

To take the recorded words of Jesus as the *ultimate* authority for Christian conduct would, if any one did it consistently, quickly land us in obvious absurdities. For if the written word is our *ultimate* basis, we have no right to introduce any other standard of measurement which shall enable us to judge one saying more important than another. As soon as we have declared that, say, the command to love God is of greater importance than the command to cross the Sea of Galilee, we have departed from the strictly literalist basis, and have introduced a standard of authority more fundamental than the word of Scripture—viz. the testimony of God's Spirit within our own hearts. Nay, were it not for that inner testimony of God's Spirit, we should have no means of recognising that God was in Jesus at all: for the bare external fact that things are written of Him in a book clearly could not of itself convince us that those things are true. However, even the professed literalist really knows that there is a region in which the words and example of Jesus are not binding on him. No literalist proposes to live in Palestine, because Jesus lived there, to go up to Jerusalem for the Passover as He went up, to wear a fringe on the edge of his garment as He did in obedience to the Law of Moses. No literalist feels it a duty to obey the commands that Jesus gave to His disciples to fetch the ass for Him to ride on or to make ready the Last Supper. There *is* an area in the Gospels which has no direct significance for modern Christian conduct; and on the strictly literalist basis, you cannot consistently recognise the existence of this area—much less of course can you define or settle its limits.

But if this extreme view be mistaken, how much more



seriously in error is the opposite view, represented by Drs. Herrmann, Scullard, and Forsyth. Let us briefly examine the statements of these three scholars.

What Dr. Herrmann says amounts to this : as Jesus had a mistaken idea about the future duration of the world-order, we need not try to obey those of His teachings which come into conflict with what he calls "social duties to which we all wish to cling" (p. 163). Now whatever truth there may be in the view that Jesus did expect a world-cataclysm to occur within a few years, we are not thereby driven to suppose that His mind was at all times dominated or obsessed by that thought. There is nothing eschatological about the parable of the Good Samaritan : and when Jesus gives the ground for His most characteristic ethical precepts, that ground is not the approaching end of the world, but the duty of imitating God and the Son of Man. We are to love our enemies and do them good, not because the end of the world is soon coming and so it does not matter if a few rascals go unpunished, but in order that we may become the sons of our heavenly Father, whose rain falls and whose sun shines on evil and good alike. We are to be the humble servants of one another, not because society is on its death-bed and therefore the maintenance of authority is of no consequence, but because the Son of Man Himself came not to be ministered unto, but to minister. And further, even Herrmann grants that the command to love our enemies and the words of Jesus dealing with the love of peace are not among the sayings invalidated by Jesus' eschatological error (pp. 178 f., 202 f.). But he gives no clear ground as to why these precepts should be singled out from the others for observance : nor does he explain how obedience to them is to be harmonised with "the dauntless use of arms."

Next, in regard to Dr. Scullard's view. Dr. Scullard

parries the attack of those who appeal to the "hard sayings" of the Sermon on the Mount, firstly, by objecting to these sayings being "torn from their context," and secondly, by putting on one side the whole Synoptic teaching of Jesus as belonging to the stage before the disciples were properly illuminated as to the Master's mind. To which we must say, firstly, that Gospel criticism shows us that we can rarely be sure of the actual historical context of any particular saying: our records are not sufficiently complete or exact to enable us to do so: if, therefore, words of Jesus are not to be used unless we can have the context with them, then we must say goodbye to any attempt to find practical guidance for ourselves in the Gospels at all. As regards the context of these sayings "in the whole revelation which Jesus Himself brought and was to men," that revelation is itself the subject of such varied interpretation and so full of what is theologically and philosophically problematic, that no single type of Christian experience or method of presenting the Gospel can be accepted of as higher authority than the experience or presentation of the Master Himself. Secondly, the Synoptic Gospels, though they tell the story of a period of imperfect illumination on the part of the disciples, were yet themselves written *after* the fuller illumination had come. All the epistles of Paul, and probably that of Peter as well, were written before, not after, the Gospel of Mark, which was itself the earliest of the three Synoptic Gospels. And thirdly, on the particular point with which Dr. Scullard is implicitly dealing, viz. the non-resistance teaching in the Sermon on the Mount, there is not a pin's head to choose, so far as the severity of the command is concerned, between the hard sayings of Jesus on the one hand and on the other the injunctions of the Apostle Paul (Rom. xii. 17-21; 1 Thess. v. 15) and in fact the Apostolic and early Christian ethical teaching in general.

I do not propose to attempt here a criticism of that extraordinary doctrine of the Atonement, on the basis of which Dr. Forsyth sees his way to make such short work of the teaching of Jesus ; but I will only remark that this view scarcely seems to do justice to the tremendous emphasis which Jesus Himself laid on the importance of obedience to His words. " Every one that heareth these words of mine and doeth them not, will be like a foolish man who built his house upon the sand ; and the rain descended, and the floods came, and the winds blew, and struck against that house ; and down it fell with a mighty crash." " Heaven and earth will pass away, but my words will not pass away." When one is told after this that it is a mistake to insist on the supreme authority of the teaching of Jesus, and that the teaching of Jesus is not the foundation of Christian Ethic, one begins to wonder what there is to choose between such a view, which reduces the historical Jesus to a mere theologoumenon, and the Christ-myth theory, which dispenses with Him altogether. One is strongly reminded of the comment of the atheist doctor in Tennyson's poem : " All very well—but the good Lord Jesus has had His day."

But above and beyond the criticisms which we might pass upon the utterances of these three authors taken in detail, there is yet a further judgment to be made in regard to the general position which they hold in common. As I read Christian history, those periods or phases in which the Church has done her Master's work most thoroughly and successfully have always been marked by a fresh insistence on the importance of some aspect of Jesus' teaching, and *vice versa* all the worst lapses of the Church, all the foulest stains on her record, have been connected with some striking departure from that teaching. Surely there was never a time more truly glorious in the annals of the Church than the first two and a half centuries of her life. There

we see at its best the tireless energy of the Christian propagandist, the steady courage of the martyr, the attainment—on the widest scale—of the loftiest Christian morality. And yet this was the time when simple obedience to the words of Jesus in general and to the hard sayings of the Sermon on the Mount in particular was openly professed by all representative Christian writers, and doubtless in the main consistently practised by the rank and file. The Franciscan revival, which woke the conscience of Europe in the thirteenth century, was started and led by a man whose object it was to reproduce the life of Jesus in himself in the closest detail. The Reformation in the sixteenth century,<sup>1</sup> Puritanism in the seventeenth, and Methodism in the eighteenth—all derived the special blessing they conferred on humanity from their conscious or unconscious emphasis on some truth taught by Jesus but forgotten by the Church of their day. And conversely, the things in Christian history which we deplore, which make us hang our heads in shame before the eyes of the world, which cause the enemies of the Lord to blaspheme, and make organised Christianity stink in the nostrils of whole masses of religiously and morally minded people—these are the things in which the Church has on one ground or another departed from the precepts of Jesus; and you can almost measure the extent of the damage that has been done in each case by the extent of the departure from Gospel teaching by which it was accompanied. I refer to such things as the over-elaboration and over-emphasis of the ritual trappings of worship, the uncharitable tone and spirit of various hair-splitting doctrinal controversies, the toleration of social wrongs and neglect of social needs, and worst of all—persecution, “the thumb-screw and the stake, for the glory of the Lord.” Now all these aberrations

<sup>1</sup> A. Moor, in *Crux Mundi*, p. 58: “They appealed from the Christianity of the sixteenth century to the Christianity of Christ.”



—to give them no stronger name—could have been avoided if people had only been more anxious to carry out the ethical teaching of Jesus; and furthermore, the worst of them can be defended if reasons can be found for relegating that teaching to the background. That this is no idle insinuation will appear from the following words written in 1888 by one who is now a leading Cambridge scholar: “Thus it is that Christ never seems to wish so much to assert a new truth, or a new law, as to impress upon His hearers the spiritual significance of some old truth or law; to raise them altogether out of the sphere of petty detail into the life of all-embracing principles. . . . He cares little for the mere mechanical performance of legal or moral duties—the outward life, but much for the inward life, the spiritual *ποῦ στῶ*.” Then a few lines later: “The theory upon which the Inquisition acted, that physical sufferings are of no moment in comparison with the supreme importance of the spiritual welfare, is quite consonant with the tone of Christ’s commands and teaching.”<sup>1</sup> The frankness of these words enables us to see clearly into what depths of unchristian iniquity this free and easy attitude towards the commands of Jesus is liable to precipitate—and has in actual fact often precipitated—his professed followers.

“The ‘Thou shalt do no murder,’ which God’s hand  
Wrote on her conscience Mary rubb’d out pale—  
She could not make it white—and over that,  
Traced in the blackest text of Hell—‘Thou shalt!’  
And signed it—Mary!”

“Philip and the Pope  
Must have signed too.”<sup>2</sup>

If therefore on the score both of logical weakness and practical harmfulness we have to reject the view of those who tell us that the precepts of the historical Jesus consti-

<sup>1</sup> J. F. Bethune-Baker, *The Influence of Christianity on War*, pp. 11 f.

<sup>2</sup> Tennyson, *Queen Mary* (*Works*, p. 608).

tute no binding authority for modern Christian conduct, the natural course to pursue would be to take refuge in the opposite theory, viz. that of absolutely literal obedience. But this theory we have already found to be inadequate. We seem driven towards that unsatisfactory middle position, which realises that the historical Jesus has got to be taken seriously, and knows at the same time that there is an area in His life and teaching which has no direct significance for modern life, but unfortunately possesses no principles according to which that area can be defined. The position is made still more difficult by the complexity of modern life, in which hardly a single situation ever presents one plain issue and no more, but which always compels us to face situations involving a tangle of apparently diverging principles, one of which can be preserved only by sacrificing the rest. Would it not be best, we may ask, to say no more, and simply leave it to the individual judgment to deal with each case on its merits? Yes, and no. Leave it to the individual by all means: for whatever seems on the whole to be right for him when the time for action arrives is always the best he is capable of in his present state. Notwithstanding any appearance to the contrary in this paper, I may say here once for all that I believe no man can rightly be censured for interpreting his Christian duty in a different way from ourselves, unless he himself confesses his blameworthiness. Whatever a man feels to be right for the time being that we must all fully recognise as right for him, however clear we may be that it would be wrong for us to do the same. In that sense then we must always leave it to the individual. But that is not to say that there is no purpose to be served by comparing notes with one another as to the grounds on which we form our moral decisions. By such discussion and even controversy, we may both give to and receive from one another important help on knotty and difficult

questions. Without prejudice therefore to the entire validity of every honest decision relative to the person that makes it, and without prejudice to Christian freedom and mutual toleration, we may go further and attempt a little constructive thinking on the question before us.

Some remarks have already been offered to the effect that the only really final and ultimate authority in moral and religious matters is the testimony of the Holy Spirit in our own hearts. It is only in so far as God gives us this inner light that we are able to recognise His presence and read His will in things and persons outside ourselves—in Nature, in the Bible, in the Church, in good men and women, and in good books. But this ultimacy and supremacy of the inner light does not mean that each man is able unaided to spin the concrete content of the moral law for himself out of his own vitals, as the spider produces its web. It is the office rather of this inner light to bear witness to—and so direct us to and enable us to recognise—the embodiment of the Divine presence and will in authorities external to ourselves. It does not itself provide the full content of the moral law, but it shows us where we may find that content and enables us to keep a certificatory check on such instalments of it as we may receive. Let us use a homely parallel. I need some authoritative judgment on a matter of medicine, on which I have personally no technical knowledge whatever. I consult my doctor, and accept his judgment as obviously better than my own. But, though he is in a real sense the objective and external authority to which I bow, yet at bottom the real ground of that authority is an internal, subjective, and private act of judgment on my own part. His authority over me depends on the fact that I have first satisfied myself that he is worth trusting. It was I, and not he, that decided where I should go for guidance ; and further, little as I know about medicine, I do

reserve to myself throughout a right to decline the expert's advice if it appears to me absurd or immoral. In other words, I keep a check on what he tells me to do. Now similarly in this matter of the practical content of the moral law, seeing that we are in need—not so much of the initial stimulus—as of definite external guidance, what can we do but go to him to whom the Spirit of God within us points as the most perfect embodiment of the Divine Will in human life that has ever been given—viz. the historical Jesus? To attempt therefore to dispense with the guidance of the Jesus of history, in favour of that of the living and indwelling Christ, is to confuse the function of the inner witness of God's Spirit in our hearts with that of the external authority to which that witness points us. The very fact that this inner witness has been called the “indwelling *Christ*” is proof that it is strictly and closely correlative with the historical figure of Jesus. The life, words, deeds, and ideals of Jesus of Nazareth form, then, a real model for him who at any period of history or in any set of conditions calls himself a Christian. This is not to fall back on bald literalism: for our *ultimate* basis is not the historical figure, but the Divine illumination which tells us that Jesus is the revelation of God; and by virtue of that Divine illumination we can discriminate, not only between what is probably true and probably false historically about Jesus, but also between what is of temporary and what of permanent value in His life and teaching. It does not indeed furnish a cut and dried system of limits, marking off infallibly that area of insignificance of which we have spoken, but it at least gives us a logical ground on which we may seek to delimit it for ourselves—the very thing which bald literalism forbids us to do. But on the other hand the view here advocated is likewise very distinct from that of those who reduce the authority of the historical Jesus to a vague recognition of



Him as being somehow or other the basis on which their own theological constructions can be reared. Least of all does it leave room for those perversions of Christian judgment which in the case of Dr. Herrmann links the desire for a national state and the dauntless use of arms with the frame of mind whereby we are united with Jesus, and in the case of Dr. Forsyth bases the justification for the infliction of bloody penalties by man on man on the very self-sacrifice of Jesus upon the cross.

The view which I advocate, therefore, is one which recognises in the historical Jesus a real authority for modern life—an authority not to be subordinated either to the demands of custom, or to loyalty to established institutions, or to the enactments of the state, or even—what will be less easily granted—to that good, but relatively inferior, standard of morals which represents the highest to which the society around us can for the present attain. The detailed application of this authority to practical life will of course not always be a simple or straightforward affair; but our obedience to it, in matters in which its requirements are clear, must not be postponed because there are other regions of conduct which are known to be out of harmony with it, but in regard to which its exact bearing is too uncertain or complicated to determine our action. Its verdict on complicated problems will be made plain in proportion to the faithfulness with which its verdict on simpler issues are obeyed.

It seems to me that it is in the light of some such view as this that we should have to find our way through that series of time-honoured antitheses which have so often been used to discourage endeavours to treat the words of Jesus as a practical guide,—I mean the antitheses between letter and spirit, temporary and eternal, external and internal, precept and underlying principle, law and grace. It would

be on these lines that I should seek to answer the objections—each of them containing an element of truth, but neither (I think) really fatal to my argument,—that Jesus did not have to face the particular problems of our day, and that He did not come to promulgate a code of laws.

And especially at a time like this—when, however we may differ on other matters, we all agree in deploring the weakness and the failures of the Church of Christ—there is special need that we should reconsider our attitude to our Founder and Saviour and Lord, and ask ourselves whether the way out of our present distresses does not lie, where the true Reformers of the Church have always consciously or unconsciously found it to lie, namely, in a closer and simpler obedience to Him who exclaimed, “Why call ye me, Lord, Lord, and do not the things which I say?”<sup>1</sup> “It was reserved for Christianity,” says Lecky,<sup>2</sup> “to present to the world an ideal character, which through all the changes of eighteen centuries has inspired the hearts of men with an impassioned love; has shown itself capable of acting on all ages, nations, temperaments, and conditions; has been not only the highest pattern of virtue but the strongest incentive to its practice. . . . This” (continues Lecky, speaking of the life of Jesus) “has indeed been the well-spring of whatever is best and purest in Christian life. Amid all the sins and failings, amid all the priestcraft and persecution and fanaticism that have defaced the Church, it has preserved, in the character and example of its Founder, an enduring principle of regeneration.”

C. J. CADOUX.

<sup>1</sup> “If the Churches could revise their whole attitude to mankind in the light of the teaching of Jesus Christ. . . . they would come much nearer the Christian ideal” (Dr. Selbie, on “The Reconstruction of Theology” in *The Hibbert Journal*, October 1917, p. 59.

<sup>2</sup> *History of European Morals*, vol. ii. pp. 8 f.

## FORMATIVE CONCEPTIONS OF ATONEMENT IN WESTERN CATHOLICISM.

It may be said in praise of Western Christianity as a whole that it reveals a truer sympathy with the ethical principles and emphasis of the New Testament than can be discovered in the theology of the East. On the other hand, Western Catholicism from the outset lacks the thought of true moral necessity, and its progressive evolution more and more imperils the central glories of the gospel. Sacramental theology with its mysteries, and church discipline, with its relative and uncertain standards, first occupied the field. When a theology of atonement did come into being, it was shaped and moulded by these compromising influences.

We have to begin by recalling the question, How is man to be forgiven? We know the leading Catholic answer: Man is forgiven at his baptism. But baptism has come to be administered habitually to unconscious infants; therefore the answer is sterile for the interpretation of atonement. For a time it seemed possible that this was to be not only the leading but the exclusive assertion of Catholicism in regard to forgiveness. Considerable sections of early Christian opinion—with a clear measure of encouragement from portions of the New Testament, e.g. Hebrews, though not, one thinks, without discouragement from other sections of the New Testament, e.g. from St. Paul—refused to admit the sure hope of any second forgiveness after grave sin. Yet so characteristic a specimen of rigorist Christianity as Tertullian, who ultimately adhered to Montanism, gave an immense impulse to the theological or disciplinary regulation of the forgiveness of *lesser* post-baptismal sins. And, as the Catholic system slowly

developed towards a "sacrament of penance," with its three finally recognised ingredients—contrition, (auricular) confession, satisfaction—it only made more plain what was contained *in nuce* in the glowing but fierce and bitter piety of the brilliant African.

Satisfaction and merit, and perhaps in a sense punishment, were conditions of being forgiven and of assuring oneself of the favour of God. Out of these disciplinary conceptions, in course of time, interpretations of the Atonement were to be drawn. Not the first and greatest forgiveness, but the secondary forgiveness of average sin-stained Christian lives, came to afford what passed as a clue to the work of Christ, the supreme manifestation of the grace of God. But all that is of later growth. Primarily, the bases of Western thought are disciplinary and legal. The central term is Satisfaction. Along with Satisfaction we must not fail to keep in view the thought of Merit, whether we are dealing with the theory of discipline or with the theology of Atonement. Punishment is much less definitely involved in the texture of Catholic thought, yet it is not wholly absent.

*The Starting Point.*—Most terms in philosophy and religion have had prehistoric existence in other regions of the human mind. Tertullian was trained as a lawyer. It has been disputed whether his professional bias did much to imprint the character of legalism upon the theology of Western Catholicism. The legal currents may have been strong enough to force their way, independently of special personal leadership. Yet, even if Tertullian is not a cause, he is highly significant as a symptom of the spirit of his age and as a prophecy of evolving Catholic beliefs.

Moreover, it turns out curiously that the legal term "satisfaction" in its most precise and technical use by the Roman lawyers referred to that "private" law which



regulated the relation of individual to individual. Accordingly, "satisfaction" in its pre-theological days implied something relative, partial, arbitrarily accepted rather than that "full, true and proper" satisfaction of which Protestant Articles of Religion speak. Those who have to do with education come to be familiar with the heading "Satisfied the Examiner." The phrase is far from connoting a performance which is everything that the examiners' hearts could crave. Rather, the performance will just serve—it will pass muster! Similar implications attach to "satisfaction" in Roman law. *Solvere* and not *satisfacere* is the proper techical expression for the true and exact discharge of a liability. In a less precise sense, say our authorities,<sup>1</sup> any claim adequately met according to law may be described as "satisfied." But the main usage denotes a bare legal sufficiency in contrast to a full discharge of what is owing. One might say that, in *strict* usage, satisfaction means a *non-strict* payment. It means a partial discharge, "accepted" as equivalent to a complete discharge.

Of course words are slippery things. This element of inexactness—*quasi*-satisfaction rather than full satisfaction—is not constant in theological usage. One observes that in the *Cur Deus Homo*<sup>2</sup> the words "satisfacere" and "solvere" are precise synonyms. Again, the Protestant doctrine of satisfaction implies beyond shadow of doubt full discharge of the inexorable claims of law. Strangely enough, Grotius the lawyer bethinks himself—when in his own fashion he is "defending" the doctrine of Christ's satisfaction—that *satisfacere* is not the same thing as *solvere*, and Mr. Mozley points out that he is echoed in this

<sup>1</sup> Franks, relying upon Hermann Schultz in *Studien und Kritiken*, who in his turn relies upon help given him by a legal colleague, Professor Merkel.

<sup>2</sup> Bk. I. chap. xx. *et al.*

by Richard Baxter. "After Last returns the First, though a wide compass round be fetched." So long as penitential satisfactions are contemplated, not even the dullest conscience could suppose that these are "full, true and proper."

Merit itself, we are told, was a term with legal antecedents, both as good desert and as ill desert. And the interesting question is raised by Schultz, how merit and satisfaction are related to each other in Catholic thought. Obviously, the Catholic theologians have not discussed the question. We have to raise it for ourselves. Schultz answers that Merit is the genus and Satisfaction a particular species. With a certain reserve, Principal Franks concurs. He holds that punishment must also come into the reckoning. In satisfaction there is a penal, or—we might say—a *quasi-penal* element. Still, upon the whole, Satisfaction is a "kind" of merit.

This finding startles one. Merit creates a Plus; satisfaction obliterates a Minus. How can the two be brought together? Yet, when one reads Schultz or Franks with due care, difficulty practically vanishes; for the explanations we require meet us at one point or another, if perhaps hardly with such clearness or emphasis as we might have desired. The whole system presupposes that man can put God into His debt. If man has previously incurred debt to God by acts of sin, his newly achieved good works or meritorious sufferings liquidate the Minus. If he has a clean slate at the time, his new merit stands as a Plus. If he has a credit balance, the balance is swelled. Schultz quotes abundantly to show that satisfaction is not regarded by the Catholic mind as of the nature of punishment, and argues that therefore it *must* be of the nature of merit. Franks, however, points out that the things which rank as meritorious—either in Tertullian's age, or with modification later—are, all or most of them, self-inflicted sufferings,

Guided by this hint, we were careful to include "meritorious sufferings" as well as "good works" when we named the things which Catholicism held to avail for the penitent sinner's profit. Obviously, the penal element here is of the nature of *quasi*-punishment rather than that true, deserved punishment which God requires and exacts. What Christian conscience is so dulled as to believe that personal sufferings have atoned in full for moral guilt? We are in the Catholic world of relative necessities. Shifting and wavering standards encompass us, and baffle us. This is the case with equal plainness whether we view satisfaction as a "kind" of merit or as a "kind" of punishment.

It is not less plain in regard to Merit as such. The thought is a bad one, undermining the conscience. "When ye have done all, say We are servants; we have done what it was our duty to do." <sup>1</sup> But a further complication discloses itself. The Catholic mind, working upon Catholic premises, sought to find in merit something beyond what is fully due—something supererogatory; the thought if not the word occurs already in Tertullian and even before him, in Hermas. Yet loosely, in the general contrast of "good desert" with "ill desert," plain obedience to God's law, or the endurance of *quasi*-penal sufferings on the sinner's part, is given the lofty name of merit. Historical Protestantism refuses to admit the conception of merit in us, if only because of our sin. And that is well, though still insufficient. All serious moral judgment must reject a point of view which destroys moral necessity and subverts moral dependence. But, if we were to admit the thought, let it be real merit! There is further mischief still in a *quasi*-merit; wavering, arbitrary, hollow.

*The Catholic Development of Legalism.*—What is true

<sup>1</sup> Luke xvii. 10, finely amended by Wellhausen after the Syr. Sin. by omission of the harsh epithet "unprofitable."

of the starting point of Western Catholic thought becomes more and more fully true in the ages during which Catholicism is spinning its web and drawing out its inferences. The half morality of the Catholic ethic is not static. It is not given once for all. It develops, it grows—from bad to worse. And, in course of time, everything—to borrow an expression used by A. B. Bruce in criticising Mansel—becomes “quasi.” Each category is cut down from its proper identity. Catholic piety is more and more encouraged by its chiefs to still its hunger with *Ersatz* productions—were that ever possible.

God requires faith, and “without faith it is impossible to please Him.” The Catholic mind makes this requirement into a legal demand, and turns faith from meaning humble trust in God and in the victory of goodness into meaning assent to the Church’s dogmas. When this change in the meaning of the word has been established, it is no longer possible to hold that in any true sense faith is God’s whole requirement. As Dr. Charles Beard remarked in his Hibbert Lectures, we could never consent to speak of “justification by belief” as Christians do gladly of “justification by faith.” And yet, for modern Catholicism, the two are precise synonyms. For ages the impression of the New Testament doctrine of grace produced its natural effect upon minds that lived in the central stream of Catholic piety. “Sola fide” is no novel Protestant war cry. From Ambrosiaster to St. Bernard, and possibly beyond these limits, it meets us again and again. On the finished and precise Catholic view, faith is “dogmatic” faith and is a part of God’s requirement. We have to *add* to faith by an external union other things which rank as meritorious—penances and good works.

And then comes the usual degradation. Faith is not to survive unmutilated, even in the strange disguise of



assent to dogmas. The *Ersatz* form of "implicit faith" may suffice for many purposes, for most, almost for all. He who hands his blank cheque to the Church, and believes with the Church, is held to believe *by implication* whatever the Church teaches. It then becomes a work of mercy on the Church's part to cut down the amount of dogma which must be known and approved by the individual in order to his winning salvation; and theologians vie with each other in making the list of necessary truths shorter and shorter. If the question can be raised at all, How much the saved soul needs to know, the question is strictly one between the soul and the God who has made and who has redeemed it.<sup>1</sup> Utterly to be desired are fulness of experience and depth of conviction, that "we may know the things which are freely given to us by God." Poor and inadequate as our best explanations must be, Christian faith is a unity. By implication, a very narrow circle of known truths, a very dim apprehension of their grounds and of their force, suffices to bring an empty soul into relation to all the fulness of God. That is true faith, in its extreme weakness, but also in its inestimable preciousness. Such "implication" of belief is a very different thing from mechanically saying "ditto" to the Church and to the hierarchy.

If there is anything to be added to faith, though in truth it cannot be separated therefrom, God requires repentance. And accordingly contrition of heart appears as one-third of the contents of the developed sacrament of penance. But again the *quasi*-merciful process is set in motion, and *quasi*-repentance is approved as a substitute for true spiritual sorrow on account of sin and true self-devotion to a new life. Attrition as well as contrition is among the psycholo-

<sup>1</sup> Catholicism is of course in an unhappy plight, and *cannot* "leave it at that."

gical possibilities ; and scholastic ingenuity will establish, to its own satisfaction, that regret based on selfish motives may initiate a process leading straight on to eternal salvation. A repentance which is no repentance may do the work of genuine repentance.

I am not able to report any progressive weakening in the usage of the word "satisfaction."<sup>1</sup> Perhaps indeed we shall rather discover a strengthening in significance—whether solid or precarious—when the term is definitely extended by Anselm to the work of Christ. The Church follows Anselm's lead, at least in word, and perseveres in the usage to this day. But satisfaction is always associated with the companion term merit ; and in regard to merit the wonted process goes cheerfully forward. New distinctions are set up between different kinds of merit, and lend themselves to new processes of attenuation and evasion. So far as our guides inform us, the new distinctions are not brought into relation with the original embarrassment whereby merit, properly a supererogatory goodness, is made to include common dutifulness and even common law-abiding decency of behaviour. The new casuistical apparatus goes back to Alexander of Hales, whose importance in the history of mediæval thought appears to be one of the discoveries of recent study. It makes a difference whether with Ritschl<sup>2</sup> one passes straight from Anselm and Abelard to St. Thomas, or whether one notes how very far the process of watering down the thought of moral necessity had been carried by St. Anselm's successors and how largely Aquinas stands for a reaction, effective or ineffective, towards better things. Yet the casuistical

<sup>1</sup> Sometimes, in tentative fashion, the dangerous distinctions which we shall presently note in the doctrine of merit spread to the doctrine of satisfaction.

<sup>2</sup> Dr. Denney still adopts the same treatment.

refinements or corruptions, once introduced, are never truly set aside within Catholicism. Merit *de condigno*—true merit, which really is meritorious—is flanked continuously after Alexander's time by *Ersatz* merit, merit *de congruo*. Very different amounts of room and scope may be given by different schoolmen to merits *de congruo* in the career of sinners who are being saved with help from the Church's means of grace. It is hard for a non-expert to ascertain how much is assigned even by St. Thomas. But the general state of the case is clear. There is a merit which is meritorious, and there is another merit which is only *quasi*-meritorious. And inevitably the cheaper type tends to encroach upon the costlier, as, according to Gresham's law, bad money drives out good. One says it again—the intelligent Protestant has no interest in asserting any doctrine of merit at all. But it is a fresh injury to the Christian faith on the part of Catholicism when, having corrupted the gospel by the thought of merit, Catholicism goes on to corrupt and adulterate that very thought of merit with which it professes to work; just as we have seen it corrupting its own inadequate and unworthy conception of faith.

The degradation of "merit" is pretty well completed in Thomas's great rival, Duns Scotus, champion, as his admirers think, of the "primacy of the will." However his phraseology may be turned—and Duns retains even the term "satisfaction," though the thought is far from him—Duns carries back merit to "acceptation." This is true of every kind of merit—highest as well as lowest, genuine merit as well as *quasi*-merit. The divine will or wilfulness makes it what it is. There is no objective standard whatever.

The same weakening, the same wavering, meets us in regard to grace; and here again the dangerous scholastic

distinctions go back to Alexander. He it is who formulates the contrast between the *quasi-grace* of "*gratia gratis data*" and the genuine or efficacious grace of "*gratia gratum faciens*." The terminology assuredly is strange. One might have affirmed with confidence that the very essence or form of grace was to be a "free gift"—*gratis data*. However, in mediæval language, *gratia gratis data* is that which has *only* the quality of being a free gift of God's undeserved goodness. It is pretty well identical with those general movements of the Holy Spirit of which Calvinism heartlessly enough speaks; for Calvinism unambiguously regards "general" grace as inevitably barren; and mediæval Augustinianism cannot escape similar beliefs, though it may and does seek refuge in evasive and ambiguous phrases. *Gratia gratum faciens* is, according to Alexander and to the Catholic Church following him, grace indeed. It also is free, except in so far as doctrines of merit encroach on the evangelical faith of Christendom. But its freeness is not its main glory. It adds higher gifts. It is sacramental in kind and saving in effect, for the sacrament becomes a "means of grace" enabling the sinner to acquire merits—whether genuine and literal, or ranking as such by arbitrary Divine decree.

Possibly the differences between Calvinism and the mediæval sacramentalism are in favour of the latter. Calvinism has the advantage in respect of logical clearness and frankness; mediævalism has the advantage of endeavouring to assert justice in God, or to disguise the essential injustice involved in its creed. *Quasi-merit* (*de congruo*) and *quasi-grace* (*gratis data*) are alike efforts to show how there may be hope for a man who does his best and is faithful in a few things. Unfortunately, if they succeed, they do but teach that from unworthy and selfish beginnings we may go straight on to a good hope of eternal salvation. Neither



Calvinism with its catastrophic doctrine of the new life, nor sacramentalism which proposes to "crib" grace "by inches," has light to impart to a conscience that has caught even a glimpse of the Christ of God. Plainly, from motives it regards as merciful, mediæval theology will incline to make more of the lesser grace—the *gratis data* in its peculiarly limited sense. And so an *Ersatz* grace is found to match the *Ersatz* merit "de congruo."<sup>1</sup>

*Transition to the Doctrine of the Work of Christ.*—Long before Anselm, fugitive efforts had been made to interpret the work of Christ as a legal satisfaction; but it was reserved for Anselm to commend the position in his own fashion, and to establish it for all the future of Western Catholicism, though assuredly not without limitations. In the mind of Anselm himself, "satisfaction" is objective and is absolute. He believes in a real need for a real satisfaction to God's honour.

On the other hand, satisfaction in Anselm's thought has nothing to do with punishment. As the necessity for satisfaction is absolute, the disjunction too is treated as absolute—*either* satisfaction *or* punishment must follow on sin. And yet, even in Anselm, satisfaction is interpreted as, in a sense, paid to the righteousness as well as to the personal honour of God. Implicitly, this view of things suggests a connexion with punishment. And, when the doctrine of Christ's satisfaction meets with general acceptance, penal or *quasi*-penal interpretations accompany it in influential utterances of mediæval theology. Peter Lombard speaks of *condigna satisfactio*.<sup>2</sup> Thomas Aquinas speaks of Christ's *superabundans satisfactio*, but the *satis*-

<sup>1</sup> It is arguable that the mischief was partly done by Augustine himself, and that *gratia cooperans* in its contrast with *gratia operans* is a thought destructive of entire dependence upon God in Christ.

<sup>2</sup> Schultz, who gives these quotations, argues that the Lombard's words do not really bear their full or proper meaning.

*factio* is also *poenalis*. And in sinful man, if finally lost, *poena satisfactoria*<sup>1</sup> will be exhibited.

Another curious quotation adduced by Foley,<sup>2</sup> whom Mozley follows, reveals a full-blown penal doctrine of atonement in Pope Innocent III., who explicitly speaks of the harmony between justice and mercy established in the death of Christ. The climax of all this is found rather in the theology of the Reformers than in any mediæval scholasticism. Or it is found in popular irresponsible Roman preaching, which can be used to stir the multitudes and disowned when inconvenient notice is taken of its extravagances.

The *merit* of Christ is affirmed in all quarters of mediæval thought, but seems nowhere to be so deliberately analysed and theorised as satisfaction is in the pages of St. Anselm. It is by accident, half unconsciously, that the *Cur Deus Homo* glides from its analysis of Christ's satisfaction into insistence upon the great "merit" which avails for all who "follow" Christ's "example." Ritschl's attack upon this, as a piece of careless thinking, seems overdone. Both thoughts are urged irresistibly upon the Western Catholic mind by their place in the theory of discipline.

And, in spite of Anselm's gallant effort to reach deeper and surer foundations, Catholic discipline familiarises men with the relative necessity of *quasi*-satisfactions, of *quasi*-merits, of *quasi*-punishments. Moreover, as we have noted, the changes which occur in the progress of Catholic thought tend increasingly to weaken positions which were already precarious. The house is built upon the sand. When the storm comes, it must fall, and the fall of that house will be great.

R. MACKINTOSH.

<sup>1</sup> Denney quotes *poenae satisfactoriae* from the decrees of Trent, applied to penances.

<sup>2</sup> *Anselm's Theory of the Atonement*, p. 215, following Neander. The passage is from Innocent's first *Sermon*; but this only slightly lessens its significance.

*THE PURPOSE OF THE EPISTLE TO THE  
HEBREWS.*

THE purpose of the Epistle to the Hebrews is obviously to strengthen the readers in their Christian faith. The author exhorts them to boldness, patience, steadfastness, and the ordinary Christian virtues. The readers' Christian life is not characterised by the high standards and the clear faith and hope which it ought to exhibit. Some such formulation of the purpose of Hebrews is becoming increasingly popular. It has the advantage of being drawn from the epistle's own words. And it has the further advantage of leaving undisturbed the troublesome problem of the readers' religious background. For whether the readers be Jewish or Gentile Christians, they are equally exhorted to a firmer Christian stand. Furthermore, such a formulation of the purpose, as far as it goes, commands the assent of all who feel that Hebrews has a practical purpose. It cannot be denied that it is the author's prime purpose to strengthen the readers' Christian faith.

But if so much be granted, the question remains, is this an adequate statement of the author's design? How fully does it explain the Epistle to the Hebrews? It is here that this formulation of the purpose fails. It explains the exhortations which give rise to the theory but it fails to give an adequate account of the rest of the epistle. It fails to account for the real genius of the epistle, the Alexandrine philosophical flavour, the Melchizedek speculation, the whole presentation of Christ's work under the figure of priesthood—these receive no adequate explanation. Furthermore, if the readers' danger is no less serious than actual apostasy, this formulation of the purpose fails to account for the seriousness of the situation. If apostasy was a real

danger, the author cannot have been satisfied with mere exhortation. He must have selected and directed his material with the particular situation in view. It seems imperative to attempt some formulation of the purpose more definite in character than the loose general statement that our epistle was written to strengthen the readers' Christian faith. Even an incorrect formulation of this more definite sort will demand a closer grappling with the actual material of the epistle and will be more rewarding than a timorous handling of the situation.

The traditional formulation of the purpose has been that the epistle was written to strengthen the readers' Christian faith in view of the danger of falling back into Judaism. There are serious objections to this statement of the purpose. The letter does not warn against falling back into a Judaism characterised by keen observance of law or, in other words, it is evident that the author is not dealing with a situation such as Paul faced in the Galatian epistle. No polemic against Judaism, the Judaism Paul encountered, is to be found in the epistle. The author compares the institutions of Judaism with those of Christianity. The occasion for a polemic against these Jewish institutions lies ready to his hand. But this polemic does not materialise. The law is characterised, without further arguments as "perfecting nothing" (vii. 19). Accordingly the law does not seem to be the point at issue. It might be said that the explanation for this lack of polemic lies in the fact that the author is trying to win his readers to a more vigorous Christian stand without antagonising them, but we are face to face with the earnestness of the epistle and the real sense of danger. Our author does not mince words in describing the ultimate possibilities of the readers' present situation (vi. 4-8; x. 29) and we have no reason to believe that he would hesitate in combatting a legalistic Judaism if that were the danger.



In addition to this negative testimony there are positive statements that do not fit well a danger of returning to the old legalistic type of Judaism. The much discussed clause in iii. 12, "falling away from the living God," cannot be pressed to prove that the readers are Gentile Christians rather than Jewish Christians, since *unbelief* is the point of the passage and a Jewish Christian could be unbelieving in his attitude to Christian truth as truly as a Gentile Christian. But the query remains, would the danger which threatens these readers be formulated as a "falling away from the living God" if it was Judaism of the old legalistic type? An even more curious expression occurs in xiii. 9, where the danger is formulated as "divers and strange teachings." The reference to these teachings seems to be more than incidental although it occurs in a list of single exhortations, for it is introduced by a solemn and weighty reference to the past and to the enduring truthfulness of the teaching the readers received at that time (xiii. 8, 9). The sentences that follow seem to confirm the impression that here the author is dealing directly with the chief danger that threatens. The word "strange" is explained to mean teachings strange or foreign to Christianity. But if applied to familiar Jewish customs it hardly seems the right word to use to Jewish Christians. The inference is that the readers must either be Gentile Christians or Jewish Christians facing some danger other than the traditional Judaism. However, if the readers are Jewish Christians, and if they are in danger of falling away from faith in Christ, it seems certain that their apostasy must be in the direction of Judaism. Thus we see that in endeavouring to formulate more accurately the purpose of the epistle we shall be obliged to move with caution.

On the other hand, those who see in the readers Gentile Christians, and who are not satisfied with a loose formulation

of the purpose to the effect that the epistle is simply written "to strengthen the readers' Christian faith," are compelled to add to that formulation "in view of a danger to revert to heathenism." This position is based upon negative evidence almost exclusively. There is no attack on heathenism, and no reference to polytheism or atheism in the slightest way in the letter. If it be an error to assume that the readers are Jewish Christians when there is a lack of positive warning against falling into Judaism, it is an error of the same sort to conclude that the readers are Gentile Christians, since there is no warning against falling into heathenism. Most scholars who hold that the readers are Gentile Christians are content to leave the purpose indefinite without following their theory to its logical conclusion.

But the possibilities are not exhausted when we decide that the danger which faces the readers cannot be described as a mere slackening in their Christian zeal or as a return to a legalistic Judaism or as a lapse into heathenism.

The most striking thing about the Epistle to the Hebrews, so far as the type of thought is concerned, is the Alexandrine cast which it betrays. No one denies the large parallels which exist between our epistle and the writings of the most important representative of the Alexandrian school, Philo Judaeus. There is difference of opinion concerning the precise relations between our writing and the writings of Philo, but the fact that there is some sort of relation is generally admitted. This similarity, which is to be found not only in the type of thought and style but in verbal parallels, is to be discovered in numerous passages of our epistle.

But however much or little be attributed to Alexandrian influence, it is at least thinkable that the Alexandrianism of our epistle may be as enlightening upon the subject of the reader's as upon the author's education. May we not

have here a key to an understanding of what the author is fighting against? Perhaps he is not so much concerned about explaining his own ideas as he is about rectifying his reader's ideas. Perhaps, like David's mighty warrior Benaiah, who "plucked the spear out of the Egyptian's hand and slew him with his own spear," he is attacking hostile influence with the very philosophy which is their weapon. To be sure he must know how to use the weapon, and a study of the parallels with Alexandrian thought proves that he does. But he uses it in another cause.

This is substantiated by the way in which he draws practical conclusions, most direct and earnest in character, from theoretical arguments which are formulated in the Alexandrian style. It is as much as to say that he expects arguments thus formulated to grip his readers. Perhaps they had been affected by Alexandrianism in the form of a speculative, liberal Judaism, which by the Alexandrian method saw in the Old Testament an absolute religion, liberated from legalism and from the more materialistic and cruder features of the old faith. They saw a way out of their difficulties—the social ostracism, sarcasm, scorn or whatever form of persecution they suffered from by attaching themselves to this liberal Judaism. They may even have been assured that they were not giving up "Christ" in so doing, it was only "Jesus" that they were abandoning. They did not consider it a break with Christianity but tried to assure themselves that it was only a further step in their religious evolution.

See how our author meets such a situation. Admitted, he says, that the Old Testament is shadow. That shadow is a foreshadowing of an historical personality to whom they have pledged their loyalty, even to Jesus. Jesus, the historical Person, is the centre of his thought. (Cf. ii. 3, 9, 10, 14-18; iii. 2, 5, 6; iv. 14, 15; v. 7-10; vi. 6; vii. 14; ix. 11-14, 28;

x. 10-14, 19, 20, 29 ; xii. 2. 3 ; xiii. 12). To make this unmistakable his favourite title is the simple word "Jesus." He uses this name to designate the Lord no less than eight times in the course of the epistle (cf. ii. 9 ; iii. 1 ; vi. 20 ; vii. 22 ; x. 19 ; xii. 2 ; xii. 24 ; xiii. 12), and in addition he speaks once of Jesus, the Son of God (iv. 14), and once of our Lord Jesus (xiii. 20). This becomes significant when we realise that, outside the gospels, the simple designation "Jesus" very rarely occurs in the New Testament, and it is doubly significant in view of our author's own developed theology regarding the Person of Christ. How could our author have made more plain the fact that he is dealing with an historical personage and with an historic set of circumstances. It is a fact that the truths he sees revealed in this historic Jesus and His early life run up into the eternities and find their climax there, but it is not by "subtracting reality from the history," it is rather by returning to the history of this Jesus that the author would have his readers get a "vivid, instantaneous revelation of the inscrutable."

How effectively he makes the Old Testament tell of this Jesus and His work. Let them never delude themselves into thinking that He can be left behind. To abandon Him, will be a re-crucifixion (vi. 4-8), a decisive and fatal step (x. 26). Do they think Christianity a little crude, a little behind this liberal, philosophical religion ? Then they have utterly failed to see how this *Jesus* in His life and death can lead their thought up into eternal verities. The Old Testament "shadows" in which they see "reality" are hopelessly faulty and incomplete. They are but "sketches" of which he is the full picture. Granted that even in Christianity the full glory is reserved for the future, yet the vision of those glories which is revealed in Jesus is incomparably richer than the Old Testament can afford. In some such



way as this we may picture the readers as under the spell of a liberal speculative Judaism. The fact that our author is rather using Alexandrian forms of thought than being used by them justifies us in postulating some such group of readers.

But a practical objection arises from the author's own characterisation of the readers in v. 11-14. There they are described as hard of hearing, dull, sluggish, even infantile in their needs. Does this fit readers who are in danger of being carried away by a liberal speculative Judaism which gives itself out to be a more developed and perfected type of religion than Christianity? At first thought decidedly not. But, if we are to understand this characterisation of the readers we must take it in its context and not isolate it. It follows more than four chapters of argument and exhortation none of which can be accurately described as "milk." It is all solid food. It precedes the Melchizedek speculation which is the particular solid food which the author has in mind in this passage. How are we to fit this characterisation of the readers logically into the epistle? Either the author clearly disregards the needs of his readers and proceeds to develop his "pet" idea, or else he is regarding his readers in this seeming disregard. Is it possible to understand this passage upon the hypothesis that the readers are in danger from a speculative Judaism of the Alexandrian type? Christians who were feeling the attractions of such influences would stand in a very real need of having the simple gospel preached to them again. The fundamentals had lost their hold upon them. But yet they prided themselves upon maturity, and "solid food" is for the mature (v. 14). Accordingly the author goes on to give them "solid food." They are seekers after perfection, and so the author proceeds to reveal to them the perfection which they seek, only in Christianity, not apart from it.

But if the readers are assailed by a form of speculative or liberal Judaism more or less influenced by the Alexandrian type of philosophy, they are attracted also by some form of ritualistic observance. This the author sharply warns against. This liberal Judaism which satisfies from a speculative point of view their religious aspirations is after all Judaism, and as such has a religious as well as a speculative appeal to make to these Christians. Its ritual is satisfying for the daily life. Exactly what this ritual is, the author does not reveal to us. It is a ritual which has to do with "meats" (xiii. 9), and the whole thing is to be characterised, from the point of view of a Christian whose background was orthodox Judaism, as "divers and strange teachings." The break with it must be complete and final (xiii. 13) whatever the cost. But how the whole thought of the epistle lightens up when we see it as directed against a ritualistic tendency of whatever character. Suppose they feel that Christianity is barren and unadorned in its services and for that reason they tend to neglect the assembly (x. 25). How admirably the author deals with these sacramentalists. You miss in Christianity the ritual, the sacramental richness? he seems to query. It is not because it is not there but because you have become dull and sluggish and have not the eyes to see it. You ritualists, think with me about Jesus and think of Him under the figure of a priest. His whole life opens up. The shame and humiliation of His earthly life at which you take offence, the death itself which causes you to stumble, take on new meaning. Think of Him as priest, think of His earthly life in the terms of ritual, of sacrament and you will understand. His life in every detail, in the very shame and humiliation which he endured, is sacramental, for it is the supreme revelation in space and time through which human personality comes into touch with divine truth and power. Interpret the life

of Jesus as you seek to interpret the liturgy and ritual of these forms and see how much more of power and sympathy, how much more of mercy and grace, you will find. You will discover a living human way opened to God.

One of the most instructive side-lights upon the Epistle to the Hebrews is derived from the study of the sacraments in this epistle. It is a point upon which scholars have dwelt but little. It is notable that this document, which may well be characterised as the most ritualistic and sacramental in its phraseology of the New Testament writings, is almost totally silent concerning Baptism and the Eucharist. We are not to deduce from this the absence of the sacraments from the Christian life and practice of which Hebrews is a witness. It does not necessarily mean that we are here in contact with a section of the early Church in which the sacraments were not used. That is too large a use to make of the argument from silence. But it is fair to conclude that the sacraments played only a minor part in the author's thought. When we search the epistle for all possible references to the sacraments we find that the evidence of them is scanty and doubtful. There are three possible references to Baptism. In vi. 2 there is reference to a teaching of Baptisms. This teaching may include Christian Baptism. The reference is incidental, however, and if we dare draw any inference it is a slighting reference. In ix. 10 the reference is clearly to Old Testament times, and has no bearing on Christian baptism. It is possible to infer here, either the author's disregard for baptism or that he thinks Christianity has a better sort. The last clause of x. 22 is more of a problem. In the first clause we read: "sprinkled in the heart from an evil conscience." This is clearly an allegory for ritual sprinkling, i.e., sprinkled symbolically and so freed from an evil conscience. It conveys in a ritual symbolism the truth of the forgiveness of

sins. The second clause reads "washed as to the body with pure water." Is this also an Old Testament usage allegorised and paralleled to the other? They seem to be not two absolutely different concepts, but two slightly varying modes of expression for the same process of salvation. But even if this last clause be taken as a distinct reference to Christian baptism it is expressed in such a way as to indicate a low significance—a cleansing of the body rather than a forgiveness of sins.

All the possible references to the Eucharist are extremely doubtful. To see in ix. 20 a memory of the last supper is entirely arbitrary. Later usage made the "altar" of xiii. 10 the name of the "Lord's table," but it is very doubtful if it can have that meaning here. In vi. 4 we have in the "enlightened" and "those who have tasted" expressions which might possibly refer to the two sacraments, but most scholars think not.

It seems correct to say that the Christian sacraments play almost no part in our author's thought for his readers. Hebrews is thus an exception to the extant literature of the period in this matter. There is less reference to the sacraments than in Paul and the other post-Pauline writings and far less than in the catholicising periods. What is the explanation? If we have correctly described the readers' situation, does that not explain the author's usage? They were attracted by "meats." They found in them a means of establishing the heart. They were in danger of being carried away by divers and strange teachings which for the positive and daily religious needs had some ritual to offer. Over against all this our author presents Christianity in ritualistic, sacramental terminology without stressing at all the specific sacramental acts, which might in themselves be less imposing than the attractive ceremonies which were appealing to his readers.



The very form in which our author frames his exhortations seems to indicate that the readers are of the type we have pictured. He cannot count upon any such deep mystical experience of Christianity as we find in Paul. It seems doubtful if these readers ever had such a deep experience. Perhaps at first their acceptance of Christianity was in the nature of the acceptance of a reformed Judaism. Under the stress of early persecution they showed up nobly. They felt the enthusiasm of the new faith. They were buoyed up by the hope of the Parousia. But days and months and years have gone by and the Parousia has not occurred. Persecution had come but not the sort of persecution that nerves men to great endeavour. It has been rather a wearing persecution of taunt and sneer, of social ostracism and petty annoyances. They have not the great experimental knowledge of the living Christ which enabled Paul to adjust his theology to the delay in the Parousia and to weather alike all storms of persecution and trial. How skilfully and powerfully does the author appeal to them in this situation. His call to them is to loyalty—a loyalty in following the Lord, in imitating Him. There is no place in our epistle for Paul's magnificent words, "I live, yet no longer I, but Christ liveth in me." The language of Hebrews is rather, "Run the race, looking unto Jesus, who hath sat down at the right hand of God." Our author does not leave the things touched and seen, the visible Jesus, for a moment. But he uses these concrete pictures in such a way as to lead his readers into the loyalty he longs for. But it is not necessarily a lower conception of union with Christ which he thus summons to. It is simply a different approach. Union with Christ is as truly the end in view as with Paul. He simply sets it forth in terms his readers will understand and, probably, in terms which describe his own attainment of a living fellowship with Christ. A following

of Jesus with true loyalty of purpose, in afflictions and reproaches such as were His lot, will bring union with Him. And they must not falter at the final test. They are to "go forth unto him without the camp, bearing his reproach." It is thus that our author makes his appeal to readers less mystical than Paul.

In attempting to make more definite the general formulation of the purpose of our epistle we have found that to think of the readers in some such way as outlined above brings us to closer grips with the material of the epistle. We have pictured them as Jewish Christians who are attracted by a liberal speculative Judaism which partakes of the Alexandrian type. This tempts them to give up "*Jesus*," the historical figure, allegiance to whom causes all their troubles, and whose humiliating earthly experiences are ridiculed. And then, too, they are attracted by a ritual of some sort which seems to satisfy their religious needs. It is against such tendencies that the author directs his thought.

But how does such a picture of the readers help to explain the problems of the epistle? Take first, the literary problem. We find the literary characteristics to be a carefully worked out, almost artificial, development of thought and a practical earnest set of exhortations growing out of the theoretical argument. To readers, such as we have endeavoured to describe, the theoretical, almost stilted arguments, cast in Alexandrian forms of thought and interpretation might be expected to have precisely the moving power which our author seems to attribute to them. What our epistle says about God's final word in His Son over against the word mediated by angels and what it says about the incomparable eternal priesthood and the single, once-for-all offering in the Heavenly Sanctuary: these things would be powerful to show the superiority of Christianity to a Christian influenced by the Alexandrian philo-

sophy. Readers trained to see in the Old Testament religion copies of eternal truths and of a heavenly world of ideas would find in our author's treatment of the Old Testament history and institutions effective arguments. The whole Old Testament is a "copy" to the author but in a sense which surpassed and indeed disproved what the readers were tempted to mean by "copy." He seems to address readers who view the Old Testament not in its concrete realities but in its "higher significance" as absolute religion. He shows them that the Old Testament has such a higher meaning but very different, incomparably deeper and higher than they thought; that all the sensible forms, words, customs in which they saw the true and the heavenly were not simply allegory but *historical preparation*. They were a real foreshadowing and prophecy of the new. These things came to reality in Jesus. In this way he could challenge them through these very arguments in all their apparent stiltedness to a living practical loyalty.

If the readers are in the situation we have pictured, we are able to understand how the author could use some of the expressions he does to Christians whose background was Judaism. The troublesome phrase in iii. 12 about "falling away from the living God" becomes clearer when we think of the readers as endangered by a speculative Judaism. The author from the standpoint of a Christian who had been an orthodox Jew might well consider that this speculative Judaism had no "living God" in the sense of real religion. And to them he might very well write in the language of vi. 1 that they needed to have laid again the foundations of all true religion, Jewish as well as Christian. He could also describe the teachings which were threatening to bear them away as "strange" from a Jewish as well as a Christian point of view.

It likewise throws light upon the problem of the

readers' situation to formulate their dangers thus. We find that there is a very real danger of apostasy. But the author does not tell us in so many words in what that danger consists. It is vague, undefined, yet real and serious. Is this not precisely the situation which our hypothesis affords? The readers are in danger of a speculative liberal Judaism. They are tempted to think that going over to this faith will not be a real break with Christianity but rather a step forward. They must leave Jesus behind perhaps, but they have never fully understood His humiliation, His death, save as they were related to a visible, glorious return. And that return is now so long delayed that it seems almost hopeless. And then, too, if they leave out Jesus their persecutions of whatever sort will be at an end. In the face of this danger the author feels compelled to declare, in the sharpest terms he can muster, that their proposed action, or rather the action into which they are drifting, is a radical break with Christianity. It means no less than a crucifixion of the Lord again. It is comparable to the presumptuous sin of the Old Testament. In the very nature of the case there can be no second repentance. If they seek for perfection, here it is, in this very Jesus.

Since this hypothesis seems to satisfy in general the problems which arise, we may formulate the purpose of the Epistle to the Hebrews as follows: This epistle is written by the author to a definite group of readers, with whom he stands in personal relations, in order to strengthen their Christian faith. A study of the contents of the epistle would seem to indicate that their Christian faith was threatened in three main directions.

I. By a speculative, liberal Judaism tinged with a more or less developed Alexandrianism. This the author meets with a presentation of the historical Jesus, whom they are in danger of leaving out, in the Alexandrian terminology and



by means of the Alexandrian interpretation, which proves Him to be one with the Eternal Son, and to offer the only perfect salvation, superior to anything that the faulty and incomplete Old Testament "ideas" can possibly picture, since He is Himself the "very image" of that which they but "shadow." In leaving Him out, they leave out the indispensable key to eternal truth.

II. Their Christian faith is threatened not only from an intellectual but from a more religious point of view. The liberal Judaism that threatened was not only liberal and speculative but it was Judaism, i.e., it had a religious heritage from the past. In the case of our readers certain rites and ceremonies were threatening to usurp the place of His grace in establishing the heart. To meet this danger our author presents Jesus in His earthly life, and finally in His Heavenly ministry, under the figure of a Priest whose service is perfect and powerful, whose offering is once-for-all, who has opened a living human way to God.

III. The readers' Christian faith is threatened because of persecution and disappointment in the delay of the Parousia. This it is which has made possible these other dangers. By turning to the speculative liberal Judaism there was a way out of persecution. In a ritual there was solace for disappointed hope. The author meets this with his philosophy of union with Christ through loyalty to Him, his explanation of the true significance of chastisement, and his eloquent illustration of both facts in the roll of heroes who both bore the reproach of Christ (xi. 26) and learned the meaning of chastisement, but whose perfection necessitated like loyalty on the part of the readers of the Epistle to the Hebrews (xi. 40).

If the author's purpose be formulated in some such way as this, what are we to say of the abiding worth of Hebrews? Is it to be thought of only as "a unique specimen of Alexan-

drian thought playing upon the primitive gospel" ? (Moffatt's *Introduction to the Literature of the New Testament*, p. 443). Is its canonical position to be justified only on this basis, or is there justification in the very purpose of the author toward his first readers ? It is the author's eloquent challenge to a practical working faith that lays hold upon the modern spirit. Men to-day, as at all times, we say, achieve, attain, triumph by virtue of a tenacious and heroic grip upon invisible values. Like Moses, the modern man is summoned to "endure as seeing him who is invisible." Like Abraham, who "went out not knowing whither he went," we are to make the supreme faith-ventures. Endurance, loyalty, patience and faith—these are great words for great values and they are of abiding significance. It is the author's imagination, poetic power of describing the Christian way in strikingly life-like pictures—pictures which bear the truth through the gates of the emotions to the very throne of the will—that gives to this letter an abiding significance. Christian hope as an anchor which holds in a stormy sea, Christian progress as a race in the arena, Christian dangers as a drifting from the course or a shortening of sail,—these and many another picture and picturesque phrase will continue to have an abiding appeal to the Christian consciousness.

But do not all these abiding values receive added significance from the background of such a purpose as we have formulated ? Our author was not writing platitudes. Others might exhort and have indeed exhorted to faith, perseverance, patience, loyalty to Christ, with none of the power of this first-century Christian. He knew whereof he spoke and why. He had thought profoundly and to some purpose. He himself was deeply moved. What was it that moved him thus deeply ? What was it that claimed all the resources of his mind, the Alexandrian culture, the

rhetorical skill, the poetic imagination, the apostolic fire ? It was more than a little slackening of faith in some little group of early Christians. It was more than a falling off in church attendance on the part of some in that group. He was facing something more menacing, more insidious than that. Even though this danger presented itself among a small group of early Christians, our author correctly estimated the magnitude of the danger to Christianity and in facing the danger he wrote for all time. If we have correctly formulated the purpose of Hebrews, this danger was a tendency to divorce religion from history, in particular the humiliating history of Jesus, in the interests of "spirituality." Against this tendency the author wrote his great work on the "Christ of history and experience." He knew full well that men "would not resist unto blood striving against sin" in the service of an abstraction but only as they looked unto Jesus. He was unwilling to grant for a moment the superior "spirituality" of a faith divorced from history, but used all his talents to prove that Christianity, historically conditioned, is the final line of spiritual progress. The arguments by which he established his position have ceased to be as powerful to us as they must have been in the day of our author, but his sincere grappling with the problem and his fundamental conviction that the history of one Jesus in His sufferings and death can never be cast behind us, and makes up, for ever, the core of the Christian consciousness, gives to his words abiding worth. With him, we confess that the temporal story of Jesus has an eternal meaning.

ALEX. C. PURDY.

*THE MISSIONARY SPIRIT OF THE OLD  
TESTAMENT.*

“THE missionary spirit,” in the sense in which we commonly use the phrase, connotes a certain practical attitude towards the propagation of Christianity, a disposition benevolent, at the least, towards efforts to spread the Gospel. This missionary spirit is inspired by, and depends on, faith in two things : firstly, faith that it is the will of God that “all men should be saved, and come to the knowledge of the truth” ; and, secondly, faith in the capacity of all men to respond to the motions of God’s will, faith in the capacity of man to answer God’s love with love. It is the spirit of comprehension as opposed to exclusiveness ; of true brotherliness, as opposed to patronising condescension.

In this discussion of the Missionary Spirit of the Old Testament, we shall assume that the Old Testament is not merely the extant classical literature of the ancient Hebrews, but that it is also to be thought of as a unity, one of the authorities in the revelation of God to man. From this point of view of the Old Testament, as a portion of the written part of revelation, the missionary spirit of it constitutes one of the elements of permanent value in it.

Such permanent elements in the Old Testament are precious in a special degree in times which are times of transition so far as the appreciation of the relative values of religious truths is concerned. For it is admitted on all hands that the present-day Christian conception of some aspects of the Old Testament has been considerably modified by literary and historical criticism.

From the purely Christian point of view, the value of the Old Testament lies in its function as a part of the *Præparatio Evangelii*, the gradual process of development



in various directions by which God prepared the world of humanity for the reception of his Son, his "perfect boon." This function of the Old Testament is still—after long exposure to the disintegrating light of criticism—a very real thing to us Christians; we can still use the noble words of Archbishop Alexander: "The whole cathedral of the Old Testament lieth cruciform." But we view this cathedral at an angle quite different from that familiar to our fathers. So much so, indeed, is this the case, that were they recalled to this life, they would not quickly recognise it as the same edifice.

But the missionary spirit of the Old Testament is unaffected by criticism. No question arises here as to the compositeness of books, their authorship, their relative dates, or even as to moral standards. And this arises from the very nature of the thing.

As already stated, a missionary spirit in any one depends primarily on faith in God's will for the spread of the Gospel. Now the *raison d'être* of the propagation of the Gospel lies in a consideration of the Incarnation as the most important stage in the working out of God's eternal purpose, viz., the summing up of all things in Christ. This is of necessity a progressive scheme; and any adequate record of it must indicate the first indeterminate beginnings of it as well as the later definite expressions. Now the Old Testament is the first volume of such a record; it is a history of the most important part of the preparation for the Incarnation, the preparation of the chosen race. There were, no doubt, other portions of the field in which God was working with a view to the Incarnation; but our knowledge of them is scanty and vague.

Yet not all in the Old Testament that points to Christ is inspired by the missionary spirit; because much of the Messianic element in the Old Testament is positively anti-

missionary in tone, narrowly national and exclusive. It is, no doubt, true that the term "Messiah," when raised to the highest power, is equivalent to "God manifest in the flesh." But from the very nature of the case, the Old Testament could not but present at some length a far lower conception of the Messiah than this, a conception which we feel to be wholly inadequate. As the Old Testament is Part i. of the history of the progressive self-revelation of God and of the progressive response of man to that revelation, it must, of necessity, present the earliest as well as the later stages of the process.

"He hath made everything beautiful in its time." And not only so, but the early stage, with all its limitations and characteristic defects and crudenesses—as they appear to us—is necessary and indispensable to the later stage; it is the foundation of higher things. For example, philanthropy of the genuine sort must be based on, and never lose contact with, the domestic affections; "If a man say, I love God, and hateth his brother, he is a liar."

Nor have we any reasonable ground for complaint that such a record misleads and confuses us. We have in our hands the whole Bible; and thus we have material wherewith we can correct, or rather supplement, the inadequacy of some part of the presentation.

That there was a narrowly national, almost provincial, aspect of the Messiah was inevitable; it was involved in the method employed by God for the education of mankind. That method is the selection of particular men or races, each for his special gift or privilege; the gift to be developed by the recipient for himself first and then for all men. Every privilege carries with it a corresponding responsibility. But the gift comes at first in a form level to the recipient's understanding at the time, else it would be useless to him. At the same time the gifts of God have in

them endless possibilities of expansion. In the case before us, "salvation is of the Jews"; but the Jews must have their Messiah if the world is to have a Saviour. In conformity with the natural working out of this principle, we find on an examination of the Old Testament that the missionary spirit is most in evidence in those stages of it in which the expression of revelation is least affected by Hebrew nationalism. Thus, the very first counterstroke to the earliest success of evil is the declaration that the Seed of the Woman, the mother of all living, shall bruise the serpent's head, that is, that Human nature, dwelt in by Good, shall eventually destroy Evil out of God's fair creation. And the same all-embracing appreciation of the potentialities of all mankind is reflected in the promise to the patriarchs of the Hebrew race: "In thee shall all the families of the earth be blessed."

But with the beginnings and the growth of the nation of Israel the conception of Messiah becomes more and more intensely national and anti-foreign. What could be more antagonistic to the missionary spirit than this terrible prayer:—

Pour out thy wrath upon the heathen that know thee not,  
And upon the kingdoms that call not upon thy name.  
(Ps. lxxix. 6.)

This is perhaps an extreme instance; and the psalm whence it comes is not a Messianic psalm. But the Messianic Psalms themselves, as intended by their authors, and understood by those who first heard them, constantly reflect a conception of the Kingdom of God which is Prussian in its disregard for the rights of others. Thus:—

Ask of me, and I will give thee the nations for thine inheritance,  
And the uttermost parts of the earth for thy possession.  
(Ps. ii. 8.)

Again,

They that dwell in the wilderness shall bow before him;  
And his enemies shall lick the dust.  
(Ps. lxxii. 9.)

And,

The Lord shall send forth the rod of thy strength out of Zion :  
Rule thou in the midst of thine enemies.

(Ps. cx. 2.)

Our minds have become so habituated to the evangelical readjustment of the Messianic prophecies, reading them as though they had been penned by Isaac Watts or Charles Wesley, that we find it hard to realise that in these passages the psalmist did not mean what we mean, when we sing,

Jesus shall reign where'er the sun  
Doth his successive journeys run ; etc.

A similar account is to be given of those psalms which Christian thought associates with the Second Advent :—

Say among the nations, The Lord reigneth. (Ps. xcvi. 10.)

All the ends of the earth have seen the salvation of our God.  
(Ps. xcvi. 4.)

Here the primary reference is to the great salvation wrought in the Return from captivity in Babylon. The tremendous cosmic significance of the Incarnation makes it not unreasonable nor unnatural to give these psalms a wider reference to the spiritual Kingdom of Christ ; but in themselves they do not breathe the missionary spirit. Christians of the twentieth century have come to understand that it is not most in accordance with God's will that His Kingdom should be extended by the imposition of a conqueror's will on vanquished and reluctant peoples ; but rather by the spontaneous action of the peoples themselves, as they come by their own choice into a federation with the prevailing power, on equal terms. We have come, in fact, to realise that the truest and most satisfying conception of the Kingdom of God is that which makes the widest and most humanitarian appeal.

And the truly wonderful thing is, that we have not to wait for the expression of this until the actual appearance of the Saviour of the world ; we can point to it in the



Old Testament. We may analyse the expression of it under three main heads :—

1. A truly missionary attitude towards the Gentiles ; a frank recognition of their capacity for religion.

2. A corresponding development in the conception of God's relationship to all mankind.

3. A broadening of the Messianic hope.

The expressions of (1) and (2) are, as might be expected, usually interfused ; but logically they are distinct.

The illustrations that follow are not to be thought of as exhaustive ; they are merely samples intended to stimulate the consecrated curiosity of the seeker after treasures hidden in the word of God written.

The prophet Amos, in the very beginning of his message to the Northern Kingdom, assumes that the moral law of God is written in the hearts of the surrounding nations as clearly as in the hearts of his own people. Damascus, Gaza, Tyre, Edom, Ammon, Moab, as well as Judah, are summoned in succession before the judgment bar of the Moral Governor of the world, and each receives an irreversible sentence for some flagrant sin against light : " For three transgressions of—, yea, for four, I will not turn away the punishment thereof : because. . . ." So runs the doom refrain, culminating with the impious ingratitude of Israel. The implication here is that Gentiles who are responsible to the same moral law as that revealed to the chosen race are capable of the spiritual privileges of the most highly favoured nation. In a like spirit, Amos, at the close of his prophecy, co-ordinates other nations with Israel as the objects of special divine providence :—" Are ye not as the children of the Ethiopians unto me, O children of Israel ? saith the Lord. Have not I brought up Israel out of the land of Egypt, and the Philistines from Caphtor, and the Syrians from Kir ? " (ix. 7). The secular

historian, of course, knows that the Exodus was not an event unique in the experience of the nations ; but that a prophet of Israel should perceive that other races were equally guided by Jehovah is indeed remarkable.

The high water mark of the missionary spirit of the Old Testament is reached, perhaps, in two passages : (a) Isaiah xix. 24, 25 and (b) Psalm lxxxvii.

(a) "In that day shall Israel be the third with Egypt and with Assyria, a blessing in the midst of the earth : for that the Lord of hosts hath blessed them, saying, Blessed be Egypt my people, and Assyria the work of my hands, and Israel mine inheritance."

When one considers what Egypt had been, and had signified, to Israel—the age-long, traditional oppressor,—and what Assyria was at the time when these words were penned,—the incarnation of scientifically organised, aggressive material force—the winged bull, swift and crushing—it will be acknowledged that we have here the reflection of a very magnanimous catholicity.

(b) This catholicity finds an equally sublime, and more poetical, expression in Psalm lxxxvii.—

I will make mention of Rahab and Babylon as among them  
that know me :

Behold Philistia, and Tyre, with Ethiopia ;

This one was born there.

Yea, of Zion it shall be said, This one and that one was born  
in her. . . .

The Lord shall count, when he writeth up the peoples,

This one was born there.

Egypt and Babylon, equally with Israel, know Jehovah ; and the roll of the citizens of Zion is enlarged not by her own fecundity (as in Isaiah xlix. 20, liv. 1) but by the naturalization in her of men of every race. In the day when Jehovah is making up the register of His own out of every country, he will enter each man as "born in Zion."

This magnificent picture of the realisation of God's will

that all men should be saved has its complement in the sublime remonstrance with which the book of Jonah closes :—  
 “Should not I have pity on Nineveh, that great city ; wherein are more than sixscore thousand persons that cannot discern between their right hand and their left hand ; and also much cattle ? ”

When, with understanding, we read passages such as these, we perceive that we have moved a long way from the conception of Jehovah as a tribal deity, co-ordinate in his limited sphere of influence with Chemosh and Molech. The imagination of some in the Old Dispensation was equal to the reception of the Master’s last and grandest charge, “Preach the Gospel to the whole creation.”

It remains to say a word about the indication of the missionary spirit in the broadening of the Messianic hope.

In this respect the climax of the Messianic idea is found in the conception of the Servant of the Lord, as revealed through the Second Isaiah. There may be other titles given in prophecy to the Messiah which are more in harmony with the loftiest Christology ; but there are none which touch so nearly the sympathy of all mankind.

As the Servant of the Lord comes into the prophet’s field of vision, it seems as if the seer were not quite certain as to the outline or significance of the mysterious yet winning figure before him. The Servant is at first the embodiment of the people of Israel, akin to the conception of “one like unto a son of man” in Daniel’s vision. But as the prophet gazes, the Servant becomes transfigured with a diviner glory ; he is seen as One to whom God can say, “It is too light a thing that thou shouldest be my servant to raise up the tribes of Jacob, and to restore the preserved of Israel : I will also give thee for a light to the Gentiles, that thou mayest be my salvation unto the end of the earth (xlix. 6.) ; a light of the Gentiles ; to open the blind eyes, to bring out

the prisoners from the dungeon, and them that sit in darkness out of the prison house" (xlii. 6, 7).

Enough has been said to supply a thought outline which the student can fill up for himself. He will be able to trace the unfolding of God's purpose of love in the Old Testament and in the New, and will see it as Ezekiel saw the mystical river in his vision :—" Behold, waters issued out from under the threshold of his house . . . waters that were to the ankles." Soon, they were " waters that were to the knees " ; and after a little, " waters that were to the loins " ; and, finally, " a river that I could not pass through : for the waters were risen, waters to swim in." And the river, though deep, was not destructive : " It shall come to pass, that every living creature which swarmeth, in every place whither the rivers come, shall live." For it is " the river of the water of life," teeming with life and fostering life, on whose banks there flourishes the tree of life the leaves of which " are for the healing of the nations."

NEWPORT J. D. WHITE.



NEW DOCUMENTS ON PHILOXENUS OF HIERA-  
POLIS, AND ON THE PHILOXENIAN VERSION  
OF THE BIBLE.

I.

FOREWORD.

“ANY person who expects to solve the problem of the diversity of the New Testament text in the second century, without employing in the solution the old Syriac and associated versions, and the closely connected Diatessaron of Tatian, is, no doubt, victim of a delusion.”<sup>1</sup> In fact, no Church can claim to have studied the Scriptures more carefully, and to have applied all the scientific resources of the early ages of Christianity to biblical criticism more steadily than the Syrian community. From the second century till the first quarter of the seventh, eight different versions of the New Testament were produced by genuine researches of the Aramæan population, spreading from the Mediterranean shores to the East of Persia, and from the *massif* of the Taurus to the Arabian peninsula.

Numerous conversions to the Gospel from Mazdaism, and, in later generations, the conquest by evangelical missionaries of a huge population from India, Mongolia, Persia, Samarkand and neighbouring districts, nay, even from China, made the Syriac a sacred and liturgical language to hundreds of nations different in ethnology and often hostile to one another by previous tribal raids and sanguinary battles.

On the other hand, the writers of the Gospels, being from an Aramaic-speaking population, while writing in Greek were generally thinking in Syriac, and the Aramaic stamp

<sup>1</sup> Dr. Rendel Harris in the *Expository Times*, May 1914.

of their phrases is sometimes so strong that without a knowledge of this language and the reading of the versions which are written in it, the real thought of the sacred author will perhaps be misunderstood.

Before we begin a study of the Syriac Version called Pshitta by means of some fresh and unedited hagiographic pieces, we wish to make known in an English translation some other new and not less important documents dealing with the life and the biblical version of the famous Philoxenus of Hierapolis, who proved himself the strongest champion in the Christological movement of the fifth and the first quarter of the sixth century. His real name was Akhsnaya (Xenaïas), and it is by this name that he is generally known in the books written by Oriental historians.

In spite of Philoxenus' greatness and of the strong and durable influence that he exercised on the highly placed patriarchs and bishops of his time, no complete life of him is extant to-day. The list, too, of his works, given by Eastern and Western writers of later generations, is very imperfect, even the precise date of his well-known version of the Bible being still very obscure. Students of Church History and critics of the Old and New Testaments will perhaps be pleased to have at hand genuine and unique documents which will throw great rays of light upon these questions, and prepare the way to a better understanding of the bitter religious schism which tore up the single Christian community into so many acephalous and autocephalous bodies that we find even in our days scattered all over the land of pre-classic empires.

The original Syriac manuscript (probably of the fourteenth century) which contains the life and works of Philoxenus, printed in this article, is preserved at Bassibrina, in Tur 'Abdin, near Mardin. I translate it from a faithful copy kindly given to me when I was travelling in that country by

the Rev. E. Barsom, of the monastery of Deiruz-Za'farân. Its title is: "Victory (= life) of Mar Akhsnaya, who is Philoxenus, bishop of the town of Mabbûg" (Hierapolis). I give first a literal translation of this narrative, then some other corroborative documents with a few words of general criticism. We will place, too, in the footnotes a critical apparatus as accurate as can be done in the present state of our knowledge, comparing our text with some other general and fresh data found in the works of writers recently published by the editors of the *Patrologia Orientalis* and of the *Corpus Scriptorum Christ. Orientalium*, etc.

## II.

### TRANSLATION.

This Mar Akhsnaya, who is Philoxenus of Mabbûg, city of priests, was in his terrestrial origin from the province of Beith Garmay,<sup>1</sup> in the East, and from the village of Tahl. His brother, called Addai, was teacher in his village. It happened that one day his parents, with all his family, left their country and came to live in Tur 'Abdin,<sup>2</sup> in the mountain of Beith Réshé. They dwelt in the possession of the great tower of Haitam, their precise residence being a small plot of ground near Beith Sabrina, northwards between this village and Beith Zriza of 'Arabân. They built houses for themselves in this ground and lived in them.

When the little Akhsnaya grew up and knew how to read, he began to study the sacred books and learned to distinguish

<sup>1</sup> This province, known in Roman and Greek geographers under the name of Garamæa, is situated on the left side of the Tigris, and the Great Zab. Trajan conquered it in 116 A.D., but at the time of Philoxenus it formed a part of the Persian Empire.

<sup>2</sup> Hilly country between Mardin and the Tigris; this name, which means "mountain of holy men," has been given to it on account of the numerous monasteries which made it for a long time a second desert or Scété.

between good and evil. Under the impulse of the divine grace Mar Akhsnaya parted from his relations to the distance of one mile, built for himself a shed of stones, and lived in it for a certain time in peace and in the service of God.

When several monks from the monasteries of the mountains of Kardū<sup>1</sup> passed close to him, on their journey to the monastery of Kartamin founded by angels,<sup>2</sup> he was much pleased, received them with joy and entertained them in his divine faith. He accompanied them afterwards to the monastery of Kartamin. All of them prayed there and were blessed by the saints (of the monastery).

Mar Akhsnaya wished to enter this monastery, and he learned there perfectly all divine science, in Syriac and in Greek. He succeeded so well that he became teacher in the school of the monastery and of the neighbouring districts. For a short interval of time he was called *Magister Doctorum*, and was praised by the professors of all countries on account of his application and his science in the divine books of both Testaments. From thence he went to Western countries, travelled to convents and monasteries, and reached the monastery of Tel'eda, which was richer in professors, students and exegetes than all other monasteries of the East and the West.<sup>3</sup>

There he perfected himself in the Greek and in the Syriac languages, and he translated both Testaments, the Old and the New, the Old (Testament) according to the Septuagint,<sup>4</sup> which he compared with the Syriac Version (= Pshiṭta?).

<sup>1</sup> Mountains of South-Western Armenia, commonly identified with Ararat, on which a well-known legend relates that the ark of Noah floated and rested.

<sup>2</sup> Allusion to an old legend which attributed the foundation of this very ancient monastery to an angel who showed the site where it should be built. See H. Pognon's *Inscriptions Sémitiques*, 1907, p. 39 sqq.

<sup>3</sup> About this famous monastery see Pognon, *ibid.* p. 52.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. the end of this article.



Jacob of Edessa<sup>1</sup> says : “ He made an excellent version which has no equal in the Church.” He translated, too, several books of the Fathers in a solid manner with great care and much diligence.

His fame spread all over the Church and he was honoured by all the bishops because of his science. For this reason he was elected to be the bishop of the holy town of Mabbūg,<sup>2</sup> which, on account of the great number of priests and doctors that it produced, was called *city of priests* (Hierapolis). The town of Mabbūg was pleased with him, and prouder of his teaching than all the other towns of other countries.

He opened in this town an immense treasure of doctrine, and filled it with spiritual riches. He composed, first of all, excellent homilies on the commemorative feasts of our Lord, and on all the Dispensation of Christ. He wrote five other books of discourses which enlighten, by means of the Holy Spirit, all those who read them. He wrote six books against the heresy of Nestorius and of Barṣauma of Nisibis,<sup>3</sup> and disclosed all the falsehood of the Nestorians by proving that they were “ new Jews ” and “ ancient Pagans.” He wrote thirteen books against the heretic Chalcedonians, and unveiled to the orthodox all their craftiness. He wrote an instruction to the monks, and ten books saturated with spiritual thoughts. He wrote twenty-two books of epistles addressed to all classes of people. The number of all the books that he wrote in the course of his life amounts to one hundred and seventy volumes<sup>4</sup> of divine doctrine, which

<sup>1</sup> A well-known Syriac writer (633-5 June 708). Cf. R. Duval, *Littérature Syriacque*, 3me édit. pp. 374-377.

<sup>2</sup> He was nominated bishop of Hierapolis by Peter the Fuller, patriarch of Antioch, in 485, see *Corp. Script. Christ. Orient.*, vol iv. p. 168.

<sup>3</sup> The greatest pillar of Nestorianism (fifth century). See J. Labourt, *Le Christianisme dans l'Empire Perse*, pp. 130-152.

<sup>4</sup> The author means doubtless by the word “ Penkitha ” a long discourse on different subjects. For the books of Philoxenus extant in our days, see Duval, *ibid.* p. 355.

illuminated all Christendom with the orthodox people of all countries.

In one of his letters addressed to John Sa'ara, metropolitan of Amid,<sup>1</sup> he writes as follows: "I love thee and I am thy colleague of the holy monastery of Kartamin<sup>2</sup>; I am weak (in science), but thy holiness is strong. In a time like this it was necessary to have a man like thee in God's Church, thee whose education has been made in the monastery of my spiritual Fathers, wherefrom thou hast been called. All the ancient doctors were brought up in this angelic monastery.<sup>3</sup> It is there that I have been myself brought up, though I was unhappily not perfected by its teaching in a complete manner.<sup>4</sup> It is true that, in body, I am now far from my spiritual and perfect and holy Fathers, but in spirit I am nearer to them."

Many sentences like these were written by him and sent to remote countries, especially to Gurzanites and to the people of the interior of Persia. In his letters to Abu Ḥafar<sup>5</sup> of Hira of Nu'mân, and in those written to the Himyarites and to the inhabitants of Nijran, in which he speaks of the

<sup>1</sup> This John was elected Bishop of Amid in 484 and died in 502. He was really brought up in the monastery of Kartamin. Cf. *Chronica Minora*, *ibid.* p. 165.

<sup>2</sup> This quotation proves convincingly that Philoxenus had in fact made his studies in this monastery. This information is corroborated by his office found in the Syrian breviary. We may, therefore, safely infer that our hero did not spend much time in the school of Edessa, as we are told by other writers. His study in the capital of Osrhoene could not then have taken place long before the year 457, in which the death of the famous Ibas is placed.

<sup>3</sup> This letter seems to have been written in 485, i.e. in the very year of the nomination of Philoxenus to the see of Hierapolis.

<sup>4</sup> We are tempted to conclude from this sentence that Philoxenus did not finish his studies at Kartamin.

<sup>5</sup> This name is written *Abu Naḡir* in the text edited by L. Martin, *Gram. ling. Syr.* p. 71. The reasons alleged to deny the authenticity of this letter do not seem to be very probable. Cf. contra, Tixeront, *Revue de l'Orient Chrétien*, viii. 623, and A. Vaschalde, *Three Letters of Philoxenus* 1902, p. 30.

error of the heretics and confirms the orthodox in their faith.

He had caused the inhabitants of Antioch to follow the order <sup>1</sup> of Zeno, the faithful king (and he caused them also) to vote for the nomination of Mar Severus to the Patriarchate of Antioch and all Syria as far as India.

When, then, Mar Severus was elected and arrived, Mar Philoxenus, with eleven other bishops, ordained him in the big town of Tyre,<sup>2</sup> which is at the seashore and which had been built by King Hiram. Afterwards (Mar Severus) entered Antioch and occupied his see during six years and a half.

Then the Chalcedonians persecuted cruelly the orthodox people, and Mar Severus escaped from them by going to Egypt. Mar Akhsnaya was seized by the perverse Greeks, who incarcerated him during five years and made him suffer all sorts of torments. He covered them every day with shame, and they were not converted, but they inflicted on him tribulation, pain, anguish and ill-treatment, which he endured with the courage of martyrs and true confessors.

After these five years, he was conducted to the town of Gangra, and there imprisoned in a high house above the oven of a bath. All the openings of the house were closed in order that he might be asphyxiated. He migrated to his Lord with the crown of victory.<sup>3</sup> May his prayer be with us.

<sup>1</sup> Allusion to the "Henoticon" which promulgated in 482, at the instigation of Acacius of Constantinople, favoured enormously the Monophysite party.

<sup>2</sup> The accession of Athanasius to the throne, in 491, reinforced the hopes of the Monophysites even more than that of Zeno. We know that under his reign Philoxenus succeeded, in 512, with the help of Sotericus, bishop of Cesaræa of Cappadocia, in exiling Flavianus the Chalcedonian Patriarch of Antioch. In this very year, and always under the influence and presidency of Philoxenus, twelve bishops elected Severus for this predominant see, and they conducted him from the monastery of Theodora (*Chron. Minora*, pp. 166, 169).

<sup>3</sup> According to the Syrian breviary, Philoxenus underwent another

Amen. Mar Akhsnaya was crowned on the tenth of December.<sup>1</sup>

Now his nephew was with him from the beginning of the persecution directed against him. He bribed the persecuting Greeks by means of much money ; he stole and brought the treasure of the body of Mar Akhsnaya, his uncle, to the town of Mabbūg. It was laid in an urn of marble and placed in the church that Philoxenus himself had erected. The nephew instituted three feasts for him, the first for the day of his death, the second for the day of his sepulture, and the third for his episcopal coronation.<sup>2</sup>

After a time his nephew was nominated to the see of his uncle, and lived in his diocese in great persecution and

exile at a period which is unhappily not clearly fixed. Unless we go back to the time of Leo (457-474), i.e. to a time in which Philoxenus was not yet a bishop, this information can hardly be in accordance with the general course of history, since before Justin the politic of Zeno and Anastasius was, roughly speaking, very favourable to Monophysism.

<sup>1</sup> We know that the election of Severus of Antioch took place in 512, and that according to our document, corroborated by general history (*Chron. Min.* p. 169) he governed the see of this celebrated metropolis during six years and a half, i.e. till 519. We have seen, too, that Philoxenus was after this date in detention during five years, i.e. till 524. The death of our hero must, therefore, be fixed at 10 Dec. 524. We think that this date ought to be adopted as the only true one, since it is made more than possible by the following new document. In the monastery of St. Lazarus, near the village of Habesnas, in Tur 'Abdin, we read in an old liturgical manuscript the following sentence at the beginning of the liturgy written by Philoxenus : " St. Philoxenus lived at the time of the great Severus and of Anastasius, the faithful king. He was asphyxiated by the Greeks with the smoke of a bath-house, in the town of Gangra, in the year 835 of the Greeks. His body was transferred to the monastery of Ƙartamin and his head to the town of Modiad." The year 835 of the Seleucides corresponds exactly, according to Eastern computation, to 524 A.D. On the other hand, if the date of his episcopal ordination be surely 485, as we are told by some reliable ancient historians, he would have governed the see of Mabbūg during 39 years. (Cf. the following footnote.)

<sup>2</sup> The ancient calendars of the Monophysite church mention clearly three feasts for Philoxenus. The first is fixed at Dec. 10, the second at Feb. 18, and the third at Aug. 18. Some parishes in Tur 'Abdin keep this third one even in our days. If these calendars may claim a good historical value, the episcopal ordination of Philoxenus ought to be fixed at Aug. 18 of the year already mentioned.



migrated to his Lord.<sup>1</sup> May their prayers be with us.

After a long time, the town of Mabbūg was destroyed in the wars between Greek and Arab kings. When the Arabs owned the seashore, the members of Mar Akhsnaya's family took the head (the body ?) of the saint, and arrived at Tur 'Abdin. They built a church in a village called Mediad, and there they laid the body of Mar Akhsnaya. This village of Mediad<sup>2</sup> is near the monastery of Mar Habel the Stylite, who, at the time when Mar Akhsnaya was going to the Western countries for the purpose of studying and enlightening himself, caused the top of the column of stones on which he was living to bend to the ground. On that occasion both saints gave each other a mutual greeting. This was a great miracle for their glorious life.

When Mar Habel died a good death, he was buried and placed in his monastery in the *castra* of Mediad. After a short time, the body of St. Abraham,<sup>3</sup> the master of Barsaumas,<sup>4</sup> the head of the Anchorets (Abîlé) was also brought to the monastery of Mar Habel. A big sanctuary has been erected to him, below the small one. The sanctuary of Mar Habel became then a *Beith Kaddishe*,<sup>5</sup> and a baptistery, and that of Mar Abraham became the real sanctuary. The monastery has been called, and is also called in our days : Monastery of Mar Abraham, belonging to the family of Mar Gabriel of Kartamin. The head of Mar Akhsnaya is down to our time in the church of the village of Mediad.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Barhebræus tells us in his *Chron. Eccles.* that this bishop, Philoxenus' nephew, surnamed the "junior" Philoxenus, joined the Chalcedonian party, and for this reason he was elected to the bishopric of Cyprus.

<sup>2</sup> This village gave its name to the actual Ottoman district of Mediad. We are, in fact, shown westwards the débris of a church under the title of Mar Philoxenus.

<sup>3</sup> This illustrious monk has a monastery extant in our day.

<sup>4</sup> A well-known Monophysite monk who propagated his doctrine even in the central provinces of the Persian Empire.

<sup>5</sup> A place where ecclesiastical prelates were inhumed.

<sup>6</sup> There are short lines here describing the invasion of the country by

## III.

## GENERAL CRITICISM.

Without resorting to a rigid criticism in discussing the value of this document, we may be allowed to state that when we compare it, in its historical points, with some other sources of information, it has some claim to a preponderating authority. The annotations which accompany our translation, dispense us from occupying ourselves with details; it forms a part of the group of lives of saints written in Tur 'Abdin, good instances of which are found in E. Rahmani's *Studia Syriaca* (pp. 33, 34, 35, 37).

Some dark points in the life of the hero known through other valuable documents are utterly missing in this notice. So, 1° if the famous archimandrite Babai the Great (569–628) deserves credit,—and so far we have no sufficient reasons to believe the contrary—Philoxenus was driven out of his country by Nestorian bishops<sup>1</sup> about 485. 2°, Simon of Beith Arsham, surnamed the *Persian Sophist* (sixth century), tells us that our hero spent some time in the school of Edessa<sup>2</sup>; and this same historian wants us to believe that he did not study exclusively in the monastery of Kartamin and Tel'eda. A complete and convincing harmony of events is almost impossible in the present state of our knowledge.

But there is a point in this notice which deserves more than a simple reference, and this point is the precise year in which the well-known Philoxenian Version of the Old and New Testaments saw the light. We were told by a colophon of some manuscripts printed by Assemani (*Bibl. Orient.* ii. 23)

the Mongol hordes. The interest of these lines, however great, is local, and would not advance theological studies.

<sup>1</sup> See A. Mingana's *Narsai Homiliae et Carmina*, 1905, vol. i. pp. 5, 6.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Assemani, *B.O.I.*, p. 351 sqq., and F. Nau, *Notice inédite sur Philoxène de Mabbug* in "Revue de l'orient Chrétien," 1903, p. 630 sqq.

that this Version was elaborated in 508 under the auspices of Philoxenus by a certain Polycarpus. A second document published by E. Rahmani (*ibid.* pp. 5, 54) informs us that it was already finished in 505. Our author seems to state that it was prepared by Philoxenus himself in the monastery of Tel'eda before his elevation to the see of Hierapolis. This opinion of an anonymous writer, confirmed by a quotation from Jacob of Edessa, may perhaps claim a certain reliance :

A. We are not to be easily convinced that a version called Philoxenian would ever have been exclusively known by this name if Philoxenus were only its promoter, and the Chor-episcopus Polycarpus its sole translator, as the document edited by Assemani would have us to believe. More probably, therefore, Philoxenus had prepared it long before his episcopal ordination, in the monastery of Tel'eda, having possibly handed his work to Polycarpus for the purpose of a simple revision in 505-508.

B. That the Philoxenian Version of the New Testament was prepared even before 505 is suggested also by the following document : In the town of Mediad there is a manuscript (probably of the eleventh century) belonging to Mr. Emmanuel, head of the Protestant community of the country ; the colophon of this manuscript being as follows<sup>1</sup> : " This is the book of the Gospels containing the four Gospels with the Acts and all the Epistles. It has been translated from Greek into Syriac, with great accuracy and with great solidity, at the first time in the town of Mabbūg in the year 809 of Alexander the Macedonian (498 A.D.) in the days of the just man and confessor Philoxenus, bishop of the town. . . ."

This colophon is found in some other manuscripts of the

<sup>1</sup> I translate it from a copy made for the Rev. A. N. Andrus, veteran American missionary at Mardin.

public libraries of Europe, but with this difference, that several of them exhibit the same date as that printed by Assemani, i.e. 819 of the Greeks<sup>1</sup> (508 A.D.). We leave it to more skilled minds to decide which manuscript has got the right date; ours seems to be more in harmony with the history of Philoxenus and with the general course of events.

ALPHONSE MINGANA.

<sup>1</sup> See W. Wright's and S. A. Cook's *A Catalogue of the Syriac Manuscripts preserved in the library of the Univer. of Cambridge*, 1901, vol. i., pp. 7-8, cod. 1700.



## *THE OUTLOOK OF EARLY CHRISTIAN APOCALYPSES.*

RESUMING our study of Christian eschatological thought in the second century (*EXPOSITOR*, October, 1919), our next task is to endeavour to gain some understanding of the outlook of the Apocalypses which may be presumed to belong to, or to reflect the opinions of, that period. The literature in question, despised or neglected for centuries, has in the last generation been gradually coming to its own. It is, indeed, generally crude in expression, sometimes coarse and repellent, and rarely rises to any heights of descriptive or ethical eloquence. But at least its contributory value for the better estimation of popular early Christian thought is becoming appreciated. It fell into disrepute because it offended the finer moral sensitiveness of cultured Christians and failed to withstand the increasing perception of the dignity and reserve of the canonical writings, which was developing amongst the scholars and defenders of the Great Church, and by reason of the growing reverence for the accepted texts as such. Let us concede that much of what still remains extant, or hidden in the re-editing of later apocalyptic material, is puerile, and frequently savage and horrible, while affording scope for fertile imagination and individual inventiveness. Yet it throws light on popular views and expectations in a different way from the writings of the Apostolic Fathers, whose outlook we have already surveyed, and from the literature of the Apologists, which we have yet to consider.

Seeing that these Apocalypses emanate from the "third race" of the Christians, with its world-wide claims and aspirations, they lack the nationalistic limitations of their Jewish exemplars and forbears, and thus become increasingly individualistic. The fate of body and soul, for righteous or wicked, faithful or pagan or apostate, is continually kept in view, rather than as of old the destiny of an elect but oppressed people, possessed of unbounded confidence in its future vindication at the hands of God. Many examples of this type of literature were Gnostic in colouring or otherwise heretical in tendency, both in the second century and subsequently; but with due reservation of conditions and circumstances the Apocalypse of Peter, apart from the canonical Revelation which dealt largely with the immediate future, seems, both from what we possess and from what we may infer, to have been the parent or at least one of the main sources of the Christian series, which displayed manifold variations in type, according to the special aim and purpose, and according to the time, environment and peculiarities of the individual compiler or composer.

We can readily recognise that the "eschatological discourse" in the Gospels provided the most suitable starting-point for Christian apocalypses which purported to be revelations of the Lord, unless they were merely revisions of or interpolations in Jewish material. But the Transfiguration episode and the Resurrection appearances also afforded fitting occasions for instruction on the last things. So we find in this class of writings revelations of Christ to Apostles, like the Apocalypse of Peter; or assumed direct visions of saints of old time, like that of Isaiah; or visions of Christian martyrs, like that in the Passion of Perpetua; as well as post-resurrection revelations, like the Testament of the Lord. Confining ourselves to the second century, either quoting actual documents of the period or what may

reasonably be assumed to reflect its thought, we may survey the main lines of expectation as they are suggested by 2 Peter, by the Apocalypse of Peter (which was regarded by several Fathers as inspired, and was still read in church in Palestine in the fifth century), both in the Greek fragment, and in the modified Ethiopic form, and in that portion of the Christian Sibyllines which utilised it, and by adaptations of Jewish *midrash*, like the Ascension of Isaiah or the opening and conclusion of 2 Esdras, which form respectively the so-called fifth and sixth books of Ezra; with side glances at interpolations like ch. xxix. (part) in the lately edited Apocalypse of Abraham. It is the present writer's experience that the clergy are seldom acquainted with this literature, despite the illumination which it gives to some parts of the New Testament, and are generally unfamiliar with the vivid conceptions of the future which were popularly current in the second century.

If the Church's interest in the Parousia was waning, and the expectation of the Millennial Kingdom, though also primitive, had gradually faded, yet what lay beyond death exercised a perennial fascination for the individual reader, especially in the lower strata of society, from which the Christians were mostly drawn, as it still attracts a large amount of popular Christian speculation, and especially so, when losses in war turn the hearts of the bereaved to thoughts of the after-life. The subject afforded also a large scope for religious imagination, and opportunities for ethical admonition and instruction in Christian conduct. So that these uncanonical works must not be overlooked by modern Christian workers, seeing that they have a value as constituting some register of the popular state of mind in a way that the Apostolic Fathers and the Apologists do not. Although the cruder apocalyptic beliefs were cast off by the more educated Christians, very little reflexion

will serve to shew how many of these primitive views, derived from Jewish imagery literalised and defined, survive in the mind of untutored believers of our own time, in popular opinions which afford an easy object of attack, and in familiar hymns which are often sung.

As the apocalyptic manner obtaining for the most part is to treat of the *Inferno* before the *Paradiso*, it will perhaps be more fitting in this paper to consider briefly the opinions entertained as to the fate of the ungodly before turning to the brighter side, the anticipations for the righteous, the faithful Christians ; and in regard to the latter the material is less considerable. For granting that the pseudo-Petrine apocalypse, in the form that we have it in the Akhmim fragment, deals first with Heaven after the warning of Judgment, yet that may not have been the original order before its incorporation (as Dr. James supposes) in the Gospel of Peter. At any rate it remains the most important of the primitive Christian descriptions of the other world. And at a period subsequent to that of which we are now thinking the sturdiest of its progeny, the Apocalypse of Paul, eclipsed the parent in popularity and continued its influence down into the Middle Ages, colouring especially, as we now know, the Western monastic sequences and Latin hymns of a blessed future, whose translations we sing to-day, as well as familiar modern ones which testify to the persistence of similar conceptions.

It should not be any real matter for surprise that in the Christian eschatological writings of the period the abiding places of the wicked, the punishments and tortures of the doomed, the use of fire for torment and also, as it seems, for separation, should fill so large a space. For the Jewish Christians took over much of the ancient material which had been inherited from what we might term unofficial Judaism, although it gradually came to be rendered more



detailed and definite. And as they fared forth on the propaganda work of missions in the wider Hellenistic world, they absorbed also much that was found to be not dissimilar or inharmonious in Graeco-Roman speculations as to the conditions of the world beyond death. Moreover, a considerable amount of the realistic symbolism can be traced back to the conglomerate of traditional matter (frequently, indeed, inconsistent in detail) whose ultimate origins in the hazy past of Oriental mythology and folk-lore were probably no more certainly ascertainable by the ancient apocalyptists than by us to-day. In the syncretism of popular expectation, Eastern and Hellenistic, and possibly Egyptian elements were fused, and coloured to a greater or less extent by specifically Christian characteristics and details.

I. Before summarising the chief features of the outlook regarding the fate of the ungodly we must notice opinions that were held as to those events which preceded it in the general eschatological scheme—the Parousia (of God or of Christ) and the Resurrection, which is necessarily antecedent to the divine Judgment of men; not forgetting that the destruction of the world seems illogically to come first, at least in order of description if not of fact. And, at the outset, something must be said about the anticipatory woes and signs that were expected.

(a) The signs which precede the Advent are mostly of the nature of woes and portents in heaven and earth, of a similar type to those which are enumerated in passages like Mark xiii. 7 ff., although it is noteworthy that just these “little apocalypse” verses are not directly represented in the Apocalypse of Peter, despite the likeness of the setting, so far as that book is reproduced in the Greek fragment and in the later Ethiopic form. Similar woes, indicative of the birth-pangs of the New Age, are very prominent

in the early Christian portions of the Sibylline Oracles, woes on peoples and places, especially in the seventh book, which has a Gnostic provenance. The main types—war, famine, plague—are usually found among the sorrows which precede the Parousia and the Rule of Righteousness in the so-called 6 Ezra, but this may have been written somewhat later than the second century. And they would, according to Apoc. Abraham xxix., afford a testing for Jewish Christians. This expectation of celestial and terrestrial portents is a common feature, whatever scheme of years may be favoured by the individual writer as about to be fulfilled before the new world begins.

Into the various applications of the Antichrist legend we cannot enter here; but with some writers Satan's Advent comes first, as the Deceiver, Beliar, Nero redivivus. There is much of this in the Sibyllines. So in Asc. Isa. (iv. 1 f.) Beliar comes at the End. Or ancient worthies, like Enoch and Elijah, were expected to appear to prepare men, as in Ap. Peter (Ethiopic—here probably more original than the Greek fragment). Again, the sound of the trumpet precedes the Parousia of the Elect or Beloved; and this expectation is found both in Jewish and Christian belief (e.g., Apoc. Abraham xxxi.; and after the signs, but before the revealing of the pit of Tartarus and the assembling of men in front of the Judgment throne, VIII Sib. 239).

(b) In Jewish and Christian revelations alike the coming of God or of His Messiah, the visitation of Yahweh or the Parousia of the Lord, was an event necessarily preliminary to the gathering of mankind, raised from the dead, for the purpose of His Judgment with its ultimate issues of blessedness or misery. To the Christian apocalyptist of the second century, whether canonical or not, it was the "coming of our Lord Jesus Christ" (2 Pet. i. 16), which despite the delay which shook the faith of many (iii. 4) was in the fore-

ground. According to Apoc. Peter (Eth.) the Son of God will come in dazzling glory, throned beside the Father, with crown on head and cross before (cf. Gosp. Peter x.) to judge the quick and the dead, and a wailing from each nation will arise at the sight of Him (*Journal of Theological Studies*, xii. 38, 43). To the pseudepigraphist of the Acts of Paul, the wickedness of false teachers will hasten His coming (3 Cor. iii. 3). On the other hand, after God has raised the dead and sat upon His throne, Christ comes in glory with angels and saints to judge the pious and the godless (II Sib. 241 f.). Similarly, it is when God holds full sway that the Holy Child will exercise the terrors of judgment upon evildoers (VIII Sib. 195 ff.; cf. VI. 11). Again, according to the author or compiler of the Ascension of Isaiah, opposing parties of the Christians were moved by conflicting views concerning the (second) coming of the Lord (iii. 21 f.), for His disciples had forsaken the teaching of the Apostles and declined from their high character. And after Beliar's advent as king of this world, as Anti-christ, apparently in the person of the returned Nero, doing wonders, some three and a half years elapse and then Christ will come from the seventh heaven in His glory, to vindicate His loyal but fugitive disciples who survive, and drawing them after Him will give them rest, but Beliar and his hosts He will bring to Gehenna (like Azazel in Ap. Abr. xiv., xxxi.). With the Lord come the dead saints in their spiritual bodies (the garments stored ready in the seventh heaven), and those yet alive here ascend too in their celestial raiment. This happens before the Beloved's judgment of heaven and earth with consuming fire from Himself (iv. 18). So also in 5 Ezra (2 Esdr. ii. 34 ff.) the peoples are told that Christ, the Shepherd, is near, and will come at the end of the world.

So far the indications have pointed to our Lord's advent.

But it is also God's coming, at any rate the coming of His "day" of judgment (2 Pet. ii. 9 ; iii. 12). The Greek of Apoc. Peter likewise anticipates God's advent to His faithful who are starved and oppressed (cf. II Sib. 6 ff. 155 ff.), and consequently as Judge of the wicked. While in the form suggested by the Ethiopic equivalent it is the day of the Lord, the Father, the Eternal, the Living One, who comes to judge (*JTS*, 39). In VIII Sib. 82 ff. also the Almighty Himself comes and judges the quick and the dead, for it is the judgment of the immortal God (93), the eternal future King (217 ff.). And later in this book we find that after the heavenly and earthly portents and the Resurrection God will come to the judgment of good and evil men, when He tests all things, heaven and earth as well, in fire, before He creates the one great day of eternal light (410 ff.). Such an act, too, seems to be implied in III, 90, while the "return" referred to shortly afterwards (95) suggests Christ's advent. We may note that on the Jewish side, in the Biblical Antiquities of Pseudo-Philo (recently edited by Dr. James), it is always God's coming rather than Messiah's which is expected. There were thus different modes current of presenting the truth of a divine advent to judge.

(c) With regard to the Resurrection, we have seen that it is God "the Holy Ruler" of the world who wakes the dead (VIII Sib. 169 f., so too II, 238 f.) Concerning the act and the conditions thereof very little information is given. But as to the spiritual body which is to be received by the dead, and bestowed upon the faithful surviving on earth at the Resurrection, the Ascension of Isaiah by itself affords considerable material, illustrative of one view at any rate which was current. Therein we read much about garments and thrones and crowns laid up for the righteous. Such raiment the prophet himself receives on his ascent, and becomes like the angels of the seventh heaven (viii. 26, 14 f.).



And such garments of the upper world the righteous patriarchs possess, receiving not their crowns and thrones till the Incarnation (ix. 9 ff.), and in the spiritual raiment bestowed on them the saints ascend with Christ from Hades, to receive in Heaven their crowns and thrones (i. 16 f.). Such also (Christian) believers on earth will possess (26), all who watch in the Holy Spirit (xi. 40), granted to them out of the storehouses of the seventh heaven, where the raiment is now laid up (cf. Enoch lxii. 15 f. ; Slav. En. xxii. 8 f. ; Ap. Abr. xiii.). But this spiritualised and approximately Pauline conception does not hold the field.

During the period under consideration it is assuredly a resuscitation of the *flesh* in the crudest literal sense that is generally insisted on (as in the so-called Apostles' creed), although naturally not so in writings of distinctively Gnostic colouring. Those who sleep in death will be brought out of the tombs, and from the secret places of the earth (5 Ezra ii. 16, 31). The number sealed for the feast of the Lord receive glorious garments, clad in white (38); they put on the immortal clothing, and have crowns and palms (45). Here two divergent conceptions seem to be blended. If we may assume that traces of the original Apocalypse of Peter remain in the concluding and later portion of the Ethiopic Pseudo-Clementine work, it is the Lord, or the Son of God, who will raise the dead by His word when He comes, their raiment (after the Resurrection and the Judgment) being like unto that of the Lord in the Transfiguration (*JTS*, 365). It is for the purpose of the ensuing Judgment that all creatures are awakened from the earth, from Sheol and Abaddon (cf. *Bibl. Antt.* iii. 10 ; xxxiii. 3), and that this resurrection is usually conceived of in a strictly material fashion is demonstrated by the intensely realistic expectations of the Christian Sibyl, that all physical defects will be cured, and the bodies of the dead totally restored (VIII,

205 ff.), and this by God through the agency of the archangel Uriel (II, 222 ff.), who was pre-eminently the angel over resurrection and judgment (Enoch xx. 2, etc.). We may compare the office of Esrael, the angel of wrath, who brings the souls of the murdered and the sinners to be half-consumed to the darkness of Gehenna, and prepares the place of fire for idolaters and idols alike (Eth. Ap. Pet. ap. *JTS*, 45, 47, 49).

(d) The Resurrection, therefore, is in the main the means to bring men either to vindication or judgment, and to the consideration of the opinions held concerning that divine act of judicial separation we must now address ourselves. For the most part the Judgment is regarded as in the hands of Christ, to whom the Father has delegated authority, and for it He is crowned (Eth. Ap. Pet., *JTS*, 38). With this II Sib. 241 ff. is in agreement, where Christ at His coming, seated on the right hand, judges from the Judge's throne good and bad alike. So in Asc. Isaiah judgment is committed to the Beloved, i.e. the Messiah, for things in heaven and earth and for the consuming of the godless (iv. 18), and its scope embraces the rulers of this world and its gods, as well as the old creation itself (x. 12). In a similar manner, according to 2 Peter, the day of Judgment, of the Lord or of God, is not only for the unrighteous but for the heavens and the earth, in fact for the whole creation (ii. 9; iii. 7, 10, 12). These terrestrial and celestial constituents will be destroyed by fire and replaced by a new, a righteous creation. This conception of the destruction of the old world—which is often described as if it would happen before the Resurrection—is part and parcel of the Judgment drama, and is met with frequently both in Jewish and Christian apocalypses, but it is quite different from that of the cyclic destruction and restoration in the Stoic doctrine. Likewise in a fragment of the closely related Apocalypse

of pseudo-Peter (ap. Macarius, *Apocritica*, iv. 16) heaven and earth are judged together. And this is in harmony with the Ethiopic version of the same (*JTS*, 41).

To revert to the Agent of judgment. In the Akhmim parchment (i.) it is God Himself who comes and judges the sons of lawlessness; yet in another fragment (ap. Methodius, *Conviv. Virginum* ii. 6) those babes untimely born, who have been committed to the "caretaking" angels, summon their unnatural parents to Christ's judgment seat. But that the universal Judgment is before the Father the Ethiopic form agrees (*JTS*, 39). So it is in VIII Sib. 82, 92, and frequently; and in II, 63 the warning, "God will later judge thee," backs the ethical appeal of the writer. And according to 6 Ezra (xvi. 67) God is the Judge to be feared. But this is only natural where the revelation is given in connexion with some Old Testament worthy, or through the (presumably) ancient Sibyl. We may notice further that in the Greek Apoc. Peter (ix.) it is God's judgment that the souls of the murdered declare to be just; while in the Ethiopic the stream of unquenchable fire is part of the judgment of the Father's wrath (*JTS*, 42 ff.). So also in III Sib. 34 f., it is the judgment of the Immortal Helper, the Creator, that men forget; and this, according to a subsequent and more certainly Christian passage (90 f.), is the judgment of the great God, after the burning up of the old creation, and the passing away of times and seasons when the Great Age has begun. With this succession of events VIII Sib. 410 ff. is in agreement: "Later I will come to the Judgment." Yet whatever be the mode of pictorial presentation the judgment ultimately is God's.

II. Let us now turn to the consideration of the *Inferno*, wherein are represented as being worked out with punishments and tortures the issues of the Judgment for the ungodly.

(i.) We have already remarked that there was a widespread belief that Satan, Beliar, Azazel, or by whatever name the "prince of this world" might be called, would be, as in the canonical New Testament, cast into and bound in Gehenna, the Hell of fire and torment. So the compiler of Asc. Isaiah anticipates that at His advent Christ will drag Beliar and his hosts thither (iv. 14), indeed they are probably said to be destroyed (x. 12), although this may not signify what we should term annihilation. In these writings Hell is regarded as a well-defined and mapped out locality for the doom of the condemned. For example, in II Sib., which seems to represent the Apoc. Peter worked over with Greek mythological colouring and later additions, it is the heathen Tartarus rather than the Jewish Gehenna that is evident, or else both in combination (290 ff.), while the latter reappears also in apocryphal apostolic Acts. And the gaping pit of Tartarus is revealed after the celestial signs according to VIII Sib. 232 ff. But from Gehenna God will protect the faithful (Christian) Israel (5 Ezra ii. 29). While we shall find it convenient for the sake of brevity to group the torments generally under the heading of Fire, seeing that it is the instrument of most of them, we may notice here how the characteristics of fire and darkness are not found to be incompatible one with another. The combination is common to pictures of Hell from those of pre-Christian Greek writers to the poetry of Milton. It is discoverable in the fragmentary Apoc. Peter (Greek) vi., x., xii. ; and in the Ethiopic form the darkness of Gehenna is often prominent (*JTS*, 47, etc.). We have dark Tartarus referred to in 2 Peter ii. 4 ; and in II Sib. are mentioned the black night of Gehenna and the beasts of Tartarus, in immeasurable darkness, and the wailing of the lost in dark Tartarus (292, 302 ff.). We may recollect that it was only to Hades, not Gehenna, Haguel, or the Abyss, to which Christ was to



descend, as the Asc. Isaiah carefully points out (x. 8). Darkness and perishing are alike associated in the *Biblical Antiquities* (xvi. 3 ; li. 5).

(ii.) Another comprehensive expression for the doom of the wicked is "death and destruction," to which the sinners are delivered by God (6 Ezra xv. 26). It is not clear, as we have intimated, whether what we should now designate annihilation was intended by such words, for that appears incompatible with the (to us unethical) everlasting punishment which these writings generally presuppose. But II Sib. 252 ff., based at least in part on Apoc. Peter, states that subsequently to the test of flowing fire and the saving of the righteous, the ungodly will be destroyed for all ages. So VII Sib. 126 mentions the burning to eternity of human spirits, as if indicating a gradual annihilation ; and such a doom is expected in VIII Sib. alike for material Rome as well as for the wicked (100 ff., 228). The same question is raised by the Asc. Isaiah, when it says that all the godless shall perish or be consumed by the fire of the Beloved, and they will be as though they had not been created (iv. 18). And the latter expression is used with reference to the stars in Eth. Apoc. Peter (*JTS*, 42). These passages certainly look like annihilation, and they consequently suggest something akin to the modern doctrine of "conditional immortality." Moreover, concerning intermediate punishment before the Judgment, a foretaste of torment according to the crime committed on earth, we have a hint in 2 Peter, where, parallel with the reservation of the rebellious angels, imprisoned in Tartarus, the unrighteous are stated to be kept under punishment to the day of Judgment (ii. 4, 9). Likewise in the wholly Jewish *Biblical Antiquities* punishment strictly according to the sin continues after death (xlv. 10). In pictures of the *Inferno*, however, angels of punishment play a large part, e.g., Apoc. Peter

(Greek) vi., viii., where they are chastising or tormenting ; but the idea itself is at least as old as Plato.

(iii.) We shall now consider Fire as the chief instrument of torture and separation, for we have not space to enter into the details of the many torments described, and the task would be gruesome and unpleasant. There can be little doubt that the belief in the fire of Hell was deeply rooted and universal among the primitive Christians, as with the Jews before them. Repentance and the sealing in the baptismal experience were held to save the believer therefrom ; but in regard to the pagans and the apostate Christians alike it may be said to have become the most appropriate as well as the simplest and commonest symbol of doom. And we must recall that, although probably not native Greek, the doctrine had a Gentile as well as a Jewish ancestry. It was thus by no means a new conception to the converts from the Hellenistic world. Consequently the apocalyptic writings of our period are full of it, and the presentation of its use as an instrument is frequently combined with a ghastly and grotesque horribleness, a savage ferocity, which comes in this way to expression against heathen persecutors. Such teaching was indeed alien to the spirit of the Gospel, alien also to its dignified reticence and simplicity. We can only indicate the main features of this faith, to us moderns cruel and repulsive in its reiterated and classified physicalness, as well as involving an immoral conception of God in the perpetuity of its punishment. Assuredly it possessed value as an ethical lever, a deterrent against vice and crime ; but its undue prominence manifests a sad departure from the Lord's teaching, which was predominantly positive, and but seldom utilised the appeal to terror.

We have then to consider fire as punitive, separating and destroying in its efficacy, eternal in its application, and not

merely as symbolic of the purificatory testing "like gold" of the elect in earthly persecution (e.g. 6 Ezra xvi. 73). In this period the far later "purgatorial" sense would be an anachronism, and even the modern mediævalist would hardly regard this literature as satisfactory authority for its primitiveness. Moreover, that retributive punishment is preparatory to Heaven, and this is of Hell. We have already had some occasion to make allusion to fire as the means of divine destruction of the old heaven and earth, in the manner in which 2 Peter represents them to be melted ere the new creation of righteousness, the everlasting one, appears. This belief is supported by the pseudo-Petrine fragment, and implied as lying behind the Ethiopic form of the same apocalypse, wherein heaven and stars and waters and all creatures are molten in the fervent heat of the judgment steam of fire. So with the Sibyl, the whole creation is to be melted in fire before the Judgment (III. 83 ff.). Fire also is the prime instrument in the cosmic catastrophe, VIII, 225 ff., 411; while in VII, 118 ff., after a catalogue of woes on places, earth and sea, heavens and peoples burn. Likewise with the author of 6 Ezra xv. 23 earth's foundations as well as the sinners will burn like straw in the fire of God's wrath. Thus the catastrophic conflagration seems usually to have been expected, as has been remarked, antecedently to the Resurrection and the Judgment, despite the logical and temporal inconsistency with the prevalent materialistic views of the latter.

As regards the fire which forms such an essential element of the *Inferno* in the second century as well as of later conceptions of the same, it is chiefly retributive and vindictive—after the Judgment; but there is also another aspect wherein it appears to have been viewed as differentiating in its preliminary operation—before the Judgment.

(a) Fire as punitive and destructive, unquenchable and

age-long. Because of our greater sensitiveness and our more spiritual outlook we are horrified at the gruesome and grossly materialistic catalogue of classified torments, wherein the punishment is generally adapted to the crime. Yet of such a list of woes a great amount of the contemporary matter relative to the *Inferno* consists, alike in the Greek fragment of the Apoc. Peter, the Ethiopic Clementines based upon it, and other examples of similar literature fundamentally connected therewith. This style of writing constituted a form of propaganda which would appeal to some minds then more than now, but it was not stimulated by the highest motives of the Gospel ; and yet such catalogues of sinners, their vices and their torments, depicted as the result of the Judgment, afforded no doubt a powerful weapon in the hands of one who would attack or hold up to reprobation some special sin or type of person, or even an individual without or within the Church. Of this last phase Dante is the supreme mediæval example.

Apart from the fiery and devouring tortures for unnatural mothers, about which we knew from pseudo-Petrine fragments which had been otherwise preserved, let us examine briefly the types which that Apocalypse exhibits of the ungodly who are condemned in the Judgment. The punishers generally are angels, the place is dark, fire is the chief means of torture, and the ceaseless retribution is in some way related to the sin committed. The sufferers successively enumerated are blasphemers, deniers of righteousness, lewd women, murderers and accomplices, unnatural mothers (exposing babes : Gr. fragm.), betrayers of righteous, doubters of God's justice (Eth.), false witnesses, pitiless trusters in riches, usurers, morally perverted, another class uncertain (Gr.), and apostates. The Ethiopic parallel and probably in some items more faithful version continues the sorry catalogue with dishonourers of parents, disobedient,



unchaste, unfaithful slaves, hypocritical givers, enchanters bound to wheels of fire in the stream of fire ; and the righteous dead in garments of heavenly life are brought to see their torments (so of the souls of the murdered, Gr. x., *JTS*, 49 f.). The series recurs with marked similarity in II Sib. 245 ff. at a later date—murderers, liars, thieves, deceivers, adulterers, slanderers, proud, lawless, idolaters, blasphemers, injurers of the good, double-faced clergy . . . usurers, oppressors of widows and orphans, evil almsgivers, undutiful, deniers of deposits, faithless slaves, incontinent, procurers of abortion and expositors, and enchanters. These data are sufficient for us to obtain a general idea of the way in which such a specific treatment of the tortures of Hell, anticipated for pagan or pervert, might well lend itself to expansion or special emphasis. The detailed torment for each class is indeed different, but, generally speaking, the changes are rung on fire beneath, blazing mud, flames without or within, fire flashing or roasting, and all alike without respite and without reprieve. Such morbidness, as we know too well, persisted for centuries, if indeed it is yet eliminated from the cruder sort of Christian belief.

Now some may rightly ask, Is there no relief in these visions from such ferocious anticipations ? There is very little. Christian Apocalyptic, as Jewish before it, always presupposed man's freewill, although there may be no passages descriptive thereof. The Apoc. Abraham (xxvi.) even compares God's with man's. And VIII Sib. 399 ff. emphasises the fact that it is in the power of man's will to choose the way of life or of death, and the wicked who have chosen evil are "cast into death and eternal fire." Repentance is, however, available in this life. The preliminary woes are "scourges for amendment," and men are counselled to leave off their sins before God's advent in judgment (6 Ezra xvi. 19, 67). So after the signs the

time comes when it is too late to "strive to reconcile God" (VII Sib. 29 f.). And the Christian portion of Apoc. Abraham (xxix.) tells how "those who change in their counsels" will join Jesus. Expression is also occasionally given to the uselessness of penitence after death. It is so even if it be thrice as much as the sin (II Sib. 304 ff.), and the divine decision is admitted to be just, according to Apoc. Peter, by wronged (Gr. x.) and wrongers (Eth.) alike, and by the sinners who seek mercy and repentance too late (*JTS*, 46, 50). Thus there is for the ungodly no hope beyond, but fire and darkness fill the ghastly future, save only for the suggestion which may have been contained (according to Dr. James) in the original Apoc. Peter, to the effect that the intercession of an apostle, and so inferentially of Christians, might prove effective for the amelioration of the tortures of the damned. This milder, if at the time novel, conception is undoubtedly developed in the continuation of the Ethiopic pseudo-Clementine writing, and in the succeeding part of II Sib. (330 ff.), where the prayers of the pious are permitted to save sinners from the terrible fire, and to gain their final removal "for His people's sake to another and eternal life with the immortals on the Elysian plain." Possibly a similarly hopeful but unusual and unorthodox belief is traceable in the Slavonic version of the Greek Apoc. Baruch (xvi. 4), where God's pity ensues after Baruch's sympathy for the sinners. Likewise something akin to petition by the living, or intercession by the righteous departed, is suggested in the Test. Abraham (xiv. A), where the prayer of the patriarch delivers a soul almost saved, and the latter appears to be implied in the Coptic Apoc. Elijah (*Church Quarterly Review*, April 1915, 32; James). Clearly this hesitating doctrine has nothing to do with Purgatory as such; but hints of this nature, like that noticed before in Hermas, no doubt opened a door for

the mediæval doctrine, when speculation on the subject began. They also testify to the existence of some moral dissatisfaction with the prevailing opinion, and thus afford a foreshadowing of the modern faith in the possibility of progress after death, even for sinners.

(b) We have seen now that torture by fire in some form or other characterises almost all the classes of punishment in Apoc. Peter and related or similar works. But this follows upon the Judgment. There is also, however, an apparently widespread expectation of fire in streams and cataracts, or a flaming river, not like the Greek river of Hell, but providing a determining and separating means for differentiating the souls of men. And it seems to be associated with or to constitute part of the preliminary destructive signs. In the Ethiopic equivalent of Apoc. Peter, before the section parallel with the Greek fragment, after the fire-stream has melted the old creation the river of flame not only pursues like a lava flow human beings in flight from judgment, but also provides a testing belt of flowing fire through which the peoples have to pass at God's behest (*JTS*, 41, 44). The faithful elect are unharmed in the passage thereof, but the fluent flame becomes, as the later Vision of Paul suggests (xxxi. f.), the torment of the wicked who sink therein to various depths according to their iniquities. This differentiating stream of fire appears again in the cognate work of the Sibyl (II, 252 ff.), where all pass through it; as does also the eternal punishment by fire, and the subsequent tortures for the various classes of the ungodly that we have already recorded. The traversing of the blazing river betokens salvation for all the just, who are borne aloft by angels in the crossing to the life that is without care and where there is one long day (315 f.); but it means destruction (failure to pass) for the evil, and that for ever. We may contrast the trial of all

in fire (before the Judgment, VIII Sib. 411 ff.), and the testing in the twelfth hour of the End (Apoc. Abraham xxix.), with the burning in spirit to the years of eternity (VII Sib. 127). For further references to the revolving wheel of fire, the torture for wizards, and to the fiery stream, as separating, cf. *JTS*, 383 ; also for the former, Acts of Thomas, lv. We have not thought it needful to adduce passages specially relative to the End as such in this paper, because it is assumed in both Jewish and Christian writings of this type that it comes between the two ages, between that of the evil world-rulers and that of the righteous creation, the glorious and perfect Reign of God.

III. Now let us in conclusion pass to the tenderer and more congenial theme, the issue for the righteous, the consideration of Paradise as represented in these writings. This section will be short in comparison, because, as we said at the outset, there is less detail given and an absence of any classification. The reward of the faithful is regarded as one, and it is not differentiated or analysed. It is only in harmony with the thought of the time that sensuous beauty and alluring delights should mark the visions or descriptions of the *Paradiso* in the apocalyptic literature. But it is not easy to discover any consistent view as to the mode of entering the place of the blessed. Sometimes it appears as if the traversing of that fiery stream to which we have but lately referred is itself the test, which for them renders any formal judgment unnecessary. Sometimes the state after judgment is envisaged without any hint as to the means of entering therein. We have remarked that the Apoc. Peter seems to have included no delineation of the acts of Resurrection or of Judgment as such ; nor does it supply material for a canvas of the scene of entrance into the heavenly life. The garden-court of Heaven itself, the place of the uncreated light of the Divine Presence,



is variously located. To one writer it is in or open to the third heaven, as perhaps with St. Paul, if 2 Corinthians xii. 2, 4 be equivalent (Slav. Enoch viii., xlii.). To another it lies in the fourth (Gr. Apoc. Baruch x.), and so on. To yet another, as is the case with the author of Apoc. Peter (Gr. v.), it is just denoted as a vast space outside this world.

Popular features figurative of the delight, beauty and perfection of Heaven were evidently the light, the glorious garments, the flowers and scents, the tuneful joy. Concerning these and some other points we may at least say a few words. (a) The dazzling light of Paradise is doubtless to be associated ultimately with the glory about the divine Throne, which Jewish as well as Christian Apocalyptic depicted as surrounded with fire and fiery creatures (cf. Apoc. Abraham, xviii., xv.), and the bliss of the righteous is connected with the shining of the everlasting light (5 Ezra ii. 35). With this we may compare the luminousness of the radiant garments and bodies of the (originally patriarchal) saints (Gr. Apoc. Peter iii. f.), and the old belief is reflected in the later description (by the Ethiopic continuation) of the crowned righteous outshining the sun (*JTS*, 366), like as the Transfiguration raiment of the Lord affords a foregleam of the Resurrection garb. This makes us think again of the glorious spiritual raiment of which we read in Asc. Isaiah (iv., viii. ff.), where the joy-giving light decreases down through the heavens from the indescribable divine glory of the seventh. Such radiance is characteristic of Heaven and its inhabitants, and Christ's glory surpasses that of all created beings (x.). The shining garb and crystal brightness of the saints renders them *like* angels, and similar glorious apparel clothes ancient worthies (Asc. Isa. ix. 9) and Christian saints (5 Ezra. ii. 39 f.). Thus frequently the life of the redeemed is shewn to be comparable to the

angelic form of existence, but not identical therewith, as is sometimes popularly supposed.

(b) Further, for their use and delectation the locality of the just bears plants and trees with life-giving fruits. In Apoc. Peter v. (Gr.) we have unfading flowers and sweet odours and imperishable fruits in the heavenly land (cf. Eth. ; and Slav. Enoch viii.); also with the heavenly tabernacles is prepared for God's people the tree of life for sweet ointment, and twelve trees with various fruits, and as many rills of celestial food, of milk and honey, with seven mighty hills with joyful flowers of wondrous perfume (5 Ezra ii. 12 ff.). Such is the resting-place for the fathers and the (Christian) saints. Compare the vision of Paradise in the Passion of Perpetua, which is indebted to Apoc. Peter, and the details in the related Vision of Paul, xxii. f. There is also a Sibylline fragment (ii. 44 ; Hennecke) which calls up a similar picture of Oriental gardens radiant with the bloom of many flowers, and where the food of the blessed comes from celestial constellations.

(c) Another characteristic which emerges from this literature is the tuneful joy of the righteous, their eternal happiness with God and Christ. For celestial songs of praise and thanksgiving are common to Jewish and Christian visions of the blessed life. Compare, for example, Apoc. Abraham x., xvii. ; the song of innumerable saints, 5 Ezra ii. 42 ; the glad praise of the heavenly dwellers, Apoc. Peter v., while in the Ethiopic continuation the Lord joins the flower-decked righteous in rejoicing, and brings the nations to His eternal kingdom.

(d) This last reference serves to remind us that the concept of the Kingdom, so familiar in the Gospels, and especially that of the millennial reign, has receded ; for the vision is generally of the eternal future, which was naturally a subject of popular curiosity and inquiry for the Christians. Its

chief quality, Life, used absolutely or with attributes, occurs with some frequency, and Life and Light are closely associated (II Sib. 149 ff., 316; frag. iii. 31). But there are indirect allusions to the Kingdom of God in the exhortation to be ready for the reward of the kingdoms, and to a glad gratitude for the call thereto; while the kingdom of Jerusalem is to be bestowed upon the Christians, who are now God's people (5 Ezra ii. 35, 11). And Michael holds the keys of the kingdom which is located in the fifth heaven (Gr. Apoc. Baruch xi. 2); and with them may be contrasted the keys of the great prison at the Judgment-seat (VIII Sib. 123). The hint that life, and glory, and the unending kingdom may be vouchsafed to sinners by God at the instance of the intercession of the just has been already noticed (*JTS*, 52, 365; II Sib. 335 ff.). This is, in semi-pagan terminology, salvation in the Elysian fields.

(e) Only occasionally do we find the figure of Reward utilised to designate the life of the redeemed and vindicated righteous. The conception is associated with the Kingdom and eternal light (5 Ezra ii. 35). It is also used in a neutral sense, in that the reward for exposed babes consists in merely receiving salvation and being without punishment (frag. Apoc. Peter, ap. Clem. Alex. *Eclogæ*, xlviii.). Contrasted therewith is the negative sense, as when the righteous are depicted as seeing the persecutors rewarded according to their works (Eth. Apoc. Peter, *JTS*, 51).

Sufficient evidence has been adduced to shew that stock apocalyptic conceptions, terms and imagery were differently brought in and variously combined, subject to the idiosyncrasy, taste and imagination of the individual writer, each contribution forming a part of that kaleidoscopic picture so dear to the heart of primitive and simple-minded Christians, and serving as an attractive contrast with the drab toil and arduous conditions of their daily slavery. In these

visionary or prophetic descriptions emanating from the period which we have been considering Paradise and Heaven are virtually equivalent, because the divisions of the latter are variable and only appear in some of the writings.

In conclusion, our verdict may well be that there is not much of permanent value in these works of or reflecting the thoughts of the second century of our era. They are often grossly materialistic ; they are but seldom eloquent. They mark a progressive literalising of ancient symbols. They are not strong in practical idealism. To construct a clearly defined system of eschatological doctrine from these writings is not possible ; and to apply the test of logical consistency to them is neither fair nor feasible, when due consideration has been accorded to their nature and character. Yet we cannot fail to observe in them the change of emphasis, which testifies to the prevailing popular interest of Christians having become centred in the ultimate future of souls (and bodies) rather than in an immediate advent of the Lord or in a millennial kingdom. Moreover, they are highly individualistic, not only in their teaching as regards the destiny of men, that of nation or church having passed into the background, but also in the fashion of their composition according to their several authors. Nevertheless it has been well worth while to make a survey of them which, although necessarily incomplete, is adequate to shew that many of the cruder conceptions which still persist as part of the mental furniture of the religion of the ordinary Christian, in regard to the end of the world and the conditions of Heaven and of Hell, derive from the syncretistic period of these early apocalypses.

EDWARD WILLIAM WINSTANLEY.



## ANSELM ON SATISFACTION TO THE DIVINE HONOUR.

ATHWART the agelong process of Catholicism, which starting from weak and wavering moral conceptions tends to make them ever more intensely wavering and ever more profoundly weak, strikes with sudden and strange power the theory of the *Cur Deus Homo*. Anselm stands without hesitation for the absolute moral necessity of an absolute and true satisfaction for sin—without hesitation, though not indeed without traces of inconsistency. He is a Saint in the Roman calendar; but his success in establishing his own views as normative was curiously limited. The term “satisfaction” is in the limelight; Anselm consciously vindicates it; and he succeeds in imposing it upon Catholic<sup>1</sup> and even upon classical Protestant theology. What had been suggested before indirectly, fugitively, unsuccessfully, is now deliberately and one might think finally achieved. But with that attainment the work of Anselm as a legislator comes to an end. Absolute necessity of the satisfaction made by Christ is denied by practically all St. Anselm’s Catholic successors. The high authority of St. Augustine, who denied the absolute necessity of Atonement, obliterates St. Anselm’s doctrine. The characteristic ethos of Catholicism is too strong to be shaken.

It is the honour, not the penal justice of God, which Anselm regards as demanding and receiving satisfaction. In the *Cur Deus Homo* penal interpretations are not merely avoided but excluded by the course of the argument. Other works

<sup>1</sup> Laberthonnière, the French modernist, is told by Rivière that he may try his desired re-statement on atonement if he likes. “Satisfaction” is not yet *de fide*. The Vatican Council could not complete its projected definitions. Evidently, however, Rivière regards Laberthonnière’s wish as rash and presumptuous.

of Anselm's are quoted in which he uses the indefinite yet traditional language that recognises penalty in Christ's death ; but in all fairness we are bound to interpret Anselm on the lines of his deliberate theory and not in the light of his devotional rhetoric. Divine justice is not said to receive "satisfaction," according to St. Anselm. That position is Protestant rather than Anselmic. At the same time, Anselm's conception of what God's honour claims becomes more emphatic and also more dignified because of occasional references to the justice of God. It is best to say, with Ritschl, that Anselm conceives Christ as satisfying a claim put forward by God most High as an individual, acting under the conditions of private law. Yet here, as so often, our ready-made categories do not exactly fit the facts. It is partly a personal claim which God raises ; but partly too it is the claim of abstract righteousness. God "will not be just to Himself"<sup>1</sup> if He waives the requirement of satisfaction ; one is tempted to render "He will not be *fair* to Himself" ; but such a gloss misses out exactly the significant element. In later generations, Anselm's thinking tells in favour of a satisfaction rendered, in some sense, to justice. But the wavering conception of justice with which Anselm operates weakens the connotation of the term even while it gives it vogue. We cannot but hold him partially responsible, against his will and intention, for lowering the thought of justice into *quasi*-justice.

While it is certain that Anselm's thought is moulded by disciplinary practice, other things have been suggested as helping to give him his clue. It has been strongly asserted—and as strongly denied—that Anselm's legal and moral standards are a direct inheritance from the primeval beliefs and customs of Germany. Here, as so often, we must recognise "plurality of causes." Each of these—discipli-

<sup>1</sup> Bk. I. chap. xiii.

nary practice in the church, tribal usages in the State—may have suggested to St. Anselm the possibility and the necessity of satisfaction for sin. Indeed, we may very well have to go further, and to recognise “intermixture of effects.” It is quite possible that both influences were at work. If so, it is a subject of antiquarian rather than of theological interest in what proportion the two streams of tendency co-operated to form St. Anselm’s thought.<sup>1</sup>

Anselm himself interprets more boldly. He thinks that he is building upon genuine moral intuitions—*quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus*; Christians, Jews or Pagans! Such assumptions are unhelpful. Even those who are most thoroughly convinced of the presence of an almost intuitional continuum in the moral judgments of mankind will hesitate to-day before adopting so bald and unhistorical a view as old-fashioned intuitionism. In a world where all things move and change, the thoughts of men, *even* regarding the deepest things—or perhaps *most of all* regarding the deepest things—will not stagnate. It is enough, and more than enough, that thought should grow, showing itself deeper, truer and worthier as ages pass. We will not despise Anselm’s desire to convince “Jews and Pagans”; but we have no relish for his naïf assumption that converts are to bring with them their Jewish and Pagan ethic, unchanged, when they enter the Kingdom of God.

Disciplinary satisfactions introduce the atmosphere of the relative and the conventional wherever their influence tells. In Anselm, however, there is a very curious kind of rivalry between Christ’s satisfaction and the sinner’s own. He states them as alternatives. In order to vindicate a necessity for Christ’s work, Anselm has to sweep away the sinner’s fancied capacity for putting himself right with God.

<sup>1</sup> It is difficult not to think that Germanic ideas are at work in the assumption that the guilty person *or some other of his stock* must “satisfy.”

He does so very trenchantly.<sup>1</sup> No part of his dialogue stands upon a higher level of ethical, of Christian, one might almost say of Protestant insight. Certainly to a Protestant reader it will seem plain that Anselm has destroyed for good and all the dream of personal satisfaction by man or of personal merit in him.

At the same time, this is not Anselm's own thought. The curious little parable of the injured king,<sup>2</sup> who is willing—after suitable satisfaction has been offered on behalf of the guilty, and has been accepted—to prove himself placable not once merely but many times, slips in as matter of course the lesser satisfactions which have to be made by the penitent on each occasion of confessed and forgiven (post-baptismal) sin. *Remoto Christo*, man can do nothing to better his evil case; but, let Christ the Saviour have suffered for sins—the strange situation arises that the second-rate and ineffectual satisfactions of sinful men are desired and welcomed by the God of Catholic piety.

The case is similar in regard to Merit. Though the “twin conception” is never placed in the centre of the stage, we cannot doubt that, as Anselm was a good Catholic in regard to secondary disciplinary satisfactions, so he must have been a good Catholic in regard to the merits of the redeemed children of men. Even the most poignant sense of the need of a Saviour's work does not deliver any Catholic mind from that compromise between law and grace which avoids the manifest dangers of extreme views on either side, but—misses the truth. As Principal Franks tells us, Biel the late nominalist schoolman can only have blurted out the inevitable result of mediæval theology, when he taught in plain terms that Christ's merits needed and found their supplement in the merits of Christ's people. We are far

<sup>1</sup> Bk. I. chap. xx.

<sup>2</sup> Bk. II. chap. xvi.



from this point in Anselm, but we are recognisably on the way thither.

As yet we have been dealing with the Protestant view of this part of Anselm's work. For the Catholic view we may turn to Rivière. He quotes and endorses Roman Catholic opinion to the effect that Anselm overshoots the mark in reckoning all that men could possibly do or bear for God as matter of strict obligation. For the Catholic mind, certain forms of self-discipline—including some of those explicitly mentioned by Anselm—are "supererogatory" and afford a basis for merit in the strictest sense. Nor does one see how sober Catholic criticism can fail to insist upon this correction of Anselm—one more proof that, as we have already put it, his insight is so deeply Christian as to carry him right into the Protestant world of thought. Yet he hardly tarries there for any length of time. Nor is it to be supposed that Protestantism endorses everything said by Anselm in these higher moods. It is almost unbearable rigorism to affirm that the Christian ought to allow himself no pleasure except such as may help him heavenwards. The ethical "must" is a great reality, but it is fanatical to blot out everything else from the life of a Christian.

Nevertheless, the first reason for Anselm's doctrine of moral necessity in Atonement may be recognised here—in the solemn and rightful severity of his moral judgment. The sane and healthy exercise of his Christian conscience put him upon the track of a conception of transcendent value—the conception of a moral necessity which is equivalent to the highest freedom. One ought not to need to add—this necessity has nothing whatever to do with physical compulsion. It is purely moral. Of God it is written that "He cannot deny Himself." Anselm would confirm the assertion that the impossibility alleged is no diminution of

divine omnipotence, but its glory. Nor of a man, the child of God, can we conceive any worthier manifestation of real moral freedom than in the words—historically true, or traditional invention truer still to the inner situation—“Here I stand; I can do no otherwise; so help me God.”

Unfortunately, we shall have to note that Anselm was unable to retain this grand conception in all its splendour. Perhaps he never grasped it in clear thought. If we take his definition of moral obligation to be “what we *owe* to God,” he is at the centre of things, and his apprehension is normal, deep and sound. If we ought rather to think of him as insisting on “what we *owe to God*,” there may be some doubt as to the value of the position. The latter is what the mediæval world of private personal claims might suggest to a mediæval theologian. And the mediæval taint leads Anselm to balance and contrast the personal claims of God with the needs of God’s universe. Such a claim, so defined, can be no matter of true moral necessity, but rather the apotheosis of sovereign caprice. Still, in his rebuke of frivolous moral judgment—never a rare fault, but probably never so worked into a system of thought or so blended with the atmosphere of life as under Catholicism—Anselm has uttered a protest which deserves to be held in grateful remembrance till the end of time.

A second motive for Anselm’s doctrine of the necessity for satisfaction is his grave estimate of sin. Formally, this estimate may be affected for the worse by defects in his conception of God. He thinks of God too much as if He were the Sultan of heaven. When he is teaching Boso “how grave a matter sin is,”<sup>1</sup> he bases his argument on a comparison between the infinite magnitude of Deity and the merely finite magnitude of “whatever is not God.” This might be no more than an erroneous form of thought

<sup>1</sup> Bk. I. chap. xxi.

or speech. It is perhaps a graver error when Anselm adopts the wonted language of hamartiology, and speaks of sinful humanity as if it consisted of one gigantic being who has had full opportunity of choosing the better part and who has deliberately incurred moral impotence. One may doubt whether conscience will ever plead guilty to this accusation from whatever quarter it may be urged.

On the other hand, it appears doubtful whether Anselm thought quite as gravely of sin as it deserves. "No one," he says in a curious aside, "could possibly wish to kill God"<sup>1</sup>—*i.e.*, knowingly; the death of the *Deus Homo*, with all its blissful results, came about on the human side because His true nature was unperceived. One might be inclined rather to say that every deliberate sin—and there is something of deliberateness in every fault which is imputable as sin at all—wishes to strike down out of the sinner's way the will, the righteousness, the very love of God. For God stands between man and his evil desire. And therefore every one who loves sin would kill God, if he could. As the fool says in his heart "There is no God," the evil-doer says in his life "Let there be none."

A third ground for Anselm's seriousness of moral judgment is his sense of the greatness and glory of God, against whom each sin is sinned. So far as this ground of moral judgment is affected by the mediæval world of personal claims or by the casual and arbitrary nature of church penances, Anselm's vision of truth is clouded and the moral worth of his contentions is lowered. So far as it expresses that experience of communion with God which filled his own devout and saintly life, it is a thing of the highest and most permanent value—a thing profoundly Christian.

There are opposing influences discernible in Anselm's thought, which militate against the view that atonement is

<sup>1</sup> Bk. I. chap. xv.

morally necessary. Nor are they confined to Anselm's starting point; whether we carry his thought back to the disciplinary ideas of the Church, or to the ideas of private rights contained in Roman law and again in German custom, or to some mixture. Other more theological principles or prejudices endanger his whole argument. His dialectic is employed, one fears, not so much in solving difficulties as in raising a dust to conceal difficulties that are unreduced and, for Anselm, irreducible.

In contrast with the latent, yet powerfully operative, idea of moral necessity, Anselm takes his stand upon an extreme conception of omnipotence, as seen not only in God but in Christ; for Christ is personally God upon the higher side of His being, though in the dialogue, Western fashion, He is constantly termed "ille homo." In the case of God, the idea of His sultan-like, unrestricted freedom clashes with the main positions of the *Cur Deus Homo*. When expounding the moral necessity of Atonement, Anselm has frankly made this necessity positive for God. If the ends of a rational creation are to be attained, they must be attained (angels having fallen) through mankind, and—man having fallen—through man's redemption. One inclines to hold that this assertion is essentially Christian. What does it affirm but that God is love, and that He follows love's necessitation, which is very freedom, in its highest form? Unfortunately, Anselm's insistence upon divine omnipotence or unrestricted freedom leads him to pare away his main thesis. After careful study one reader, to the best of his knowledge and belief, must report evasion or self-contradiction on Anselm's part. God cannot be necessitated, not even morally. He must always be free with the freedom of caprice or of limitless power. Whether because of the Predestinarian tradition, or because of a traditional Paganism incorporated in the theological doctrine



of God, the moralising and consequent Christianising of Anselm's thought suffers grave loss. The final result is persistent ambiguity.

Like difficulty emerges in regard to the work of Christ. A divine Christ, pledged to God and to man by obligations which He cannot set aside, is to Anselm—as to Catholicism in general—unfree and undivine. Boso manages to raise the difficulty in a perversely ingenious form. The mother of Christ, still conceived by the majority of Catholic minds in Anselm's day as a sharer in racial sin, was purified by her faith in the foreseen death of her Son and Lord. How then could Christ be free to act as He might choose—to be a Saviour, or alternatively to refuse the tremendous task? Once again the argument appears to hedge and quibble. Perhaps it conceals but certainly it does not solve the difficulty that has been unearthed. Later Roman theology, raising the Immaculate Conception of Mary to the rank of a dogma, obviates the emergence of Boso's clever puzzle. And a more intelligent and more historical view of the progress of revelation will not affirm to-day the foreseen Atonement of Jesus Christ in any mind before His own; and even in it, perhaps, will detect the slow and painful discovery of the tremendous truth. But these changes affect the form rather than the substance of Boso's puzzle. In one shape or another the puzzle will remain for all who take the wrong view of freedom, and will remain insoluble. Only the identification of freedom with moral necessity will reveal to us that Christ is not lowered but glorified by His steadfast purpose to surrender His own will in fidelity to the will of God.

Another difficulty arises, or the same difficulty recurs intensified, when we consider the Catholic doctrine of merit as a moral extra, lying above and beyond the requirements of moral law. Here we have to do not with God but with Christ, and with Christ purely as man; for Catholic theology

has never undertaken the paradox of expounding God as a meritorious being. It is true that, when Anselm is dealing with what Protestant orthodoxy calls the "impetration" of human salvation by Christ, he never uses the word "merit." That term emerges<sup>1</sup> when he turns to speak of the "application" of salvation. But there is the same fundamental view of what makes Christ's satisfaction satisfactory and of what makes His merit meritorious. Each is a moral extra; and indeed the two are one. Hence the whole gracious life of the Saviour falls out of the reckoning when Anselm is reckoning up the worth of Christ's prestations. He concentrates on the death.<sup>2</sup> The life of obedience was due to God by the *Deus Homo qua homo*. The death alone was something beyond all that could be due. Death is the penalty of sin. It is due from sinners. Personal death is not due from the spotlessly Righteous One. Hence when—we might almost say—He got Himself killed by His enemies "through persevering in righteousness," a moral value could be offered to God which was infinitely satisfactory and infinitely meritorious; for this death was the death of the *Deus homo*; innocent as man, and infinite as God. So great a deed of honour and act of service more than outweighed all the wrong that<sup>3</sup> sin had done to God. Concurrently this, the one possible satisfaction for human sin,<sup>4</sup> being itself an infinite satisfaction, disengages an infinite merit; which God rewards by imputing<sup>5</sup> it not to

<sup>1</sup> Bk. II. chap. xix.

<sup>2</sup> Dr. David Smith makes a curious slip in speaking of Anselm's emphasizing not the death but the life of Christ. Perhaps he meant to dwell on the fact that positive moral worth in Christ and not mere negative rehabilitation of mankind is recognised by Anselm.

<sup>3</sup> In one sense! In another sense, God can suffer no loss by the worst acts of sinners—so says Anselm.

<sup>4</sup> And for diabolic sins satisfaction is impossible, in view of reasons which Anselm gives and Boso accepts.

<sup>5</sup> Though the word is not used the thought is there.

Christ—He has no need ! He is qualified for all glory and honour as *Deus Homo*—but to the human brethren of Christ who imitate His example. At this point, the laxity of Anselm's seemingly close logic becomes strangely manifest. We have travelled a long way from absolute moral necessitation when the meritoriousness of Christ's extra service is decreed, by God and by Christ, to balance and more than balance the bankrupt account of the [elect] human race. All these artificialities vanish if we return to the thought of moral necessitation, or—as the best modern Protestant theology expresses it—of the Vocation of Christ.

The last criticism may be restated and expanded from a slightly different point of view. The positive or, in M'Leod Campbell's phrase, "prospective" aspect of the Atonement is interpreted by Anselm as merit towards God and as example towards men. In choosing the latter expression he makes a further extraordinary revelation of the incoherence of his system. Critics, contemporary and recent, of the brilliant theologian of the next generation—Abelard—have taunted him with laying undue emphasis on the thought of Christ's example ; as if *that* could possibly be all ! The criticism hardly does Abelard justice. Whatever he has to say about example, he lays much greater emphasis upon the revelation of God's love in Christ and upon its effects on human character. Incomplete though this may be, it constitutes a much deeper and more truly "ethical" theory of Atonement than any doctrine of example. It is amazing that the profoundly Christian mind of Anselm could formulate nothing better than a reference to example when he sought to explain the bearing of Christ's Atonement on character and on motive and on the heart of man. Even if one were able to accept Anselm's central thoughts as they stand—a thing we neither can nor ought to do—we should still have to confess that his vision was woefully incomplete.

A quantitative element is introduced or emphasised by Anselm<sup>1</sup> in his doctrine of satisfaction on a seemingly unchallengeable ground. If satisfactions are required for sins, it is urged that great sins need greater satisfactions and minor sins less—whether from the sinner directly or from the Saviour acting on his behalf. On the other hand, Anselm finds that the satisfaction offered by the God-man is infinite. Perhaps this affirmation really implies the cancelling of the quantitative conception. Between infinity and a finite quantity, small or great, the gulf is absolute. If we allow ourselves, under the guidance of such a thinker as M'Leod Campbell, to conceive a moral and spiritual atonement, quantitative values disappear. The whole Catholic apparatus vanishes—admittedly great sins, definitely small sins, individual separate liabilities, quantitative sums of guilt, bookkeeping that shows a balance for or against one. But, once again, if this is the implicit meaning of what he says, Anselm has not grasped it. He does not intend to move away from the general Catholic assumptions.

In comparison both with previous and with later ages,<sup>2</sup> Anselm stands alone in viewing atonement as due to the personal honour of God. He has no intention of antagonising this claim to that of abstract righteousness; but the danger is always present, and it shows itself clearly when Anselm contrasts the scale of God's greatness with that of the finite universe,<sup>3</sup> and when he condemns a hypothetical sin which saved the whole universe but infringed, however slightly, the Divine dignity. This imaginary illustration is an inversion of all facts. It is not really sin that saves universes from perishing! Righteousness and the fear of

<sup>1</sup> I. 21.

<sup>2</sup> There is a possible exception in the case of theories which explain Atonement in terms of personal relationships.

<sup>3</sup> I. 21.



God might do that. God has joined two things together, His glory and our good. Let not theology put them asunder ! There are questions which admit of no rational answer. This is one—Of two inseparables, which to choose ? Suppose  $2 + 2 = 5$ , how will you reconstitute the science of arithmetic ? It cannot be done. The science lies in ruins. Suppose loyalty to God destroys the universe and disloyalty spares it, how ought we to act ? Anselm, in his devotion to the Sultan of heaven, dares to answer a question which is intrinsically meaningless or worse. Are we required to deal with that question ? We are bound to answer that the science of theology lies in ruins. More, and worse still, the faith of a Christian heart lies in ruins.

Every one who says, with any glimmering of real faith, "I believe in God"—assuredly every one who says "I believe in God the Father of Jesus Christ"—is pledged never to put, never to answer, questions of such blasphemous folly. *Our Father*—what father is that whose glory can, even in imagination, be erected on the destruction of all his children ? The theology of Atonement has habitually thought of God's claim as hostile to man. It is never to be denied, or kept out of sight, that God in His eternal righteousness is hostile to deliberate sin. But also, God is our truest friend. And—explain it as we may—there is no schism or self-contradiction in God. We take refuge with Him because He is righteous ; if He were not righteous, what refuge could He afford us ? We take refuge with Him too because He is loving, gracious, fatherly—not in spite of His righteousness, but as the full blazing glory of which the first partial yet sacred revelation is made when His righteousness is revealed—a righteousness which cannot and will not look upon sin. In that glory of Divine love, the righteousness, the justice, the very wrath of God is present. It is not abolished, though it is transcended.

It follows from what has been said that there can be no nett sacrifice on the part of a child of God. There are those who taunt Christianity for this reason with moral inferiority as compared with atheism ; and we must allow them the pleasure of making a successful debating score. In God's reasonable universe it can never permanently be the better for any man to do wrong ; nor can it ever fail to be the better for every man and for every great interest to do right. In our shortsightedness, with our exposure to pain and sorrow, there will be trial enough for the virtue of the proudest heart independently of the morally preposterous trial of accepting nett loss in the service of the good. Time after time, it will look to us as if we were offering idle sacrifices to cruel abstractions. Yet in our heart of heart we shall know better. So " God shall repay," and " we are safer so."

Are we then in error if we emphasise the personal claim of God ? It might be possible to state a whole theology in terms of abstract righteousness, and by so doing we might escape some of those errors which gravely mar the achievement of Anselm.

It might be possible ; but how unnatural it would be ! To let the glory of God count for *nothing* in our interpretation of the work and suffering of Christ would not be according to the mind that was in Him. If we add no new formal element to our analysis of the contents of righteousness by interpreting it in terms of Divine honour and glory, we make its appeal incomparably more telling. For, if God is indeed our Father, the childlike and repentant heart cannot possibly be indifferent to the insults which sin has heaped upon perfect holiness and perfect love.

As we give thanks to Christ our Lord for all things, so especially we will thank and praise Him for glorifying the name of God upon earth. Where God had been distrusted, we see in Christ trust to the uttermost. Where God had

been disliked and ignored, we see in Christ God loved and adored by a human heart. Where God's appointments had been criticised, misjudged, reviled, met with murmuring, with mockery, we see in Christ God's will honoured to the uttermost. Nothing is withheld ; the sacrifice is complete. Best of all, the mind that was in Christ is not barren. This temper of the true " Servant of the Lord " is not an antiquarian curiosity, which left the world nearly two thousand years ago. It passes age after age into others—victoriously, redeemingly. It may pass into us and get the mastery, " according to the power whereby he is able even to subdue all things unto himself " ; yes, and to His Father.

If God is indeed our Father in heaven, is not the owning of that claim salvation's self—for the soul, and for the universe ? Such salvation is Christ's gift.

However little Anselm has stated all this in terms which the Christian conscience can accept, he has borne a witness to one aspect of the thought of Christ's Atonement which we could obliterate only at our peril and with immeasurable impoverishment of our faith and life.

R. MACKINTOSH.

EDITORIAL ARRANGEMENT IN MATTHEW  
VIII.—IX.

ONE of the most striking peculiarities of our first canonical Gospel is the rearrangement of narrative material now generally admitted to be taken from Mark, between the first and second of the five great agglutinated discourses of Jesus which also characterise this Gospel. Papias certainly has these Matthæan agglutinations in mind when in apology for the surprising absence from Mark of those "commandments delivered by the Lord to the faith" which to the post-apostolic age were the main desideratum, he explains that Mark wrote down "some things" (ἐνία) as he remembered them. We cannot reasonably doubt that to the author of the five books of Interpretation of the Lord's Precepts <sup>1</sup> the Gospel which contained the five discourses of Matthew v.-vii., x., xiii., xviii., and xxiii.-xxv., and which he attributed to the Apostle Matthew, constituted such a "compend" both complete and unimpeachable. It only required to be properly "translated"; for it had been composed "in the Hebrew tongue" and had therefore long been subject to irresponsible rendering.<sup>2</sup> There is room, accordingly, for Papias' own "renderings" (ἐρμηνείαι), to which he "subjoins" carefully authenticated traditions of the Elders. It is not probable at so late a date that these "traditions of the elders" were regarded as *supplementing* the content of the written gospel, but only as *interpreting* it. The "commandments" had

<sup>1</sup> The title of Papias' work was Κυριακῶν λογίων ἐξηγήσεως (var. ἐξηγήσεων)—έ.

<sup>2</sup> In distinction from the discourses of Peter which had the authoritative translation (ἐρμηνεία) of Mark.



been "delivered by the Lord to the faith," and had been incorporated by an apostle in an authoritative compend. The dispute was as to the meaning. The heretics, it was alleged, "perverted the oracles of the Lord to their own lusts."<sup>1</sup> Papias thinks the traditions of the elders the best guide to the meaning, for they present (unlike the vain talk of the many and the "alien" commandments of the false teachers) the "living and abiding (*i.e.* autochthonous) voice." To Papias, as to all early second century fathers, the Gospel of Matthew is "the" Gospel.<sup>2</sup> Its contents are referred to as "the (divine) precepts" (τὰ λόγια),<sup>3</sup> not because Matthew has no narrative, but because the narrative is recognised as subordinate to the main purpose; and the main purpose of Matthew coincides with that of the sub-apostolic age generally. It aims to teach men "to observe all things whatsoever (Jesus) commanded." We are no more justified in supposing that Papias meant to attribute to the Apostle a different writing from our own canonical Gospel when he declares that "Matthew wrote the *logia*" than we would be in inferring from a statement by St. Paul that Moses wrote the *logia* of the old covenant<sup>4</sup> that St. Paul held a Pentateuchal theory differentiating narrative from commandment in the Books of Moses. Whether in Pentateuchal or in Gospel story it was the "divine oracles" (τὰ λόγια), the "commandments delivered to the faith," which then represented the values. They constituted the "trust" (παραθήκη). In speaking of the apostolic record of these "divine precepts" which Papias proposed to interpret, the mere narrative frame-

<sup>1</sup> *Ep. Polyc.* vii.

<sup>2</sup> So *e.g.* Διδ. xv. 3, ὡς ἔχετε ἐν τῷ εὐαγγελίῳ; cf. viii. 2 and xi. 3.

<sup>3</sup> As often noted, the word differs from the primary form λόγοι (employed by first century writers) by its connotation of superhuman authority. Lightfoot renders "oracles."

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Romans iii. 2, ἐπιστεύθησαν τὰ λόγια τοῦ θεοῦ.

work of Matthew could be passed over, as Paul passes over the narrative framework of "the law."

It is highly significant of Papias' judgment of this apostolic record, that in defending his use of Mark in spite of its admitted incompleteness (*ἐνία*), he should add that Peter, Mark's only source of knowledge, "had no design of making a systematic compend of the Lord's precepts."<sup>1</sup> It proves that just as surely as Papias has in mind the greater fulness of Matthew on the score of "commandments" (*ἐντολαί*) when apologising for the paucity of Mark (*ἐνία ἔγραψεν*), even so surely his reference to Mark's lack of "order" (*οὐ μέντοι τάξει*) applies the same standard of comparison, namely Matthew. We may properly infer what he intends to claim for Matthew by what he explicitly declines to claim for Peter (as represented by Mark). Both Peter and Matthew were "followers of the Lord." But Peter had no design in his discourses of giving a complete account of the Lord's precepts in their order, and Mark, his "translator" (*ἐρμηνευτής*), could not supply the lack, because "Mark had not been himself a follower of the Lord." Matthew, then, according to Papias, *did* have such a design. And Matthew, and only Matthew, determines for Papias the true order. In spite of authorities of the eminence even of Wernle the order of the fourth Gospel is here utterly out of the question. Had "Papias the Great," whose traditions as to the origins of the Gospels became the accepted standards of the age, begun a polemic against Synoptic order in favour of the Johannine in the first half of the second century it is inconceivable that no reference to this should appear when Gaius and the Alogi in the second half of the century are vehemently opposing the acceptance of John, and making its disagreement *in order*

<sup>1</sup> Σύνταξις τῶν κυριακῶν λογίων. The reading λόγων is ill-attested and does not fit the context.

with the long accepted Synoptics a main point of their argument. Hippolytus, the pupil of Irenæus, took up the cudgels to refute these over-zealous opponents of Montanism who, according to Irenæus his master and predecessor in the conflict,

do not admit that aspect (of evangelic tradition) which is presented by John's Gospel, but set aside together both Gospel and prophetic Spirit (in the Revelation).<sup>1</sup>

Papias' book (he wrote but the one small work) is diligently employed by Irenæus, and probably by Hippolytus also. Had Papias advocated the order of John against Mark or Matthew it would be simply impossible for the conflict with the Alogi to have taken the course it actually followed.

We must adopt, accordingly, the view which in itself would be most natural and simple, that Papias deals with no other standards than those universally accepted in his age, Matthew, the apostolic "compend of the precepts," and Mark, the only secondary authority which as containing the "memorabilia" of Peter<sup>2</sup> could establish a connexion with actual "followers of the Lord." Luke and John are probably known, but on the questions Papias is dealing with, historical order of events, and precise report of the Lord's commandments, Luke and John could not as yet be expected to rank with "Matthew" and the "follower of Peter." Had Papias been a modern critic he might have seen the objections to preferring the order of Matthew to that of Mark. But Papias does not go by internal evidence.

<sup>1</sup> Irenæus, *Haer.*, iii. xi. 9. The unnamed anti-Montanistic zealots are either the followers or, perhaps, the predecessors of Gaius, the "learned ecclesiastic," bishop of Portus, whose *Dialogue* against Priscus the Montanist is answered by Hippolytus in his *Heads against Gaius*.

<sup>2</sup> The phrase applied by Justin and others to the Gospel of Mark ἀπομνημονεύματα Πέτρου, may well be based on the tradition in the form given it by Papias, ὡς ἀπεμνημόνευσεν.

He follows accepted Church authority. "Matthew" was an Apostle. Mark was not. That was enough.

We may regard it as certain, accordingly, that the extraordinary rearrangement of Markan material in Matthew viii.-ix. had not escaped the notice of Papias, and that in apologising for the lack of *τάξις* in Mark he is assuming that the order of Matthew is chronologically <sup>1</sup> correct. Mark, the secondary authority, was here, as Papias thinks, subject to the limitation of the Petrine discourses, which being in the nature of missionary sermons could not be made to serve the purposes of an orderly compend, but were given "as the exigencies of the occasion demanded (*πρὸς τὴν χρεῖαν*)."<sup>2</sup> Does the implied distinction convey a true idea of the Matthaean order? Or must we on internal grounds attribute the divergence to other causes?

From the view-point of the modern interpreter no doubt can exist as to the real nature of the *τάξις* of Matthew. In general it is strictly dependent on Mark. Only in Matthew v.-xiii. is there a conspicuous and radical departure. And even here Matthew's arrangement is not chronological, but topical. It has a clearly definable pragmatic purpose which dominates all. The discrepancy of order between Matthew and Mark is mainly due to the rearrangement of incidents in Matthew viii. 1-ix. 34, and here Matthew's aim is clearly to exhibit Jesus in his activity as Healer and Worker of Wonders. The evangelist presents for this purpose a selected series of Ten Mighty Works, and these are made to follow upon a comprehensive presentation of Jesus' Teaching in the so-called Sermon on the Mount, which itself

<sup>1</sup> The suggestion that Papias may have some other than chronological order in mind is made inadmissible by the reason given: "he was not a follower of the Lord, but afterwards of Peter."

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Arrian, Preface to the *Enchiridion*. "Epictetus . . . discussed various topics, not in a systematic order, but as the need for their consideration arose."



is an agglutination of many sayings and discourses. The Mighty Works are followed in turn by a second agglutination (chap. x.) comprising under the form of a Charge to the Twelve the whole duty of the Christian Missionary. This again is followed by two chapters (xi.-xii.) showing how the message was rejected in spite of the "mighty works." A third agglutination, the chapter of Parables (xiii.), concludes the account of Jesus' work in Galilee, the parables being treated (as in Mark) as esoteric teaching, hiding "the mysteries of the kingdom of heaven" from those who having eyes and ears see not and hear not. The rest of the Gospel follows the order of Mark, making important additions from another source, or sources, but with very slight omission and no transposition. As we do not now attempt a complete survey of the work we may confine our attention to the group of Mighty Works occupying chapters viii. and ix.

We owe it to one of the most eminent and one of the most cautious of gospel critics to have pointed out in particular the close correspondence of this group of Mighty Works to a nearly contemporary Jewish parallel. Sir J. C. Hawkins writes of this section of Matthew :

In the course of chapters viii. and ix., between the first and second collections of sayings, we have a collection of *ten* miracles, which is made up in a very unchronological way, but which reminds one irresistibly of the enumerations in the *Pirke Aboth* (v. 5 and 8), "Ten miracles were wrought for our fathers in Egypt, and ten by the sea. . . . Ten miracles were wrought in the sanctuary." <sup>1</sup>

The intention of the evangelist to make a series of just *ten* miracles is supported by several minor considerations.

(1) The very great number of groupings by numerical symmetry (threes, sevens and tens) has frequently been pointed out as a characteristic of this Gospel.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Hor. Syn.*, 2, p. 167.

<sup>2</sup> See W. C. Allen, *Intern. Crit. Comm. on Matthew*, p. lxx.

(2) A subordinate grouping into two series (*a* and *b*) of three miracles followed by a tetrad (*c*) consisting of one two-fold and two single miracles makes the decad conform to parallel arrangements elsewhere.<sup>1</sup> The division is effected by means of appropriate narrative sections which form prologues or introductions to sub-groups *b* and *c* (viii. 18-22; ix. 9-17).

(3) The last two miracles (ix. 27-31 and 32-34) are duplicated later on (Matt. xx. 29-34 and xii. 22-24), and give every appearance of editorial compositions introduced to fill out the necessary ten.<sup>2</sup>

The general truth of Sir John Hawkins' observation will not be questioned, but some further study will be necessary before the true significance of the editorial rearrangement of Markan and other material in Matthew viii.-ix. is fully appreciated. For we have not yet determined the principle which has controlled arrangement within the limits of the decad; and in this order, if at all, should be traceable surviving remains of connexions in the sources employed. There is, for example, no room for doubt that ix. 9-17, a passage quite without reference to miracle of any kind, finds its present place in the group of Mighty Works primarily because in Mark ii. 13-22 it forms the sequel to the story taken up in Matthew ix. 1-8. In like manner viii. 16 is not strictly required by the context, but is carried over from Mark i. 32-34 along with the rest. In view of this it would not be unreasonable to look for surviving source-connexions in the non-Markan material of the group, particularly in viii. 18-22, a section which contains no reference to miracle.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. John i. 1-5 in Loisy's division, *Quatrième Évangile*. Verse 5 has a double utterance: "And the light shineth in the darkness, and the darkness overcame it not," making a tetrad of 4-5, which when added to the triads of verse 1 and verses 2-3 produces a sonorous opening decad.

<sup>2</sup> So W. C. Allen, *Intern. Crit. Comm.*, *ad loc.*

As to the motives determining the "very unchronological" arrangement adopted by the editor, nothing thus far published is more penetrating than the analysis of Dr. W. C. Allen,<sup>1</sup> though as respects detail assent must be withheld. Thus there is abundant room to doubt the desire imputed by Dr. Allen to the editor to present "three healings of disease" followed by "three miracles which illustrate Christ's power over natural forces, over the hostility of demons, and in the spiritual sphere." We may well be even more sceptical of Matthew's alleged desire to conclude with "a third series illustrating Christ's power to restore life, sight and speech." Motives of this kind will hardly explain the evangelist's destruction in these two chapters of that Markan order which in all the latter part of his Gospel he follows so religiously. The motive supposed to control in the formation of sub-group *b* (viii. 18-ix. 8) has a very modern ring, and that of sub-group *c* (ix. 9-34) should surely not produce the anti-climactic order "life, sight and speech." Rearrangement from such a motive would surely result in the order: speech, sight and life. In general the supposed classification of Jesus' miracles according to type of power exerted is unconvincing. Arrangements of this kind have small support in any ancient writer, least of all would they appeal to the evangelist who makes the simple "word" of Jesus equivalent to the divine fiat (viii. 8, 16).

That the Mighty Works are really *grouped* in three series, the first two having three each, the third a double and two single miracles, is suggested by the opening and closing formulae, and is generally admitted. For example, the colophon viii. 17 must be intended to wind up a series. Indeed the evangelist himself has made his motive fairly clear in this first instance by the appended quotation:

That it might be fulfilled which was spoken by Isaiah the prophet, saying, Himself took our infirmities and bare our diseases.

<sup>1</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. xv. ff.

The very fact, however, that this singular "fulfilment" of Isaiah liii. 4 (!) is appended here rather than at the close of the whole decal of Mighty Works, shows that the editor has motives more or less different in the later sub-groups. But it will be well before considering these to determine as accurately as the material allows his motive in sub-group *a*.

1. In general it is clear from verse 17 that sub-group *a* aims to prove Jesus the predicted Saviour by possession of "the word of power" over disease. We note, however, that in the first example, the Leper Cleansed (viii. 1-4 = Mark i. 40-45), the point is emphasised by the closing words (derived from Mark) "for a testimony unto them." It is true that the direction of verse 4 to "offer the gift *that Moses commanded*," is thoroughly in line with the evangelist's conservative attitude on matters affecting the Law (v. 17-20), and the loose chronological and geographical setting of this incident in Mark would permit an easy transfer to the position Matthew has given it. These reasons are often alleged (and not without force) as showing why this incident was made to stand first in the group, itself following immediately upon the Sermon. But the only motive which receives explicit support from the evangelist's own words is the peculiarity of this miracle in directing a report to the temple authorities "for a testimony unto them."<sup>1</sup> We must compare this with the rest.

2. The evangelist's second instance, Healing of the Centurion's Servant (ix. 5-13 = Luke vii. 1-10) receives special

<sup>1</sup> We do not raise the question of the meaning of the direction *in Jesus' intention*. That may very well have been: Follow the course required by Moses as a proof to the public that the cure is real; or, Offer, etc., to prove that the cure is real. In the understanding of *Mark and Matthew* the "testimony" is apparently a testimony to Israel through its religious authorities that the work of the Christ has begun. Cf. Mark xiii. 9 = Matthew x. 18.



re-enforcement by his addition of another Q saying (verses 11-12 = Luke xiii. 28-29) on this point of the *testimony to Israel*. The Gentile's faith is a lesson to Israel's unbelief. We surely need seek no other reason why this great example of the power of Jesus' healing word should occupy a place in this group than its perfect adaptation to the purpose expressed in the colophon.

3. The story of the Gentile's faith might well have stood last in the triad, or even in the whole decad, especially as it presupposes numerous other healings of which the centurion has heard, and also abundant opportunity on the part of "Israel" to take the centurion's attitude of faith. Perhaps it would have been given this closing place in the triad had not the briefer Markan anecdote of the Healing of Peter's Wife's Mother been already provided with a closing formula which summarised the events of the day of healings in Capernaum (Mark i. 32-34 = Matthew viii. 16). Having this conclusion, the Healing of Peter's Wife's Mother was on the whole better fitted to occupy the closing place in the triad which Matthew has given it.

The foregoing considerations, together with the slight change from the Markan summary in Matthew viii. 16, "He cast out the spirits *with a word*," and the addition of the fulfilled Isaian prophecy, enable us to define with reasonable certainty and precision the motive for this first sub-group of the Mighty Works and its arrangement. The motive is pragmatic. They are typical works of *Testimony to Israel*.

Sub-group *b* consists of a second triad of miracles, but these are prefaced by a seemingly irrelevant paragraph (viii. 18-22 = Luke ix. 57-60). It would be not unnatural to account for this prefixed paragraph by a theory of survival of source-connexion, similar to that affecting the Markan paragraph ix. 9-17. This explanation is the more attrac-

tive from the fact that in Luke ix. 57-62 the paragraph appears in immediate connexion with the Mission of the Seventy (Luke x. 1 ff.), a parallel to the not distant Mission of the Twelve in Matthew ix. 35 ff. We should be at a loss, however, to explain its intercalation here, separated by the whole extent of triad *b* and tetrad *c* from its original connexion, when it could just as well have been reserved for the end of the decad, and thus have retained its proper connexion with the Mission of the Twelve. The suggestion that Matthew wished to construct a parallel to the Call of the Publican at the beginning of sub-group *c* (ix. 9) merely serves to show how greatly critics are at a loss to explain the insertion. As an example of perplexity taking refuge in bare statement of the fact which calls for explanation we may cite Allen's account of the process of compilation. In following Mark (says Allen) Matthew comes to Mark iv. 35.

Here Christ is surrounded by a crowd. The editor adapts this to his context :

viii. 18 = Mark iv. 35,

*inserts viii. 19-22*

and then takes over Mark iv. 36-v. 20 with considerable omissions :

viii. 23-34 = Mark iv. 36-v. 20.

In Mark v. 21 Christ returns to the western side of the lake. Matthew adds to this, that "He came to His own city" :

Matthew ix. 1 = Mark v. 21*a*,

and can then go back and borrow Mark ii. 1-12 with its sequel 13-23 :

Matthew ix. 2-17 = Mark ii. 1-22,

thus completing a second series of three miracles which illustrate Christ's power over natural forces (viii. 23-27) ; over the hostility of demons (28-34), and in the spiritual sphere (the forgiveness of sins, ix. 1-8).<sup>1</sup>

This is an excellent presentation of the facts, but a meagre suggestion of reasons. It tells us *how* Matthew actually has used Mark, but it leaves entirely unanswered the really puzzling question *why* Matthew should here intermingle other non-Markan material, *not* descriptive of miracle.

<sup>1</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. xvi.

Between Mark iv. 35, where "Jesus is surrounded by a crowd," and iv. 36 ff., which affords the editor his material for "completing a second series of three miracles illustrating Christ's power," we are told that he "inserts viii. 19-22." *Why* does he? That is what requires to be explained; and on this point the suggestion that the evangelist desired to "illustrate Christ's power" in various ways throws no light whatever.

The evangelist does not really leave us altogether in the dark as to his motive in thus arranging triad *b*. As with triad *a*, slight turns of phraseology indicate what to him is important, and these will also throw light upon the insertion of the introductory paragraph.

1. At the close of the triad (ix. 8) we have a remarkable change from the phraseology of Mark ii. 12, which Matthew is following. Instead of "They glorified God, saying, We never saw it on this fashion," Matthew writes, "They glorified God, *which had given such power unto men.*" Wellhausen not unnaturally finds evidence here in support of his peculiar theory of the priority of Mark to Q. According to Wellhausen the Matthaean form here allows the original sense of the Markan *logion* to break through. In Mark (or at least in proto-Mark) the Son of man was not a title, but simply a generic term. Matthew, therefore, comes nearer the original sense: Human beings too ("the Son of *man*") have authority on earth to forgive sins. The reasoning though acute is fallacious. Our Matthew is simply dependent, here as elsewhere, on Mark. He is not here (if anywhere) concerned to prove the authority of the Christ, the Son of Man, to forgive sins. This evangelist should be the last to be suspected of undervaluing the distinction which forms the heart of Mark's reasoning in Mark ii. 1-12 that forgiveness of sins is a distinctively divine prerogative. For Matthew and his readers the ques-

tion whether this divine prerogative had been delegated to Christ the Son of Man (*i.e.* the heavenly Judge of Daniel vii. 9-14) is already long past debate (cf. vii. 23 and xxv. 31-46). What concerns him is whether this prerogative can be still further delegated "on earth." If so, it can be committed not only to Christ but "to men" who represent Him. Matthew has the same interest here as in xvi. 19, where Peter receives the authority to "bind and loose." He has the same interest as the fourth evangelist in his description of the apostolic commission "to forgive sins" (John xx. 23). He is vindicating the authority of the "men" who in his own age are proclaiming the glad tidings. Have these human agents and representatives of the exalted Christ "authority to declare unto his people (they being duly penitent) the absolution and remission of their sins"? The change, then, is made in the interest of this practical application of the example of the still unexalted Christ. We have no ground whatever to assume an otherwise unaccountable reversion to an alleged primitive sense of the *logion*, which in reality is more than doubtful.

The interest thus displayed in *the work of Christ's representatives* at the end of triad *b* will help to determine the motive of the sub-group as a whole.

2. A similar verbal change in viii. 27 has almost equal bearing on the motive of triad *b*, and is less open to dispute; for it belongs to a series of editorial changes in Matthew, whose character is fully recognised. Thus Allen, among other commentators, notes the constant alterations from Mark "in favour of the disciples." Of these he gives more than a dozen striking examples, by which even slight disparagement of the Apostles is avoided. Among the rest he justly cites Matthew's substitution here (viii. 26) for "Have ye not yet faith?" (*οὐπω ἔχετε πίστιν*; Mark iv.



40) of the milder: "O ye of little faith" (ὀλιγόπιστοι), a Q-phrase (Matt. vi. 30 = Luke xii. 28) which Matthew after his manner <sup>1</sup> adopts. Allen does not here enumerate, however, the slight turn in viii. 27 "and *the men* (οἱ δὲ ἄνθρωποι) marvelled," though later (p. 83) he comments:

Feeling that Mark's "and they feared greatly" refers to the disciples, he substitutes "marvelled" to soften the expression, and then to remove all reference to the disciples inserts οἱ ἄνθρωποι as subject to the sentence. Cf. ix. 8, where he inserts οἱ ἄλλοι to remove all possible reference to the disciples.

The "disciples," accordingly, who "followed" Jesus when he "entered into a boat" are not, or at least not alone, the holy Apostles. They include many half-hearted followers, whose vice is indecision, that διψυχία against which early Christian documents of the type of the Epistle of James, Hermas and the *Didaché* are so earnest in their warnings. "Thou shalt not doubt whether a thing shall be or shall not be," says the *Didaché*. According to Mark xi. 23,

Whosoever shall say unto this mountain, Be thou taken up and cast into the sea, and shall not doubt in his heart, but shall believe that what he saith cometh to pass; he shall have it.

What Matthew thinks of the religious lesson pointed by the first miracle of this group appears from his addition later to a kindred Markan story:

Matthew viii. 25-27.

And they came to him and awoke him saying, Save, Lord, we perish. And he saith unto them, Why are ye fearful, *O ye of little faith?* Then he arose and rebuked the winds and the

Matthew xiv. 30-33.

But when he saw the wind he was afraid; and beginning to sink he cried out, saying, Lord, save me. And immediately Jesus stretched forth his hand and took hold of him, and saith

<sup>1</sup> The habit of Matthew to stereotype Q phrases into recurrent refrains is well illustrated in Matthew vii. 28 (= Luke vii. 1 β text), repeated five times, Matthew xiii. 9 (= Luke viii. 8) repeated three times, and xiii. 42 (= Luke xiii. 28) repeated seven times.

sea ; and there was a great calm.  
And *the men* marvelled, saying,  
What manner of man is this, that  
even the winds and the sea obey  
him ?

unto him, *O thou of little faith,*  
wherefore didst thou doubt ?  
And when they were gone up  
into the boat the wind ceased.  
And *they that were in the boat*  
worshipped him, saying, Of a  
truth thou art the Son of God.

With this insight into Matthew's conception of *pragmatic values* in this miracle-story we can understand his prefixing the two sayings addressed to Half-hearted Followers in viii. 18-22. The "great multitudes about him" are mentioned in verse 18 not (as Allen seems to suppose) with some vague idea of connecting with the scene of Mark iv. 35, but for the same reason as in Luke xiv. 25, where the sayings which follow in 26-35 leave no doubt of the point to be emphasised—the sifting out of the half-hearted. For Matthew's purpose two examples suffice : "one who was a scribe," an example to the Christian teacher (xiii. 52) reluctant to endure hardship, the other a "disciple" simply, but not charged (as in the Lukan parallel) with a mission to "preach the kingdom of God." The Lukan third instance (Luke ix. 61 f.) might well seem to Matthew superfluous, if not exaggerated. We need not wonder that it fails to appear.

Introduced by the two sayings to Half-hearted Followers, and beginning with the miracle of Rebuke to Men of Little Faith, no doubt can reasonably remain as to the motive controlling in the formation of triad *b* (Matt. viii. 18-ix. 8). Unlike triad *a* (Works of Testimony to Israel), they are addressed to *disciples*. They have as their motive Increase of Faith.<sup>1</sup> They instruct men soon to be sent forth "to have authority over unclean spirits to cast them out, and to heal all manner of disease and all manner of sickness." In particular the herald of the glad tidings must be assured that God hath "given authority to men" to declare the

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Luke xvii. 5 f.

forgiveness of sins, of which the power to heal is a token and confirmation.

3. If the first and last members of sub-group *b* reveal its character as *testimonies to half-hearted followers* we shall have little difficulty with the central member of the triad. A group of the Mighty Works arranged with the design of increasing the faith of those who are to take up the Lord's ministry of healing and forgiveness could find no example more appropriate in the feeling of that age than the Markan anecdote of the Exorcism of the Gerasene <sup>1</sup> Demoniac who "came forth out of the tombs exceeding fierce so that no man could pass by that way." Moreover this incident followed immediately in Mark v. 1-20 on that which opens the Matthaean triad, and the two stood first in a series (Mark iv. 35-vi. 6) which seems to have had the same design which Matthew here adopts.

*c.* The prologue to Matthew's third and closing sub-group in the decad of Mighty Works is furnished ready-made. It follows in Mark ii. 13-22 as a sequel to the demonstration of Authority to Forgive Sins. What it signified to Matthew becomes apparent through the traits which are made salient in the group of miracles that follow.

As before in sub-groups *a* and *b* it is the *effect*, whether in faith or unbelief, which dominates the descriptive purpose. Only, whereas in sub-group *a* the evangelist has in mind the effect upon Israel as a whole, and in sub-group *b* upon half-hearted followers, in sub-group *c* he aims primarily to emphasise *the parting of belief from unbelief*.

1. The double miracle of Mark v. 21-43 is admirably adapted to this purpose. The believing ruler who came and worshipped him, saying, My daughter is even now dead : but come and lay thy hand upon her and she shall live.

<sup>1</sup> Matthew alters to "Gadarene" to remove (mitigate ?) the obvious geographical difficulty.

stands certainly in the extreme of contrast with those at his house who "laughed (Jesus) to scorn." What Matthew thinks of the lesson of the companion miracle may be judged from his modification of Mark vii. 29 in Matthew xv. 28, "O woman, great is thy faith," and from the pains taken in the incident of the Two Blind Men Healed which follows (viii. 27-31), to bring out the same "faith" lesson. One more comparison of parallels will be decisive as to where this evangelist places the emphasis.

## Matthew ix. 27-29.

Two blind men followed him crying out, and saying, Have mercy on us, thou Son of David. And when he was come into the house the blind men came to him; and Jesus saith unto them, *Believe ye that I am able to do this?* They say unto him, Yea, Lord. Then touched he their eyes, saying, *According to your faith be it done unto you.* And their eyes were opened.

## Mark x. 46-52.

Bartimaeus a blind beggar, began to cry out, and say, Jesus, thou Son of David, have mercy on me. . . . And Jesus answered him and said, What wilt thou that I should do unto thee? And the blind man said unto him, Rabboni, that I may receive my sight. And Jesus said unto him, Go thy way; thy faith hath made thee whole. And straightway he received his sight.

The changes in Matthew ix. 27-29 are the more significant of the special design controlling in this particular context from the fact that in the doublet, Matthew xx. 29-34, where the evangelist is simply copying Mark *seriatim*, they do not occur.

2. The closing miracle of this sub-group, and thus of the whole decad of Mighty Works, is a brief epitome of the incident more fully related in Matthew xii. 22-45 of the Blasphemy of the Pharisees. Without the time-determination "as they went forth" one could hardly say whether the evangelist intends ix. 32-34 to be understood as a separate incident, or really intends his duplication to be recognised. In either case the nature of the selection is



significant of the motive of the group—Contrast of Belief and Unbelief. It appears more clearly wherever the evangelist takes larger personal share in the composition, and in both these closing incidents we can but echo the judgment of Allen that they are “editorial” supplements. They have been constructed on the model of the incidents taken from Mark and Q respectively in Matthew xx. 29–34 and xii. 22–24, for the purpose of filling out the required *ten*.

3. It appears, then, that Matthew is far from blind to the pragmatic value of Mark ii. 13–22 when he adopts it as a prologue to his closing tetrad. The incidents of the Call of the Publican (ix. 9–13) and the Question of John’s Disciples (14–17) are taken (much as in their Markan sense) as illustrative of the Growth of Opposition, the Division of Belief from Unbelief. The evangelist might have reserved them for combination with his great chapter on the Stumbling of Israel (chap. xii.). He has preferred to retain them here in their original connexion (Matt. ix. 1–17; Mark ii. 1–22), because to his mind they form so good a preface to tetrad *c*, exhibiting in the contrasted conduct of the publicans and sinners who believed, and the Pharisees and disciples of John who believed not, the two-fold Effect of the Mighty Works. Just as the reading of Mark iii. 13–vi. 13 seems to have determined Matthew to construct a triad addressed to Half-hearted Followers (viii. 18–ix. 8), so the reading of Mark ii. 1–iii. 6 seems to have suggested to him the final tetrad of Mighty Works producing on the one side Belief, on the other Unbelief. The closing words, briefly epitomising the Q section xii. 22–45, are these :

And the multitudes marvelled, saying, It was never so seen in Israel. But the Pharisees said, By the prince of the devils casteth he out devils.

The clearer the rhetorical symmetry and the pragmatic purpose which have determined the formation of the decad

of Mighty Works in Matthew viii. 1-ix. 34, the more certain does it become that the order is not, as Papias assumed, chronological, but (like the five agglutinations of sayings) artificial. This conclusion is of course no novelty to the critic. A further inference, however, is equally legitimate, and has a direct bearing on the moot-point of the order of Q. The more fully the order of Matthew in its rare departures from Mark can be explained by purely redactional motives, the less ground have we to look, even in sections such as the Centurion's Servant (viii. 5-13), or Half-hearted Followers (viii. 18-22), for survivals of the order of the source. As respects *τάξις* Matthew seems to have admitted no authority save that of Mark; and even Mark's order was sometimes subordinate in his mind to the rule: "Let all things be done unto *edification*."

B. W. BACON.

*THE VOCABULARY OF PATIENCE IN THE  
OLD TESTAMENT.*

EXPOSITORY preaching on any subject is the expression in words of the truth stored in and suggested by synonyms. There is the greatest need of the historical imagination to mark the play and inter-play of mind in all Old Testament Theology and there is an equal demand for the same gift in regard to its Ethics. For just as the "patience of Jesus" requires that the student transpose himself back to the hills and hamlets of the Holy Land; just as the "patience of St. Paul" demands that we follow his footsteps by land and sea; just as the "patience of St. John" asks for the island of Patmos; and the "patience of the saints" in the "Revelation of Jesus Christ" requires some knowledge of the persecutions of Nero; so, too, does the "patience of the prophets" demand the background of history. Their purity was found in real and current sorrows: their maturity in tears and triumph. Their mental attitudes were the fruit of every-day trials which, when recalled, make their language vivid, pictorial, illuminating, up-to-date. If the ideals of the New Testament are victories, then the ideals of the Old Testament were the visions which made the victories possible.

For all this, however, there is required exactitude in ripe scholarship. In the Hebrew text there is, on this subject of "patience," a wealth of suggestion no translation can convey to the English reader, an accuracy of thought and a precision of idea which repay the utmost care in study.

The student is faced with the strange fact that *not one text* in the whole of the Authorised Version of 1611 contains the noun "patience." The adjective "patient" is once

used in Ecclesiastes vii. 8 and the adverb "patiently" is found in Psalm xl. 1. But not once is the noun found as a word. Are we then to conclude that the Old Testament has no message on this subject? Are we to say that these two references are but furtive glances made in an exalted mood while the rest of the Book is silent on this all-important subject?

The view of life in Ecclesiastes where the word אָרַךְ occurs is expressed in the recurring phrase: "All is a vapour and a striving after wind," whenever the koheleth finds something in life insoluble. The course of nature seems an endless cycle and as man can do nothing to alter it "the patient in spirit" is the better man. But what exactly does אָרַךְ mean here? A study of the use of this word shows it applied to "long," such as long rooms, long cherubims, long life, long wars. In only two cases is this word אָרַךְ used in a moral sense and the instance in Ecclesiastes vii. is one where the thought is "the length of time" one is able to bear that sorrow which is better than laughter, or the length of time one can bear the rebuke of the wise, or the length of time one can wait for the end of the thing.

Beside the idea of length of time there is coupled with this the further idea of strength of soul, and so may be regarded as the nearest approach to the Greek use of μακρὰν (Ιση) or the classic use of μακρόθυμος.

The second word קָיָה quoted from Psalm xl. (1) is translated "patiently." Where the Greek uses the adverbial ending μὴν the poet in the Hebrew has used a new and expressive word. In the root there is the idea of waiting *for some one to help*. In the Niph. mood it has the sense of "being gathered in hope." In the Piel the direction of the look is fixed. As the Vulgate translates the text comes nearer the meaning in the words: "expectans expectare," I waited waitingly as does Joseph in the Dothan pit; or



as the soul in Sheol (Ps. xxviii. 1); or as Christian did in Doubting Castle (Bunyan's *Pilgrim's Progress*).

The eastern tongues to-day in Semitic lands have a word (i.e. in Arabic) which means to "knock against a stone wall." This is their way of expressing the patient life. And in a similar way by using their own synonyms the writers in the Old Testament express the first ideas of both human and divine patience in words which we translate as "endurance," "expectation," "longsuffering," "forbearance." And just as it is with these words in the New Testament so is it in the older books—they each have some distinctive thought. Different words are often given the same meaning where it is important to preserve variety. The context, too, often varies or modifies the use while enriching the meaning. It is necessary to remember that the minds of the older writers were primarily soaked in the vocabulary of the writers older still: and if they send the mind back (as they so often do (Heb. vi. 12, James v. 10-11, Rom. ii. 4) to literature written before their time it is because they see some identity of grace. Life is seen, no doubt, to be richer and fuller in meaning, there is more intensity of being in it, more and finer shades of personality in it, yea, and clearer visions of the Divine Plan. For all these changes in life the old words needed setting in new phases and where a felt lack occurred new Greek words were born in some ten instances. But there was still some identity in the root ideas of patience.

If the ten different Hebrew words for "pain" and the twenty-six words for "grief" are studied there will be found identity of life in the varying centuries and yet room for varieties in the shadings of both grief and pain. This prepares the mind to expect some variations in the quality of patience from the most passive mood of eastern pessimism to the mood that dares to challenge Time, Earth, Devil,

Evil, even Kings to do their very worst. Life so hard set as to express itself in "groaning" needed the spirit of patience, so נִאֲקָה (Exod. ii. 24, vi. 5, Judg. ii. 18, Ezek. xxx. 24) expresses the national side; while the word אֲנָקָה (Job xxii. 2, Ps. vi. 6, Ps. xxxviii. 9, Ps. cii. 5) gives the personal aspect. The three Hebrew words מִבֶּט, מִבֶּט, תְּקוּהָ are rendered as "expectation," but the first two deal with national hopes, while the third is individual. Again, at least three distinctions are drawn in the matter of "forbearance." While דָּמָם denotes forbearance in speech, הִשָּׁף stands for forbearance in temper and הִדָּל indicates "forbearance in passing judgment. Even the word for endurance (cf. Ezek. xxii. 14) has the meanings of "to be," "to be able," "to sit down and be quiet," "to stand still," "to be unending."

How very expressive is אָרַךְ אֵף! In four special cases in the Old Testament are these two words translated "long-suffering" (Exod. xxiv. 6, Numb. xiv. 18, Ps. lxxxvi. 15, Jer. xv. 15). And it is of note that it is the "longsuffering of God." This attribute is first revealed to rather than discovered by Moses and indicates the outward manifestation of the inward dispositions of—merciful, gracious, goodness, truth. As opposed to "quick" or "short temper" or wrath (ὀξύθυμία) in man so is the "long-suffering" of the Christian (μακροθύμια); but highest of all is the "longsuffering of God" (אָרַךְ אֵף). It is the *spirit which God cherishes in His dealings with the race in general* (Rom. ii. 4), *with "thousands in particular"* (Exod. xxxiv. 7), and more especially with Zion (Joel ii. 13).

First, then, His patience in preparing a habitation for man which is creational; then His patience or longsuffering *with man* which is remedial. "Evigilabit contra te furor qui nunc in longanimitate . . .," says Apoc. Baruch xii. 4.

Slow to anger is God. In fact, according to one reading of the text in Joel (R. Levi) He removes to a distance His wrath and His anger which are messengers of destruction, or He locks them up. Into His treasure-chamber He stores them until man repents.

After revelation of this attribute comes the manifestation of it along the paths of history. Time after time the claim is made that this attribute revealed itself in sending messengers of truth ; that God revealed His patient longsuffering through the lives and the literature of the poets and prophets. Their clear visions, their fierce hatred of evil, the way they lashed with satire the false codes of life, their quenchless fire for purity and their constant pointing to some nameless *Terror* from which neither power nor wealth could save them—these were the graphic manifestations of the אֵל אֱלֹהִים of God. Time after time the “patience of God” is challenged and each time a new messenger appears—on they come, on, on from sere old Samuel and down through the early Assyrian time, Babylonian, Persian, some eighteen of them, and each with the dominant note : I am here because of Divine patience with your false festivals and fairs, with the smoke on your false altars, with your false balances and buckets of wine. Tamper no longer with the scales of Divine Justice. Beware ! Beware !

In spite of the fact that hundreds of names are used of God in the Old Testament it is left to Paul to write *ὁ δὲ Θεὸς τῆς ὑπομονῆς* in his Letter to the Romans. It is a beautiful title. It is a beautiful conception of a God who along the centuries showed infinite patience with the sins of democracy, with the sins of the Hierarchy, and with the sins of plutocracy. Whatever other messages may not be there in the language of the Old Testament there is *divine patience*. *Nations flicker against it as a moth and learn it to their cost*. Many of the clouds of retribution are self-made. The armis-

tice of God (*ἀνοχή*) is written large as life is beaten out on the anvil of experience.

Any impression of the full message of the Old Testament on this theme must of necessity be incomplete unless it takes note, even in brief, of specific pictures of Divine Patience, although the word itself may not be named. For the highest watermark in this matter is reached in Isaiah liii. Here, in all this rich vocabulary, is divine patience personified. These are pain-filled synonyms, soft and silvery cadences in the flow of grief—"surely he hath borne our grief and carried our sorrows"; seven distinct, emphatic words follow: stricken (*נָגַע*), smitten of God (*נִכָּה*), and afflicted (*עָנָה*), wounded (*הָלַל*), pierced, bruised (*דָּכָא*), chastisement (*מִוֶּסֶר*), stripes (*חֲבִירָה*); *yet he opened not his mouth. He is brought as a lamb to the slaughter and as a sheep before her shearers is dumb so he opened not his mouth.* What pictures of a new kind of patience—vicarious and redemptive!

The remaining feature of Divine patience is found in most of the poets and prophets; but Ezekiel, who saw the old life fall away like a moth-eaten garment, sees the patience of God in the reconstructive aspect. Carlyle, when he sat to re-write the burnt volume of the Revolution, had his patience tested more severely than at first. Ezekiel, it is, who caught sight of this combination of infinite power and infinite patience in the Shepherd who tempered the pace to the weakest lamb or the most sorely hurt sheep in the flock (Ezek. xxiv. 23 *וַעֲה*). The prodigal nation, with lost crown, with dishevelled locks, will yet arise from the dust and return to Him who knows all, who understands all, who forgives all, who suffers with all. And the patient Shepherd will wait till the hour has fully come.

In one sense the whole vocabulary of the Old Testament is a vocabulary of patience which is very real and very



human. It is literary patience. A look at one book begets a haunting sense of patient thought and toil. The grand thoughts, the giant thoughts inside the book, may have been thrown off the mind in moods of high inspiration, but they were carved into shape slowly, carefully, masterfully through many weary hours. The "Little Library of the Old Testament" tells of the patient toil in thought of the prophets as well as the patient lives in action, some of them for forty years, amid many forms of difficulty. It is creational patience of a highly artistic kind. It is a trinity of patience—three in one and one in three, for there is not only the patient hand but the patient head and the patient heart of devotion.

Nothing, therefore, could be more fitting than the whole picture of patient suffering which these old writers give of the suffering nation. "Let us stand up," says Principal G. A. Smith, "and reverently look to the one essential unmistakable Figure of Nation as a whole: Israel, the real author, as she has been the age-long singer, of the Psalms: 'Our Mother of Sorrows, our Mistress in pain and in patience, at whose feet we have learned our first prayers of penitence and confession,' " (EXPOSITOR, vol. iii., eighth series, p. 3).

"Our Mother of Sorrows, our Mistress in pain and patience." Her pains were many: her patience is not yet ended. "Desert-born" there is little wonder it is sometimes broken by dark and disturbing curses. The pathos of life will always find a rich confessional in the vocabulary of the Psalms.

W. MEIKLE.

### PASSOVER AND PRIESTS CODE.

IN any attempt to arrive at a critical and harmonious history of the development of the Passover much confusion is caused by the anomalous position of the passage Exodus xii. 1-14. This passage is part of the Priest's Code; it must therefore *ex hypothesi* have been composed during the exile with a view to support the theories of a priestly group whose standpoint it ought to reflect and whose views as to ritual and sacrifice it ought to embody. But when examined it is most opposed to these views and theories. It displays the oldest form of Passover rite <sup>1</sup> and is earlier in its contents than any other law or ordinance of that feast. It represents a purely domestic rite, having nothing to do with priest or temple or pilgrimage. It is not to be performed at any sanctuary, local or central, but at home; it is a definite memorial of Exodus and deliverance from Egypt, and the *Mazzoth* feast, although described directly afterwards verses 15-20, is treated as a separate feast. In these respects this account is in complete harmony with the piece, verses 21-27, taken from J E, which is certainly pre-exilic, <sup>2</sup> although the two accounts are obviously quite independent, and each contains matter not found in the other. They give the impression of a real institution of widespread observance.

In the list of three sacred Pilgrimage-feasts at the local sanctuaries which every man of Israel was required by the Book of the Covenant (Exodus xxiii. 14) to attend, *Mazzoth* is included, but Passover is not. The reason of this is very plain. Passover was not a pilgrimage-feast, it was not

<sup>1</sup> See Ewald, *Alt.*, E.T., p. 453; Dillmann, *E. L.* 3te Auf., pp. 117, 121; Wellhausen, *ProL.* 5te Auf., p. 91; Benzinger, *Archäologik*, p. 470.

<sup>2</sup> "In Form und Ton etwas mehr auf seiten des Jehovist—in der Sache fast ganz auf seiten von Q." Wellhausen, *Comp.* 3te Auf. 75.

performed at Shiloh or Shechem but at home. But in the little group of ritual laws of the same period (Exodus xxxiv. 18-26) somewhat absurdly called "the second Decalogue,"<sup>1</sup> while *Mazzoth* is enjoined as a memorial of the Exodus Passover is incidentally mentioned in the rule which prohibits "the sacrifice of the feast of the Passover to remain till morning," a trait which belongs to the house-feast. It would appear from 1 Samuel i. (the only case we know of) that a good Israelite of this period was content with one pilgrimage in a year to the local sanctuary, and this was probably in the autumn.<sup>2</sup> It is reasonable to conclude that he kept the Passover at home.

A great change was inaugurated by the Deuteronomic legislation and its prevailing idea of concentrating all worship at Jerusalem. Deuteronomy xvi. 1-8 requires a very different observance of the Passover from the house-feast in Exodus xii. 1-14, 21-27. It allows cattle as an alternative of the lamb of the older rite. It combines Passover and *Mazzoth* into one feast (עליי verse 3). The flesh is to be boiled. But, most important change of all, the Passover must not be sacrificed "in any one of thy gates," but only at Jerusalem. Still much of the old rite still remains. Apparently the layman is still to kill his own victim; there is the atmosphere of hasty trepidation, the slaying at night. None of the flesh is to remain till the morning. The whole rite is still felt to be a memorial of the Exodus, and no intervention on the part of any priest appears to be contemplated. It is in view of these reforms that 2 Kings xxiii. 21 records that the Passover in the reign of Josiah was ordered to be sacrificed, as it was written "upon the roll of this Covenant," and that there had never been such a Passover

<sup>1</sup> There are thirteen rules which critics try to mould into ten according to fancy. See Wellhausen, *Comp.* 85, 333. Driver, *L. O. T.*, p. 37, 1st ed.

<sup>2</sup> Driver, *Sam.* on verse 20.

before. The historian saw that this law was a revolutionary innovation.

Ezekiel the poet-priest forms a link between the ordinances of Deuteronomy and those of the post-captivity priesthood, and he may be taken to represent the views and aspirations of his order at this period. Brooding in captivity, he evolves a sketch of the ideal ritual of a restored temple. In Ezekiel xlv. 21-24 he refers to the Passover, but only as a Temple-feast without a word relating to the domestic rite. Pass-over and *Mazzoth* are fused into a seven days feast. The Prince, who seems to be thought of as a kind of Priest-King, is to offer on the first day a trespass-offering and on every other day a burnt-offering and a trespass-offering with *minchah* and libation of oil. Nothing is said as to the slaying of the Passover lamb, or as to leaven; there is no memory of the Exodus. To this priest the atonement in the temple is the only significance of the sacred season.

We now turn to the Priests-Code which has three ordinances of the Passover, all of which imply the reforms of Deuteronomy. In Leviticus xxiii. 5-8<sup>1</sup> (part of a calendar of sacred days) the Passover is to be performed on the evening of the fourteenth of the first month and the seven days of *Mazzoth* begin on the fifteenth. A holy assembly and cessation of work mark the first and last days of *Mazzoth* and a fire offering each day is prescribed. In Numbers ix. 1-14 a short ordinance in verse 1 directs that the Passover is to be kept on the fourteenth of the first month in the evening, according to its laws and rules. But in a supplemental instruction which provides a second Passover on the fourteenth of the second month for men prevented from taking part on the proper day, some rules are mentioned. It is to be eaten with *Mazzoth* and bitter herbs. Nothing is to be left till morning. No bone is to

<sup>1</sup> This passage appears to be P not H. Wellhausen, *Comp.* 161.



be broken. A man who, not being prevented by ceremonial impurity or by a journey, does not sacrifice the Passover is to be "cut off from his people"; he has not brought his *gorban* to Jahveh at the proper time. This passage is of the same character as Deuteronomy xvi. 1-8. It contains new legislation, but includes several of the rules of the old domestic rite.

Numbers xxviii. 16-25 (part of a calendar of sacred feasts) is like Leviticus xxiii. 5-8. but more elaborate. The Passover on the fourteenth of the first month is named but without any rules. On the fifteenth begins the seven days' *Mazzoth* feast with a holy assembly and stoppage of work on the first and on the seventh days. There is a developed system of fire offerings with *minchah* and libation. It is obvious that the system of the Priests-Code implies the reforms of Deuteronomy. If a worshipper was to participate in a holy assembly on the fifteenth of the month he could not eat the Passover at home in the night of the fourteenth, he must do so at Jerusalem. It will also be noticed that in none of these three passages of the Priests-Code is there any memory of the Exodus in either Passover or *Mazzoth*. That side of the old rite has passed out of sight. It was present in Deuteronomy, it is absent here.

Now it is generally admitted<sup>1</sup> and it is quite plain that Exodus xii. 1-14 is in absolute conflict with the rest of the Priests-Code on the subject of the Passover. It enjoins a family sacrifice in a man's own house which is entirely forbidden in Leviticus xvii. The Sanctuary, the Priest, the Altar, are not even thought of. The flesh is to be roasted, not boiled (as in 2 Chron. xxxv. 13). The whole feast is pervaded by memories of the Exodus. It agrees with the pre-exilic ordinance Exodus xii. 21-27. [It is itself pre-Deuteronomic. How then does it come about that this

<sup>1</sup> See Wellhausen, *Proh.*, 98.

piece, which contradicts every principle and theory of the Priests-Code, forms a part of that book ?

Eerdmanns<sup>1</sup> has made a strenuous effort to prove that this passage does not form part of P, but of an unknown writing to which also Exodus vi. 13-28 belongs. Stated in this way, this is hardly a satisfactory solution of the difficulty. For this passage bears the linguistic marks of P. If there is anything at all in the evidence from style it is present here, and the usual inferences must be drawn from it. The true way out of the difficulty must rather be sought in a wider consideration of the characteristics of P as throwing light on the probable method of its composition. Many of the critical analysers of P seem to lose sight of the fact that they are dealing with a real book written by live men. They treat it so abstractly that it becomes as lifeless as a proposition of Euclid. Let us turn away for a little from P<sup>1</sup>, P<sup>2</sup>, p. P<sup>3</sup> Ph, from R<sup>1</sup>, R<sup>2</sup>, R<sup>d</sup> and the rest of them, and direct our attention to the really important question, "What were the *sources* of this book, and what is their value as materials for history ?"

When we examine the wide compass of the book, its inartistic arrangement and the heterogeneous nature of its contents, it must be felt that it is not an exclusively original work. While some parts are obviously mere abstract theorising, other very large parts could hardly have been composed without a basis of existing sources—not merely oral traditions but actual written documents. Such a book could not have been written under conditions of exile with no more equipment than a ruling theory and some oral traditions. In fact, when the book is scrutinised from this point of view the underlying documents clearly reveal themselves.<sup>2</sup> They are often much edited, perhaps all

<sup>1</sup> A. T. Studien, III. 36.

<sup>2</sup> See Dillman, N.D. J. pp. 650 f. ; Carpenter and Harford, *Hexateuch*, I. pp. 142 f. ; Kittel. *Gesch.*, Vol. I. 2te auf. 296-332.

have been rewritten in the peculiar idiom affected by the priesthood, but through all this they are apparent. The following list of such documents makes no claim to be exhaustive, and the specimens it contains will, it is thought, be readily agreed to.

1. The ten Toledoth in Genesis, one of which expressly states (Genesis v. 1) that it is a book, ספר, which is probably the case with the others.<sup>1</sup> It is possible that the fragment Ruth iv. 18-22 came from the same collection.

2. The list of Edomite Kings and chiefs, Genesis xxxvi. 31-43.

3. The code of laws, Leviticus i.-vii.<sup>2</sup>

4. The Law of Holiness, Leviticus xvii.-xxvi.<sup>3</sup>

5. The Torôth of Leprosy, Leviticus xiii.-xiv.

6. The law of fringes, Numbers xv. 38-41.

7. The journeys of Israel, Numbers xxxiii. 1-49, expressly naming a written source משה וכתב verse 2.

8. The boundaries of the Kingdom West of the Jordan, Numbers xxxiv. 1-13.

9. The division of the land among the tribes (from the standpoint of the Monarchy),<sup>4</sup> Joshua xv.-xxi.

10. Considerable portions of the various lists of names, Genesis xlv., Exodus vi., and Numbers. It is simply impossible that a priest in exile could compose these long lists out of nothing.

11. The conflicting statements as to the wives of Esau (Genesis xxvi. 34, xxviii. 9, xxxvi. 3) can only be explained from the use of diverging documents.<sup>5</sup>

These documents must have been very varied in origin and character, but they are all pre-exilic and some of them cannot be of a later date than the undivided monarchy.

<sup>1</sup> Eerdmanns, *A. T. Studien*, I.

<sup>2</sup> Wellhausen, *Comp.* 144n.

<sup>4</sup> Driver, *L. O. T.*, p. 119.

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.* 150.

<sup>5</sup> Eerdmanns u.s.

Their presence and every probability of the case lead to the view that the priestly body at their headquarters in Jerusalem collected, from one generation to another, *documents*, some relating to sacred ritual, others bearing on national history or antiquities. As they were representatives of learning, and had the duty of pronouncing *Torah*, the amassing of such a collection was not only natural but almost inevitable. There is indeed a case somewhat analogous—that of the learned syndicate in Jerusalem in the time of Hezekiah—who made a collection of works attributed to Solomon.<sup>1</sup> So then when ruin fell upon Judah, and kingdom and temple went to the ground, we may think of these priests carrying with them into exile their precious collection of documents, which was to be the foundation upon which they could build their theory of religious history and their scheme of ritual reform.

We suggest that Exodus xii. 1–14 was a document stored up and preserved in the Priests' collection and inserted by them in their book as a piece of sacred history. Such a view removes all difficulties about this passage. If we are to think of it as a new Passover ordinance fashioned by priests in exile or later it throws the whole history of the rite into confusion; it cannot be reconciled either with the other documents or with the facts. The attempt at such a reconciliation made by Benzinger<sup>2</sup> is by no means a success. He actually says, "the law of P. marks a retrogression from D. The Passover again becomes a domestic feast." Can he mean to suggest that in post-exilic days a Jew living, say, in Hebron was allowed to kill his lamb at home, roast it, eat it, put the blood on the doorposts and never go near Jerusalem at all? Of course not, for he

<sup>1</sup> Proverbs xxv. 1, Baba Bathra i. 5. See Cannon, *Song of Songs*, p. 80.

<sup>2</sup> *Enc. Bib.* art. "Passover."



proceeds to point out that "Deuteronomy was followed in later days in the slaying of the lamb in the Temple." If this is the best that can be said it does not help the matter much. So long as Exodus xii. 1-14 is regarded as a new law of P, so long will confusion exist. If, on the other hand, it is viewed as what it really is, an old document older than Deuteronomy xvi. and at least as old as Exodus xii. 21-27, everything falls into its place, all confusion ceases, and a consistent and sensible history of the institution becomes possible. It is not a new law but a bit of old fact, a source for history.

Indeed, support for this view may be found in the Priests-Code itself. As we have seen, Numbers ix., like Deuteronomy xvi., introduces in connexion with its new ordinance several rules relating not to a temple feast but to the well-known family feast, and the simple statement in Joshua v. 10-11 is interesting in its entire absence of allusion to Priests, Sanctuary or Pilgrimage.

It is quite certain that Exodus xii. 1-14 is in the sharpest conflict with post-exilic usage. In the Passover mentioned in Ezra vi. 19 as kept by the men returned from the exile,<sup>1</sup> probably including the authors of the Priests-Code, the Priests and Levites slew the victims. In 2 Chronicles xxx. 13 f., which may be taken as evidence of what took place in the writer's own day, a large crowd assembled at Jerusalem. It is not stated in verse 15 who killed the victims, but from verse 17 it would appear that a large proportion were killed by the Levites. The Priests received the blood from the Levites and sprinkled it [on the altar]. Similarly in 2 Chronicles xxxv. 11 the Levites killed the victim, the Priests received the blood from them and sprinkled it, and the flesh was boiled. No doubt the author knew of the passage Exodus xii. 1-14, but if he did he would regard

<sup>1</sup> בני הגולה verse 19. השבים מהגולה verse 21.

it not as a law to be observed, but as history, telling what had been the custom in the days before the reforms of Deuteronomy.

Josephus<sup>1</sup> gives similar testimony. In his time vast numbers of people assembled at Jerusalem for the Passover; they went to the Temple and surrounded the altar, the feast was eaten in companies from ten to twenty in number, leaving nothing of the sacrifice till the morning. The seven days' feast of unleavened bread began the next morning.

We learn from a Talmudic Tract<sup>2</sup> that the Passover sacrifice followed the daily evening sacrifice. It is thus described. The priests placed themselves in double rows, each had a silver or a gold bowl in his hand. The Israelite slaughtered and the priest received the blood and gave it to another priest, who in turn passed it to another, and each received a full bowl, at the same time returning an empty one. The priest nearest the altar squirted out the blood in one stream at the base of the altar. When the sacrifice had been opened the pieces which were to be sacrificed on the altar were removed and offered up. As soon as it was dark the worshippers left the temple and went out to roast their sacrifice; each man wrapped up the lamb in the skin and carried it off. This tract displays a feeling that in Exodus xii. 1-14 they were dealing with history, not with a living law. It is asked<sup>3</sup> "What is the difference between the Passover in Egypt and other Passovers?" and the answer names the selection of the lamb on the tenth day, the sprinkling of the blood with hyssop on lintel and doorposts, the eating in hasty trepidation, and the abstaining from leaven for one day only.

<sup>1</sup> *Ant.* iii. 10, 5; xvii. 9, 3. *Wars.* v. 3, 1; vi. 3, 1.

<sup>2</sup> *Pesachim* 5, trans. Rodkinson, vol. v. 119 sqq.

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.* 9, 5; Rodkinson, p. 202.

Thus the post-exilic evidence gives strong support to the view that Exodus xii. 1-14 was not a law devised by the authors of the Priests-Code but an old historic document inserted by them in their book.

W. W. CANNON.

### DANIEL AND BABYLON.

THE last word has hardly yet been said on the many problems presented by the book of Daniel. The narrative itself would appear to make its hero a younger contemporary of the historical prophet Ezekiel ; but the latter's references to Daniel, as is now generally admitted, by no means imply this. Indeed, for Ezekiel, Daniel belongs to the old heroic age, like Noah and Job (Ezek. xiv. 14, 20) ; and his name has become a proverb of ancient wisdom (xxviii. 3). In this connexion it is surely a fact of some significance that, among the personal names of the period of the First Babylonian Dynasty, we find not only A-a-bu (i.e. *Ābu* = Ayabu) and A-ia-bu (in the compound A-ia-bu-ia-qar = *Ayabu-yaqar*, אִיבִיקָר), which is naturally compared with Job (אִיּוֹב), but also such names as Danya (= דְּנִיָּאל = דְּנִיָּה ?) and Dan-Adad, which resemble the Hebrew Daniel. Possibly the first element in these names is to be compared with *dannu*, "strong," rather than with *dānu*, "judge." In the Hebrew story Daniel plays the part of an interpreter of dreams (i. 17) rather than that of a judge or legal functionary ; and this has reasonably been regarded as a feature of verisimilitude in the narrative, inasmuch as dreams and the interpretation of them were from time immemorial a principal study of the Wise Men of Babylon. Another point which is perhaps worthy of notice is that peculiar feature of style which may be called *progress by repetition*. It especi-

ally characterises Daniel iii.-v. ; and vividly reminds us of the numerous word-for-word repetitions in the old Babylonian Epic of Creation. This resemblance of style is probably not accidental. It may be taken for granted that during the Exile, if not before, the Jewish literati became acquainted with much, if not most, of the religious literature of their conquerors ; and the new knowledge doubtless exercised no small influence upon their own ideas and subsequent writings (cf. e.g. Ezek. i.).

It is now some twenty years since attention was first called to the remains of an old Babylonian poem in which many students have recognised a sort of parallel or prototype of the book of Job. The language is unusually difficult of interpretation ; a difficulty aggravated for us by the more or less fragmentary condition of the tablets, especially the first, of which only a few lines have been preserved. These tablets, originally four in number and containing perhaps 120 verses apiece, are part of the treasure-trove from Assurbanipal's library at Nineveh ; where also were found portions of a commentary which supplies glosses on many of the more obscure words and phrases. Both text and commentary were copied by the royal scribes from originals in Esagila, the great temple of Bel-Merodach at Babylon. The fact that a commentary was necessary to the understanding of the text even in the seventh century B.C. and before it, is significant of the great antiquity of the poem.

The purpose of this venerable relic of ancient piety is to glorify the god Merodach as a healer and saviour, and to attract sufferers to his temple in hope of deliverance. It is a long monologue in which a king describes how, in spite of an exemplary attention to the claims of religious duty, he was stricken by demonic agency with a terrible malady or accumulation of maladies which baffled the wisdom of



his magicians and soothsayers. God and goddess were deaf to his prayers, until at last Merodach relented, accepted his supplications, expelled the evil spirits, and freed the several members and organs of the patient from their manifold ailments, restoring his entire body to perfect health.

Now the conclusion to which a closer study of this fascinating, if somewhat tantalising, relic of the religious literature of Babylonia has led me is that it throws a light, as welcome as it certainly was unexpected, upon several of the narratives comprised in Daniel ii.–vi. The most striking instance is Daniel iv.—the story of Nebuchadnezzar's Humiliation and subsequent Restoration. Like the far older Babylonian poem, Daniel iv. is a personal narrative ; and the closing words of the Biblical account, " Now I Nebuchadnezzar praise and extol and honour the King of Heaven " read almost like a paraphrase of the opening words which constitute the title of the Babylonian prototype, " I will worship the Lord of Wisdom " (*Ludlul bél nîmegi*) : cf. also Daniel iv. 2, 3 ; ii. 21, 22, 28. What immediately followed in the tablet is unhappily lost ; but there is little doubt that the exordium was occupied with the grateful hero's praise of Bel-Merodach, his divine Deliverer (cf. Dan. iv. 2, 3). The beginning of the sequel relating the calamities that befel him, is also lost, with the exception of the single line, " Mine ears he (the demon ?) blocked up ; I became as one deaf." The next complete line which has survived—" I am King, and I became a thrall " (*Šarrákuma atûr ana rêši* : published text *Šarra kîma*)—i.e. I was treated like one, in my helpless misery ; I was abased from my royal dignity and humiliated to the utmost—might well be regarded as the keynote to Daniel iv., which was written to demonstrate that " the Most High is sovran in the kingdom of men and gives it to whom He will, and appoints over it the lowliest

of men " (Dan. iv. 17) : cf. also " The kingdom is departed from thee " (vv. 31).

Again, the tall tree of the Bible story, which in his dream represented Nebuchadnezzar himself, and was hewn down by command of a celestial spirit, may have been suggested by such lines of the Babylonian poem as " My ample form they (the evil spirits) prostrated ; Like a palm-tree was I overturned, on my back was I thrown." When the god restores the suffering monarch to health and strength, he makes his bowed neck " firm as a young palm " and " erect as a cedar." Taken by itself, this last coincidence might not amount to much ; but the essential fact is that, in each case, the proud monarch is compared to a majestic tree brought low by spiritual agency. But the crucial test of relation between the elder and younger narratives may be found in the peculiar details of the punishment of Nebuchadnezzar (Dan. iv. 15, 16, 23, 25, 32), which, as they stand in the present text of Daniel, appear to involve the incongruity of a mixture of metaphors. However that may be, the idea of the king's *heart* or sense being *changed* to that of a beast, so that he dwelt with the beasts of the field *and did eat grass like oxen*, may ultimately depend on the lines

" Bread was turned into stench, into corruption.

Mightily was the malady prolonged.

For lack of food, grass was my fare."

(*Ašnan illapitma daddariš alaḫiṣ*

*Appânâma eterik silêtum*

*Ina lâ mâkalê eḫbu (iṣpu ? iṣbu ?) bubûti.)*

He (or It) gripped my blood wrenched away my heart (or understanding)."

(*Itmuḫa dami issuḫa libbî-bî* : so read. Cf. 4 R. iii. 19, 20a.)

In the sequel, when Merodach restores the sufferer to health, he supplies his famished belly with proper food and drink (Tab. iv. 1, 2).

"In my stable I fell down like an ox;  
I wallowed like a sheep in my own dung."

(*Ina rubçia abît kî alpi*

*Ubtallil kî immeri ina tabaštania.*)

Here, as elsewhere in the Old Testament, the grosser features of the ancient mythus are naturally omitted. The brilliant Haggadist is contented with the statement that his Nebuchadnezzar "did eat grass *like oxen*." Both likeness and unlikeness are suggestive of the real relation between the stories. When the Daniel account goes on to state that "his body was wet with the dew of heaven" (v. 33), we may perhaps assume reminiscence of the words of the hero of the Babylonian poem: "And he" (Merodach, in the process of healing) "rained down upon me the cool showers of night." And when the Bible-story adds that "his hair had grown long like that of eagles, and his nails like those of birds," it is surely not fanciful to remember that, in describing the successive steps of his cure by the god, the old king says: "Like those of a she-swampfiend or a šûcû-demon He had marred my nails—He poured forth their ailment, made good their condition" (*Kîma nakimtum šûcû uçappira çupurâa : Ibuk manahtašûn šikinšûn uštîb*); and finally, "On the banks of the divine River, where doom passeth on men, I had my long locks plucked—of fetters I was freed" (*muttûtu ammarit abbutum appatir*).

In Babylonian sculpture demons have long claw-like nails.

Of other points of similarity we note only two. The instrumental music in the worship of Nebuchadnezzar's golden image (Dan. iii. 5, 7, 10, 15) is confirmed by the lines of the old poem.

"The King's worship—that was my joy;  
And his music (or psalmody)—my delight it was."

(*ikribî LUGAL šî hidûti*

*û nigûtašû ana damiqti šumma*).

And one of the closing lines that have reached us

“In the mouth of the lion devouring me Merodach put a bit”  
(*ina pî girra KU-ša iddi napsama D. Mardug*)

may conceivably have supplied more than a hint for the narrative of Daniel vi.

C. J. BALL.



## *THE SILENCE OF ST. PAUL.*

A FEW years ago, in acknowledging the gift of a short work dealing with the missionary journeys of St. Paul, a man of affairs holding a high position in the civil service, sent a mild complaint that the work did nothing to solve his difficulty. This was his difficulty. In the Gospels you find a story. In St. Paul's Epistles you find a scheme of theology. How do you connect the two? Was it possible for St. Paul, or would it have been possible for anybody having only the former to go upon, to develop the latter out of it? This difficulty has presented itself to many thoughtful minds. No attempt is here made to solve it, but attention is directed to the consideration of one problem which has a direct bearing upon the larger question. That problem is raised by the question which has often been put since the world became critical, "How comes it that we get so little of the personal Jesus, the Son of Mary who walked in Galilee, in the Epistles of St. Paul? Was St. Paul ignorant of the story of that life as it has come down to us in the synoptic Gospels, or had its details no interest for him? What inference must be drawn from the silence of St. Paul?" This question is here considered, not from the standpoint of the scholarly expert, but from the standpoint of one who can claim only some familiarity with historical and literary problems and some experience in the weighing of documentary evidence.

Before going to the special date of the problem, one may venture to indicate a general reason for caution in dealing

with it. Confident inference from silence is dangerous. One is at liberty freely to infer a writer's knowledge or his ignorance from what he says, but one must be very cautious in inferring knowledge or ignorance from what a writer does not say.

I came across a curious illustration the other day of the danger of the argument from silence. I was shewn by a friend an old letter written to one of his ancestors. It was written at Kennet on the banks of the Forth by a young man of education, and he must have been also a man of at least average intelligence, for he afterwards became a judge of the Court of Session. It was a friendly letter to a neighbour who lived a few miles away. The writer was sorry not to have been able to call the day he intended as his father had required the carriage. He hoped, however, to get over a few days later, and so forth. It was quite an ordinary chatty letter, and might have been written yesterday. But it struck me that the year was 1745, and it seemed curious that there was no reference to the rebellion. So I looked up my history and verified exact dates, and what did I find? I found that on the day that the letter was written on the banks of the Forth, Prince Charles Edward and the Highland army crossed the Forth at the Fords of Frew, just sixteen miles from the spot where that letter was written. Now, if the '45 were as far away from us as is Palestine at the opening of our era and contemporary records were as scarce, would not this letter be hailed as a trump card by those who maintained that the '45 was the echo of a Solar Myth, and the "Lyon in Mourning" the work of a late nineteenth century forger? To take another illustration which, if not more apposite, is more cognate. One of the problems of authorship which has given least trouble to critics is the common authorship of the Fourth Gospel and the Johannine Epistles. But the author of the Fourth

Gospel was not without knowledge of or interest in the human life of Christ, for he himself wrote an account of it. Further, unless the Epistles, and with them the Gospel, are to be assigned to a date so early as to shock criticism, the writer had the synoptic story before him substantially as it has come down to us : indeed there seems to be internal evidence in his Gospel that this was so. Yet when we turn to the Epistles we find in them a characterisation of Christ even less anthropomorphic and more transcendental than St. Paul's, and there is not in these Epistles a single reference to the human life of Jesus, except the statement that He came in the flesh. Now if we had no Fourth Gospel, might not one rashly and erroneously argue from silence that the writer of the Epistles was ignorant of the Gospel story ?

To come now to the data of the problem. St. Paul was a man of great intellectual force, of keen and alert human interest, of warm, emotional and sympathetic temperament. If not a great scholar, he was a man of education, deeply versed and keenly interested in all that concerned his own people and his own religion. For thirty years his personal devotion to Christ was the one dominating influence of his life. It is hard to believe that such a man was ignorant of anything concerning Jesus and His life on earth which it was possible for him to learn. St. Paul stood very near to Jesus. Whether he ever saw Jesus in the flesh we cannot tell. The arguments on either side are inconclusive. But at the date of St. Paul's conversion the crucifixion was not more remote than is the battle of Jutland to-day. The Man Jesus was nearer to St. Paul than is Edith Cavell to us. It would have been as easy to gather particulars about Jesus in Palestine then as to gather particulars about Principal Denney in Scotland to-day. St. Paul spent weeks, if not months, in the company of Peter and John and James

the Lord's Brother.<sup>1</sup> It would be ridiculous to compare the devotion of the most enthusiastic Scot for our great Scottish soldier Earl Haig, with St. Paul's devotion to Christ. Some years ago Douglas Haig was quite unknown outside a narrow professional circle. But now everything about him has been eagerly searched out. His native county, Fife, his birthplace, Edinburgh, his place of baptism, St. Andrews Church—even his ancestry have been diligently inquired into. Now if such particulars in regard to a distinguished soldier are matters of interest to the ordinary members of the community, is it conceivable that St. Paul would take no interest in like details in regard to the life of the Master for whom he was willing to suffer the loss of all things and count them but as dung ; the leader whose banner he never lowered from the day he raised it at Damascus, to the day he washed it with his blood in Rome ? But this is not all. St. Paul must have heard the other side of the story. He was in intimate relations with the leaders of the Sanhedrim who compassed the death of Jesus. He must have heard their account of the matter and of the events that led to it. A man of his alert intelligence was not going to take it that they suddenly seized an obscure visitor to the feast and had him crucified on account of some indiscreet utterances. He must have heard of the ministry in Galilee and the commotion which it excited, and of the popular reputation of Jesus as a worker of miracles. With that side of the story to start with, St. Paul must have got the other side to end up with. In view of these considerations it appears to be incredible that St. Paul did not know all that there was to

<sup>1</sup> I here ignore as involving matters of textual criticism, but I do not underestimate, the value of the Lukan argument, which identifies the "We" document with the writer of the rest of Acts, and the writer of Acts with the evangelist who in the Third Gospel records "the things which they delivered unto us which from the beginning were eye-witnesses."



learn about the earthly life of Jesus either from His enemies, His disciples, or His Brother.

These considerations, however, do not answer the question what did St. Paul know, what was his story, what were the particulars of his Gospel? His Epistles are taken to be of earlier date than can be affirmed of any of the Gospels in the form in which we have them. As it cannot be affirmed with certainty that any of the Gospels were written by companions of our Lord, St. Paul's account of the matter would, in view of its earlier date, carry greater authority than any of the Gospels. But St. Paul, we are told, is silent. Much has been said and written upon that subject—the silence of St. Paul. But before considering what inference may be drawn from that silence, it may be worth while to ask the question, Is St. Paul then silent? As will be shewn later, there is often a tendency in these discussions to build upon an exaggerated generalisation. St. Paul's allusions to the earthly life of Jesus are not copious or generally detailed. That may be conceded. It may need explanation. But the thing to be explained is the thing as we find it: the paucity of reference, if one will, but not the total silence of the rash generalisation.

What then are the references to the earthly life of Christ in the Epistles of St. Paul? We find that St. Paul records or refers to the following occurrences or circumstances in connexion with the life of Jesus:—

That He was born of a woman (Gal. iv. 4).

That He was a Jew (Rom. ix. 5).

That He was of the family of David (Rom. i. 3).

That He had brothers (1 Cor. ix. 5).

That one of them was named James (Gal. i. 19).

That His earthly surroundings were humble (2 Cor. viii.

9).

That He was of a meek and gentle disposition (2 Cor. x. 1).

That He was a preacher (Eph. ii. 17).

That He condemned arbitrary divorce (1 Cor. vii. 10).

That He taught that we should bear one another's burdens (Gal. vi. 2).

That He thus summed up the Second Table of the law, "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself" (Rom. xiii. 9).

That He pleased not Himself but submitted to reproaches (Rom. xv. 3).

That He had a band of special disciples called apostles (1 Cor. ix. 5).

That their number was twelve (1 Cor. xv. 5).

That one of them was Peter or Cephas, a married man (1 Cor. ix. 5).

That another was named John (Gal. ii. 9).

That the rite of baptism was associated with His ministry (1 Cor. i. 13).

That He instituted the supper, at the time under the circumstances and in the manner narrated in the Gospels (1 Cor. xi. 23).

That He was betrayed (1 Cor. xi. 23).

That His betrayal took place at night (ibid.).

That He was crucified (Rom. vi. 6).

That nails not cords were used (Col. ii. 14).

That this took place at the time of the Feast of the Pass-over (1 Cor. v. 7).

That the Jews were responsible for His death (1 Thess. ii. 15).

That He was buried (1 Cor. xv. 4).

That He rose from the dead (ibid.).

That this took place upon the third day (ibid.).

That He appeared to Peter (1 Cor. xv. 5).

That He appeared to the Apostles (ibid.).

That He appeared to above 500 brethren at once (1 Cor. xv. 6).

That He appeared to James (1 Cor. xv. 7).

That He again appeared to the Apostles (*ibid.*).

That He foretold his second coming (1 Cor. xv. 23).

That He ascended to Heaven (Eph. iv. 9).

To these, if we accept 1 Timothy as Pauline in its present form, we may add :—

That His judge was Pontius Pilate (1 Tim. vi. 13). Possibly one or two of these references might be questioned, and possibly one or two have been omitted which others might deem that they detected. But in substance this is the body of reference direct or indirect in the Epistles of St. Paul to the earthly life and ministry of Jesus. It may not be so voluminous as some might have expected, but it is certainly a goodly list, and the silence of St. Paul was far from being absolute.

Much has been said of two omissions,—the Virgin Birth and the working of miracles. These cannot be here discussed in detail. One may remark, however, as regards the first, that all that St. Paul says of the birth of Jesus is that He was born of a woman and, notwithstanding the importance which, as a Jew, he attached to it, he says nothing of male generation. As regards the second, to a man of St. Paul's age and surroundings, the breach of ordinary physical law by miracle had not the same significance as to a modern. He says that he himself wrought signs and wonders, and he attributes the gift of miracle to some of his followers.

The only events referred to by St. Paul which are not definitely recorded in the Gospels, are the appearance to James and the appearance to above 500 brethren at once, an occasion which cannot be specifically identified in the Gospels. In no single particular is St. Paul at variance with the Gospel narrative. What does this import? The problem is this. Was St. Paul familiar with the story of the life of Jesus that has been handed down to us in the

Gospels ? In the synoptic Gospels we have the story of a life. In the Epistles of St. Paul we have a number of references to that life, all without exception consistent with that story, and in almost every case corroborative of that story sometimes in very small particulars. In regard to a certain part of that story, to which St. Paul attached supreme importance, the Passion and the Resurrection, the corroboration is detailed and minute. So standing the matter, and regarding it simply as a question of evidence, the body of reference to the earthly life of Jesus in the Epistles of St. Paul seem to prove that he was familiar with the story of the life of Jesus as it has come down to us in the Gospels. If we possessed the writings of an author dated thirty years after the expedition of Cyrus against his brother Artaxerxes, which contained as many references to incidents recorded by Xenophon as the Epistles do to the Gospels, and no discrepancies, we should have no hesitation in affirming that, whether the writer had read the *Anabasis* or not, he had the same story. Nor would it the least disturb that conclusion if the writer, happening to attach special importance to Persian history, had referred more frequently and fully to the actual *Anabasis* and death of Cyrus than to the retreat of the Greeks.

To revert to one or two more general considerations as bearing upon the matter. There must have been a story, and that story could not have been unknown to a man of Christ's own time of St. Paul's intellectual eagerness and personal devotion to Christ. St. Paul did not believe that the Son of God descended in human form at Jerusalem to be forthwith seized and crucified. He knew that He was born a Babe and grew up to manhood. Nor could he have believed that having lived as an obscure peasant He was suddenly seized and put to death on the occasion of a visit to the Feast at Jerusalem. There must have been some



story, but in so far as St. Paul can be said to be silent, he is silent about any story. It may be argued—whether reasonably or not—that St. Paul did not attach much importance or special interest to that story. But seeing that there must have been a story, it cannot surely reasonably be argued from St. Paul's silence that St. Paul's story was a different story from that which has been handed down in the Gospels. There must have been a story, that story has come down in documents, which, if not written exactly in their present form in St. Paul's lifetime, must have taken their first shape before St. Paul wrote his Epistles. St. Paul does not contradict that story in any particular, his references are almost all directly corroborative. Why then should it be suggested that St. Paul was ignorant of the story as it is recorded in the Gospels and received in the Church, and that St. Paul's story was or may have been a different one?

Next let us apply the comparative test. St. Paul, it is said, makes scanty reference to the earthly ministry of Jesus and cannot, therefore, it is suggested, have been familiar with the Gospel narrative. What then of the writers of Hebrews, of the Epistle of James, of the Petrine Epistles, and of the Johannine Epistles to which reference has already been made? If we eliminate from the New Testament the Gospels and the first chapter of Acts in so far as it completes the Gospel narrative, and the Pauline Epistles, we have a body of Christian literature approximately equal in length to the Pauline Epistles. All this, according to critical authority, is of later date than the Pauline Epistles, and must have been written by men who were familiar with St. Mark's Gospel or its prototype. Yet in this body of literature we have less of the earthly life of Jesus than in St. Paul's Epistles. Again, to take a modern comparison, libraries are full of religious works, theological treatises, sermons, religious correspondence. Doubtless, in many

of these incidents in the earthly life of Jesus are frequently referred to. But one will find on every shelf religious volumes, ten times as bulky as the Epistles of St. Paul, which contain fewer references to incidents in the life of Christ than occur in these Epistles. Yet all these volumes were written by men who have been familiar with our Gospel story from childhood.

Again, still pursuing the comparative method. What of John the Baptist, and what of the events of contemporary Roman history? The mission of John the Baptist is attested by secular history. The permanence of his influence is strikingly borne out by an incidental reference in Acts to the baptism of John. The writer of Acts, too, makes Paul, in one of his discourses, directly connect the mission of John with the coming of Jesus. St. Paul must have heard of that mission before he ever heard of Jesus, and as a zealous young Jew he must have been keenly interested therein. But in his Epistles he nowhere mentions John the Baptist. Again, there were great and tragic events in Roman history during St. Paul's ministry. He makes no reference to these things. He names no Emperor, no Proconsul, no Imperial Edict. He is silent as to the expulsion of the Jews from Rome, the conquest of Britain, the tragedies of the Imperial house.

Recent discoveries in the East, and particularly in Egypt, have thrown an indirect but very important light upon the New Testament documents. We have been apt to think of writing in the first century as a somewhat rare and esoteric art, and to conceive of epistolary correspondence in that age as having been limited to solemn communications within a small circle of highly educated persons. But the vast stores of manuscripts which have been unearthed in the last thirty years have dispelled that idea. They show that not only was the art of writing widespread

even among the common people, and the non-Greek-speaking people, but that there was a passion for writing and scribbling of all kinds. Everything important or trivial had to be recorded in writing, and all classes of the community corresponded copiously upon matters of personal, domestic, or business, or public interest. Probably in no age down to the introduction of the penny post was writing more copious or more varied. These discoveries lend a high probability to the conjecture that the story of Jesus was recorded in writing contemporaneously with the events narrated in the first chapters of Acts, and have been so recorded ever since. To the original story, as so recorded, there may have been accretions by the incorporation of traditionary details, but the outline must be the same. There may have been additions, but there can have been no important subtractions. There may not be a very large number of Christian manuscripts of the second century, but there are early manuscripts of many works written in that century in which the Gospels are quoted, and all the evidence points to the conclusion that by the middle of the century not only the substance but the language was stereotyped, and being so stereotyped, it must then have been of some antiquity. The originals of these Gospels must have been in the hands of St. Paul. They cannot have been much changed between 60 A.D. and the beginning of the second century.

The new discoveries as regards the writings of the period throw new light also upon the Epistles of St. Paul as regards their form and occasion. We are apt to think of St. Paul's Epistles as deliberate treatises; indeed so strong is that tendency, that it has influenced the sense in which we now use the word "Epistle" and divorced it somewhat from the meaning of a letter. We think of the writings of St. Paul, not as letters, but as Epistles, meaning thereby some-

thing other than letters, something studied, deliberate, literary. His personal relations to the recipients are mere setting to what were conceived as world-wide and age-long expositions. I recall how a learned divine of the old school once insisted to me that St. Paul knew quite well when he wrote his Epistles that he was writing something as permanent and as authoritative as the Scriptures of the Old Testament. St. Paul was not a meek man, but [this suggestion would have astonished him. St. Paul's Epistles, so far as he was concerned, were simply letters, pastoral and not personal letters most of them, but none the less letters, written on an occasion and to a particular body of his followers. Within the last few years hundreds of personal and family letters have been discovered with salutations and personal courtesies identical in expression with those used by St. Paul. The character and the occasion of St. Paul's communications must be kept clearly in view in considering what one might expect to find in them, or what it may be deemed surprising to find omitted. Many pastoral letters have been written within the last five years. Ministers absent with the army have written to their people, as St. Paul did, suggestions in regard to local difficulties or arrangements, or words of counsel, encouragement, or consolation. I venture to suggest that it would be as hopeless a task to attempt to reconstruct a life of Jesus out of the whole volume of letters that have been so written as out of the Epistles of St. Paul. Nor do I think that if 2,000 years hence the proverbial New Zealander, after completing his sketch of the ruins of St. Paul's, journeys to Scotland, and is so fortunate as to unearth a [Kirk Session safe with a bundle of these letters, he will be either a very intelligent or a very charitable Antipodean if he concludes that the writer must have been ignorant of the Gospels.

It may be said, however, that whilst such considerations



might go far to explain silence, they do not explain the partial references. St. Paul refers constantly to the fact of the Crucifixion, and frequently to the Incarnation and the Resurrection. How comes it that if he had the whole Gospel story his references are so limited? This question, however, ignores the personal equation. To St. Paul these were the profoundly important matters. The author of the Third Gospel and of the Acts of the Apostles refers to medical matters, he is fond of having a hit at Jewish prejudice, he magnifies the Romans. Here we have the personal equation. The writer was a medical man, a Greek, and a Roman provincial. St. Paul was a theologian and a religious enthusiast, possessed and overmastered by these great inter-connected ideas,—God came in the flesh, God gave Himself for man upon the Cross, God conquered death and rose triumphant from the tomb. Is St. Paul singular in this regard? He leaps, it is complained, from the Incarnation to the Crucifixion. What of the Catholic Creeds? “Born of the Virgin Mary, suffered under Pontius Pilate” in the Apostles’ Creed: “And was made man, and was crucified for us also under Pontius Pilate” in the Nicene Creed: “Born in the world, suffered for our salvation” in the Athanasian Creed.

The question has been asked whether St. Paul’s oral teaching was limited in the same way as regards reference to the life of Christ as are his writings. If St. Paul knew the story from Bethlehem to Calvary, it is hard to believe that one so practical, so human, so sympathetic, failed to impart it to his followers. Moreover, teaching, such as we have in his Epistles, would not be connected or intelligible without far more particulars than are therein contained. He nowhere, for example, explains the cause of the Jewish enmity against Jesus. There are two particular narrative passages in the Epistles, the account of the institution of the

Supper and the account of the appearances after the Resurrection. St. Paul three times refers to what he "delivered" to his followers. One reference, 1 Corinthians xi. 2, is general. He uses the corresponding noun (*τὰς παραδόσεις*). "The deliverances which I have delivered." The Authorised Version renders it "ordinances," the Revised Version "traditions." But in the two other cases there is no doubt as to what he has "delivered unto them." In the one case it is the story of the Supper, in the other case the story of the Resurrection. This appears strongly suggestive that his oral teaching must have been much more narrative in character than his Epistles. A word more as to the Supper. This is a good illustration of the importance of having regard to the occasion, and to the danger of the inference from silence. The references to the Supper in 1 Corinthians were called forth by certain disorders that had arisen in the Church at Corinth. But for that occasion the Epistles of St. Paul might have been silent about the Supper, and there cannot be the least doubt that in these circumstances a certain school of modern criticism would have assured us that St. Paul knew nothing about the most sacred rite of our religion.

Reference has been made to the personal equation as regards St. Paul. But there was also a personal equation as regards those to whom his Epistles were addressed. They had no New Testament. Reasons have been given above for holding that there must have been at this time written Gospel narratives. But these were not authoritatively stereotyped, there was no canon, and it is extremely doubtful whether the great body of the oral teaching of Jesus was then in the same collection as the narrative. St. Paul could not refer to sayings and incidents as things with which everybody was familiar, as a modern preacher or writer can do. If one figures a modern missionary, who

pays a visit to a heathen community, and during a sojourn of a few months makes a number of Christian converts but is unable to supply them with Bibles : if one supposes that after he has left he sends them a pastoral letter, one may expect him to refer to the Incarnation, the Crucifixion, and the Resurrection, but one will hardly expect him to refer to particular parables and sayings of our Lord or even to incidents in His Galilean Ministry as things with which the recent converts were all familiar.

As already stated, it is not within the scope of this article to consider the question how far the theological system expounded in the Epistles of St. Paul, and in particular the conception of the personality of Christ therein set forth, are derivable from the Gospel narrative. But one may glance very briefly at the question whether there is any inconsistency between the two. Can the Jesus of the synoptic narrative be the Eternal Son in whom dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead of the Epistle to the Colossians ? Well, the two have stood together for more than eighteen centuries. At a time when men were still living who had known the Apostles, the Gospel narrative and the theology of the Pauline Epistles were both received in the Church. They have been so received ever since. They have both been received without difficulty or misgiving by countless generations of Christian theology and Christian devotion. The primitive Church, the mediæval Church, the modern Church, the Eastern Church, the Roman Church, and the Protestant Churches, Augustine and Origen, Aquinas and Wycliffe, Luther and Loyola, Newman and Lightfoot, have rested upon both. Doubtless, it may be said, that the critical faculty has been developed and critical and comparative methods have been applied only within the last two generations. But it does not require either the critical faculty or critical methods to detect an obvious discrepancy. Whilst

it may not be possible to affirm that the Christ of St. Paul must have acted and must have taught as did the Jesus of the synoptic Gospels, it can be affirmed that if we postulate the Christ of St. Paul, there is nothing which Jesus did or Jesus said as recorded in the synoptics which could not have been done or said by the Christ of St. Paul. But further, as has already been pointed out, there is a tendency in these discussions to exaggerate, to treat as absolute, what is only relative. The Jesus of the Gospels is not depicted as so obviously and uniformly a transcendental being as is the Christ of St. Paul. So be it. This is true, just as it is true that St. Paul does not dwell constantly upon the earthly life of Jesus. But having got so far, a certain school of criticism at once proceeds to make absolute what is only relative, and forthwith it is accepted among them as almost axiomatic that the Jesus of the Gospels is not a transcendental being but only a wise and holy teacher and preacher, who professed to exercise certain miraculous powers of healing disease. One is familiar with the saying "Give a lie a start." No serious critical proposition should be so described, but to use quite a colourless expression "Give a notion of this kind a start and it will run almost as far and as long as a lie." One hears, no doubt, much in the sphere of criticism of the blind and uncritical acceptance of conventional teaching in the past. But some of the generalisations of criticism stand in need of critical examination. This is one of them,—this thesis as to the homely personality of Jesus as depicted in the synoptic Gospels. Is the Jesus of the synoptics only an extraordinary man, a wise and holy teacher with certain remarkable powers of healing diseases? Let us test this generalisation; let us turn to the Gospels themselves. Let us take Mark, the simplest and most homely narrative:—

"The Son of Man hath power on earth to forgive sins."



“The Son of Man is Lord also of the Sabbath.”

“What manner of man is this that even the wind and the sea obey him.”

“The unclean spirits when they saw him fell down before him and cried, saying, ‘Thou art the Son of God.’”

“Whosoever shall be ashamed of me and my words . . . of him also shall the Son of Man be ashamed when he cometh in the glory of the Father.”

“A voice came out of the cloud saying, This is my beloved Son, hear him.”

“Heaven and earth shall pass away but my words shall not pass away.”

“Verily I say unto you, wheresoever this Gospel shall be preached throughout the whole world this also which this woman hath done shall be spoken of for a memorial of her.”

“Art thou the Christ, the Son of the Blessed? And Jesus said, I am, and ye shall see the Son of Man sitting on the right hand of power and coming on the clouds of glory.”

“And the veil of the Temple was rent in twain from the top to the bottom, and when the centurion that stood over against him saw that he so cried and gave up the Ghost he said, ‘Truly this man was the Son of God.’”

These are not the mystical musings of the author of the Fourth Gospel, or the ecstatic utterances or theological elaborations of St. Paul. They are uninfluenced by Alexandrine philosophy or Greek theogony. They are the simple statements of the oldest record of the life and the earthly ministry of Jesus of Nazareth. An examination of the other synoptics yields a like result. The Jesus of the Gospels is no mere man of ordinary human mold, but is transcendental personality, not merely a worker of miracles, but himself a miraculous being. It may be legitimate to contend that all this does not give us the Christ of St. Paul, but it appears to be impossible to affirm, This

is not the Christ of St. Paul ; this cannot be the eternal pre-existent Son of God. Be it said that St. Paul cannot have derived all his theological system from the Gospel story, but be it not said, This Jesus who stood alone and forsaken before Pilate cannot be the Christ of whom St. Paul affirms, "Who being in the form of God thought it not robbery to be equal with God, but made himself of no reputation and took upon him the form of a servant and was made in the likeness of man, and being found in the fashion of a man he humbled himself and was obedient until death, even the death of the Cross." Be it said that the dogmatics of the Epistle to the Romans must have been influenced by other sources than the Gospel narrative, but be it not said that the Jesus who hung between two thieves on Golgotha cannot be the Christ of whom St. Paul declared :

"Wherefore God also hath highly exalted him and given him a name which is above every name, that at the name of Jesus every knee should bow, of things in Heaven and things in earth and things under the earth, and that every tongue should confess that Jesus Christ is Lord to the glory of God the Father."

St. Paul found Christianity a small Jewish sect ; he made it a world-religion. But St. Paul did more. He interpreted the faith. He shewed the world its meaning. He found its true symbol. The first symbol of the Church was the empty tomb. St. Paul gave to the Church the symbol of the Cross. Not that St. Paul undervalued the Resurrection ; he makes that clear. The Incarnation, the Cross, and the Resurrection : all three are vital. But the Incarnation is vital because it is the necessary condition of the Cross. The Resurrection is vital because it is the necessary complement of the Cross. For the Cross stands in the centre. That was the verdict of the Master, though His first disciples did not fully understand it. "I, if I be lifted

up, will draw all men unto me." It was the verdict of St. Paul, "We preach Christ crucified." The faithful in all ages have accepted that testimony now confirmed by nineteen centuries of Christian experience, and the Cross in the centre is the verdict of the universal Church. The path of life is the path that leads to Calvary.

We may fondly wish that St. Paul had told us more of what he knew of the beautiful life in Galilee, but need we wonder, can we complain, that as in Corinth, so among all peoples, St. Paul has known nothing save Jesus Christ and Him crucified?

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### *HISTORIC PROTESTANTISM AND THE PENAL SCHEME.*

A SECOND great effort at establishing true moral necessity for Atonement was the penal doctrine. It began pretty early, and gained considerable strength during the later middle ages, but it culminated at the Reformation. Satisfaction came to be sharply defined as satisfaction to justice, and mainly—though not exclusively—to penal justice. All Catholic theology has a taint of contingency. Authority, not reason or conscience, is the supreme thing for it. Even when its thoughts of atonement are guided by elements from its own sacrament of penance which suggest punishment, it inclines to something of the nature of *quasi*-punishment in dealing with Christ as in dealing with us. Everything is conventional, arbitrary, wavering.

It is an immense change from this—a marked change too from Anselm's premises—when, as Ritschl expresses it, Protestant thought conceives of God as the administrator of a great system of public criminal law. We must not be

misled by Professor David Smith, who seeks to trace the influence of the arbitrary State Governments of the time in the Protestant scheme of doctrine. Apart from cross-currents due to belief in Predestination, the God of Protestant theology is no tyrant. Rather He is a constitutional sovereign. One might almost call Him a limited monarch. At every point He has to reckon with the requirements of His own law. The classical Protestant scheme of Atonement tells us how God bought off the claims of law, and secured freedom for the impulses of His grace.

One is bound to add that, in one's own judgment, the penal scheme decisively broke down. If a thought was made central which had flickered through the minds of Christian men during long ages, the result of focussing it at the centre of vision was to exhibit it not as true but as incredible. Whatever analogy there may be, closer or looser, between the sufferings of Christ and the punishment of a criminal or sinner, identity there is none; and no ingenuity, however equipped with the manifold resources of sophistry, can make a penal substitution appear morally normal. As time goes on, the presence of unworthy elements in this proudly self-confident theology becomes plainer and plainer. One may doubt the sufficiency of the late Professor Stevens' own positive construction, as hinted in his *Christian Doctrine of Salvation*; but his cross-examination of the penal theory is masterly and triumphant. If the Reformers began by enumerating the constitutional obstacles which the love of God had to clear out of its path in order to accomplish its free purpose of mercy, the logic of the structure is not satisfied until we reach the frank formulation quoted from the earlier work of Dr. A. H. Strong.<sup>1</sup> Justice, or retributive righteousness is "a principle of God's nature, not only independent of love, but superior to love."

<sup>1</sup> By Stevens, *ut supra*, p. 178.



We are sometimes told that logic rules the world. Happily that is not true. God has never abdicated, and His children are not left to work out unhelped the consequences of half-true premises. He knows far better than we ourselves not only what we say but what it is we are trying to utter. At the same time, theological and religious error is no small mischief; and it is not possible permanently for the most pious of hearts to set logic at defiance. There are impressive, there are most moving displays of a Christian piety which uses the dialect of the penal theory. And that piety is unquestionably aiming at a truth; not merely the truth of the necessity of Christ to human salvation, but at the least the further truth of the necessity of Christ's sufferings. And yet, in logic, this is what it comes to; that God is essentially just—according to the principles of penal law—and accidentally or contingently loving, gracious, redemptive. Catholicism had hinted at this; the older Protestantism embarked upon definitions which could have no other outcome than the naked assertion itself. Not upon such lines can the moral necessity of atonement be truly vindicated.

But we must return to the beginnings of Protestantism, noting the assertions which are distinctive of its beliefs regarding atonement in their contrast with mediævalism.

I. First of all, we might expect to find in Protestantism a clear affirmation of the necessity of Christ's sufferings as the only means of human salvation. Strangely enough, this affirmation lingers. All the four chief Reformers as quoted by Principal Franks—Luther, Zwingli, Melancthon, Calvin—make reserves, and in the end decline the assertion. They are not content with the formula of a later orthodoxy—that God “might justly have left us” all in our sins, and that no positive necessity arising either from righteousness or from mercy required God to save men. Contin-

gency is affirmed, not merely in regard to the choice—to redeem, or not to redeem—but also in regard to the method of redemption. It may seem audacious to charge the Reformers with not having clearly understood the purport of their own thought; and yet, upon full consideration, the verdict seems inevitable. It was not the great men who came first, but the lesser men <sup>1</sup> who followed, that spoke out on this matter the inner thought of Protestantism.

More precisely, the adhesion of the great Reformers to the traditional thesis of Augustine, which denies the absolute necessity of Christ's sufferings, may be explained by the following considerations. *First*: the immense and deserved influence of Augustine. *Secondly*: the natural working of Christian reverence. One may think such reverence misapplied. One may hold that the fact of Christ's death, which assuredly was not "gratuitous," makes it truer reverence in us to proclaim rather than to dispute absolute moral necessitation. One may also concede that the difference, between affirming such necessitation and affirming a high degree of moral fitness, is less important for Christian preaching or prayer than for the schools of theology. Also the motive of reverence is eminently honourable, even if it be not always wise. There is something pleasing to us when great Christian minds, almost reckless at times in their dogmatism, decline to affirm that God "must" do this or that. Would that all errors had as much of redeeming quality in them!

But *thirdly* we must also reckon with the workings of Predestinarian belief, whose effects, one must affirm, are almost wholly bad. Almost—for it is better that Christian faith and hope should fasten upon the strong, unwavering, victorious purpose of God than upon the fluctuating movements of the human will. "The counsel of the Lord, it

<sup>1</sup> Mr. Mozley names John Gerhard the Lutheran scholastic.

standeth for ever ; the thoughts of His heart unto all generations." But, if we frame the evil dogmas, that some are saved and some lost, and that the difference is due to God's own choice ; that the saved are saved because God willed their salvation, while the lost perish because He preferred their perdition ; that the difference between one and another is due to God's arbitrary preference, or else to some hidden motive ; so that even the Christian, if Predestinationism is true, worships an unknown and probably an unknowable God, not a God of love : then, alas,

The pillared firmament is rottenness  
And earth's base built on stubble.

There is perhaps no result more unexpected from the study of the Christian doctrine of Atonement, but certainly none is better assured, than that Predestinationism—*God's unmotived or secret will, used as the master key*—always works for the disintegration both of theology and of faith. From Augustine downwards, if not even from St. Paul, belief in election was the vehicle of evangelical religion. Entire dependence on God in Christ was supposed to involve literally a potter Deity who deals with the sentient human clay just as He wills. This intended vehicle of evangelical piety proved again and again destructive of evangelicalism. We must break with the age-long error, not only in zeal for the rights of man, but also for the glory of God. It is time that Christian theology should cease to dabble in blasphemy. If one may judge from Denney's last legacy, the tyranny is practically overpast even in what has hitherto been a distinctively Calvinistic Church. Is it too much to hope that Presbyterian Churches will put themselves right with the Christian and also the non-Christian world by practising a little more frankness ?

II. A second conspicuous novelty is the tremendous assertion that Christ upon the cross suffered the very pains of

hell. This is not indeed exclusively Protestant teaching. To say nothing of the extravagances of modern Roman Catholic preaching, Mr. Mozley quotes from a sixteenth century Spanish cardinal what is hardly to be distinguished from this evil piece of audacity. Denney, who refers us to "a list of passages" in Köstlin's *Life*, reminds us that Luther began the tradition within Protestantism. On this point, so far as my information goes, Zwingli and Melancthon are silent. The cautious Calvin, however, is found supporting the opinion, which he offers as the interpretation of the phrase in the creed "He descended into hell." That is a piece of rather violent exegesis. Calvin does not suffer undeservedly if Bellarmine the Roman Catholic and John Gerhard the Lutheran impute to him the belief that, between Christ's death and His resurrection, He "went to hell" <sup>1</sup> in the modern sense of the word, i.e. inhabited the place of punishment. The same John Gerhard and his fellow-Lutheran Quenstedt repeat the doctrine that Christ suffered the pains of hell.<sup>2</sup> Among Calvinists, the English Puritan Owen is notable as laying down the same thesis; Denney reasonably remarks upon the extraordinary logical coldness with which he handles it.

And yet, if we are to believe that Christ was literally a substitute bearing the punishment which we had incurred, what less can we affirm? *Quasi*-punishment may be anything or nothing; the real punishment of real moral guilt is *hell*—whatever hell may prove to be for those who

<sup>1</sup> Comp. Mozley. This appears to have been the theology of Sir Lewis Morris. In some verses describing a mother who became a street-walker to earn bread for her children, Morris breaks out

Motherly love sunk to this! Ah! well  
Teach they how He passed into hell.

"They" who "teach" that are no Christians of any recognized Church or creed.

<sup>2</sup> I have conjectured that Ps. cxvi. 3 must have been distorted in this sense: *Albrecht Ritschl and his School*, p. 88, note.



make the awful experience.<sup>1</sup> There is no evading this conclusion. Christ did not die for those who had incurred little guilt and small liability to punishment. He died for the worst. He died for all. If punishment was transferred, the worst punishment of all must have been laid on Him—hell, in all or more than all of its intensity, if not in its alleged endless duration. This is indeed a *reductio ad blasphemiam*. To state such a thesis is to refute it. But, if we seriously mean that Christ as a substitute endured the punishment which His brethren had incurred, had they not incurred this?

III. There are not a few who will dismiss this whole doctrine because they have ceased to believe in retributive punishment anywhere, under any conditions. The present writer desires once again to dissociate himself from that way of escape. He would once again quote the immortal, the boundlessly significant confession, "We indeed suffer justly, for we receive the due reward of our deeds." To be unable to join in that confession, when one's sin has found one out, is a measureless spiritual loss. To influence others against "accepting the punishment of their iniquity" is to vex God's good Spirit. Not punishment as such, but transferred punishment, is morally anomalous and incredible. Hence we must break with the penal doctrine of Atonement. At that one decisive point it goes bankrupt. We believe that it is worthy of God to punish. Rather would it be unworthy of Him to exhibit indifference towards sin. But, according to the plain verdict of the undrugged

<sup>1</sup> Corporal punishment in hell will rarely be affirmed to-day, though I believe I have heard a distinguished Scottish theological Professor name it from the pulpit as "part" of the ultimate doom.

Those who make little of the possibilities of physical pain can have had little experience of it. But those who make little of mental pain—ah! what do they know of "the power which an infinite Being has over us, to make us miserable"?

conscience, transferred punishment *is unjust*. And, if a scheme of doctrine breaks down at a single point which is vital to it, how great and how significant is that collapse !

There is a further reason which seems to make this single difficulty fatal to the entire theory. Protestantism, we believe, is in search of a scheme of thought which shall exhibit the Atonement of Jesus Christ as morally necessary. Christian thought and life are to be rescued from those forces of arbitrariness and contingency which had nearly destroyed the faith. Apparently, the penal theory takes strong ground in support of moral necessity. Sin must be punished, and therefore Christ our substitute must die. Granted the premises, considerable weight attaches to these thoughts. But what about the crucial affirmation itself ? Can penal substitution—granted it were possible—be termed morally necessary ? Do not contingency and arbitrariness show themselves at this point with fatal power ? This is the Achilles' heel of the doctrine. The evil thing may have been driven into one small corner ; but there it is ! And it is the very pivot on which the whole construction turns. The penal theory, sporadic in Catholicism, central in early Protestantism, has been associated over and over again with deep Christian piety. Symbolically, it must correspond to great truths. But it comes forward not as symbol but as fact, as gnosis, as “ philosophy of the plan of salvation.” And therefore, with all its good intentions and ambitious claims—therefore it fails.

IV. When established under early Protestantism, the penal doctrine as such was confessed to be inadequate. The completed scheme was not in every part penal ; but in a true sense every part was legal.<sup>1</sup> Two extensions were introduced. They made the doctrine perhaps less

<sup>1</sup> Even “ merit ” of which Protestantism speaks has its significance in contrast with bare legality.

inadequate, but certainly more clumsy and artificial.

(a) It was taught with quite new definiteness that the law of God was "satisfied" not merely by the transferred punishment of the cross, passively endured, but also by the transferred "active" obedience of the life of the Saviour. So unwarrantable is it to say, with Foley, that Protestantism took a purely passive view of Christ's work. Possibly there may be ground for the assertion sometimes made, that the *death* of Christ is with Roman Catholic theology more of the active presentation of a sacrifice—with classical Protestantism, rather the passive endurance of punishment. But, in the view taken of the whole earthly *life* of Christ, it is Protestantism which emphasises the redemptive value of Christ's active righteousness. And we cannot but recognise in this a beginning of insight into the moral meaning of the greatest thing in history, the "fact of Christ." Only, unhappily, the classical Protestant theology takes the life of obedience as well as the death of suffering as a debt due to law.

It is not our meaning that the life and the death are sharply contrasted by the Protestant divines. They are fully aware that activity and passivity are aspects of one grand achievement on behalf of God and righteousness—not things separate in time, or different kinds of experience in the history of the Christ. But law is dominant. Wherever there is suffering in Christ, we are to count it legal penalty. And wherever there is an obedient will, we are to regard it as satisfaction to the commands which law addresses to those whom Christ saves. His righteousness is a legal achievement, "imputed" to us. Now Law—if we will accept the guidance of St. Paul—is not an adequate measure of the relations between God and men. And, if it were, one cannot shake off the impression that there would be something pettifogging in the justice of heaven

if it required both the substitutionary punishment of the fault committed and the substitutionary performance of the duty that had remained unperformed. God is likened in such theology to an unscrupulous attorney, who puts down every possible claim, even if claims overlap, in the hope that something may be gained for a client's profit if not for his honour. Correspondingly, the "imputation of the active obedience" was one of the first parts of the complex Protestant structure to give way, notably—though not first of all—in Arminianism, evangelical as well as rationalistic.

Scripture tells us that Christ died for our sins. That affirmation is the heart of the matter. That He also obeyed in our room and stead is at best a theological refinement. No doubt it is true that God—even, if one like to put it so, that the justice of God—cannot be satisfied with the most tremendous of penalties, even with a penalty endured by the righteous and holy One. But this truth summons us to break entirely with legalism. It does not authorise us to patch or eke out the theology of substitutionary penalty with a still more anomalous doctrine of substitutionary obedience.

(b) The second supplement is the doctrine of Christ's merit. In this, obviously, another Catholic and mediæval category is taken over by the new firm of Protestant divinity, side by side with the equally Catholic doctrine of satisfaction which for Protestantism has become twofold. There is new wine, but the wine is again to be poured into old bottles. Merit is a radically Catholic idea—Catholic in a sense which makes it radically un-Protestant and in the last resort un-Christian. It stands for something beyond the performance of strict duty. Of course Catholic theology exhibits its usual laxity when it speaks of merit. Continually we find it dealing in paper money—in *quasi-*



merit. Sinners may attain to merit *de congruo*; saints may have their dutiful no less than their supererogatory actions accepted, as if all were positively meritorious.<sup>1</sup> Protestantism would rather teach that the flawless fidelity of the God-man, in act and in suffering, is a thing of such beauty and purity as not merely to meet every requirement of righteousness but to run out beyond law, promising infinite blessedness to the humblest, weakest, and (in the past) guiltiest of Christ's clients. That thought is true indeed, commending itself to every Christian conscience; but it must find a happier expression.

The maturer theology of the Protestant Church has no use either for the conception of a goodness which is more than good, or for an estimation put by God upon the achievement even of the Only-begotten which works with arbitrary standards. The thought of merit, even as confined to Christ, darkens and disturbs the moral intuitions of Christianity. We had thought that the love of God would find its way to us unerringly if the barrier created by sin were once removed. Now we are told a different tale. The barrier is gone; satisfaction for sin is presented and is accepted; yet the love of God flows forth only in recognition of merit in Christ—of a claim on the part of the Saviour—of a claim that is *quasi*-legal, or more-than-legal, and yet is of the same general type with legal things. Such a conception as that is unworthy to be brought into contact with Christ.

It may be said in praise of historic Protestantism that it furnishes a completer and closer-knit doctrine of Atonement than Catholicism ever achieved. "Satisfaction" and "merit" are no longer hesitatingly identified or imperfectly discriminated. Each has its own meaning. Satisfaction is negative, or—in M'Leod Campbell's terminology—"retrospective." It deals directly with law—

<sup>1</sup> One conjectures this to be the Catholic train of thought.

sometimes with the law that commands, sometimes with the law that punishes. "Merit" is positive or "prospective." Denney thinks it probable that American Protestant theology went farthest in the elaboration of the doctrine. It may have gone far; but there seems no reason for dethroning the Lutheran Formula of Concord from its supreme place as a great official embodiment of this most scholastic doctrine of Protestantism. In any case, Protestant scholasticism may claim to have beaten mediæval scholasticism at its own game. In Ritschl's formulation, when "co-ordinated" active and passive obedience mean satisfaction; but, when passive is "subordinated" to active obedience, they mean Merit—positive moral claim and promise before God. Praise then is due to the Protestant schoolmen, but we must not carry our praise too far. A better expression than either satisfaction or merit is found in the assertion of Christ's faithfulness in His vocation, as put forward by Schleiermacher, Ritschl, Hofmann and others. Such language is worthier of Protestantism and worthier of Christianity.

For our purpose, the chief lesson from these refinements of formulated post-Reformation orthodoxy may be very briefly stated. On the admission of its own champions, the penal doctrine of Atonement in itself is incomplete. And the refinements needed to round it off were so artificial that they began to fall to pieces when the structure was hardly so much as finished. This is not our only reason for rejecting the traditional Protestant theology of Atonement; but one may boldly claim that it is a good reason and a sound. And it confirms the teaching of those more fundamental criticisms already indicated.

R. MACKINTOSH,

*THE ARAMAIC SOURCE OF ACTS I.-XV. AND  
PAUL'S CONVERSION.*

IN a short but scholarly work entitled *The Composition and Date of Acts*, Professor Torrey, of Yale, revives in part an old theory that the first half of Acts is dependent on an Aramaic source. Nearly seventy years ago Samuel Davidson wrote: "That the book of Acts was translated from the Aramæan is utterly inconceivable." In this case a further stage is reached in that the author makes the bold attempt to restore the original and to illustrate the mistranslations into which Luke fell.

Dr. Torrey concludes that there is a definite cleavage in Acts. The earlier section, except the first eight words which are loosely attached to the original document, is a literal, one might almost say a slavish, translation from the original Aramaic. This section, consisting of fifteen chapters, he calls I. Acts. Throughout the entire part there runs a decidedly Semitic colour: "It is not enough to speak of frequent Semitisms: the truth is that the language of all the fifteen chapters is translation-Greek through and through, generally preserving even the order of words" (p. 7). In the remainder of the book, called II. Acts, we have entirely new phenomena. The Aramaic background vanishes, the Semitic features disappear except in so far as they are part of a common dialect, the Koiné, or the unconscious effect of Luke's wide reading in translation-Greek. Instead of this we have an easier and purer Greek, from which alone, along with the short introduction in the Gospel, we can form some judgment on Luke's peculiar style. "When Luke writes his own language the resulting Greek represents a Syrian type of the Koiné which reads smoothly and is sufficiently idiomatic. In

short, the Greek of the first half of Acts differs widely and constantly from that of the second half, both in the idiom which it uses and in its literary structure. There is one obvious and satisfactory way of accounting for this fact, namely, the hypothesis of translation in the first half" (p. 9). "Acts was merely the translation of a single document—a lucky find—supplemented by a very brief outline of Paul's missionary labours enlivened by miscellaneous personal reminiscences" (p. 68).

Perhaps the most valuable part of the work is the number of examples which Dr. Torrey furnishes of mistranslation in Acts i.-xv., by which he suggests new interpretations of acknowledged difficulties. Acts ii. 47 may be taken as an example. In Moffatt's version of the New Testament it reads, "Meantime the Lord added the saved daily to their number," but with a footnote that it is "difficult to get the above sense, or indeed any, out of the Greek." Dr. Torrey retranslates this into the original Aramaic and discovers that the word which in northern Syria meant "together" was in Judean dialect used to mean "greatly," hence the translation "The Lord added greatly day by day to the saved." The same method is applied to iii. 16, iv. 24, viii. 10, xi. 27-30, xv. 7 with instructive results. His conclusion as to date is that II. Acts was written by Luke about A.D. 64 as a continuation of I. Acts, which was written about 50, and translated by Luke from the Aramaic.

In all this the author is following up the contribution which he made to a volume of essays entitled *Studies in the History of Religion*, in which he discussed the translations made from the original Aramaic gospel. Here he joined issue with Dr. Moulton on the Semitisms of the New Testament. He opposed the tendency of Dr. Moulton and Dr. Deissmann to dissolve all such Semitisms into the current colloquial Greek or Koiné, and threw his authority



on the side of Dalman, who accentuates the Semitic features of the New Testament language. On p. 274 of this earlier work Dr. Torrey wrote: "No evidence which has thus far come to light tends to show that such Greek as that of the Gospels was spoken in any part of the world. The idiom of the Synoptic Gospels, like that of the Apocalypse, is half Semitic throughout." He claims that the original language of the Gospels was Aramaic and that the translators followed the text very closely. "They wished to render words rather than ideas." The mistranslations which Dr. Torrey found in the Gospel have led him to apply the same method to the Acts, with the results already described.

The presentation of so defined a position at once awakens the spirit of inquiry and forces many questions to the front. One is at first a little agitated over the reputation of Luke, who has already endured so many things because of his style. If his Gospel is largely and I. Acts entirely a translation, this leaves a very meagre residue to the credit of "our beloved physician." He too has suffered many things at the hands of the doctors. One is tempted to ask whether sufficient evidence is given in these few instances of supposed mistranslation to carry conviction. Are they enough to balance the presumption that so skilful a historian would shrink from so mechanical a method of composition? The use of various sources, the deliberate weighing of their respective merits, the measuring of proportions, the imparting of a spirit that may give unity to a book and command the admiration of posterity—these are features that go to the making of an historian, and one would naturally associate these qualifications with Luke, who seems to have a sensitive consciousness of historic responsibility (Luke i. 1-4), and whose Gospel was said to be the "most beautiful book that has ever been written," and that by Renan, whom

some French savants still regard as their most distinguished critic of style.

We should attempt some less drastic theory before resorting to this extremity. Might it not suffice to suppose that Luke made use of different sources, incorporating what he deemed best, retaining their Semitic elements but ordering all in accordance with his own individual ideal of authorship, playing the high rôle of a painstaking historian? With regard to the question whether Luke was acquainted with Aramaic, Jülicher is inclined to answer in the negative and even Dalman is not very sure. It is quite within the range of possibility that the irregularities in Acts already existed in the Greek translations which Luke used.

The object of this article is to test this theory by examining those sections in Acts where the same incident is described at first in I. Acts and then in II. Acts. There are three accounts of Paul's conversion, in chapters ix, xxii. and xxvi., which we shall refer to as A, B and C respectively. If Dr. Torrey's hypothesis is correct, A which is in I. Acts ought to illustrate the features of the Aramaic source, while B and C should reflect the Lukan peculiarities of smooth and non-Semitic Greek as found in II. Acts. The result to which we shall be driven is that there is no convincing evidence of a radical difference in tone or manner, but that the author of B and C was also the author of A. It will only confirm in a small degree the wider generalisation at which so many have arrived, and which Dalman expresses when he says that "the Acts of the Apostles agrees in linguistic peculiarities with the Gospel of Luke."

## I.

*The Relation of A to II. Acts :* (a) As regards *style*. Dr. Torrey mentions only one case of Aramaic influence in A, where the Christian religion is spoken of as "That way"

(ix. 2). This, however, reappears in B (xxii. 4). He also hints that the use in ix. 3 of ἐν τῷ with infinitive may be taken into account. But Dalman does not regard this as an Aramaism but a pure Hebraism, while Moulton affirms that it is equally good Greek, appearing frequently in the classical authors from Plato onward. In addition to these furnished by Dr. Torrey mention might be made of the Hebrew form of Saul, which is also given in all the narratives and is probably reminiscent of the first words spoken to Paul by Jesus. In passing it may be said that in a purely Aramaic source, such as Dr. Torrey regards I. Acts to be, the name would be always in the same Hebrew form and the differences of translation as in A (vers. 4, 8) could scarcely be expected.

The following instances are given to show the unity of style between A and II. Acts. In verse 3 we have the word ἐγένετο with accusative and infinitive, which is regarded as a pure Hebraism but is scattered throughout both parts of Acts. In verse 15 comes the Lukan usage of ἐνώπιον which is also found in II. Acts. The construction ἀλλά with imperative verse 6 is classical, as is the genitive absolute of verse 8, while the language in the section ix. 1-9 is very close to that in chapter xxii. 4-11 as we shall see later. In verse 5 "he said" is not expressed, as also in xix. 2, xxv. 22. Also the medical touches in verse 18 are quite in keeping with the usually recognised preference of the author for such phraseology. These may not seem to be very decisive, but they certainly lend no support to the theory that there are two different atmospheres, one Semitic the other Hellenistic. Whatever conclusion they suggest will be in favour of harmony between A and II. Acts.

(b) As regards *Aim*. There is a threefold purpose running through the whole of the Acts which gives unity to the book and reflects the historic insight of the author. His

purpose is (1) to describe the expansion of the Gospel as a universal religion, (2) to exhibit the favourable attitude of the Imperial authorities, (3) to set forth the powerful working of the Spirit of God. These are very manifest in the story of Paul's Conversion and Commission in A. (1) The Conversion of Saul is represented as following upon the death of Stephen and the persecution of the Christians, and shows how these events were definite steps in the growth of the Church. The mission to the Gentiles throws open the door of the Gospel to the entire world. (2) The Commission (ix. 15) is distinctly said to include within its range "the Kings." The word βασιλεύς is stated by Moulton and Milligan in their *Vocabulary* to have been a familiar term "instinct with present meaning and full of absorbing associations." It is significant that in C we have the title βασιλεῦ twice repeated, a fulfilment of the prediction in A, and a subtle evidence of the harmony between the stories. (3) The importance of the Spirit is emphasised in ix. 17 where Ananias comes and places his hand upon Paul saying, "The Lord sent me that you might be filled with the Holy Spirit." The form πνεῦμα ἅγιον is found sixteen times scattered through all parts of Acts. There is no evidence of a development in the doctrine of the Spirit in I. and II. Acts. The conception of the charismatic ministry is identical in both sections.

Here again the unity of aim in A and II. Acts supports the evidence already furnished by the style that there is a real harmony between these parts of Luke's writings.

## II.

*The Relation of B and C to I. Acts.* The following evidence is brought forward with a view of showing that these narratives in II. Acts do not differ materially in style from I. Acts. We find the same mingling of Semitic with Hellenistic



elements, the reappearance of similar locutions. The address in chapter xxii. opens with the Hebraism ἄνδρες ἀδελφοί, as in vii. 2, xiii. 26. In verse 6 ἐγένετο δὲ is used with the same construction as we have noticed in ix. 3. In verses 10 and 16 ἀναστάς is one of the acknowledged Aramaisms and is scattered throughout the entire book, appearing in all nineteen times. A similar use of redundant forms is to be noted in ἐλθών and ἐπιστάς in verse 12. In verse 14 "God of our Fathers" is found, as also in vii. 32. τὸν δίκαιον, a messianic title which appears in vii. 52, is included by Dr. Torrey in his list of evidences of translation in I. Acts, p. 33. It is rather significant that it should be found in B and not in A. Verse 14 ἐκ τοῦ στόματος is Hebraic.

καὶ νῦν (verse 16) is used Hebraistically in the New Testament according to Abbott (*Johannine Grammar*), and is found in both parts of Acts, iii. 17, x. 5, xiii. 11, xvi. 37, xx. 22, xxvi. 6. ἐπικαλεσάμενος τὸ ὄνομα αὐτοῦ (verse 16) is due to the LXX translation and is found in ii. 21, and also in ix. 14. It almost seems as if ix. 14 was a later usage than xxii. 16, as it is becoming a technical term for believers. The description of Ananias in xxii. 12 is conceived in a Semitic spirit, and is strongly reminiscent of Acts x., where the pious character and Jewish reputation of Cornelius are referred to in a similar manner (x. 1-22).

The following characteristic words are found in B and C and I. Acts : αἵρεσις διάλεκτος ἐξαιρούμενος εὐλαβής ἱκανός κατοικέω λαός περιαστράπτω προχειρίζω χειραγωγέω. Notice also the use of the future participle, rare in New Testament writers but found in xxii. 5 and viii. 27.

These are similarities which cannot be quite overlooked and point to a unity in authorship ; and with such examples of Semitic influence taken from a small section of II. Acts it is scarcely correct for Dr. Torrey to remark that "II. Acts

is almost entirely free from Semitisms." We rather incline to the opinion that the Hebraistic factor is an element in Luke's style, that, as Dalman says, "Luke shows himself partial to Hebraising formulae."

Dr. Torrey would doubtless discount the value of this kind of appeal since he is ready to acknowledge that there is a unity of purpose and of style in all parts of the Acts. He speaks of the "unmistakable uniformity of vocabulary and phraseology" and rests his case upon the "Aramaic idiom," which is omnipresent in I. Acts, and from which II. Acts is almost entirely free (p. 55). In the face of this it is almost futile for us to refer to the relation of A to II. Acts, or of B and C to I. Acts, since this will be explained away on the ground that the translator of I. Acts and the composer of II. Acts were the same.

It must, however, be quite evident that this bears equally upon Dr. Torrey; and this contention of his renders it difficult for him to use the phrases and terms of I. Acts for the support of his special theory—and yet this is in part the method he adopts. Whether there are subtle evidences of an Aramaic idiom and ordering of words traceable by the specialist in that language in I. Acts and not in II. Acts is a matter on which I cannot express an opinion. However it may be observed that Dr. Torrey regards the translation as a very literal one, and in this case one would expect a much greater variation in the Greek of the two parts.

In fact it is difficult to escape the impression that Dr. Torrey is a little inconsistent when he emphasises at one time the differences and at another time the similarities of I. and II. Acts. Is it possible to reconcile the statement on p. 9, "The Greek of the first half of Acts differs widely and constantly from that of the second half in the idiom which it uses and in its literary construction," with the statement

that the entire work has an "unmistakable uniformity of vocabulary and phraseology"? Such a finding almost excludes any attempt at reply. It is as it were the removal of the one instrument by which the critical study can be carried on.

It would be a decided literary feat for Luke to throw himself into the language, spirit and aim of a document and to carry these forward into his own original contribution, without revealing any break in style or purpose, being at the same time faithful to the idiom and order of words in his source. For such a striking accomplishment more evidence should be given than a few dozen mistranslations from a problematic source in an obscure language. Also, if the original writer of I. Acts wished, as Dr. Torrey supposes, "to set forth the main facts touching the growth of the Christian Church from the little band of Jews left behind by Jesus to the large and rapidly growing body, chiefly Gentiles, whose branches were in all parts of the world," if his chief interest was the universal mission of Christianity (pp. 64-5), would not Aramaic seem a rather restricted medium for his purpose? Should we not expect Greek?

### III.

*The Relation of A to B and C.* This is in some ways the most important aspect of the subject since it opens up the question of a possible single source for all these narratives. In proceeding to make the comparison we shall divide the narrative into three parts. (1) The circumstances preparatory to the conversion. (2) The incident of conversion. (3) The commission.

(1) The circumstances are described in ix. 1-3a, xxii. 1-6, xxvi. 9-12 and in much the same manner. Saul had undertaken an active persecution of the followers of Jesus, his hatred had showed itself in the arrest at Jerusalem, and

now he has obtained authority from the high priests to continue his course at Damascus, to seize and bring down to Jerusalem all who are of that way. The general situation is identical in each of these sections; and there are fine points of agreement, such as "breathing out murder," in A which corresponds with B, "I persecuted unto the death," and with C, "When they were put to death I voted against them." "Men and women" explicitly occurs in each case. There are some new features in each passage, but these do not contradict but rather supplement one another. Indeed the fact of dependence is amply clear.

(2) The Conversion (ix. 3 f.-9, xxii. 7-11, xxvi. 13-16a). Here we are met at once with the so-called contradictions. These gather around the companions of Saul and concern what they saw, what they heard and what they did. There is no difficulty in the first of these, as one account says they saw the light while the other says they saw no one. Neither is there any serious obstacle in regard to what they did. In A it is said "they stood speechless," while in C "they fell to the ground." The verb "to stand" often carries no force and is used by Luke in a superfluous way (Luke xviii. 10). The meaning is "they were speechless." The only serious contradiction is associated with the hearing of a voice. In A they "hear the voice," while in B they "did not hear the voice." It is possible that the change from the accusative to the genitive may be intentional. Moulton writes: "The fact that the maintenance of an old and well known distinction between the accusative and genitive with ἀκούω saves the author of Acts ix. 7 and xxii. 9 from a patent self-contradiction, should by itself be enough to make us recognise it for Luke and for other writers until it is proved wrong" (*Prolegomena*, p. 66). Even though this distinction in regard to the usage of cases be not clear



(and it is not easy to reconcile ix. 3 and xxii. 7 with it), yet this is only a trifling matter, especially when we note that A emphasises the sound, and fails to accentuate the brightness of the light as in B and C. It is quite in keeping with A that the *hearers* should remain "speechless" (ix. 7).

Leaving these surface variations we notice the very large common factor. They all agree in the general presentation. The light shines, a voice is heard, Saul and his companions are overawed, the address is the same, as is also the reply. The similarities in language are too striking to be explained on any other hypothesis than that of a common source. In these short sections thirty-three words, many of them of unusual nature, are common, and such changes as there are in their use are to be explained by the fact that what is given in A as indirect narrative becomes direct narrative in B. The order is slightly changed. The words of Jesus which in ix. 5-6 are united are broken in xxii. 8-10. There are new elements in each of these passages, where sometimes C unites with A, sometimes with B. There is the striking addition in C, "It is hard to kick against the goads." But all of these are supplementary and do not affect the manifest fact of close dependence.

(3) It is in studying the Commission (ix. 10-19, xxii. 12-16, xxvi. 16-18) that we come upon the greatest measure of divergence. In A there is a long section of eighteen lines, the interview between Jesus and Ananias, which is without a parallel in B; while C makes no mention of Ananias at all, and ascribes to Jesus directly the instructions which elsewhere come through Ananias. Whether it is sufficient to say that Paul condensed with conscious purpose on the assumption that what was said through a servant was really said by the Lord, need not concern us now. In general A treats the Commission historically, B treats it as autobiography. The character of Ananias as

given in B is rendered needful by the fact that he has not previously been mentioned as he was in A. In A the name and message of Jesus are given, while in B Ananias simply says, "Brother Saul, receive your sight." The effect of this is differently expressed in ix. 18 and xxii. 13.

But it is in the manner in which they present the divine call that the difference is most manifest. In B there is a much fuller narrative of the purpose of the divine call, which includes three elements, (1) to know God's will, (2) to see and hear the Messiah, (3) to be a witness to all men of what he had seen and heard. In A the purpose of the call is twofold and is contained in the earlier interview (ix. 15). He is (1) to be a vessel of election to carry the name of the Lord before the Gentiles and Kings and Sons of Israel, (2) to suffer many things on account of the name of Jesus. In C the Commission is differently approached, and, as Preuschen says, re-echoes the Old Testament language. (1) Paul is to be a servant and witness of what he has seen and will see; (2) he is to be delivered from the Jews and Gentiles to whom he is sent (*ἀποστέλλω* suggesting the Apostolic office), (3) this new office includes the task of opening their eyes, turning them from darkness to light, from the power of Satan to God; (4) that they may receive forgiveness of sins and inheritance among those who are sanctified by faith in Jesus.

While there is thus a large measure of divergence in the details of the Commission, yet all of these agree on the emphasis placed upon the universal mission of Paul, including Jews and Gentiles. Indeed the prominence of the whole section is due to the transforming effect wrought by the call of this enemy of the Faith. The space devoted to the Conversion is Luke's estimate of the importance of the event. He must have regarded this as a turning-point in the history of the Church. The *universal* element in the

call being made clear, he felt free to introduce the largest possible amount of variation in the particulars of the call.

#### IV.

It now remains to ask whether we can determine which of the narratives is the earliest and whether anything definite may be said about their origin. Dr. Percy Gardner holds that there is a probability that chapter xxii. depends on chapter x., and that B and C are expansions due to the skill of Luke (*Cambridge Biblical Essays*, p. 41). Others treat A as devoid of all historical value and select B and C as the reliable sections. (See Moffatt's *Introduction to the Literature of the New Testament*, 287.)

We have already seen that so far as the common parts are concerned the question of priority is hard to decide, and a much more valuable line of inquiry is opened when we ask if there is any affiliation with some other New Testament source. This leads to the consideration of the Pauline features in these narratives. Most of the variations in the section on the Commission are in entire harmony with the Epistles of St. Paul. In A we note the following points of contact. (ix. 15) *σκεῦος ἐκλογῆς*; five out of seven appearances of the word *ἐκλογή* in the New Testament belong to Paul; "Gentiles and sons of Israel" (cf. Romans i. 5): "Suffer for my name" (verse 16) recalls the appeal Paul makes to the apostolic travail (2 Cor. xi. 23-28, Gal. vi. 17). Note the prominence of the word "name" (Phil. ii. 9, Col. iii. 17, etc.).

The threefold purpose of the call as given in B is quite in line with the manner in which Paul regarded his apostolic office. (1) "To know His will" (Rom. ii. 18, xii. 2, xv. 32; Gal. i. 4; Eph. v. 17, vi. 6); (2) "to see and hear the Messiah" (cf. 1 Cor. ix. 1; Gal. i. 16); (3) "to be a witness to all men." This consciousness of his wide mission runs through the Epistles (Rom. i. 14-16, etc.).

In C we observe the same function of witness-bearing. Deliverance from the people and from the Gentiles suggests the apostolic travail. The collocation of *λαός* and *ἔθνος* is quite Pauline (Rom. xv. 10). The verb *ἐξαιρούμενος* has been called a Lukan-Pauline word; *ἀποστέλλω* (cf. Gal. i. 1, 16, 17), "to open their eyes" (2 Cor. iv. 6; Eph. i. 18, iv. 18), "to turn them from darkness to light" (Rom. ii. 19; Eph. v. 8), "from the power of Satan to God" (1 Cor. v. 5; 2 Cor. iv. 4; Eph. ii. 2), "forgiveness of sins" (Col. i. 12-14), "inheritance" (Col. i. 12), "By faith" (Eph. i. 11-14).

In fact in reading these passages in Acts we feel that we are moving in a region of language and thought quite familiar in the Pauline epistles. Dr. Gardner also points out the conformity of method between Paul's speech at Jerusalem and his epistles. "In his dwelling on early orthodoxy and zeal for the law we have a fresh example of Paul's method of in the first place conciliating his audience by mentioning the matters which will arouse their sympathy. From the epistles we know that this was in fact the way of the Apostle."

The conclusion of our study is that if we place the unity of the narratives beside their agreement with Paul's epistles we are led to accept Paul as the authority for these parts of Acts. We know that Luke was present with Paul during the arrest at Jerusalem and the imprisonment at Cæsarea (cf. Torrey, p. 44). He would therefore naturally be well informed as to Paul's defence on these two occasions (B and C). Most of A can be explained by the putting into indirect form of what Luke had heard directly from Paul in the defence. We should expect to find the slightest amount of variation in the narrative of the external event. This is what is actually the case in sections 1 and 2. But the interview with Ananias was no doubt a long one in which



many themes were discussed and much material reviewed. That day when Paul first spoke as a friend with a follower of Jesus would be very rich in deep emotion and experience, and it was inevitable that in speaking of it Paul should now emphasise one side and now another. The divine purpose of his conversion was ever a marvel to Paul and the range of the three narratives in this aspect of it is not at all surprising. He might speak of his commission under many aspects and yet not exhaust its content. Therefore, as is natural, differences of detail are combined with the primary fact of his universal apostolic mission, which is mentioned in all of the narratives.

If this explanation be correct, we require no additional Aramaic source for the narrative of the conversion in Acts. Dr. Lake, in his article on Acts in the *Dictionary of the Apostolic Church*, finds nothing in chapter ix. 1-30 which cannot have come from St. Paul or his entourage. The friendship between Paul and Luke is sufficient. This intimacy is most significant. That two such great masters of New Testament literature should have been thus thrown together, so that Luke was, as Irenæus puts it, "inseparable from Paul," is one of the most important facts of the apostolic age. The affiliation between Paul and Luke is almost an axiom of New Testament interpretation.

J. W. FALCONER.

### JESUS' WORDS REGARDING CARE.

It is generally accepted now that the group of Sayings known as the Sermon on the Mount is a composite document, arranged, no doubt, partly according to subject, but probably also in rough chronological order as they were arranged in the original collection known as the *Logia*. The evangelist Luke recognises this, and, while he is de-

pendent for these Sayings mainly on the same collection as Matthew, he endeavours to distribute them throughout the course of the narrative, thus making an effort to place them in their true setting. He has, for example, set Jesus' discourse on Care in connexion with a definite incident, namely, after the telling of the parable of the Rich Fool, which was occasioned by an interrupter who requested Him to become an arbitrator in a property dispute. It is safe to assume that it was a separate discourse (or separate fragments of discourses), and not part of the Sermon on the Mount delivered at the ordination of the disciples. But has Luke given it the right place? Is he relying for his setting of it on the word of an eye-witness? Professor Moffatt regards Luke's setting as a superior context, and the occasion a likely occasion. Certain surface considerations go to support this. For one thing, its affinity with the parable of the Rich Fool is obvious. And the appearance of the man worried about worldly affairs seems an appropriate occasion for such an address. Further, the idea of seeking first the kingdom, and being more concerned about treasure in heaven—an idea which was more than once in Jesus' thoughts during the Passion journey as Luke records it (compare xiv. 14 and xvi. 9)—may be thought to verge towards the more apocalyptic note of the later days of the Ministry. It might further be pointed out that the Discourse as Luke gives it reveals a running parallelism of comment with the course of the parable:

xii. 17, "He *thought* within himself." (διελογίζετο)

xii. 18, "I will pull down my *barns* and build."

xii. 19, "Eat, drink, and be merry."

xii. 21, "He that *layeth up treasure* for himself, and is not rich toward God."

xii. 22, "Take no *thought*." (μὴ μεριμνᾶτε)

xii. 24, "The ravens neither have storehouse nor *barn*."

xii. 29, "Seek not what ye shall eat, or what ye shall *drink*."

xii. 33, "Give alms, provide . . . a *treasure in the heavens*. . . Where your treasure is, there will *your heart* be also."

From this it would appear as if the words of the Discourse had arisen naturally out of the parable. Thus Luke's placing of the parable seems by no means an unhappy or impossible one.

But a closer scrutiny yields certain weighty objections to accepting this as the true chronological context. (1) To begin with, the Discourse is obviously fitted into this place. A certain roughness is clearly observable in the joinings. (a) The venue of talk is awkwardly changed at the beginning of the Discourse by the "*Logia*" formula: "And He said to His disciples" (xii. 22). The crowd (xii. 1, and xii. 13) suddenly disappears. (b) Again at the close of the Discourse there is no attempt made to build a bridge between xii. 34 and xii. 35. The impression is created at this point indeed that something has been removed before xii. 35, as if to make room for the Discourse on Care. For we are plunged into the heart of a new theme—concerning the Son of Man's Return—abruptly and without warning. (c) Further, before long (xii. 41) it becomes apparent that Jesus is addressing the crowd again. But there is nothing at xii. 35 to indicate that He has once more turned from His disciples to the people.

(2) It has further to be noted that Luke does not follow Matthew's order in his record of the Discourse on Care, though linguistic examination shows that he is following a version of the *Logia* the same or closely similar to Matthew's; and the probabilities are that Matthew has followed the order in that document. Indeed it is significant that Luke begins after the important verse about "God and Mammon" (Matt. vi. 24)—a verse which Luke omits from this place altogether. Luke's version then runs on until near the end of this Discourse as it is given in Matthew (Matt. vi. 33=Luke xii. 31); but he very significantly substitutes a different verse ("Fear not, little flock," etc.) for

Matthew vi. 34 ("Take no thought for the morrow"). And then Luke's version goes back to that portion of the Discourse in Matthew which precedes the "God and Mammon" verse. It seems clear, in short, that Luke's version has been editorially arranged, possibly with the intention of bringing out precisely the above-noted parallelism between the parable and the Discourse which follows it.

(3) The omission of the "God and Mammon" verse from Luke's version goes far to strengthen the argument that the insertion of the address at this point in Luke's Gospel was an afterthought on the part of the evangelist. (a) He knew that he had the verse elsewhere in his Gospel, and indeed at a considerably later point (xvi. 13), where it is almost certainly an editorial addition on Luke's part. (b) There can hardly be any doubt that the verse was in the Discourse on Care as it stood in the *Logia*, and that Matthew's inclusion of it there is correct. (c) This verse is really the verse most relevant to the parable of the Rich Fool, and would have been in a happier setting here than where it occurs later, if Luke had been free to use it. (d) Though the omission of the verse about "the light of the body" (Matt. vi. 22 f.) from the Discourse here in Luke is not so conclusive an argument as the omission of the "God and Mammon" verse, since the former is quoted by Luke before (xi. 34-36), not after, the Discourse, it nevertheless serves to corroborate our view. For it is editorially placed by Luke at xi. 34. Had he been going to give the Discourse on Care in the first draft of his Gospel, he would no doubt have reserved it until then. Even if the above arguments do not prove that the placing of this Discourse is not chronologically correct, they do prove that its placing is an editorial conjecture on Luke's part, of the nature of an afterthought, and not on the authority of his special witness for the context.



(4) The omission of Matthew vi. 34 ("Take no thought for the morrow") raises an entirely different line of argument. For it does not occur elsewhere in Luke. And the reason must be in the context. That reason would seem to be that it suits the point of the parable more awkwardly than the rest of the Discourse. At least the antithesis which we are about to discuss at length is more obvious here.

The omission which we have just noted leads us to examine and compare the Discourse and the parable more closely. And this comparison soon makes it apparent that it can hardly have been the same occasion that called them both forth. The parable, or story, was an illustration of the theme of covetousness—the construing of life in terms of possessions. The Discourse, on the other hand, is about anxiety, spoken to those who possessed little or nothing. The rich man's "taking thought" was how to make room for his abundance: the poor man's "taking thought" was anxiety about his want. The rich man had barns, and only needed to add to them for his riches: the poor folk had meagre storehouses and little or nothing in them—like the birds. The rich man did not need to consider what he would eat or drink. He could take his ease and be merry. The morrow held no terrors for him. The poor man, on the other hand, was always worrying about food and drink. The morrow was an ogre to him. God's connexion with the rich man is manifested in a sudden and abrupt interruption of his imagined "many years"—a swift summoning into eternity. It is this brevity and uncertainty of the end of life that colours and darkens Christ's thought in these days of the Passion Journey. But the whole ground for His exhortation in the Discourse concerning Care is the reliability and steadfastness of God where the welfare of the faithful poor in this life is concerned. Not the uncertainty of

to-morrow, but the certainty of to-morrow and its portion. The partial omission by Luke of the words about raiment (xii. 26, 29) is also significant : they do not suit the parable. The whole Discourse, in short, shows marks of belonging to the earlier sunnier days in Galilee.<sup>1</sup>

Psychologically considered, too, this Discourse on Care seems to demand a setting in the earlier days of the Ministry. It could not have been long before Jesus' hearers became strongly impressed by His vivid sense of the presence of God. And this Discourse seems to supply the answer to questions that must have arisen in their minds as to why that vision of God was so veiled from their eyes. If He is so near and so intimate as Jesus constantly asserted, why did they not realise His possession with all Jesus' thrilling certainty ? What was it in life that they must renounce or make sacrifice of in order to win this vision of God ?

Again, we know that it was very early in the Ministry that Jesus became painfully aware of the materialistic outlook of those who were attracted by His deeds and words. The excitement which followed His first appearance in the Capernaum synagogue—"the whole city gathered about the door" demanding healing for their sick—gave Him a sleepless night, and drove Him forth to the hills "a great while before dawn." We see here, in part at least, the excitement of the shy and shrinking Jesus, jealous of the heavenly treasure which had been committed to Him, lest it should be debased to false uses. This was not what He had been sent for—to have all His time monopolised by those who were concerned about the mere "ills that flesh is heir to."

The Discourse concerning Care seems most naturally to have been called forth in response to some such con-

<sup>1</sup> Luke xii. 33 is not found in Matthew's version of the Discourse on Care. While it is kin to the "treasure in heaven" verse which follows it in Luke, it may belong to the end of the parable of the Rich Fool. One can detect in it a certain advance on the supposed *Interimsethik* of that verse ; and that might bespeak for it this later position.

siderations as these. One of the main notes of it reflects strongly this concern of Jesus about the direction of men's desires. All the world seemed to be seeking for earthly treasure, and the treasure He would fain make them possessors of was a heavenly one. "Seek *first* the kingdom of heaven and its righteousness." Earthly welfare would follow as a matter of course.

But the central truth of the Discourse is that it was precisely this low-pitched human desire that was the cause of the absence of the heavenly vision in men. Material security—that was what men were out to win ; and they banked at Mammon's bank ; and where the treasure is, there the heart is also. Now it is the heart that determines vision. In the murky twilight of self-interest, haunted as it is by the ghosts of Fear and Care, men cannot see God. These are the great Despoilers of Vision. Evil heart makes evil eye. But when the eye is single—selfless—then all the world is radiant with the divine. Rain, sun, birds, lilies, grass—God is in and through them all.

J. A. ROBERTSON.

### *THE MORAL SCEPTICISM OF TO-DAY.*

IN his History of Civilization, Buckle devoted a provocative chapter to the thesis that the main factor in progress is intellectual rather than moral. He minimises the part played by moral motives, on the ground that the great truths of morality have been clearly discerned and have remained unchanged for long enough. "There is unquestionably nothing to be found in the world which has undergone so little change as those great dogmas of which moral systems are composed. To do good to others : to sacrifice for their benefit your own wishes : to love your neighbour as yourself : to forgive your enemies : to restrain your

passions : to honour your parents : to respect those who are set over you : these and a few others are the sole essentials of morals : but they have been known for thousands of years, and not one jot or tittle has been added to them by all the sermons, homilies and textbooks which moralists and theologians have been able to produce.”<sup>1</sup> The inadequacy of this observation for Buckle’s own purpose is obvious enough. He ignores the fact that sermons and homilies if they have not enlarged the moral code have often obscured it. The recognition accorded to the great principles of ethics has been far from constant. These moral truths may have been known for thousands of years, but have they always been practised with equal zeal? If the general principles have for centuries been accepted, has there been no growth of understanding as to particular applications? As an account of morals, this paragraph is singularly incomplete. But to-day it would be challenged, where Christians would most sympathise with it. Buckle assumed that there were ethical principles of absolute validity, and that among such principles, these commandments of love would stand unchallenged. In this, he was representative of his age. Among the Mid-Victorian critics of Christianity, the soundness of Christian ethics seemed as obvious as the unsoundness of Christian doctrine. The moral principles of Christianity were beyond dispute and indeed commonplace. But now we have changed all that. Now the Christian ethic is the subject of debate, and men call in question the very existence of a moral law. Are there any ethical principles of absolute validity? Are not all moral judgments matters of taste? Men do not merely doubt the reasonableness of Christian ethic. They despair of giving a reason for any ethical faith whatever.

It would be easy to multiply examples of this tendency.

<sup>1</sup> Buckle, *History of Civilisation*, vol. i., p. 137.



Two recent illustrations may suffice. The first is from a review in the *Saturday Westminster Gazette* for January 18 of this year. The book under review was Mr. James Beck's pamphlet, *The Reckoning*. Mr. Beck had apparently appealed to a moral law as binding on nations. The reviewer comments, "As to Mr. Beck's other point, it would of course be possible to argue at far greater length than his pamphlet, whether or not the principles of ethics are absolute. *The best modern opinion would probably maintain they are not.*" It would be interesting to know what the writer meant by the best modern opinion, but his judgment is significant. The other is a more extended passage from a review in the *Nation* in December last. "All opinions on ethical questions are inspired by emotion or passion, whatever camouflage of reason may be used to conceal their source. Reason alone cannot decide what is good or bad in any fundamental sense, though it can of course decide subsidiary questions when the main ends of life have been agreed upon. The passions that inspire Nietzsche's philosophy are different from those that inspire the Sermon on the Mount: those who share the one set of passions will agree with the one, while those who share the other will agree with the other. To state the issue in terms of objective morals is merely an attempt to give legislative authority to our own tastes. . . . It is perhaps better to be frank, to let one's desires appear and appeal for support to those who share them. The attempt to prove things not susceptible of proof can only lead to shoddy thought and the substitution of authority for the free play of reason and creative desire." Here then ethics become purely subjective, the reflex of emotion and desire.

The change in outlook is largely due to the doctrine of evolution. Darwinism has re-acted upon ethics mainly in two ways, and though the two tendencies of thought seem

inconsistent with one another, the same writer will often exhibit both and appeal to both to enforce a moral scepticism. The first is the familiar contrast between altruistic ethics, and the principles embodied in the struggle for existence. Nature according to Tennyson shrieks against the moral code which Buckle assumed to be not only stable but stationary. Huxley regarded our social ideals and organisation as a kind of defiance of cosmic process. Man pursues ethical aims which Nature does not endorse. It was a simple conclusion that our ideals are our own, that they lack all external support. The moral is the unnatural, a little human side-show in a universe that cares for none of these things. The second line of thought finds a place for altruistic morals within the cosmic struggle. Henry Drummond asserted the value of mother-love as a factor in the struggle for existence. Kropotkin emphasised the part played by the virtues of co-operation in the same conflict. So it appeared that evolution found a place for the other-regarding virtues. Many Christians thought the edge of the Darwinistic criticism of the Sermon on the Mount had been turned by these and similar concessions. But the recognition thus given to mother-love and neighbourliness is after all a Pyrrhic victory. For these are not absolute virtues. They are still subordinate to the instinct of self-preservation. They are good not in themselves, but just in so far as they help the individual or the community to survive. From this point of view, all moral laws and judgments become relative. To assert yourself or to deny yourself, both are right or wrong according to the particular requirements of the struggle for existence. We must return later to the question whether moral judgments can thus be traced to the necessities of evolution, but in the meantime let us note that evolution is held to prove first that our ethical judgments and ideals are unnatural and so merely subjective, merely our own, and

second that they are entirely natural, the outcome of the struggle for existence and so purely relative. In either case, we are landed in moral scepticism, and thinkers like Huxley travelled indifferently to this goal by either route.

Perhaps the most distinguished modern exponent of moral scepticism is the Hon. Bertrand Russell. He began apparently with a vivid apprehension of the indifference or antagonism of nature to our human ideas of good. He did not at once regard ethical notions as subjective, but in the preface to *Mysticism and Logic* he tells us that he feels less convinced than he did of the objectivity of good and evil. In this volume he endorses the view that such notions arise out of the struggle of human communities for existence and power. They are part of purely human history and throw no light on the nature of outside reality. They are the outcome of deep-seated instincts and fluctuating temporary desires. A lengthy passage from *Mysticism and Logic* (pp. 107-9) will put his main position clearly enough. "Human ethical notions . . . are essentially anthropocentric and involve when used in metaphysics an attempt, however veiled, to legislate for the universe on the basis of the present desires of men. In this way they interfere with that receptivity to fact which is the essence of the scientific attitude towards the world. To regard ethical notions as a key to the understanding of the world is essentially pre-Copernican. It is to make man, with the hopes and ideals which he happens to have at the present moment, the centre of the universe and the interpreter of its supposed aims and purposes. Ethical metaphysics is fundamentally an attempt, however disguised, to give legislative force to our own wishes. This may, of course, be questioned, but I think it is confirmed by a consideration of the way in which ethical notions arise. Ethics is essentially a product of the gregarious instinct, i.e. of the instinct

to co-operate with those who are to form our own group against those who belong to other groups. Those who belong to our own group are good : those who belong to hostile groups are wicked. The ends which are pursued by our own group are desirable ends, the ends pursued by hostile groups are nefarious. The subjectivity of this situation is not apparent to the gregarious animal, which feels that the general principles of justice are on the side of its own herd. When the animal has arrived at the dignity of metaphysics, it invents ethics as the embodiment of its belief in the justice of its own herd. . . . But it may be said that this account of ethics takes no account of such truly ethical notions as that of self-sacrifice. This, however, would be a mistake. The success of gregarious animals in the struggle for existence depends upon co-operation within the herd, and co-operation requires sacrifice to some extent of what would otherwise be the interest of the individual. Hence arises a conflict of desires and instincts, since both self-preservation and the preservation of the herd are biological ends to the individual. Ethics is in origin the art of recommending to others the sacrifices required for co-operation with oneself. Hence, by reflexion, it comes, through the operation of social justice, to recommend sacrifices by oneself, but all ethics, however refined, remains more or less subjective."

In this paragraph Mr. Russell accepts the evolutionary theory of morals. Ethical notions are formulated and enforced by society for biological ends. They are therefore temporary and varying weapons, as liable to revision as the weapons of our carnal warfare. The paragraph is curious, because it is glaringly inconsistent and exposes the theory it expounds. For naïvely enough, Mr. Russell informs us that the gregarious animal identifies the interests of its own herd with the general principles of justice. That



is to say, the general principles exist independently of this morality of herd-instinct and consequently cannot be traced to it or explained by it. Again, Mr. Russell is conscious that the ethical notions his theory explains are not exactly true ethical notions. The passage to the latter is secured *through the operation of social justice*, a principle which he does not attempt to derive and cannot derive from the gregarious instinct. It belongs, in the terms of his own social philosophy, not to instinct but to spirit. The gulf between the promptings of gregarious instinct and true ethical notions is manifest and unbridged. Moreover, if ethics were simply the outcome of our present desires and wishes, how is it we are able to distinguish between the good and the desired or desirable? Unless ethics are distinct in nature and origin from our instinctive desires, the very camouflage of emotion or passion by reason would be impossible. To camouflage is to make a thing look something other than itself. If ethics were a by-form of instinct or emotion or passion, it would be an ineffective camouflage. Mr. Russell confuses the tendency of passion or instinct to warp and colour our ethical notions with the power of originating those notions. But thoughts which are fathered by our wishes take on an ethical form precisely because the ethical form is not originated by the wishes concerned. There is no evidence advanced to show that the gregarious animal, having become a metaphysician, either did invent or could have invented ethics. And if the invention only followed when he became a metaphysician, it is clear that ethics are not the product of mere instinct. The assertion that ethics however refined are still more or less subjective, gives away Mr. Russell's whole case. If they are not completely subjective, what is the other element, which presumably is different from the subjective in character and origin and may be the essential thing in ethics? That

men's particular moral judgments are constantly coloured by instinct and passion is generally admitted. That truly ethical notions are therefore the outcome of passion or instinct, is obviously untrue.

The identification of ethical notions with present human desires is equally indefensible. Apart from the fact already mentioned that we distinguish constantly between what is good and what is desired, and know quite well that the good if always desirable is not always desired and the things we desire are not always good, this insistence that ethical notions are human and temporary demands, ignores the element of permanence which Buckle no doubt exaggerated, but rightly asserted, and denies the reality of moral progress. It overlooks the way in which human desires have been cleansed by ethical demands. It discounts the element of submission in the moral life. In other words, the essentials of ethics are lost sight of in such an identification. As a result Mr. Russell is again reduced to self-contradiction. Thus he writes, "A philosophy which does not seek to impose upon the world its own conceptions of good and evil is not only more likely to achieve truth but is *also the outcome of a higher ethical standpoint* than one which is perpetually appraising the universe and seeking to find in it an embodiment of present ideals."<sup>1</sup> It appears then that ethical philosophies are essentially "the tyrannous imposition on the world of our human and temporary demands." At the same time a higher ethical philosophy refuses to do anything of the kind. By what standard is this judged to be higher ethically, if ethics are just the reflex of our emotions, the embodiment of the hopes and ideals which we happen to have at the present moment? The essence of ethics is to insist on having our own way. There is however a super-ethics, a still more ethical ethics, which resolutely represses

<sup>1</sup> *M.L.*, p. 31.

our desires. How can there be an ethical standpoint higher than the essence of ethics? It is plain that Mr. Russell has not thought out the essence of ethics.

Since Mr. Russell is right about the higher ethical standpoint, he is wrong in his notion of what is essential in ethics. He starts out with a distinction between the scientific attitude and the moral, which he realises with a start is a false distinction. This is worth a little more attention. Those who contrast intellectual and moral, science and ethics, constantly forget that truth is an absolute good and love of truth a virtue. Mr. Buckle's thesis contrasting the moral and intellectual factors in progress to the great advantage of the latter is vitiated by the fact that the intellectual factor involves a moral element. One of the trifling things which Mr. Buckle omits in enumerating the moral common-places, is love of truth. Consequently when he goes on to argue that Inquisitors and Persecutors generally have been morally blameless, he is unaware that he is employing a very limited moral standard. Not merely intellectually, but morally they were defective. There is no science apart from a high morality. Huxley is very emphatic about this. Science, he tells us, "learns in her heart of hearts, the lesson that the foundation of morality is to have done once and for all with lying: to give up pretending to believe that for which there is no evidence, and repeating unintelligible propositions about things beyond the possibilities of knowledge." This foundation-morality science learns from nature. "The safety of morality lies . . . in a real and living belief in that fixed order of nature which sends social disorganisation upon the track of immorality as surely as it sends physical disease after physical trespasses." It is true that in his fine contempt for logical consistency, Huxley later on assures us that the governing principle of the course of nature is intellectual and not moral: "it is a

materialised logical process accompanied by pleasures and pains the incidence of which in the majority of cases has not the slightest reference to moral desert." Nature apparently both guarantees and denies the foundation of morality. But at least Huxley recognised that science itself depends on that moral foundation. Mr. Russell, as I say, remembers this with a start when he claims that a strictly scientific philosophy is higher ethically than an ethical philosophy so-called, because the scientific philosophy is inspired by a greater devotion to truth. Is he prepared to explain this higher ethic as he has explained other ethical notions? If ethics is essentially the product of the gregarious instinct, what of the morality of science? Does that spring from the same source? Will he go on to contend that the valuation of truth as an absolute good and the ethical notion of the pursuit of truth as a duty, are merely the camouflage which reason gives to the instinct of curiosity? Is truth only good as and when it is desired? Is it more of a good when men seek it earnestly and less of a good when their interest flags? When we assert that men ought to seek truth at all costs, are we merely giving legislative authority to our own tastes? Is the desire for truth a human and temporary demand? Are we obliged to serve truth only when we feel in the mood for it?

If Mr. Russell would answer these questions in the affirmative as his notion of ethics would seem to require him to do, he is at least clear that in yielding to the instinct which looks for truth, we have reached something objective. He does not believe that truth is merely what we want, just because we want it, though he is persuaded of goodness in general that it is merely what we happen to desire at the moment. Good things are the things we instinctively and temporarily like. Can such a view be seriously maintained? Is the instinct of curiosity the only instinct likely to find



objective satisfaction and bring us into touch with objective reality ? Are other noble instincts of human nature which can only find satisfaction in that which is infinite and eternal destined to disappointment ? There is no ground in reason or experience for supposing that the separation of truth from other ultimate goods is at all possible. Scepticism in morals must inevitably issue in scepticism as to knowledge. Are morals rooted in the life of instinct ? So is science. Have our powers of moral judgment been shaped and developed by the struggle for existence ? So has the intellect, as Bergson rightly contends. Do our desires warp our notions of what is right ? So do they colour our notions of what is true. If Mr. Russell is right in declaring goodness to be nothing but the objects of our present desires, how can he resist the crude Pragmatist who says truth is nothing but that which we happen at the moment to want ? There is no consideration which Mr. Russell advances against the objectivity of good and evil, which cannot be advanced with equal force against the objectivity of truth and error. His whole social philosophy cries out for a faith which he is afraid to affirm. Take this noble passage from the close of the *Principles of Social Reconstruction*. "The world has need of a philosophy or a religion which will promote life. But in order to promote life it is necessary to value something other than mere life. Life devoted only to life is animal, without any real human value, incapable of preserving men permanently from weariness and the feeling that all is vanity." [What then becomes of the contention that ethical notions are essentially related to biological ends ?] "If life is to be fully human it must serve some end which seems in some sense outside human life, some end which is impersonal and above mankind, such as God or truth or beauty." [What then becomes of the contention that all human ethical notions are essentially anthropocentric and

never liberate us from the parochial, the conditioned, and the taint of self ?] “Those who best promote life do not have life for their purpose. They aim rather at what seems like a gradual incarnation, a bringing into our human existence of something eternal, something that appears to imagination to live in a heaven remote from strife and failure and the devouring jaws of Time. Contact with this eternal world—even if it be only a world of our imagining—brings a strength and a fundamental peace which cannot be wholly destroyed by the struggles and apparent failures of our temporal life.” To me this is a pathetic passage. If the end only *seems* to be in some sense outside human life, if it only *seems* to be eternal and is not really so, the peace we seek is a false peace, and the strength we need will fail us. A world of our imagining, is not and cannot be an eternal world. Mr. Russell can only get the fulfilment of his moral requirement, by deceiving himself and tampering with truth. And yet it is not genuine science which compels him to build his moral life on illusion. His moral scepticism is really due to his unwillingness to study the facts of our ethical experience scientifically. He prefers hastily to determine the essence of ethics through immature systems of sociology and psychology which are not yet thoroughly imbued with scientific reverence for fact.

The study of the intellectual chaos which surrounds Mr. Russell's judgments on ethical questions is worth while, because it serves to bring out the disastrous reaction of moral scepticism on the life of the mind. It is none the less grievous that so distinguished a thinker as Mr. Russell should countenance this position. His own positive influence, which might help much in moral reconstruction, will be discounted by his declaring beforehand that his principles are incapable of reasoned defence and are merely the personal preferences which he chances to hold at the moment. Men

will disregard his personal preferences, but note that there is no valid reason why they should not indulge their own. His authority will be cited, to justify the view that in the problems that confront us, there are no common moral standards to which we can appeal and by which we may be guided. To seek a unity of moral judgment is a hopeless quest. Just when we need most a sure word of prophecy, some moral guidance to lift us beyond our passions and emotions, men are least convinced that any such guidance is possible. It is a misfortune for the world that our moral pulse beats so feebly.

There is however one advantage in the development of moral scepticism. It was not altogether a good thing, that Christian standards were taken for granted. It is just as well that they should be challenged. We are likely to take our ethical standards more seriously if they are not beyond question.

The moral scepticism of to-day is in part a reaction from the moral confidence of the Victorians. It is the fashion to dwell now on the priggishness of the great figures of the Victorian age. We criticise their moral faith on the strength of their theory of knowledge. We are sceptics morally because "knowledge is of things we see." Yet in the Victorian tradition, the element we discard, the element of faith in moral law, was sound ; the element we retain, the limited and inadequate conception of knowledge enshrined in Tennyson's famous line, was and is fallacious. The critics of the Victorians are smaller men. We abandon what is great and retain what is little in that age. Our supreme need is the regeneration of moral faith—the faith to which they were so magnificently loyal.

HERBERT G. WOOD.

## THE VOCABULARY OF "PATIENCE" IN THE NEW TESTAMENT.

THE value of a love of words to the expositor cannot hardly be overstated. Besides the mental discipline this gives, there is accuracy of habit in the giving of the "sense," and needful as this is in the English version, it may be said to be far more essential in the matter of the Greek text. Essential, too, as this is with the doctrines of the New Testament, taught as they are in the more abstract terms of the Greek, it is pre-eminently so on the great duties of the Christian life laid down as often in the concrete life as in the abstract term. Side by side the finest gifts of genius and the finest gifts of the Spirit are set out in words and phrases which are beautiful, graphic, sometimes tragic with realism.

"When a phrase is new it is certain to be real; when it is old it is apt to sink into cant. It is, however, to be remembered that, although our banknote be worn so thin that it hardly holds together, and it is so soiled that we hesitate to touch it, that bit of paper still retains a definite value, and if you go into things, it still represents the same amount of gold. When one comes on a phrase in religious literature, and when one finds it in use amongst religious people, however abused it may be . . . let him be sure that phrase stands for a religious fact. Human souls have one day felt this, wanted this, or else they had not coined the term and it had not been freely circulated. In proportion to their commonness the words of religion are an evidence of the facts of religion" (Dr. Watson, *Doctrines of Grace*, p. 72).

"If you go into things . . . it still represents the same amount of gold," says this scholar. The exegete knows the



truth of this, and so seeks out, like Ruth, the unreaped corners waiting in the words and phrases of the New Testament on the Christian doctrine of patience. Experience has shown that the New Testament is a mine which has strata upon strata of gold, or, like the sea, has depth upon depth which you find upon experiment yields treasure upon treasure. Melancthon gave a true hint when he said: "*Non potest Scriptura intelligi theologicè, nisi antea intellecta sit grammaticè.*"

The studious mind which turns to the English translations will be struck by several strange facts in relation to this subject. One is the diversity wherewith one seems to use the terms "patience" while another translates it "endurance," or still another gives the word "continuance," or still another "long-suffering." The student is also struck with the scarcity of references in the Gospels. Only three times, in the English translations, is "patience" used. And in these instances, of only one of them (Matt. xvii. 15) can it be said to bear the etymological sense which Crabb gives. If patience strictly means "to bear trouble calmly and bravely without murmuring or fault-finding," there is much ground for the rejection by many scholars of the Vulgate word "*patientia*" as the true equivalent in two of these cases in the Gospels. For the idea of slowness in avenging a wrong some take "*clementia*" as more fitting. Apart from the diversity and the scarcity, however, is the apparent discrepancy that the Books which portray the finest life of patience in Christ says little or nothing about this grace. His perfect example of patience, in every sense of the word, is therein seen persistently accomplished amid rumours and scandals and provocations to curiosity and ambitions. Add to this the fact that the Gospels give more naked stories of suffering

than all the rest of the Book, and the relative scarcity of the word "patience" becomes a] very suggestive study.

On the other hand is the relative frequency of this word in the later Books; the later the date, as far as date can be laid down at present, the more frequent the references. The largest number of cases are in the very latest Letters. For example, while St. John omits it in his Gospel and Letters, he uses it seven times in the Revelation. The explanation of this phenomenon in the religious literature would be interesting.

Still a third impression will be to find this grace linked to the very highest and lowliest things in life. The patience of the farmer is coupled with the patience of the prophets; the patience of Jesus is joined to the kingdom; the groaning of creation is associated with the manifestation of the Sons of God. Above the undertone of the sorest sorrow there is heard the cry "with joy." The English reader, without a knowledge of Greek, cannot help seeing that this kind of life is laid down as a necessity, as a matter of urgency, as part of a true symmetry in character; indeed as a form of energy where the stoical apathy was in contrast.

### *The Vocabulary in the Greek Text.*

Closer study of the Greek text, however, partly explains why the various revisers have hesitated sometimes in the use of "patience" as the meaning of the original. In fact, few words have given translators so much trouble as the two synonyms which are usually found for this. The general impression is left that the two Greek words *ὑπομονή* *μακροθυμία* express all the Christian doctrine of long-suffering as taught in the New Testament, but closer study dispels this idea entirely, for quite a large number of other synonyms have rich shadings of ideas on the "patient life."

Each single one is a vignette of some specific type of life held up in ideal. These await the fuller treatment of some scholar with the masterly precision and insight of a Bengel or the rare indefatigable labour of a Wetstein. Here it is only possible to give the most general indications and suggestions.

A brief list of the various words in the Greek text which have some connotation bearing on patience of some form or other includes the following :—

ἀποκαραδόκια	Paul	Rom viii. 19.	Patience of Creation .	1
ἀγγαρεύω	Matt.	v. 41.	Patience under State compulsion . . . . .	1
ἀνέχομαι	Matt.	xvii. 17.	Patience under restraint .	15
ἀνοχή	Paul	Rom. ii. 24.	Divine Patience in Judgment . . . . .	2
ἀνεξίκακος	Paul	2 Tim. ii. 24.	Patience under illegal things . . . . .	1
διανυκτερεύω	Luke	Gos. vi. 12.	Patience in prayer . .	1
ἐπεικής	Paul	1 Tim. iii. 3.	Patience under legal wrong . . . . .	2
ἐκδέχομαι	James	Jas. v. 11.	Patience of Hope . . .	8
ὑπομένω	Various		Patience as sentinel . . . . .	16
ὑπομονή	Various		Patience as holding up under . . .	29
ὑποφέρω	Paul	2 Tim. iii. 11.	Patience carrying a burden . . . . .	2
κακοπαθῶ	James	Jas. v. 13.	Patience versus Evil . .	1
κακοπάθεια	James	Jas. v. 10.	Patience versus Evil . .	4
καρτερῶ	Heb.	xi. 27.	Patience not giving blow for blow . . . . .	1
μακροθυμέω	Matt.	xviii. 26.	Longsuffering . . . . .	11
μακροθυμία	James	v. 10.	Longsuffering . . . . .	1
μακροθύμως	Paul	Acts xxvi. 3.	Longsuffering . . . . .	1
μετριοπάθεια	Heb.	vi. 2, 3.	Patience as arbitrator . .	1
μεμψίμοιρος	Jude	16.	Complaining, absence of patience	1
προσκαρτέω	Luke	Acts vii. 24.	Continuance towards . .	1
συμπάσχω	Peter Paul	1 Pet. iii. 18.	The emotional aspect	2

V. strong. The patience of the groaning creation. Rom. viii. ἀποκαραδόκια, concentrated patience.

All these synonyms, as found in the New Testament, have been consecrated to the teaching of a nobler life than that of any Stoic. Hence it is that the Epistles show fuller and

richer shades of thought and doctrine than are found in the Gospels. In that of Luke patience is combined with the dark and disturbing factors of earthquakes, famine, pestilence, betrayals, hatred for Christ's sake. *Here the first three factors are in the realm of nature and make a tragic picture of forces of destruction while whole races are wiped out, and should some survive they are overcome with sheer horror. Against such a dark background stands the Christian looking upon such as serving some higher end. The second two are in the sphere of human nature-betrayal and hatred for My sake. In spite of these the disciples are to show no resentment under personal injury and preserve a gentleness where another might burn with rage.*

These, however, are the extraordinary factors in life. What of life under ordinary conditions as depicted in the Gospels? Galilee, like a seashell, was ever on the moan; mothers at Bethlehem, too, refused to be comforted for the lost children, the peasant suffered intensely, there were invalids hopeful and hopeless. On a broad analysis one might say that, although the word "patience" is almost absent, there was plenty of the "thing" itself there, and so Matthew may be treated as showing patience on the wide and narrow streets; Mark that of the home; Luke as showing the rarer pictures of physical endurance, more especially that *of the wife as a woman; while John gives his pictures by the Pool.* The long struggle by the prophets and the stoics to define the correct attitude to suffering had made the idea of patience familiar. But a closer study of the teaching of the Sermon on the Mount and of the life of Jesus shows the dawn of a richer message. Hence it is that we encounter the frequency of the word in newer combinations in the later Epistles. While the same germinal ideas are found in the later books, there are scores of new pictures in the original, for the gamut of variations are



described as *holding a long time, holding back, holding up, holding one's ground, holding one's breath from complaint, holding one's pain with joy, holding one's faith while others fall away, holding back one's lawful revenge for higher reasons*. Forbearance under divine affliction, endurance of some personal disability, waiting for the time of the Parousia, waiting before the door of some mystery for Christ's sake. Thus it is that the later Books are a region where this truth presents itself, not as a plain barren and dry, but a continual changing from plain to valley and hill where one breathes a rarer atmosphere than Stoicism and sees visions that disturb contentment.

In quite a general way it may be indicated that the synonyms *ὑπομονή* and *μακροθυμία* occur respectively eleven times and twenty-nine times, while *ὑπομένω* occurs some sixteen times. These then are the most common, and are therefore the ones usually translated in the sense of patience. In a general sense they suggest the idea of *time and stress, the length to which the soul goes*. But the main question which arises for the expositor here is whether *ὑπομονή* or *μακροθυμία* should be made the keystone in the arch of Christian doctrine? The fact that in Romans Paul couples the two words would seem to indicate the use of both in any full-orbed view; but the fact that he seems to show a strong preference for one would seem to give the most emphasis there; and it would add weight to the contentions of scholars like Lightfoot, Trench, Deissmann and others that there is a fundamental difference between the two. Abbott (Col. i. 11) contends that "*patience is a very inadequate rendering of ὑπομονή which includes perseverance in a course of action, and that μακροθυμία comes nearer to our notion of patience.*" Quoting Chrysostom, he adds: *μακροθυμεῖ τις πρὸς ἐκείνους οὓς δύνατον καὶ ἀμύνεσθαι*: but this, though correct as to *μακροθυμεῖ*, is clearly inadequate for

*ὑπομένει*. The difference between them, contends Lightfoot, is best seen in their opposites. While the one (*ὑπομονή*) is the temper which does not easily succumb under suffering, the other (*μακροθυμία*) is the self-restraint which does not hastily retaliate a wrong. The one is opposed to cowardice or despondency, the other is opposed to wrath or revenge.

Few words have given more trouble in translation than just those rendered frequently as "Patience." For example, *ὑπομονή* has been translated steadfastness, forbearance, longsuffering, endurance, continuance, patient mind; *μακροθυμία* has also been rendered by the same words. Both, however, are pictorial enough, whichever rendering is adopted. One is derived from *ὑπο* and *μένω*, which means literally to remain behind when others have departed. The other word, *μακροθυμία*, from *μακρος* and *θυμος*, means self-restraint. These, then, are shadings of thought, and the answer to the question of preference involves exactitude in reading the context. In a quiet life, where there are no great oppositions from evil or from evil men, one word would serve as the key; in another life, where there is persecution, the other word would be the correct word. The one has its face set chiefly towards God; the other has its finger on the self.

If the two words *ὑπομένω* and *ὑπομονή* are taken together they make a total of forty-five shadings of thought, but in some eleven instances, it is notable, *μακροθυμέω* is combined with various other graces and gifts. Together these give variety, sequence of thought, sidelights on truth that amply repay the studious, for they cover matters of doctrine, of duty, of delineations of character. No hard and fast rule, however, can be drawn, it would seem, in the strictness of application of *ὑπομονή* to the sheltered life and *μακροθυμία* to the exposed and opposed life, for both are coupled with

bonds, with pain, with sufferings, with afflictions, with martyrs and minister with great weakness and supernatural power, with youth and old age, with God and Christ, with escapable and inescapable things. As for *ὑπομένω*, it is found alike on the lips of Jesus, John, James, Peter, Paul, as well as in Hebrews. The general idea in the word—to abide the issue of a thing—takes on rich meaning when the “thing” and the issue thereof are noted. Where the “thing” requires steadfastness in endurance and the temptation to avenge is overcome, in the New Testament generally, it is the synonym *μακροθυμία* that is found. Fritze puts it thus: “*Clementia (not patientia) qui iræ temperans delictum non statim vindices sed ei qui pecaverit pœnitende locum relinquo.*”

But what are the oppositions which tend to despondency on the one hand or retaliation on the other? In three of the above words the answer of a general nature is contained in the words *ἀνεξίκακος*, *κακοπαθέως*, and *κακοπάθεια*. In classics *ἀνεξίκακος* carried the idea of “holding up,” as of holding up one’s hands so as to show them openly to others. Visibility with a view to encourage others. Once only it is used, and then it is pastoral patience with “evil.” The *κακός* in this instance took the form of windy words, foolish words which engender division. It may be that Timothy, having a Greek’s love of argument from his father’s side and a Jew’s knowledge of the Scripture from his mother’s side, more particularly required the injunction to show patience with a silent tongue. *This was a novelty in the Greek and Roman world. Word-splitting versus word-repression.*

The word usually used for evil in the New Testament some forty times is *ὁ πονηρός*. The less specific is *ἡ κακία*, and it will be found that it embraces loss of goods, trials to faith, illusions of life, disturbing defeats of the soul, pain, problems of Providence, even accidents.

*Legal wrongs play a large part in the teaching of the New Testament, too.* Hence several of the references circle round one's attitude to these. *Μακροθύμως*, e.g., is used in regard to the patience of the haughty judge on the dais. But when common justice was denied a new problem pressed, new attitudes of mind were needed. The whole world of one's relations had to be faced, each one needing a new expression. The burden had to be held up else one would sink under it (*ὑποφέρω*); the burden had to be carried like a cross daily (*προσκαρτερέω*), the burden had to be carried in hope (*ἐκδέχομαι*). The passive life in prison before the guards created a new demand, for he must not fail in Christian patience where they failed not in Stoical patience. If it is hard to wait in hope, a long-deferred hope carries a double pain. How much harder to wait *for Hope, to see no glimmer* of fulfilment. This came to Paul, as to many others, and he has left us traces of this in Colossians i. 15, Titus ii. 13.

Quite another sense, however, is added in the word *τὸ ἐπιεικής*. The pastor is not in prison, but actively engaged in his pastoral work. He should be blameless in character, sober-minded, well-behaved, kind to strangers, apt to teach, neither a drunkard nor a boxer, but *τὸ ἐπιεικής*. But what does that mean? Archbishop Trench informs his readers that this word had been given ten different meanings—meekness, courtesy, gentleness, clemency, softness, modesty, patience, patient mind, moderation, forbearance by the Revisers. Many, however, still unsatisfied, read into it something fitting, meet, suitable, reasonable, fair, equitable, just, legally just, and so translate the word in the sense of the presbyter not being a stickler for legal rights. The *κακός* is a form of social injustice to which ministers are too often subjected. While he lives for the bigger things of life—righteousness, godliness, faith, patience—this



withholding of his legal rights makes his unique trial.

Passing from church life to the ordinary life of a citizen in those days, it was only reasonable that this new type of life should come into opposition. The earliest hint of this occurs in Matthew, where the word *ἀγγαρεύω* (Matt. v. 4) occurs. It is, we are told by some, a Persian word denoting the state compulsion of the courier, who was compelled to serve the state in some function. Whatever be the origin of the word, it would seem to denote the patience of meekness for the *social good*. The patience of God, the patience of Jesus, the patience of the Spirit, are also linked to this aspect.

Thus it is that every challenge in life seems to be regarded in the New Testament as an occasion for this grace, and though the trials as they vary *demand differing forms of patience, they all demand some degree of it*. The command to *let patience have her perfect work covers one's own good, the social good, the good of the kingdom*. Patience is needed alike for the searches of youth and the sorrows of mid-life and the silences of age.

W. MEIKLE.

### SOME OBSCURE PASSAGES IN THE PSALMS.

THE Psalms have been my daily companion and consolation in the dark days through which we have passed. They have rung in my ears constantly; and what a wonderful ring they have as one reads them in the Hebrew! This ring can be reproduced to a great extent in translation, for Hebrew poetry is not tied down to a syllabic metre, and its rhythmical phrases can be expressed with a like rhythm in other languages.

The ring of many of the Psalms has been fairly well

preserved in existing translations, and in these cases there is a continuous and melodious flow from verse to verse, and one is carried on to the end without any sense of uneasiness. But this is not always so, and many of the Psalms in translation halt and disappoint, and we find ourselves up against obscurities and inconsequences.

I have been trying to translate each of the Psalms so that it preserves the original rhythm and makes sense in all its parts. Psalm cxvi. given at the end of this present article may be taken as a specimen.

One thing that has impressed itself very forcibly on my mind is that attention to rhythm is a great aid to interpretation, and that obscurities and inconsequences in the existing translations have arisen through neglect of this. I propose in this article to give a few illustrations.

I will begin with the concluding verses of Psalm iv. In the Prayer Book Psalter they run thus :

6. There be many that say : Who will shew us any good ?
7. Lord, lift thou up : the light of Thy countenance upon us.
8. Thou hast put gladness in my heart : since the time that their corn, and wine, and oil increased.
9. I will lay me down in peace, and take my rest : for it is thou, Lord, only, that makest me dwell in safety.

The translation of the Revised Version is as follows :

6. Many there be that say, Who will shew us any good ?  
LORD, lift thou up the light of Thy countenance upon us.
7. Thou hast put gladness in my heart,  
More than they have when their corn and their wine are increased.
8. In peace will I both lay me down and sleep :  
For thou, LORD, alone makest me dwell in safety.

This does not differ substantially from the translation of the Authorised Version. We may note however that the Revised Version gives in the margin an alternative rendering of the word translated "alone" in the last line, namely "in solitude." This last I believe to be the meaning, as I shall presently indicate.

Comparing the Prayer Book and Bible Versions we notice two real points of difference. First, the Bible Version makes one verse of vv. 6, 7 of the Prayer Book. This is important, for in the original these are inseparably connected by the rhythm, as will be seen shortly. Secondly, for the Prayer Book translation, "since the time that their corn and wine and oil increased," we have in the Revised Version, "More than they have when their corn and their wine are increased." The Hebrew is literally "*from* the time, etc.," but as the preposition "*from*" is used to indicate comparison the Bible Version is quite correct in so interpreting it here.

The Bible Version then is to be preferred to the Prayer Book. But what is the connexion of these verses? For they do not hang together as they should. The last verse seems quite inconsequent, and v. 7 does not seem to have much to do with the preceding one.

Now here comes in the importance of attending to the rhythm, for it goes without saying that the verses connect together in the original, which indeed I render thus :

6. While many are saying, Who will shew us some good ?  
Lift on us, LORD, the light of Thy presence.
7. Thou givest more joy in my heart  
Than they have in increase of corn and wine ;
8. And in peace withal do I lie down and sleep,  
For Thou, O LORD, in my solitude  
Dost make me to dwell in safety.

The Psalmist's good is God's presence, though others find theirs in things material. Thus v. 7 connects naturally with v. 6. And God's presence means to him not only joy in his consciousness, but also security when he resigns his consciousness to sleep, so that v. 8 connects up too. The word which I translate "*withal*" is that which in the Bible Version is rendered "*both*." Literally it is "*together with it*," and it connects naturally with what has gone before.

Let us take next *vv.* 11–14 of Psalm lxxviii. These in the Prayer Book Version are obscurely translated thus :

11. The Lord gave the word : great was the company of the preachers.
12. Kings with their armies did flee, and were discomfited : and they of the household divided the spoil.
13. Though ye have lien among the pots, yet shall ye be as the wings of a dove : that is covered with silver wings, and her feathers like gold.
14. When the Almighty scattered kings for their sake : then were they as white as snow in Salmon.

The translation of the Revised Version runs as follows :

11. The LORD giveth the word :  
The women that publish the tidings are a great host.
12. Kings of armies flee, they flee :  
And she that tarrieth at home divideth the spoil.
13. Will ye lie among the sheepfolds,  
As the wings of a dove covered with silver,  
And her pinions with yellow gold ?
14. When the Almighty scattered kings therein,  
*It was as when* it snoweth in Zalmon.

This is certainly less obscure, but obscure it still is, and the verses do not connect up, whereas the rhythm of the original requires that *v.* 12 should connect closely with *v.* 11, and *v.* 14 with *v.* 13. In the translation *v.* 14 is inconsequent, and because of the full stop placed at the end of *v.* 11, the following verse does not follow upon it as it should.

The meaning intended in *vv.* 11, 12 is I think expressed if we translate with the ring of the original :

11. The LORD giveth the word ;  
The women bringing tidings are an host :
12. Kings of armies flee, they flee,  
And the women at home shall divide the spoil.

This translation, it will be observed, makes *v.* 12 the words of the women who bring the tidings of the defeat of the kings. The two verses hang together, and we have sense. It is possible of course that the Revisers intended this



connexion in their translation, but if so, the full stop after *v.* 11 has obscured their intention.

Now we come to the other two verses. We observe that the Revised Version makes *v.* 13 a question : "Will ye lie ? etc." This is grammatically possible. The first word in the Hebrew means "if" or "when," and it is used often to introduce a question, "if" being equivalent to "say if." Had verse 13 stood alone we might well have remained in doubt whether to interpret it interrogatively or not, but it seems to me that this point is decided for us by the cadence of the verse that follows it, and that we must certainly interpret, as in the margin of the Revised Version : "When ye lie among the sheepfolds."

The meaning of the two verses seems clear enough if we attend to the rhythm. They ring thus :

13. It is like, when ye lie among the sheepfolds,  
To a dove's wings covered with silver,  
And her pinions with yellow of gold,
14. [But] when the Almighty scattered [the] kings,  
Then was it snow in Zalmon.

If this be correct, as I believe it to be, we have depicted for us the contrast between the fairness and colour of the landscape when the shepherds lie out among their flocks, whose silvery light would mingle with the golden hue of the yellow grass, and the ghastly paleness of the battlefield strewn with the dead.

The Revised Version has, it seems to me, gone astray in *v.* 14 in following the Authorised Version by taking the word it translates "therein" with the first phrase of the verse instead of with the second. In the original rhythm it certainly belongs to the second phrase, and I take it that the word means "there" or "then."

I will now pass to Psalm cxvi., which seems to me laden with inconsequences in the existing translations. It is a

hymn of thanksgiving for recovery from sickness. The author of it had come very near to the grave, and he recognises the hand of God in sparing him to "walk before the LORD in the land of the living." The Psalm divides naturally into sections and I translate it as follows :

1. I love the LORD, for He hath heard  
My voice and my supplications.
2. Because he inclined me His ear,  
I will call on Him all my days.
3. The cords of death compassed me,  
The pains of hell found me ;  
I found trouble and sorrow.
4. Then I called on the name of the LORD :  
O LORD, I beseech Thee, deliver my soul.
5. Gracious is the LORD, and righteous,  
Yea, our God is merciful.
6. The LORD preserveth the simple :  
I was brought down low, and He saved me.
7. Return to thy rest, O my soul,  
For the LORD hath dealt bountifully with thee ;
8. For thou hast delivered my soul from death,  
Mine eyes from tears,  
And my feet from falling,
9. [And] I shall walk in the presence of the LORD  
In the land of the living.
10. I believed it when thus I spake,  
For sore was my trouble,
11. And thus in my haste I said :  
All mankind is a lie.
12. What shall I render to the LORD  
For all his benefits toward me ?
13. I will take the cup of salvation,  
And will call upon the name of the LORD ;
14. And my vows to the LORD will I pay  
In the sight yea of all His people.
15. Of concern in the eyes of the LORD  
Is the coming of death to His saints ;
16. Yea LORD, and for that I am thy servant,  
(I am thy servant, the son of thine handmaid)  
Thou hast loosed for me my bonds.

17. And I will offer thee the sacrifice of thanksgiving,  
And will call upon the name of the LORD ;
18. And my vows to the LORD will I pay  
In the sight yea of all His people—
19. In the courts of the LORD'S house,  
In thy very midst, O Jerusalem.

Each section of the Psalm as here presented is complete and forms a living member of the whole. It should be noticed that *v.* 9 flows on from the preceding verse, at which no heavy stop should be placed. *Vv.* 10 and 11 stand by themselves and record the temporary despair of the Psalmist when it seemed that his life was to be cut short. The rendering of the Prayer Book and the Authorised Version "All men are liars" misses the point. What is intended is that human life is but a lie or deception if it is to end in death.

We come now to *v.* 15, which opens a new section. It is most unfortunate that in the Prayer Book Psalter the words "Right dear in the sight of the LORD is the death of his saints" are fastened on to the words preceding them: "I will pay my vows now in the presence of all his people," thus forming with them *v.* 13. The Bible Versions (A.V. and R.V.) have: "Precious in the sight of the LORD is the death of his saints." This does not seem to me to express what is meant. The word in the original for "death" is not the ordinary one, and the word "dying" better expresses the meaning, and what seems intended is not that the dying of God's saints is a thing that He desires, but rather that it weighs with Him when His saints are threatened by death. It is to Him, as we say, a matter of concern.

The connexion of *v.* 16 with the preceding verse should be made more obvious than in the existing translations. Verse 16 states the general principle, and then the Psalmist goes on to say how it has been exemplified in his individual case. It is a matter of concern to God when His saints are

threatened by death, and he himself is one of God's people. The "I" of the first line is emphatic :

Yea, LORD, and for that *I* am thy servant  
 (I am thy servant, the son of thine handmaid)  
 Thou hast loosed for me my bonds.

We note in conclusion that the Psalmist lays emphasis on the duty of public recognition of God's benefits. He will pay to God the sacrifice of thanksgiving, and this in the presence of his saints, in the courts of the house of the LORD, in the very midst of Jerusalem.

When I read my translation of this Psalm at a meeting of Clerical brethren, one who was present, in thanking me for it, said : " It makes one feel more than ever how appropriate the Psalm is as used in the Churching of Women." With this I agree. I only wish the 10th verse of the Psalm, as it is there abbreviated, could be altered so as to make good sense.

E. H. ASKWITH.



## *THE MYSTERY OF GODLINESS.*

### I.

GODLINESS, which was regarded by Hooker as "the chiefest top and root of all true virtues," is one of those words which have almost dropped out of use in the age that has just closed. Its quality did not suit the prevailing temper of the period. The claim of the godly man to have a supernatural source for his virtues was a challenge to a world which prided itself upon its ability to comprehend nature, and which cherished the optimistic doctrine of progress as a sufficient working hypothesis for ordinary persons. Even apart from the mystery attached to the virtue its quality was not admired. In the nineteenth century saints in the popularly accepted view of that character were rare. They seldom came within the purview of the average man, and when they did they were strangers in whose society he had little interest. Probably Newman will be thought to bear the most familiar marks of sainthood, but this example does not refute the truth of the general view that has just been expressed, for though the influence of Newman through the Tractarian movement has been enormous, the deep stream, which had a constantly increasing volume for many years, kept within its own banks, and did not overflow and greatly enrich the intellectual and moral life of the outside world. Newman abhorred the prevailing spirit of his age, and though he was heard with great deference, he was not accepted as a prophet by the intellect of the period nor even by the most vigorous moral and religious life. He was

alien to and incurred the suspicion of many whose religion was of a more confident and less ascetic type.

Up till the war our age was like a man who lives on good terms with the world enjoying to the full what it offers, assuming that his bank account will not be overdrawn, but in any case acting on the principle that in this best of all possible worlds his good fortune would not fail him. He faced the world cheerfully, for was he not rapidly wresting from Nature her secrets ? Had he not penetrated to every corner of the earth, explored the depths of the sea, mastered the air and succeeded in almost every adventure on which his courageous spirit had led him ? The luxurious and expanding present was so real and satisfying to his powers of nerve and brain that he was content with his world as it went, and had no desire to scan the horizon of the visible for the pinnacles of another City whose foundations are laid in the Unseen. He desired to be left alone with what he saw. Moreover, Man was becoming more reasonable and would soon be brought by a process of education into willing obedience to the law of life which Science was opening up to him. He was said by high authorities to be acquiring a sense of decency which constrained him to master his cruder passions and accept the ordered government of the world. There was also much idealism stirring the soul of that age. Bold reformers were ever launching schemes many of which after voyages more or less stormy returned with rich cargoes. But on the whole the age was much more successful in solving its scientific and commercial problems than its moral ones, a proof of which is the war, because it would not have happened if there had not been confusion of the material with the moral. If we were strong in optimism and moderately so in moral aspiration we were conspicuously weak in religion. A writer in the *Saturday Review* recently said : "Judged by the facts of the last twelve years and by the

present position of affairs both in England and in Europe Christianity has failed and is dead. . . . We have still an Established Church, it is true, and its worship is still conducted with reverence, sometimes with splendour, and in some places attended by numerous worshippers. But of spiritual authority there is none, and as an ethical engine in the national life of to-day, Christianity is as dead as the pagan mythology in the first three centuries of the Roman empire."

But the war has made us reconsider our assumptions. Millions of the finest young men have been cut off in their prime without a chance for any of the satisfying adventure of life, and far more have been maimed so that their ambitions can never be realised. Where is our ground for optimism? It is true that there has been a spectacular vindication of justice in the collapse of Germany, five years ago the supreme embodiment of that optimistic progressive spirit which was content to grasp the visible world as her prize. It was a swift moral judgment, but we are still in the greatest confusion. A thick fog surrounds us, and he is a brave man who is willing to point out the path along which we are likely to move. We may be bemired for many a day. The next generation may have to plunge along with heavy steps and with little contentment. Pessimism may reign for a season. Our coming age may prove to be not unlike the first century after the hopes of the Augustan age faded away, when courage and initiative so failed men that in desperation they were ready to invest any ruler with divine honours in the hope that some one might prove to be a "manifest God." Philosophy had lost its spirit of self-sufficiency and had yielded its proud vantage ground to timorous and wistful seekers for some Revealer, or for salvation into immortal life through some oriental "Mystery."

Into this world Christianity brought a regenerating optimism. It preached the "Mystery of Godliness," and soon it met extraordinary success. The soul of man, inestimable in comparison with all the vain-glory of life, was to be saved from the wreck of a perishing age not by the effort of human reason in a process of self-education, nor in any fellowship of philosophers, but by losing itself to follow a Redeemer who would lead it to God. A new hope entered the world with the proclamation of the "Mystery of Godliness."

## II.

The words "Mystery of Godliness" occur in 1 Timothy iii. 16, and seem to belong to a period when Christianity had for a generation at least been making proof throughout the Roman world that a new moral power was at work among the common people. They probably mean the mystery which is at the heart of godliness and gives it its power, the mystery which gives to the Christian religion its unique quality and spell. This mystery is said to be "confessedly great," of which the most natural interpretation is that the public confession of Christ, which was so rapidly being made throughout the world, was an ever renewed tribute to the wonder of the Christian mystery (1 Tim. vi. 12). It is just possible also that there is a reference to the result which the Gospel has had upon the heathen mind as compared with other "mysteries," for from 1 Timothy ii. 1, 2 it seems that the Christians were leading an undisturbed life and that their faith was effective in making conversions from paganism. The words "confessedly great" also denote that there was a large consentient testimony on the part of the Church. Diverse teachings were as yet only here and there eating their way in upon the central truth that Jesus Christ came into the world to save sinners (1 Tim. i. 15).



According to Romans xvi. 25, 26 the great Christian Mystery had been concealed from all ages and was not made known until recently by God Himself. Its substance was that the whole world, Jew and Gentile, was to be saved in Christ Jesus, a view of the Mystery which is different from that of 1 Timothy iii. 16.

What is "Godliness" (εὐσέβεια), the product of this Mystery? It may be translated "The Christian religion," and it is almost equivalent to "the faith" as in Galatians i. 23. The word is, of course, very common in contemporary Greek, but is not so frequent in the LXX nor in the apocryphal and pseudepigraphic Jewish writings, and is quite rare in the New Testament. Its equivalent in contemporary or earlier Latin was *pietas*, concerning which Warde Fowler says: "The *pietas* of the Italians and Aeneas was a calm reasonableness of mind, taking effect in constant and active good-will towards man and God."<sup>1</sup> "In Christianity morality becomes an active *pietas* of universal love consecrated by an appeal to the life and death of the Master." "In Virgil *pietas* is the word for religion as it had been Cicero's in his more exalted moments."

This use of *pietas* illuminates the meaning of εὐσέβεια in the Hellenistic period. Further light is thrown upon it by a passage in 4th Maccabees, the work probably of a Pharisaic quietist who wrote from Alexandria in the first half of the first century A.D., in which is seen the influence of the Stoic philosophy with its four primary virtues of justice, courage, self-restraint and prudence, though for the last the author in other passages substitutes εὐσέβεια or θεοσέβεια. Eleasar says to the tyrant Antiochus: "Thou mockest at our philosophy, as though it is owing to lack of reasonable consideration that we direct our lives by it; but it teaches us self-restraint so that we can control

<sup>1</sup>See *The Death of Turnus*, 148.

all our pleasures and passions, and it gives us practice in courage so that we can willingly endure any pain, and it disciplines us in righteousness so that in all moods we may act with moderation ; it instructs us in godliness so that we may worship the only living God in a manner befitting His Majesty ! ” <sup>1</sup> Godliness, therefore, which is not unlike “ religious reasoning,” enables the pious man to master his lower nature, is accompanied by the exercise of the cardinal virtues, and is developed by discipline and instruction.

In the New Testament the word “ godliness ” is most frequent in the Pastoral Epistles and the Acts, occurring elsewhere only in 2 Peter. It is noteworthy that in Acts the “ godfearers,” so often mentioned, are the proselytes who had found the true God in Jehovah and were worshipping Him without taking on themselves the full obligations of the Law.

The root idea of the word “ godliness ” is worship of the true God, reverence for His holiness, submission to what He commands. Whereas the ungodly man is a profane person, self-willed, wanton, trampling on things sacred, the godly man exhibits a spirit of devotion to a Person and to a rule of conduct which is sacred because it is the will of this Divine Being.

In the Epistles to Timothy and Titus this word has a Godward and a manward phase, the former expressing itself in the performance of worship in a reverent demeanour and a sober fashion ; the faith, prayerfulness and restraint of the godly Christians being in marked contrast to the extravagances which so often attended the worship of the pagan world. Their “ gentle and quiet life ” was also to be adorned with graces denoting a grave rather than an exuberant virtue though without asceticism, which were to be exhibited in

<sup>1</sup> 4 Macc. v. 22-25.

domestic life and in the Church. The godly man must fulfil his duties to his family and his dependants ; it might be to a destitute widow or to slaves. Women were to be modest and to obey constituted authority ; and indeed this note of grave submission to order, shown even in prayer for the king, is prevalent throughout. Already wealth had brought its difficulties and the rich " brother " had problems that were unknown in the primitive days when all things were held in common. He must be a good steward as in the parable, and lay a good foundation, thereby securing life indeed as he shares his riches with others, and above all, in the midst of his plenty, finding satisfaction, joy and hope in God Himself. Religiosity had already made its appearance and there were persons who traded on " godliness," using the profession of piety to deceive simple folk and make gain out of them. A well-chosen order of teachers and spiritual directors maintained standards of godliness in worship and conduct, which after the primitive enthusiasm had cooled off resulted in a fixed type of character, reliable and recognisable, a bulwark in the persecutions, heresies and subtle temptations which soon laid siege to the Christian soul. The glimpses afforded by these epistles show us happy, quiet and well-ordered homes, such as may be paralleled in every age of the Christian Church. The " godly " of those epistles, who were given the promise of the life that now is as well as of that which is to come, received its fulfilment in the peacefulness, love, purity, faith, and hope of the Christian Church and home, in contrast to the envy, strife, hatred, avarice, and wantonness of the ungodly in that frightful Roman world, then reduced to chaos as the sanctions that had once held society together had been dissolved. It thus appears that Christian godliness, with its Godward and manward aspects, resembles the conception of the Kingdom of God as preached by Jesus, and His words

“to you has been given to know the mysteries of the kingdom of heaven ”(Matt. xiii. 11) might have been in the mind of the man who wrote 1 Timothy iii. 15, 16.

The Christian's life was the product of Grace. It was surrounded with mystery. He believed that he was experiencing the kindness and love of God to man through the appearance on earth of a Saviour who had brought him into an inheritance with hope of eternal life. This historic fact was the great mystery, and the rapid growth of the Church which was the guardian of this truth was to this author a proof of the power of the mystery, the substance of which is set forth in the verses of a hymn or liturgical confession (1 Tim. iii. 16) :

He who was manifested in the flesh,  
Justified in the spirit,  
Seen of Angels ;  
Preached among the nations,  
Believed on in the world,  
Received up in glory.

This very striking passage was probably composed after our present Gospels, or at least after the original Gospels that went into their making, had been put into circulation, for a careful reading shows that this “Mystery” is just the historic Gospel as it was preached by such missionaries as those whose messages lie embedded in our Gospels. A detailed consideration of each clause should make this evident.

*He who was manifested in the flesh.* A Person is at the heart of this Mystery. He appeared in human form as though He had been hidden and was then revealed. Probably the idea is the same as in “The Word became flesh” (John i. 14), and is illustrated by such an account of the Epiphany of Jesus as is given in the first two chapters of the Gospel of Luke, though it might also refer to His whole human manifestation on earth in word, deed and character.



*Justified in the spirit.* Unlike the scribes and the pharisees, who wished to proclaim to the world their righteousness, this Person was justified in the spirit. At the Baptism Jesus heard the voice which equipped Him for His mission, "Thou art my Son." Later in His career on the return of the Seventy He exulted in the Spirit and broke forth into the profoundest words of the synoptic Gospels (Luke x. 21-24). After all the disappointments of His outward life He feels Himself now justified as the only Revealer of the Father to the world, and as known to the Father if not yet recognised by the world. Shortly before at the Transfiguration, when talking with heavenly visitants of the decease which He was to accomplish at Jerusalem, came the Father's voice, "This is my chosen Son, Hear Him"—a magnificent justification in the spirit at a time when outwardly His mission seemed to have had so little success and signs of His death began to thicken. It was His constant spiritual communion with His Father, so often indicated in Luke, that enabled Him to fulfil His life in the world.

*Seen of Angels.* After the Temptation angels ministered to Jesus. A similar idea is found in John i. 51: "Heaven opened and the angels of God ascending and descending upon the Son of Man." In Gethsemane, according to an ancient reading embedded in Luke xxii. 43, 44, an angel strengthened Him, and at His Resurrection angels evidently supported Him. So from His birth to His Resurrection He was attended by these divine ministers.

The first half of the hymn, the strophe, deals with the life on earth in which the Mystery of His divine nature was being gloriously manifested to Himself and to His immediate followers. The antistrophe relates His outward triumph as the effects of the Mystery were manifested to the world.

*Preached among the nations.* According to Luke Jesus was to be a light to the Gentiles, and this Gospel is the only

one to record the Mission of the Seventy. After the Resurrection Jesus proclaims that the Gospel of Forgiveness is to go to all nations, and this promise finds its fulfilment in the Acts.

*Believed on in the world.* Though this is the theme of the Gospel of John in which we see the culmination of faith and unbelief, the most ample record of the progress of the Gospel is the story in Acts of its acceptance in ever widening circles until it reached the capital of the world, Rome itself.

*Received up in glory.* This hymn makes no mention of the Resurrection. Evidently, as in Luke, the culmination of His triumph was the return to the right hand of the Majesty on high. In the Epistle to the Hebrews also Jesus is represented as crowned with honour and glory, the proof that His mission will be accomplished and humanity redeemed.

These liturgical verses inspired by the Gospels seem to belong to a period long removed from the early Pauline world. Apparently there were in existence written records of the historic Jesus who Himself is the Gospel (cf. 1 Tim. vi. 3). Paul, however, in the major epistles finds the Mystery of the Gospel in the crucified and risen Christ who had rendered the Law of no effect and has sent His Spirit to Jew and Gentile alike. This hymn sung in the Church of the living God is the substance of the Gospel of Jesus, as He lived on earth and went triumphant through the world, productive of godliness and adorning with virtue the family of God. Those quiet, modest, peaceful homes were vibrant with mystery. Grace had ushered in the dawn of their day; they had hope of grace yet more abundant to light up its close.

### III.

The oriental mysteries of the first century swept before them the philosophies, even those in which monotheism was a regulative principle, because they were the result not of deep religious experience but of cold reasoning. Average

men and women soon grow weary of argument, and mere dogma becomes unintelligible or ineffective though it be maintained by the authority of some institution or system ; and in that age there was none to speak with authority. Therefore when the oriental cults offered revelation and displayed before the eyes of the initiated, whose emotions were stirred by their environment, the life-drama of the god, what cold reason or pure thought could not have effected, the mystery-vision did for the worshipper. Having undergone the necessary purification and in contemplation of the divine drama he became assured of his own immortality.

For a time these mysteries were keen rivals of Christianity, especially Mithras, who had multitudes of worshippers wherever the Roman soldiers went. But they did not offer the solution of the deepest mystery of life nor did they meet the deepest needs of the human spirit. For men desire more than mere immortality which was the most real promise of the pagan cults. Indeed, at many of the most powerful and creative periods of the human spirit the desire for immortality has been dulled ; and that hope is always a doubtful blessing unless the unseen holds for us a richer and fuller life than that which most mortals lead. The thought of an endless continuance of such selfish and fruitless careers as have no higher worth than that of their present earthly existence would be to many an evil dream.

It is noticeable that in the New Testament the word immortality occurs only three times, and in 1 Timothy vi. 16 God alone is said to possess immortality. No declaration is ever made as to the inherent immortality of the human soul. Instead of proof of the continued existence of the individual there is the promise of Eternal Life, which, moreover, is to be begun here as an earthly experience. A new life of godliness is to displace the old life of the flesh. This new life is eternal, created by divine power. No human

effort, however it may arouse the imagination of man, can endue the spirit with eternal life. Christianity has never had much belief in the virtues of the self-conscious, self-educated, self-made man of the world which got so much admiration from the best people like the Stoics in the first century. It is through the Divine Spirit imparted to us, not by reason of the excellence of human nature, that we get this gift. Years wear out the body, but an inner man is being renewed day by day, and the believer, who in the present denies ungodliness and fleshly lusts, living soberly, righteously and godly, cherishes the blessed hope and appearing of the glory of the great God and Saviour Jesus Christ.

Christianity is peculiarly rich and ethical in its promises for the future. It is therefore a striking phenomenon of recent years, accentuated by the War, that a multitude of inquisitive seekers have allowed themselves to be carried forward as on a tide towards the barriers of the unseen world, and on that gloomy and mist-covered strand they profess to have met and spoken to familiar visitants who, drawn by the impulse of affection, have left the inner depths long enough to give some token, usually insignificant or unilluminating, that they are still alive. Such scraps of information as have been imparted about individuals give us no real knowledge of the invisible world, and will not continue to satisfy earnest men and women when in the Gospel they are offered so much that appeals to our noblest aspirations—the promise of an inheritance incorruptible and undefiled and such a life as is to be found only in the presence of God Himself. In the twentieth century Christianity, still presenting “the mystery of godliness,” can have no such struggle as it had with the mystery-religions in the first century.

During the past five years many things have been accomplished which have upset our axioms, and we are no longer



so complacent or so self-satisfied as the Victorian era was. The dogmas of that period have been found to be too narrow for our experience. We will not, for example, say hereafter that a sound economic system will in itself make a contented and progressive society. Man has been found to be far greater than anything that he possesses or produces. But on the other hand we shall not be unfair to the past age. It educated the generation that won the war and that has to solve its immediate issues. Critics of society there are in abundance, novelists and satirists who cleverly depict the pharisaism, as they see it, of our average life. Sadly we must admit that much of what they say is too true of society, novelists included ; but cynicism in the face of things as they are is no cure. We are not complacent and we will listen modestly to anyone who will offer a remedy, but those who have tried to persuade us that society is unsound at the core must not leave us to our natural and unregulated simplicity. We have had enough of the pessimistic critic touched with pharisaism.

Nor are we to be long comforted by the appeal to " high ideals." The words are beginning to get a tinge like the withered colour that comes on the leaves in a season of prolonged drought. Too often the ideals are another man's conventions which are not human enough for this very real world, and are not good " mixers " in a society which, strange as it may appear, is sensitive to purity of purpose and sincerity. This age is not to be reformed by those who only preach " high ideals " from the house-tops, even as the first century was not redeemed by the Stoics.

But men and women are in the mood for a genuine word of hope, restless though they are, and disillusioned for the moment as they seem to see Progress lying derailed. Is the idea of Progress a delusion ? Not in its true meaning, which I believe is to be found in the conception of the King-

dom of God or true godliness, giving as it does the promise of the life that now is as well as that which is to come. In the face of spurious mysteries the Life of Jesus is the great mystery of the moral universe, still compelling homage and discipleship, a revelation to myriads not of empty immortality but of the fulness of Eternal Life.

It may be that the coming age will be strong where the preceding has been weak, that it will have a deeper sense of the mystery wherewith life is enveloped, and that without any diminution of keen intellectual search after truth in the realm of the visible, another adventure will open for the mind and soul of man in the sphere of the moral and the spiritual. Then godliness may be discovered anew, and again be admired as "the chiefest top and root of all true virtues."

R. A. FALCONER.

### THE ORIGINAL TITLE OF THE GOSPEL OF MARK.

IN a recent treatise by Professor B. W. Bacon, entitled *Is Mark a Roman Gospel?* we have the following statement made with regard to the original title of the Gospel that is being discussed: we are told that "The Gospel was not first known as ἀπομνημονεύματα Πέτρου and afterwards entitled κατὰ Μάρκον. It was first known simply as τὸ εὐαγγέλιον, later (to distinguish it from rivals) as τὸ κατὰ Μάρκον. Finally, to give it still greater authority, perhaps for wider circles, it was declared to embody recollections of the teaching or preaching of Peter. *The reverse process is inconceivable.*" The last sentence is somewhat pontifical in manner, and might provoke resentment in certain quarters. One could imagine, for instance, how it would have irritated the author of *Supernatural Religion* to whom

even the identification of the Memoirs of the Apostles and the Gospels was a *petitio principii*; but even if there should be no one left alive to carry on the tradition of Mr. W. R. Cassels, it must surely be lawful to question the *causa finita est* of Professor Bacon. We do not say this as having a rooted hostility to the *ex cathedra* method of settling a problem; on the contrary, we rather enjoy the use of it when it is employed by ourselves, and are, therefore, in a position of enforced charity when it turns up elsewhere. Only we reserve the right to the use of the sign of interrogation on the margins of the books that we read, and when we use it no unfriendliness is implied.

Are we, then, quite sure that the genesis of Gospel titles is in the direction affirmed by Professor Bacon? We remember the way in which Justin Martyr in one passage speaks of

*Memoirs, which are called Gospels;*

and are aware that it is common to regard the alternative statement as a gloss; without committing ourselves to that view, we may assert that either *Memoirs* is the primitive title which has to be explained either by Justin or his glossator, because it is going out of use and passing away, or else, if it is a new title, the text of Justin must be altered to

*Gospels, which are also called Memoirs.*

The latter alternative will hardly secure support.

Let us, then, see whether in any direction we can get further light on the meaning of the term *Memoirs* or the reason for its introduction.

It has been suggested, naturally enough, that the term has been copied from Xenophon. Thus Westcott, in his *Canon of the New Testament*, says:

“The title was probably adopted from that of Xenophon’s well-known Ἀπομνημονεύματα Σωκράτους, from which indeed the word had been already borrowed by several writers.”

It does not seem to have occurred to Westcott to inquire

what was the content of the word which Xenophon employed, by which relationship was established between the *Memoirs of Socrates* by Xenophon and the *Memoirs of Jesus* by Peter. Yet there must have been some such relationship in the inner meaning of the two works, before Mark could use the Xenophontean title or some later writer replace Mark's original title by one that he thought more appropriate. It appears, then, that the inquiry into the original title of Mark's Gospel, and into the meaning of that title, takes us into the prior question as to the original form and meaning of the title which Xenophon gave to his book.

The lexicons will tell us that the word ἀπομνημονεύματα in the plural denotes *a narrative of sayings and doings, memoirs*, as those of Socrates by Xenophon. When we turn to the text of Xenophon to see whether this was the idea in the author's own mind, we find that the book opens with a sense of surprise that the Athenians should ever have charged Socrates with impiety, and presently we are told that

οὐδεὶς πώποτε Σωκράτους οὐδὲν ἀσεβὲς οὐδὲ ἀνόσιον οὔτε πράττοντος εἶδεν οὔτε λέγοντος ἤκουεν.  
(*Mem.* i. 1, 11.)

At the end of the first book he reverts to his starting-point and says :

θauμάζω οὖν ὅπως ποτὲ ἐπέισθησαν Ἀθηναῖοι Σωκράτη περὶ θεοὺς μὴ σωφρονεῖν, τὸν ἀσεβὲς μὲν οὐδὲν ποτὲ οὔτ' εἰποντα οὔτε πράξαντα, τοιαῦτα δὲ καὶ λέγοντα καὶ πράττοντα, οἷά τις ἂν καὶ λέγων καὶ πράττων εἴη τε καὶ νομίζοιτο εὖσεβέστατος.  
(*Mem.* i. 1, 20.)

Evidently the discourse of Xenophon is in harmony with the statement that his title, either directly or indirectly, was concerned with the *words and works* of Socrates.

We may see this in another way. Let us take a case or two from the authors in Justin's century who are said to have imitated the Xenophontean title. Here is Plutarch, for



example, who collects the *Apophthegmata* of great and wise men. In his prologue addressed to the Emperor Trajan, he changes the title to ἀπομνημονεύματα and then goes on to explain the change because, in the collections he has made, you can see the *actions* of the men whom he quotes side by side with their *utterances* (αἱ ἀποφάσεις τῶν ἀνδρῶν τὰς πράξεις παρακειμένας ἔχουσας), or you can study their *words* alone as the germs and illustrations of their *actions* in the case of men who have deserved *memorial*. Evidently Plutarch thought that his first title *Apophthegmata* was too weak, being only concerned with speeches, and he replaced it by another with a possibly wider meaning.

Or let us turn to Aulus Gellius. In his discourse on the different treatment which Socrates gets at the hands of Plato and Xenophon respectively, he says that

“Xenophon in libris quos *dictorum et factorum Socratis commentarios* composuit, negat Socratem de coeli atque naturae causis rationibusque unquam disputavisse” (Aulus Gellius: *Noctes*, lib. 14, c. 3).

Here we have on the part of Aulus Gellius an explanation of the word ἀπομνημονεύματα, as *Memorials of Words and Deeds*, or we have evidence of a longer original title of Xenophon's work. In either case we have the content of the word *memoirs* carefully specified.

What Aulus Gellius does, when he writes in Latin about Xenophon's work, the descriptions which the official catalogues give of the extant manuscripts of the book reproduce exactly. The best MS. at Paris (Cod. Paris, Gr. 1302) is entered as *Commentariorum de dictis et factis Socratis libri duo priores auctore Xenophonte*. The next (Cod. Paris, Gr. 1740) says simply, *Xenophontis rerum memorabilium libri quatuor*. Four other manuscripts, as described in the catalogue, have the longer title. The point to notice is the alternation of *memorabilia* with *dicta et facta*. They

are to be treated as equivalent or supplementary terms.

But this brings us to Papias and Mark : for Papias quotes from a certain elder (? the Presbyter John) the statement that " Mark, who had been Peter's interpreter, wrote accurately all that he *remembered* (ἐμνημόνευσεν) of what had been either *said or done* by Christ (ἢ λεχθέντα ἢ πραχθέντα). That is, the Gospel of Mark is a volume of ἀπομνημονεύματα.

The question at once arises whether the subject of the verb in Papias' statement is Mark or Peter. Upon this Westcott remarked as follows :

"The ἐμνημόνευσεν here and ἀπεμνημόνευσεν below are ambiguous. They may mean either *remembered* or *related*. In the latter case the sense would be that Mark "recorded all that *Peter* related." The change of subject would be abrupt, but is not unexampled."

We think that this is what the Elder wanted to say. He wished to make Peter the literary parent of Mark. But whatever be the correct rendering, we see that the combination of ἐμνημόνευσεν with λεχθέντα καὶ πραχθέντα is exactly the same as we found involved in Xenophon and his imitators ; and this justified us in saying that either Mark or Peter described the book whose title we are investigating as ἀπομνημονεύματα, in imitation of Xenophon. It has been usual to take the expression λεχθέντα ἢ πραχθέντα as indicating in some way the contents of a Gospel as different from a *Book of Sayings* : the meaning of the expression appears to be more general than this, and the formula ought not to be used as a discriminant between one Gospel and another. The point which has come out clearly is that the εὐαγγέλιον is not the first title. The first title was *Memoirs*, i.e., the *Sayings and Doings* of Jesus.

We get an echo of this in the opening words of the *Acts of the Apostles*, where Luke advises us that his former treatise had been occupied with all that Jesus began to

*do and to teach.* As we know, Luke had Mark's Gospel before him when he began to write. His language was influenced by the title of the book which he was re-editing. We conclude, then, that Professor Bacon's statement, which we undertook to examine, is invalid.

The matter does not, however, stop there. If we concede with Westcott that there has been a deliberate imitation of Xenophon, then the person who imitates must have been acquainted (at least by title) with the author in question. The choice between Mark and Peter at this point is easily made; only one of the two is a Greek scholar in the literary sense. *If Xenophon has been imitated it is Mark that imitated him.* So we are led to inquire into the education of this young Aramean dragoman, and into the reasons for his drawing the parallel between Jesus and Socrates. The second part of the inquiry can be dismissed in a sentence. The identification of Jesus as the Wisdom of God raised at once the question for the Semites as to whether Jesus was wiser than Solomon, and for the Greeks whether He was wiser than Socrates.<sup>1</sup>

We turn, then, to the first part of the suggested inquiry. The question of the education of Mark is really of considerable importance. Whether he is Peter's interpreter or not, he probably translated the first Aramaic Gospel into Greek, and his translation is, in part, a product of his education. The books he was brought up on will colour his speech. We ought to be able to recognise the colour.

For instance, Blass suggested that Luke (who probably was just as much an Aramean as Mark, in spite of certain suggestions of Ramsay to the contrary) was acquainted with Homer, because in Acts xxvii. they wished to "beach

<sup>1</sup> Cf. the Epistle of Mara bar Serapion, in Cureton, *Spicilegium*, p. 73. "What advantage did the Athenians gain by the murder of Socrates . . . or the Jews [by the death] of their wise king?"

the ship" (v. 41) in Homeric language, and this is the only place in the New Testament where a ship is called *ναῦς*, to say nothing of the peculiar word for "grounding" (*ἐπικέλλω*). It is curious to see how Luke has, just before, the alternative phrase *ἐξῶσαι τὸ πλοῖον*, and how he reverts to *πλοῖον* when the next ship is found.<sup>1</sup>

In the same way that we are able to show Luke's acquaintance with Homer, we were able recently to point out<sup>2</sup> (where no translation is involved) that the author of 3 Maccabees was acquainted with the *Hecuba* of Euripides, the *Prometheus Vincetus* of Aeschylus, and a lot of unknown Greek tragedy. The discovery makes one say that, whoever he was, he must have had an education very like our own, and retained, as we do, the aroma with which the vessel was first imbued. For we ourselves, when we passed from prose to verse, moved into the Euripidean area, and stumbled over *Hecuba*.

What shall we then say about Mark? What of his initial studies? In prose? In verse? Did he begin with the *Anabasis*? Did he read Homer later on? Has he ever been suspected of using poetical terms, and if so where did he get them?

For instance, when he writes about the storm on the Lake, he uses the word *λαίλαψ* to indicate the kind of wind that was blowing then, and still blows over the Galilean waters. Let us examine the word more closely: it occurs, outside the Synoptic tradition, only in 2 Peter ii. 17.

*πηγαὶ ἄνυδροι καὶ ὄμιχλαὶ ὑπὸ λαίλαπος ἐλαννόμεναι,*

When we compare the parallel language of Jude 12 we find

*νεφέλαι ἄνυδροι ὑπὸ ἀνέμων παραφερόμεναι.*

We must admit that the language of Peter, relatively to

<sup>1</sup> The translator Aquila, has a similar Homeric *νῆς* in two places.

<sup>2</sup> John Rylands Library Bulletin, December, 1919.



that of Jude, is much more poetical ; ὀμιχλή does not here mean *a mist*, more tenuous than *a cloud* (νεφελή) ; it is the same cloud in both cases, with ὀμιχλή for a rarer and more poetical form ; it is a Homeric word from the *Iliad*. In the same way λαῖλαψ is a Homeric word from either the *Iliad* or the *Odyssey*. Every one must feel, also, that ἐλαυνόμεναι is a much stronger and more vivid form than παραφερόμεναι. If, however, this is true of 2 Peter, whose language generally betrays a consciousness on the part of the writer that he is an educated man, and wishes to be thought so, it must equally be true of Mark, whose λαῖλαψ was so perplexing to Matthew that he substitutes for it a σεισμός, as if wind had nothing to do with it. This shows that the first Markan form did not have the explanatory άνέμου, or Matthew could not have made the mistake.<sup>1</sup> The fact is that λαῖλαψ was not understood. It was a good Homeric word, and its use convicts Mark of an acquaintance with the father of poetry. It is not properly a prose word at all. The supposition of Homeric origin for the language of this episode receives striking confirmation when we compare Mark iv. 39.

καὶ ἐκόπασεν ἄνεμος καὶ ἐγένετο γαλήνη μεγάλη,

with *Odyssey* xii. 169 (cf. v. 391).

αὐτίκ' ἔπειτ' ἄνεμος μὲν ἐπαύσατο, ἡ δὲ γαλήνη  
ἔπλετο νηνεμία, κοίμησε δὲ κύματα δαίμων.

Thus the Marcan episode of the stilling of the storm shows poetic parallelism with Homeric language both in the opening, and in the close with its "windless calm" and a "divinity that sets the waves on sleep."

It is curious that scholars and divines should have carried their doctrine of the Isolation of Israel so far as to prac-

<sup>1</sup> Luke has λαῖλαψ άνέμου : but Luke is a Homeriser and has no difficulty over λαῖλαψ.

tically exclude the interpreters who form the literary bridge between East and West from a knowledge of the literature at one end of the bridge. Surely, if language can tell us anything, it can tell us that more than one kind of uncial type is necessary to mark reminiscence in the New Testament.

If we establish, in a single instance, probable dependence of Mark upon a Greek poet, we establish at the same time the dependence of the same dragoman upon some form of Greek prose, for we may be sure that he passed from prose to poetry and not in the reverse order. The knowledge of the *Odyssey* would make the acquaintance with the *Anabasis* or some easy Greek prose almost a certainty.<sup>1</sup>

We will now approach the subject of Mark's acquaintance with Greek prose, i.e., with Xenophon, from another point of view.

It is well known that among those portions of the second Gospel which are peculiar to Mark, we must reckon the story of the young man who, at the arrest of Jesus in the Garden of Gethsemane, made a spectacular and half-clad appearance, and only escaped arrest at the hand of the officers of the high-priest by disengaging himself of the scanty raiment which he had about him and running away at top-speed. Nothing is said further that would lead us to identify the young man, or to say what became of him ; but, if the incident is historical, as it certainly appears to be, it is natural to infer that the bed which he had quitted was not far off, and that he returned again *minus* his sleeping-gear to some house in the neighbourhood, from which he had been disturbed by the noise and the lights of the police who made the arrest. It is commonly supposed that this young man is Mark himself.

<sup>1</sup> The popularity of Xenophon may be seen from the frequency with which he turns up in papyri : there are now fifteen such papyri published.

Suppose we assume the incident to be historical ; there is really no reason to assume the contrary unless we turn our thoughts in two possible directions : (1) to suggest that it is one of those quasi-historical details which are brought in to demonstrate the fulfilment of a prophecy ; or (2) if its language suggests the artificial imitation of some earlier historical incident for which the literary artist without adequate basis in the region of facts has proceeded to invent a parallel.

For example in Amos ii. 16 we are told that " he that is strong of heart among men of might shall flee away naked in that day ; thus saith the Oracle of Jahveh." It is not inconceivable that the strength of the asseveration at the end of the verse, like the similar oracle at the beginning of the cxth Psalm (the Oracle of Jahveh to my lord), might have invited the inquiry on the part of an early Christian as to when this prophecy of Amos had come into fulfilment ; and a lively invention might have coined a brief story by which to make the proof. It is not inconceivable, for there are some cases of possible artificial fulfilment of prophecy in the evangelical field of view, but it is in the highest degree improbable.

The same thing may be said of the possibility of a literary imitation. For instance, Swete, in his note of the incident, draws attention to the description in 1 Maccabees x. 64 of the honours bestowed upon the High Priest Jonathan, who, according to the Alexandrian MS., is carried through the streets of Jerusalem " wrapped in a sindon," the exact words used of the runaway young man in Mark. The parallel can be made even closer, for in the Maccabee story we are told that when Jonathan appeared thus arrayed, all his political enemies ran away, a phrase which corresponds exactly to the context in Mark (*ἔφυγον πάντες*). As, however, there is really no parallelism between the

two incidents, which can be dignified with the term historical, we do not need to spend time in showing that the incident in Mark cannot have been derived from 1 Maccabees. We shall assume that we are dealing with a historical fragment and go on to find out some more about the young man in question.

If we turn to the Introductory chapter in which Swete discusses the personal history of St. Mark we shall find the following illuminating statement :

P. xxiv. " John Mark had enjoyed opportunities of becoming a serviceable interpreter to an Aramaic-speaking Jew. As a resident in Jerusalem he was familiar with Aramaic ; as a Jew, who on one side at least was of Hellenistic descent, he could doubtless make himself understood in Greek. His Graeco-Latin surname implies something more than this ; *he had probably acquired in Jerusalem the power of reading and writing the Greek which passed current in Judaea and amongst Hellenistic Jews.*"

Swete's statement of the case, which is nearly the same as our own, involves (though he does not recognise the fact) the possibility of a literary imitation, and suggests that, as we have dismissed Jonathan the High Priest, we should turn to the *Anabasis*. Let us look for a parallel to the anonymous young man in Mark.

The *Anabasis* happens to have a precisely similar literary problem. There is a young man (*νεανίσκος τις*) over whose identification there has been a dispute from the earliest times. It was a case of military tactics, not long after the battle of Cunaxa, with regard to which a young man, probably an Athenian, volunteered advice on the plan of campaign (*Anab.* ii. 4, 19). The retiring Greeks had been advised by a spy, who professed friendliness, to be prepared for a night attack, and in any case to set a guard over the bridge of boats on the Tigris. For, said he, Tissaphernes means to destroy the bridge, and then the Greeks will find themselves in a trap between the Tigris



and the Grand Canal. Upon this suggestion Klearchos, the Greek general, was much perturbed. But a certain young man (*νεανίσκος τις*) pointed out that the night-attack did not necessarily involve the destruction of the bridge. What would the enemy gain by that if they overcame us? Many such bridges would not save us. And what would not the enemy himself lose by such a procedure, if the attack upon us failed? It would be they that in that case were entrapped and not we.

Who, then, was the young man whose advice was here tendered with the usual Greek freedom of speech, and involved assumption of leadership? It is a point upon which Xenophon's Greek commentators have offered a variety of solutions. The most natural is that the young man was Xenophon himself. The objection to this is, first that Xenophon talks of himself and his own speeches and actions all through the *Anabasis*, without any circumlocution; second, the question has been raised as to the age of Xenophon at the time, and whether he could properly be described as *νεανίσκος*.

To the second part of the objection the answer is easy; Xenophon is so described elsewhere in the *Anabasis*, so that we need not assume that he had passed out of the ranks of the *νεανίσκοι* into those of the *πρεσβύτεροι*.

To the first part of the objection an answer may be found in the fact that *νεανίσκος* had shortly before been applied to him contemptuously. After Cunaxa, one Phalinus had addressed him, and criticised his speech by saying, "My young friend (*ὦ νεανίσκε*), you seem to be a philosopher, and you are an excellent speaker, but your judgment of the case is altogether at fault." It was, therefore, quite artistic that Xenophon should introduce his next speech with *νεανίσκος τις*, and there is no need to look for a further identification, as Greek writers have done, by

various marginal annotations. The correct note is, "the young man was Xenophon the Athenian," or "the young man's name was Xenophon."

Now as it is not likely that our young dragoman, brought up in Greek prose on Xenophon's *Anabasis*, should have been ignorant of the question about the young man who volunteered advice to the military leaders after the battle of Cunaxa, so it is not improbable that Mark, when writing about himself, should have adopted a Xenophontic disguise, and incorporated a statement in his narrative to the effect that "there was a young man who had come on the scene in his night-gear"; and it would be natural for copyists of the original Marcan narrative to annotate their margins to the effect that

The young man's name was Marcus.

Suppose, then, we annotate our margin in this way. As soon as we do so we find that we are treading on the heels of the Fourth Evangelist. He, *dealing with Marcan material*, has volunteered an identification of the servant of the high-priest in Mark xiv. 47: accordingly he inserts the statement that

The name of the servant was Malchus.

We are at once struck by the similarity of this statement with our previous conjectural annotation. "Servant" and "Young man" are almost equivalent, and the names are very near together.<sup>1</sup>

We know how commonly the Syrian converted his real name into an equivalent Greek name; how, if his real name was Manasseh, he called himself Mnaseas or Mnason, or if his name was Joshua, he called himself Jesus or Jason; and if we are looking for a Semitic original for the name

<sup>1</sup> Compare the forms in which the Gospels tell the story of the centurion's young man.

of the second Evangelist, where shall we find it except in some such form as *Malku*, a form which occurs constantly in Aramaic inscriptions, and which would easily pass over into the Malchos, or rather Malchūs, of St. John. In this way we are able to suggest that the Johannine statement (John xviii. 10) does not belong to the servant of the High Priest at all, but to the young man in the Markan narrative. It was taken from the margin of the Aramaic text without sufficient regard to the place in the text where the annotation belonged.

The statement in the Fourth Gospel would thus be unhistorical where it stands, but historical in another connexion. It would be almost first-hand evidence that Mark wrote the Gospel, and the evidence would also be suggestive that he wrote it in Aramaic as well as Greek ; his real name was John Malku, or perhaps John bar Malku, and his Roman name, John, whose surname is Mark, would be a natural adaptation of this.

No doubt much of the foregoing reasoning is conjectural, and there are one or two flying leaps in the programme : with our paucity of evidence we are obliged to resort to conjecture, and as Matthew and Luke have dropped the perplexing young man, we had no resort for further illumination but the Fourth Gospel which is known to have intimate links with the second. The conjectural method, if it can be justified, may result in the final establishment of the Markan authorship of the Second Gospel. That would be a great point gained.

It must, however, be admitted that if something is gained for Mark, something is lost by Papias and the Elder. For Papias draws the conclusion that Mark had never heard the Lord, except through Peter's ears. This is improbable, if Mark was the young man who strayed into the garden of Gethsemane. The Jerusalem youth must have heard the

Galilean prophet. But Papias did not know any more about the matter than what he found, or thought he found, in his text and in his Gospel title : and it is possible that he has misunderstood quite as much as he has understood. Suppose we question his accuracy, at least as regards his statement about Mark's personal knowledge of Jesus : let us say that Mark knew more at first hand than Papias and the Elder give him credit for.

To sum up the results of this brief investigation. The original Gospel of Mark was issued anonymously with a title imitated from Xenophon.

The title said or implied that it was a memorial of the words and works of Jesus.

The name of Peter was not there at the first publication.

From Xenophon the author took a hint for describing himself anonymously.

On the margin of an early Aramaic copy the name was supplied. This marginal reference was transferred by the author of the Fourth Gospel to his account of the arrest, and assigned to the wrong person.

It is doubtful if the Elder knew any more of the Gospel than its title, upon which he dilates in an obscure fashion.

I am aware that Eusebius makes a different explanation. He has a dissertation on the Papias-and-the-Elder statement in the third book of the *Demonstratio Evangelica* in which he tried to prove that Mark omitted the major part of the Confession of Peter at Cæsarea Philippi, which we find in Matthew. So it was not a case of *nihil praetermisit*, but of committing no error in praetermitting, for did not St. Peter tell him to leave that out when he was making his public addresses ?

I do not think we can project the Eusebian speculation as to the relative contents of Mark and Matthew in a single passage into the mind of the Elder whom Papias is quoting,



and to that extent we may put Eusebius on one side. It is, however, necessary to remind students, who spend their time trying to twist meanings out of the extract from Papias in the *Ecclesiastical History of Eusebius*, that they will do much better to turn to the *Demonstratio Evangelica*, where Eusebius is treating the very same passage of Papias, and that they will find there the very statements which we have been making as to the existence of a *Memorabilia* title for Mark. For example, take the following extracts :

“Mark became a companion and disciple of Peter, and he is said to have made *Memorabilia* (ἀπομνημονεύσαι) of the discourses of Peter on the Acts of Jesus.”

(*D. E.* iii. p. 121.)

“Everything in Mark is said to be the *Memorabilia* of the discourses of Peter.”

(*D. E.* iii. p. 122.)

“We must certainly altogether believe or altogether disbelieve the disciples of Jesus. . . . If they are persons to be disbelieved, we must disbelieve all the Greek and Barbarian writers, who have written Lives or Discourses or *Memorabilia*.”

(*D. E.* iii. p. 122.)

Here Eusebius, commenting on Papias (and on the Elder), makes definite statement that the Gospel of Mark is the *Memorabilia* of Peter. The comparison with Greek writers who have produced *Memorabilia* is suggestive. One sees Xenophon behind Mark.

The objection may perhaps be made that the foregoing analysis is not only too rapid, but that it is unjust to Papias and the Elder whom he quotes. It represents them as not betraying an acquaintance with the inner text of the Gospel of Mark, but only with its title ; whereas it is clear, it will be said, that Papias or the Elder has found difficulties both in the order of the events narrated, and to some extent with the events themselves. Does not Papias tell us that “Mark made no mistake while he thus wrote down some things (ἐνία) as he remembered them” (ἀπεμνημόνευσεν),

and could such language have been used unless the things recorded were themselves matter of debate? Let us see whether this objection is valid.

If we turn to the best manuscript of the *Memorabilia* of Xenophon (Cod. Paris. Gr. 1302), we find that the title is

ἐκ τῶν τοῦ Ξενοφώντος ἀπομνημονευμάτων,

and this title, whether it be the complete one or not, should be correct as far as it goes. The use of the form “*From the Memorabilia*” does not mean that anything is missing in the text, but it might easily lead to such a misunderstanding on the part of a careless reader, who might take ἐκ τῶν to imply extracts; in which case we should have the exact analogy in the *ἐνια* or “some things” in the account of the *Memorabilia* given by Papias. So that this expression has come from the title, and not from the contents of the book. And when Papias or the Elder says that “Mark made no mistake,” he does not mean internal accuracy, but that Mark *nihil praetermisit*. It is an attempt to show that the book is not a book of extracts. We may, therefore, paraphrase the sentence as follows:

“Mark did not miss anything in writing a book ‘From the Memoirs of Jesus’; he was particularly careful not to be guilty either of omission or commission.”

Thus we come back to the previous conclusion, viz., that the Elder is explaining the title *Memorabilia* to people who might be in danger of interpreting it incorrectly. *He is not quoting the contents of the book.*

RENDEL HARRIS.

## THE 'PRESENCE' OF JESUS.

ATTEMPTING to recall the impressions that remain with us from the days when we sat in Sabbath school, most of us would be forced to confess that the mental picture of the Christ, which we carried with us into our maturer years was one of which the outstanding mark was *gentleness*. A very pastoral and idyllic picture, charged with an infinite and melting pathos. Our commonest name for Him has been, not so much even God's "Good Shepherd" (though that, too, was often in our thought of Him), but rather "God's Lamb." Our evangelical Faith has mostly thought of Him as the innocent and unoffending victim and sacrifice for the sinfulness of mankind. And—to some extent unconsciously, perhaps—we have taken the character which belongs to the symbol and affirmed it to be the supreme element in the character of the Man. Gentleness and meekness—these are the readiest words to spring to our lips, when we think of the character of Christ: an amiable and winning soul, the Friend of little children, the idol of adoring Syrian maids and matrons; delicate in features, sensitive as a woman, a frail, slight form, emaciated, pale and worn; inconspicuous as a root out of a dry ground; sad-spirited, one who, as the Church in the days of the martyrs loved to imagine Him, had 'never been seen to laugh, but oftentimes to weep'; unassertive, shrinking from the storm of the world's hate and scorn which broke about his short and tragic way; a Lamb for whom the rough untempered winds of the world were to prove too much in the end.

It is regrettable that the moving beauty of the truth that lies behind that picture of Christ should have been so falsified for us by the prejudice of a somewhat sentimental

piety which has tended to suppress or belittle nearly every other feature, and to make these things dominate almost the entire canvas of the religious imagination. For it is not the full picture, even of the reflective writings of the New Testament. In the very circle of writings which have preserved for us the name "The Lamb of God," there are other words which speak of "the wrath of the Lamb," and "the Lion of the tribe of Judah," a name which tells of strength, and majesty, and absolute fearlessness. And in the Gospel records we may find that other picture too.

Even in His physical appearance there must have been something lion-like about the Prophet of Galilee who became the Saviour of the world. There was majesty in His mien, His step, His presence. He was a striking and arresting figure. When the Roman governor was astounded to be told that He had yielded up the ghost so soon upon the Cross (Mark xv. 44) it is proof that this rough soldier had formed a very different impression of his strange disturbing silent prisoner at the bar than that of frailty and weakness. When the painstaking, conscientious Luke, seeking to glean a true impression from the reminiscent talk of Jesus' early friends—from the mother Mary or from some one who had talked with her—refers with repeated emphasis to the fact that the boy "grew," developed physically, "increased in stature," he surely means us to infer that the young Jesus was conspicuous among the companions of His youth. His tallness was a matter which His mother had been in the habit of dwelling on with fond pride. All the neighbours in Nazareth remarked it. And the phrase "waxed strong in spirit" conveys a false suggestion to our ears to-day. What it really means where it stands (Luke ii. 40) is that He was spirited, alert, mettlesome, the life and soul of every boyish game. All His life long He loved to climb hills and go long walking expeditions. He had no difficulty in ob-



serving over the heads of the crowd on the streets of Jericho, Zacchaeus hidden in the tree. We can see Him speaking to an open-air crowd in Galilee, a man of robust build, somewhat above the average height, broad-shouldered, clean-limbed, muscular, His head thrown back in eagerness, His full and flowing hair parted over a commanding brow, His dark and deep-set Jewish eyes, kind but searching, lighted with celestial fire, revealing the prophet and the mystic—windows of purity through which His soul saw into heaven, wells of love from which flowed exhaustless sympathy into the hearts of those who listened; His voice strong, calm, resonant, reaching without exertion to the outskirts of the throng; His bronzed cheeks aglow with fervour; His hands uplifted or outstretched, His every gesture, lithe and rhythmic and expressive of His theme. Where do we find this picture in the Gospel story? Listen to that exclamation breaking from amid the crowd, that spontaneous irrepressible outburst of womanly admiration, with its human touch of half-envious, yet whole-hearted congratulation: "Blessed be the womb which bare thee, and the breasts which thou hast sucked!" (Luke xi. 27)—happy woman to be the mother of such a son! Surely it was outward admiration—admiration of the manly form of flesh and blood before her. A word like that, naïve and simple in its unrestrained candour, makes the scene flash and live before the eyes. And does not the quick response of Christ, detecting in a moment what was in her woman's heart, confirm this? "Yea rather, blessed are they that hear the word of God and do it."

But that word surely bids us also pass from contemplation of His outward stateliness to dwell upon His inward spiritual majesty. Great as was the immediate physical impression which the Carpenter of Nazareth made on men, by how much more was it deepened and intensified when men

felt—as we may feel it still to-day—the contagion of His soul ? Something of this must have been in Peter's memory when, speaking of the transfiguration, He said, " We were eye-witnesses of His majesty " (2 Peter i. 16). (The Greek word is *μεγαλειότης* ; and the reminiscence seems to come from a disciple, even if the letter cannot be ascribed to Peter.) Something of this must have been in Peter's mind and heart when he speaks of the " times of reviving from the presence of the Lord " (Acts iii. 19). No doubt the phrase, although it may refer primarily to God, has all the added content from Peter's experience of companying with Christ. For this Pentecostal visitation was to Peter simply a restoration of that life and joy, that rest, protection, certainty, which he had found when he walked and talked with Jesus among the fair hills of Galilee in the days before the Cross.

The Gospel records give us ample warrant for speaking of Jesus as possessing " presence," though we need not burden Peter's expression with this meaning. Presence is the name we give to that mysterious quality, that strange magnetic effluence which communicates itself to the bystander unconsciously from the glance, the bearing, every movement of its fortunate possessor. It has been pointed out that a fine physique is not essential to this spiritual endowment, for little men like St. Francis of Assisi had it. And that it does not primarily depend on goodness either, for a fiend like Caesar Borgia possessed it. But when noble souls appear upon the earth, dowered with this extraordinary gift besides, how precious and how lasting is the influence they bequeath to their age, and later ages ! It lasts when well-nigh everything else about them has been forgotten. What is the secret of this effluence ? Does it not depend on the extent to which the soul has moved out to take possession of the body ? They are the men whose very flesh has been informed and possessed to an unusual degree by spirit.

A radiant energy flows from them. Often something in the face reflects and signals the unseen spiritual resources. The world when it comes in contact with such men somehow discerns the soul glowing through the living garment of the flesh, and is thenceforth haunted with the sight.

No careful and unbiassed reader of the Gospels can possibly ignore the fact that this very endowment was possessed by Christ in a measure that is unique among the great ones of the earth. We recall how once His kingly bearing quelled a mob of His own townsmen who tried to fling Him from the rocks in anger; how the money-changers were driven from the Temple-courts before His flashing indignation; how the Sanhedrin officers, sent to take Him, returned without their charge. We recall that weird midnight in Gethsemane, when His figure towering up sublime, compelling, dimly outlined in the torchlight, and His calm voice saying to His would-be captors "I am He," made even the hardy Roman soldiers quail and bow in breathless wonder. We recall the influence of His presence upon the Baptizer at the Jordan, upon Matthew at his desk, upon Zacchaeus among the sycamore leaves, upon Peter prostrate by the Lake, and ashamed in Caiaphas' judgment-hall, on Pilate, on the Roman Centurion who watched Him die. More particularly we would recall that first synagogue service in Capernaum, when He stood up to speak; and there fell upon the throng a hush that was deeper than silence, a magic spell from the presence of this unlearned peasant artizan; and as the address went on the tension grew so overwhelming that a wretched epileptic, unable to endure it any longer, cried out in anguish, "What have you to do with us, Jesus the Nazarene? Have you come to destroy us? I know who you are—God's Holy One"; then shrieked, and writhing in convulsion, fell. Yea, all of them, as well as this poor sickly creature, saw the Man's soul which had

leaped to the surface of His being as He spoke ; the grandeur of His undisturbed serenity ; His absolute sincerity ; His burning moral passion ; His consuming pity, giving the living words that dropped from His lips wings of fire and hands that grasped and would not let them go. And we listen to their whispers of amazement as the throng dispersed : " Who is this that speaks with such authority ? We never heard any man—nay, not the most learned scribe, not even the saintly Hillel, nor the cultured Shammai—speak like this. Glory to God ! Glory to God for it ! " . . . And every time He spoke this amazing glamour fell on those who listened, till the multitudes that gathered under the open sky swelled to a vast living human sea where men trod on each other in their excited eagerness to hear.

When we turn again to watch Him in His private walk and conversation, and in His interviews with individual men and women, the wonder of His magnetic presence grows and deepens on the soul. Who *is* this homeless outcast, this wandering teacher, bearing no credentials from any seat of learning or from any church, before whose presence none the less all sorts and conditions of men and women felt themselves compelled to pay the homage due to a king ? We think of yonder leper, for example, who broke the stern, dread law of Moses and risked the penalty of death by stoning, in order that he might reach the Rabbi as He journeyed on through Galilee on His first great pilgrimage of love. What reckless courage born of desperation this mutilated and unsightly sufferer displayed ! But lo, it melts away in a moment when he comes at length into the Master's presence ; and he *kneeled down* at His feet. We think of the poor maniac, once the terror of the countryside, *sitting at the feet of Jesus*, beside the tombs of Gadara, his eyes never off Him—wistful, wondering eyes—tamed and subdued, dog-like in his devotion to his new-found Friend.



No wonder that the crowds who came to see turned homeward, smitten with a new and stranger fear ! We think of Jairus, proud, exclusive, sanctimonious Jairus, who came to Him as He stepped on shore, returning across the Lake from Gadara. Chief ruler of the Capernaum synagogue, a man of weight and consequence, with a dignity to maintain—yet all his pride is broken down to-day ! And he too *fell at His feet*—the feet of the artisan who made the people's ploughs and yokes and spades a little while ago ! We think of the shy and timid woman, who in that same hour when she heard Him ask " Who touched me ? " dared the staring eyes of the multitude from which the long seclusion of ill-health had made her so averse, and *came trembling and falling down before Him*, merely to confess that it was she who had touched Him in the throng. We think of that Gentile mother, who, later, came to this unknown Refugee, by the shores of Tyre, and *fell at His feet*, and *worshipped Him*—a member of the race she hated !—crying, Help me, Lord ! We think of that poor distracted father who came to Him at the foot of the Mount of Transfiguration, and besought Him for his son. His heart was all absorbed in his own unutterable grief, and yet when he came into that Presence, he, too, *came kneeling down to Him*. We think of the Rich Young Ruler, proud of his great possessions, proud of his own manly perfection, reserved, exclusive like his caste, deigning nevertheless to seek an audience with this peasant reformer, who possessed no scrap of worldly power, or place, or prestige—nay, *running* in his eagerness until he stood before Him, and then, prompted by some unaccountable impulse, even he *kneeled to Him*. We think of the mother of Zebedee's sons, masterful, ambitious woman, her heart filled with high swelling thoughts, coming one day into the Presence of this lowly-hearted Man, yet constrained to kneel *worshipping Him* ere she presented her request.

It was a tribute to the greatness of Jesus in her eyes that she was thinking of thrones for her boys in His coming Kingdom. Amazed she saw that in His eyes there loomed the awful sorrow of a Cross; and yet—she worshipped Him! <sup>1</sup>

What was it about the Man that made this motley throng of seekers kneel, tremble, fall down, and worship in His presence—the desperate and the broken-spirited, the cultured and the self-righteous, aristocrat and serf, alien and familiar friend? None of these could have named Him then the Son of God. What was this deep, imperious instinct that made them kneel? A wandering preacher, dust-stained and travel-worn—what was this spiritual garment of commanding royalty in which they all perceived Him to be clad? They could not tell. They could not have given an answer to our questions in the cold halting words of human speech. But the souls of men have their own way of vibrating in response to the Master-soul. “The heart,” said Pascal, “has its reasons which the reason knows not of.” Aye, and the heart has eyes—eyes to perceive what the eye of sense alone can never see—eyes to perceive the signals which are flashed to it from the unseen spiritual world through One whose life is a flame lighted at the Fire of God. And all those seekers saw about this lonely Man a majesty which was not earth-born—the marks of One whose citizenship was in heaven. Nay, as His followers watched Him day by day, they saw that each day He seemed to come before them fresh from the presence-chamber of the Eternal King. The glow of His daily, hourly interview with God was always about Him; an ambassador, clothed in all the ambassadorial authority and sanctity, on intimate and familiar terms with the King of Kings! What could they do but kneel?

<sup>1</sup> The oriental suppliant usually kneels, but only before a superior; and not all of Jesus' suppliants knelt (Luke vii. 4).

It was a new life springing out of death for them just to be in His company, to stand in His presence. It was heaven to walk with Him. He was "the shadow of a great rock in a weary land." It was a land long emptied of the presence of God,—the sky all blotted out by the tangled growth of Rabbis' traditions, the ways all blown over by the desert sands of their weary rules and maxims, and round its inhabitants the lurking shadows of terror and hopelessness and the persecuting demands of an impossible Law. It was a world where dead souls wandered, crushed by debasing superstitions, broken and embittered by an alien oppressor,—all the longings of the heart for the presence of God dried like the brooks in a summer drought—until this Man came. And lo, the nightmare was broken by a beam of heavenly splendour. The banished God had burst the awful bars of religious death that had shut Him out. Once more the great heart of the common people heard God calling in the looks and tones and deeds of this Man. And life revived again. The Lord had visited His people. It was times of refreshing from the presence of the Lord. And they cried, "Lord to whom can we go but unto Thee? Thou hast the words of eternal life."

It was life all these seekers were wanting; and it was life they found—in the majesty of His Presence; rest from their hopeless longings and perplexities, protection from their fears and their temptations—in His calm serenity; comfort for their sorrows—in His sympathy; and certainty in the face of death and the great Hereafter—in the sincerity that came throbbing through all His words. Ah, when they came to Him, those Galilean crowds, sick with doubts, tired of the dusty answers of the scribes; when they stood in the presence of that transparent honesty of soul, and heard Him say a thousand times, "It is so! I say it unto you," their doubts melted, their difficulties scattered

and fled. The value of a religion, it has been said, lies in the pledge it can give of the presence of God. Surely there could be no nobler or more convincing pledge than this Jesus Christ of Nazareth.

The power of this majestic Presence has not spent itself to-day. Men still long for the Man of towering wisdom whose voice rings with a certainty and conviction that cannot be denied, the Leader whose words gleam with a light that the instinct of the heart recognises to be light from heaven. Some time ago one sat dejected, his spirit heavy with the news of friends and familiars slain or wounded in the days of ceaseless fighting, his brain turning and turning again, bewildered with the horror and the madness of the wild nightmare that had fallen upon the world, until at last he found himself repeating :

“What time my heart is overwhelmed  
And in perplexity,  
Do thou me lead unto the rock  
That higher is than I.”

A strange relief, a peace that was not born of earth came back to him. It was this great Presence, Jesus of Nazareth—He who was the Rock in a weary land, nineteen hundred years ago—that became to him that night “the Rock that higher is than I.” No, He is not dead. He has vanquished death. Myriads of wistful seekers, and of weak and broken men, have known Him intimately, and leaned hard on Him, since Calvary—finding peace in His very wounds. His majestic presence towers more commandingly than ever above our Humanity to-day. And a voice comes pealing from the heights : “Lo I am with you alway, even unto the end of the world.”

J. A. ROBERTSON.



*THE EPISTLE GENERAL OF JUDE.*

THIS little Epistle, it would appear, managed only with difficulty to get a place in the canon of Holy Scripture. In the earliest documents of the New Testament literature it does not appear. But later, from well on in the second century, it seems to have secured itself. It is an angry, passionate, but from another point of view a very tender and indeed beautiful little document. It affects one like a fierce hour or two of tempest, occurring on a day which on the whole was fine. It begins with a prayer, and ends with a benediction.

Now, there are quiet and tame days in our experience, and in the situation of the world, when probably it would never occur to us to turn to this portion of the Scriptures. The language would seem to us to be too extreme and outrageous, dealing with abysmal and tragic elements, about which we all had the feeling that of course they were there, but the less said about them the better. We used to make much of the proverb about letting "sleeping dogs lie": but no thoughtful man is quite so sure nowadays that that is wise. If the sleeping dogs are known to be mad dogs, then perhaps their sleep is our opportunity to deal with them so that they shall not awake. We used to say that it is no part of our business to turn up the soil deeper than is necessary. But in days like these, when the soil has been turned up, and when things do stare us in the face, it may bring to our minds a certain comfort to reflect that at least not for the first time have these sinister things appeared; that before our day, and long before our day, when good men had less to help them than we have, they had to face and deal with dark and savage things, in a world which seemed to them to have gone mad.

It is very wonderful that there should be so little of this kind of literature in the New Testament, written, as the greater part of the New Testament was, in circumstances which might well have provoked almost no other feelings. Jude, 2 Peter—and the one either copied largely from the other, or both drew from a common source which has been lost—Jude, 2 Peter, and some passages in the Book of Revelation—there only in the New Testament do we have a good man letting himself go freely, calling things, as we say, by their proper names.

It is very wonderful, I repeat, that the New Testament should show this great economy and reticence in its references to the moral condition of the world which it addressed. It is an evidence—an entirely unpremeditated one, and therefore all the more beautiful and authentic—of the depth to which the mind that was in Christ had already dominated those early writers. Good men take no pleasure in telling sad stories of their fellow-men. If “the evil that men do lives after them, and the good is oft interred with their bones,” it was never good men who were responsible for that. The men who wrote the New Testament might have scarified us for ever with their accounts of what they saw, and of what they knew, and of what they suspected. But no ; they saw and they knew something else, something about God, and something about man ; for they had seen this something about man coming to the surface in the most unlikely places ; and they were so impressed and fascinated by these finer and more beautiful things, that they had not much heart or interest in giving additional evidence of the more miserable side of things.

There is a fine saying in the Old Testament. It is put into the mouth of God Himself. “Who is blind like my servant ?” I should like to think that the words mean, although I rather fear they do not, that a true servant of

God is a man who is blind to a great many things that more knowing and worldly people make much of. Certain it is that you may estimate the true character and final moral interest of a man by listening to him when he tells you of the things he sees, and of the things he knows. For the fact is, the things we see and know and speak about are the things that we ourselves were seeking, and this with an appetite for such things away down in the depths of our nature. And so our Lord enunciated the great principle which, once we give our minds to it, we see is absolutely just and final : “ By your words shall you be justified, and by your words shall you be condemned.” Those who want to know all the bad and squalid and disheartening things about the human race in any particular age since the Christian era, must not go to distinctively Christian literature. Or if they go to Christian literature, what they find of that element they will always find bathed in something bigger than itself ; like a dark cloud in a big sky, its black face towards us, but the true glory of things trying to master it and overflowing at the edges.

## II.

The writer of this short letter has been declared by tradition to be Jude, the brother of James. (In that case also the brother of the Lord according to the flesh, and too modest to say so : or is this reticence confirmation of the later date and of an advanced Christology ?) He writes this letter of his to a Church. He himself was probably a bishop or superintendent ; and most likely he had been consulted on some definite matter or on the general state of matters. *He addresses the letter, I repeat, to a Church.* I should like to dwell for a moment upon the circumstance. Jude knew and accepted the position that it was only to a Church that he had the right to speak in this kind of way ; that

he had no moral authority over the world as such ; that he had no standing as a guide to the world as such, but had a right and standing in his Church. He had the right to say certain things to people who had accepted certain principles. He had no right, and he assumed none, to castigate the world for its neglect of principles which the world as such never had adopted ; but he had the right to castigate the Church for its neglect and perversion of principles which every man and woman of them by their very presence in the Church had publicly professed.

I think that is a point of view which we must never lose sight of. We look out upon a world to-day ; and every metaphor that has been coined by poets to describe storms and earthquakes, and to create in the mind of men the spirit of fear, comes home to us as true. And yet, if I could believe—and in dark days to believe the best, is one's precise task—that here and there and everywhere throughout Christendom there are saving groups who are aware of what they stand for, and are prepared to profess it and if need be to suffer for it, I should have not the slightest misgiving, and should hail the clearing away of all these clouds as a thing as inevitable and fated as the time which in wintry days is moving towards us with invincible feet, when the trees bud, and there return to these Northern lands the sunshine and the swallows and the flowers.

### III.

I am not going into the Epistle in any detail. It is an Epistle to read and ponder and inwardly digest. Serious and careful readers will see things in it which of course one cannot dwell upon, phrases, suggestions, the lifting here and there of the corner of a veil. But all that we can do for ourselves, and when we do it for ourselves it is better done. If we give our minds to it in the light of our own reading,



in the light of what we see in the newspapers and have rumours of from time to time, we shall understand what it is all about. The big and decisive thing seems to be that what our fathers called "the fear of God" had begun to lose its power, not over men out in the world with whom I say again the Church in the first instance took nothing to do, but over people within the Church itself. That seems a very dreadful thing to say, but there you have it.

Scholars suggest that the Epistle was written to break up and oppose a movement that had come into the Church, claiming the authority of the characteristic teaching of St. Paul; that the Church of that time was going wrong on the matter of liberty. Now we have not read any Epistle of St. Paul with ordinary intelligence if we still need to be told how this easily might have come about. St. Paul made everything of liberty; indeed, it might be a fair thing to say that St. Paul coined the word in our sense. You may summarise his whole spiritual teaching in his own great saying: "Where the spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty." That meant, as St. Paul used the words, this, and it is obvious: that Christ has delivered us from the bondage of merely legal restraints and prohibitions. Upon this, minds of a baser sort may rush easily to the conclusion that henceforward, according to St. Paul, there are no ten commandments: which of course is the last thing that St. Paul would have dreamed of saying. The only doctrine of liberty which St. Paul offered to men, and the very declaration of it made his gospel, is that a man who comes under the direct control of Jesus Christ, in that very act, and by assuming that very position, is made free of the whole system of mere rewards and punishments and restraints and prohibitions which are associated with the system of laws. A man who has come under the direct control of Christ is, so to put it, like a man who, climbing a ladder, comes now within reach

of a rope, on which he lays hold, and by which he is raised. If he no longer requires the ladder, it is not because he is once more down upon the earth and content to stay there : it is because now he has risen above the ladder.

Like every metaphor, that one upon second thoughts may break down. It would be simpler to say that there are two ways in which you might fortify a child for going out to meet the world. The two ways do not contradict one another at all ; they supplement one another. But, separating them in imagination for a moment, you might give your child all manner of most excellent instructions, and warn him of the consequences of any breach of these instructions, and so let him out to find his way. Or you yourself might have lived before your child, yourself the embodiment and symbol of everything that was beautiful in those instructions ; and if you were sure that your child loved you, and if he knew that the deepest pain he could ever inflict upon yourself would be to act in a way which would give you pain, then, you might be sure that your child's love for you had given him freedom from the restraint and even from the consciousness of this and that. But it is a freedom, you perceive, which, far from being liberty in the crass sense, is itself a dearer and more intimate bondage.

Apply all that to the love of a man for Christ, and the power of a love of that kind to lift him above the irritations and seductions of temptation, the power of such a love to make him free, and there you have in essence the teaching of St. Paul.

But we can see at a glance how that could all be perverted by minds so disposed. For it is the crucial sign that we have arrived at the very truth when we have arrived at something of such a kind that by merely altering the tone of our voice we can make it mean precisely the opposite of what was intended.

This perversion and subsequent degradation had occurred in the particular Church, wherever it was, to which Jude sent this letter. The body of the letter is occupied with describing those people who have given way to this liberty of theirs ; who have unseated Christ from His place of moral control ; who have kept hold of the liberty, but have renounced the allegiance. "Hidden rocks in your love feasts," he calls them. "Clouds without water, carried along by winds." "Autumn trees without fruit, twice dead, plucked up by the roots. Wild waves of the sea, foaming out their own shame. Wandering stars for whom the blackness of darkness hath been reserved for ever." These are phrases, I say, every one of which bears thinking about. They are good to have in our memory. One day, it may be, when we are reading some sad contemporary story in the daily press or some work of fiction which embodies the restlessness and uncontrolledness of our time, as we follow the hero or the heroine to his or her inevitable place, from which all the ingenuity of the author cannot save them, one or other of those phrases may start up in our mind, expressing precisely what we feel and what we ought to feel. And then, if we lay down the book or newspaper, and close our eyes for a few minutes and bethink ourselves, the very thing we have been reading may become what our fathers used to call "a means of grace." For it may bring before our mind what the Bible calls "that mystery of iniquity which hath been from the beginning, and which still worketh" ; and, before we know, we may find our lips moving in a kind of prayer to Christ to have mercy upon us all.

#### IV.

With that, this little letter moves towards its close. "Beloved," he says, "remember." It would be a sad day for the world if there were no institution, no place, no meet-

ing-house, where people could address one another in terms of affection, and deal with one another as those who mean the same thing by life and who use the great and decisive words—God, Duty, Love—in the same sense. A sad day, too, it would be for the world if there were no place where people had *memories* in common, so that they could stir up all that is best in each other by an appeal to old days. And still more tragic and awful for the world would it be if there were no institution over which, according to the faith and piety of those who frequent it, the Lord Jesus Christ presides.

The Church of Christ in the world is such an institution, in its true and enduring ideas as ancient as the heart of man. And it is a thing which, more than the secular unrest of the world, brings confusion to my mind, that being such a place, rooted in such necessities, the Church of Christ should not be more keenly and passionately loved. I am sure any failure of love towards Christ, and towards Christ in this appointed way, is due in the long run to want of sustained imagination, to a want of that imagination which includes and transcends reason, and takes account of life and death and God Himself.

And so, after the earthquake and the mighty rushing wind, we have the still small voice. After anger and invective, we have this tender appeal. A good man has something more to do in the world than to be angry with its conditions. He has to rally men and women in the depths of their souls. For ultimately, if we ever rise from any lower obedience, it is not by hearing words of condemnation ; it is by hearing words of hope. The words of condemnation which we hear, we have all heard long ago and many a time, and we have heard them from one who knew more about us than any outsiders. We have heard them each from himself or herself. But when we rise it is by an invitation,



by a promise, by the opening in front of us of a door through which we see all desirable and most fair things.

## V.

It is on this tone, like a piece of music which, after storm and confusion, subsides into melody, and sinks into silence on some haunting tender note, that this small episode in literature ends.

“ Beloved, remember how we were warned that all that has happened within ourselves and round about, would happen, and will always happen when the spirit of Christ is dethroned from the hearts of men.” So the writer proceeds, and continues, in effect. “ For the world, I have no definite guidance. For those who, being in the Church, have fallen away, I have said what I have said. Our Lord always assured us that His Church would be saved by steadfast minorities ; and that the world itself would be saved by that steadfast minority which the whole Church is. We have our duties, our principles, our faith and practice. As for you to whom I am writing ; keep yourselves in the love of God. Cherish your faith. Take time to think out what faith means. You will soon learn that, living in this world, you can keep your faith only by repeated acts of prayer. And all the time never allow yourselves to forget that we live in a passing show ; that whatever this world was designed by God to be to us, it was never designed to satisfy us or to be to us all in all. Meanwhile there are those to whom you must be kind. There are others with whom you must be strict. And there are still others about whom, it may be, we have no right to pass judgment. With regard to these last, let us, for ourselves, avoid the things in them about which we know that if we were to show such signs we should do well to be afraid.”

By this time not only is the storm past, and the gentle

winds in which a storm sometimes dies away have fallen, but the quiet evening has come, and God's verger is moving about the sky, lighting the white tapers of the stars ; and all things await the Benediction. " Now unto Him that is able to guard you from stumbling, and to set you before the presence of God's glory without blemish in exceeding joy ; to the only God our Saviour through Jesus Christ our Lord, be glory and majesty, dominion and power, before all time, and now, and for ever more." Amen.

JOHN A. HUTTON.

### *GROTIANISM AND ITS ECHOES.*

BETWEEN the modern mind and the classical theologies—patristic, mediæval or Protestant—a great gulf is interposed by the " Enlightenment " of the eighteenth century. Grotius belongs to the further side of that gulf. He has the distinction of having contributed one more theory to the old world's view of the Christian Atonement. It is true that a fresh attempt to explain the mystery was not in the least what Grotius desired to produce. His purpose was to defend the Catholic <sup>1</sup> faith in Christ's " satisfaction " against the attacks of Socinus. But his train of thought is essentially transitional. He says something quite different from what he believes he is saying. In the end he substitutes—unconsciously—the deterrent for the retributive conception of punishment. The Enlightenment improves on his example by substituting for both the reformatory theory of punishment ; this it does with full consciousness. And, as the assumption remains that the Atonement is a vicarious endurance of punishment, Grotius defends the Atonement in words while undermining it in thought, but the Enlightenment flatly denies it.

<sup>1</sup> " Catholic " in the sense of being generally or universally Christian.

On the nearer side of the devastating flood of rationalistic Enlightenment, we see much laborious piecing together of old views, notably of the penal doctrine. But we also see earnest efforts by the Christian mind to formulate the great truth freshly in more credible and worthier terms. Kant revives the stern moral temper exhibited by Anselm and by the Protestant theology. His own theology contains little or nothing to arrest us ; but in philosophy he has laid deep foundations upon which more thoroughly Christian minds have striven to raise new structures. Schleiermacher again states in the grand manner a mystical doctrine of the redemption of character by the influence of the personality of Jesus. Unhappily, however, the sufferings and death of Jesus seem to yield him nothing. He does not so much explain their significance as explain them away. Thus the student of Atonement gains hardly anything from Schleiermacher.

It is not necessary to do more than remind the reader in a word of Grotius' eminence in jurisprudence, and of his pioneer work in the statement of a coolly rational Christian apologetic. We feel it interesting to meet a layman in these regions. Apologetics and still more dogmatics had hitherto been strictly theological preserves. Yet perhaps this layman, for all his genius, fails to lead theology into the fresh air. Rather he substitutes the pedantry of a lawyer for the pedantry of divines. His manner in debate is stilted and academic, and he quotes usages of law from many different lands and ages, as if all were revelations from God Himself and binding precedents for faith.

Independently of whatever impulse Grotius imparted to the rising forces of the Enlightenment, he established a school which lasted until yesterday, and perhaps lingers still in corners to-day. While he speaks in round terms of Christ's enduring "punishment," his own characteristic

views are summed up—by himself—in the affirmation of “rectoral justice” in God, and of “penal example” in Christ. He feels the difficulty of defending vicarious punishment; but, as a lawyer, he affirms—and takes our breath away by affirming—that, though punishment is necessary, it need not alight upon the particular persons who are guilty. Other theologians have laboured to show that the transference of punishment is thinkable under the unique conditions of the transaction—in the judgment of orthodoxy it *is* unquestionably a transaction—by which Christ redeems us. It was left for a lawyer to tell us that there is no presumption of injustice in punishing the wrong man. Perhaps this does something to explain the curious finding of Dale, that the real drift of Protestant orthodoxy is best revealed in the “degraded form” which the theory assumes in Grotius. Several high authorities have expressed their dissent from Dale’s estimate; and it certainly appears to be unsound, though it may be revealing. It shows us perhaps how the mind of Dale was led to at least partial admission of the need of “something deeper and truer” than legal fictions as a clue to the central mystery of redemption.

The leaven of Grotius worked far and wide. Traces of it have been recognised in the greatest of American thinkers, Jonathan Edwards. His son, Jonathan Edwards the younger, went over to Grotianism bag and baggage, and exercised a wide influence. It is shrewdly observed by Bushnell,<sup>1</sup> in commenting on this New England theory of God’s rectoral honour, that it is “never clear of the old view,” i.e., of the penal theory. In other words, Bushnell recognises in the New England writers what we recognised in Grotius, that the new view is essentially transitional.

In our own country also the theory gained ground.

<sup>1</sup> *The Vicarious Sacrifice*, part III. ch. vi. pp. 310–11.



Samuel Johnson<sup>1</sup> calls attention to a tribute paid to Grotius by Richard Baxter.<sup>2</sup> Johnson told Boswell that he had not himself read Grotius' *De Satisfactione Christi*, but hoped to do so ; and he added, " you may do so too." Curiously enough, at an earlier point in the same conversation, Johnson had enunciated views of the doctrine which one can only characterize as strongly Grotian. That strange theologian and very strange Christian, Boswell, is uneasy at having to record such utterances by his hero ; a footnote adds the assurance that other utterances by Johnson made clear how firmly he believed in " the sacrifice of Christ."

Late in the eighteenth and early in the nineteenth century English and Scottish Congregationalism was strongly influenced by views which were essentially and in most details Grotian. M'Leod Campbell registers these views under the title " Calvinism as recently modified," and very calmly and searchingly criticises them. Josiah Gilbert, in the first of the Congregationalist Lectures, embodied the scheme in a *quasi*-official manifesto. Again, Richard Watson, the lawgiver of Methodist theology for more than a generation, certified that there were two safe and reliable doctrines of Atonement—the penal theory and the penal example theory. When Dale, in a later Congregational lecture, speaks of " an act of at least equal moral energy with punishment,"<sup>3</sup> he has been thought to show something of the Grotian infection.

We may explain to ourselves the movement of Grotius'

<sup>1</sup> Boswell's *Tour to Hebrides*, chap. v.

<sup>2</sup> Dr. Powicke, a high authority on Baxter, thinks this must refer to a passage in *Reliquiae Baxterianae*, pt. I, p. 109. Apparently, Baxter's theology is not visibly tinged with Grotian ideas. His book on *Grotian Religion* is " an attack," and an attempt to show that " Grotius favoured Popery."—According to M'Leod Campbell, Baxter " with Grotius " taught that Christ's sufferings were " equivalent " to sin's punishment, but " not identical."

<sup>3</sup> *Atonement*, p. 451, ed. 25.

mind, if only conjecturally, as follows : He wishes to define what are the principles of just (and wise) punishment. He is not satisfied that the bare fact of guilt demands penalty. It *warrants* punishment ; but no human government will attempt to visit every moral fault with its exact due—and the great lawyer is approaching his task not in the light of the human family, nor yet in the light of abstract ethics, but as a student of politics and of administration. In other words, Grotius begins his task by divesting punitive justice of the obligation to deal equally with all the guilty. Is this right or is it wrong ? Justice has unquestionable affinities with equality. Is not *equity* one of its synonyms ? Distributive justice would be surrendering its task and renouncing its ideal if it did not seek to hold the scales even. But is it possible to carry out the principle in the region of corrective justice ?

A and B are both at fault, but A is punished while B escapes. Does the immunity of B make the punishment of A unjust ? The implication of Grotius' thought is a negative answer. There is no injustice in punishing guilty A because guilty B goes free. A has no right to quarrel with the law merely because it does not overtake every one who was partner in his guilt. His "eye" is not to be "evil" because God's eye has been "good"—i.e., merciful or indulgent—towards the fellow-offender. Is this a true account of justice ? Or is Grotius transferring all the imperfections of human justice to the administration of Him who "without respect of persons judgeth according to every man's work" ?

First of all, it is obvious to any one who knows children that nothing makes nursery discipline so odious as recognisable inequality. That one should be punished and that another who has behaved as badly should escape is, to a child, loathsome injustice. His own guilt, even if admitted,

will never silence him while his fellow-malefactor goes free. This is not a proof that the child's claim is just, though it is a plain enough indication of duty for those who have the government of children. They must not "provoke their children to wrath." Nursery discipline, however remote from standards of abstract justice, is meant to be an administration in terms of moral desert. It is the business of the parent or guardian to make no bad blunder in such matters. *He ought to know!*

In a law court, too, visible inequality is visibly unjust. Say that A and B are both charged; that the same evidence is led against both; that A is condemned and B acquitted. This "will never do." The case is clear. Not justice but injustice has prevailed. If, however, evidence breaks down against B while it is fairly conclusive against A, then A's punishment is just though, in point of fact, B may have been equally guilty and yet escapes.

But can this apply to *God's* justice? He knows everything; may He not be trusted to do exact justice in the end? Strangely, as we think, and yet unquestionably, such an affirmation raises great difficulties. A flies into a passion, strikes his enemy, and kills him. He is a man-slayer, possibly a murderer, and must expect dreadful punishment. B flies into a similar passion. The blow he launches against his enemy "happens" to fall half an inch to right or left of the fatal spot. He inflicts a mere bruise; human justice laughs at the whole transaction, or closes it with a trumpery fine. Was A guiltier than B? He was infinitely unhappier! He can never forgive himself till the day of his death. If, then, B escapes—escapes altogether, or escapes with a paltry sentence—must A enjoy the same immunities? Is there to be a "most favoured nation clause" in the criminal law of God and men? Would that be just? Alternatively, must B be doomed to death

or to hard labour, like A ? Only a fantastic travesty of justice would result from such "equal" dealing.

Or again : B encounters temptation. But he meets it in one of his better hours. He has just parted from a friend—one of the best friends ever man had. The palm of B's hand is still warm with his friend's grasp ; his friend's "God bless you" rings in his ears and in his heart. At such an hour temptation is no temptation whatever ; it falls dead. But A meets the same temptation "in an hour of moral weakness," and stains himself indelibly. Can even the justice of heaven establish equality between these two cases ?

One would infer, not that heaven is unjust, but that literal equality is not always included in the highest equity. There are critical points where the curve breaks. Our age is intoxicated with the thought of continuity ; but physical nature reveals tremendous discontinuities, and moral experience does the same. We know our dangers. We ought to remember them. We must act, and abstain from action, in the light of what we know. We dare not heedlessly strike a blow because most angry blows leave only trifling consequences. In indulging anger we take the risk of doing murder ; and we know that the risk exists. We have no right to dally with temptation because others have gone to the edge of the cliff and have drawn back just in time. While no temptation is fatal, and no sin necessitated, we may "grieve the Spirit till He leaves us and tempt the devil till he comes to us."

These are the considerations that made a good man say at sight of a condemned criminal, "There, but for the grace of God, goes John Bradford." The criminal is not guiltless, nor is his punishment unjust, because Bradford knows in his heart how nearly he fell into equal degradation, or how easily he might have done so. The earth is a dreadful



place, and the life of man is a terrible life. Moral evil is so widely diffused, so deeply and intricately entangled in our being.

The best of all we do and are  
Just God forgive !

The upshot of this long digression, so far as it bears upon our estimate of Grotius' doctrine of Atonement, is that he was not without good reasons for questioning the assumptions on which moralism proceeds and which substitutionism fully accepts, that God and conscience establish an exactly measurable responsibility for sins, and an exact order of demerit among wrong-doers. Grotius expresses his dissent by implication rather than with full consciousness. Consciously, he is seeking to defend the doctrine of Christ's satisfaction. He believes himself to be maintaining that Christ was punished. But he seriously modifies the traditional form of the doctrine ; and we must give him the credit of having detected or at least *felt* its pedantic character, and its lack of touch with real moral experience.

But Grotius' train of thought pushes things much further than this. In one passage he urges that actual moral experience—or actual experience of the administration of law, human or divine—shows that the innocent may suffer with the guilty. And again, that the same experience shows how the guilty may not unsuitably escape. Put these two together, argues Grotius, and you get the Christian doctrine of Atonement. If each half is morally credible, can the whole be morally incredible ? What a collapse is here ! The "counter-imputations" of orthodox Protestant scholasticism were its pride and its strength, vindicating the ways of God to men. A modern might feel that the scheme was perilously like the affirmation that two blacks make a white ; but it passed with its defenders for

something eminently worthy of acceptance. In the hands of its new counsel, the great Grotius, the challenge which used to appeal for endorsement to every conscience has become a shrinking plea of "not guilty" or even perhaps of "not proven." *After all, the doctrine is not morally incredible*; suppose that were satisfactorily established, how poor the triumph would be!

And how can we accept Grotius' logic? Granted that either of two strains will not break down a bridge, we have no proof that the structure can endure both simultaneously. A fair probability, a 2 to 1 chance, is represented numerically by the fraction  $\frac{2}{3}$ . But, if the process has to be repeated, though each part taken separately stands for a 2 to 1 chance, the entire value is not  $\frac{2}{3}$ , but  $\frac{2}{3} \times \frac{2}{3} = \frac{4}{9}$ . Thus the probability of a probability may very well turn out to mean the improbability of the entire fact alleged.

But further still; if all this were granted to Grotius, he has yet to define the principles upon which the apparent demands of justice may be reconsidered, so as sometimes to be carried out but in other cases waived. The principle to which Grotius appeals is "rectoral" justice. What a ruler finds necessary for the good of his state—naturally, for its future good—that will be exacted, whether it be the just punishment of past wrong-doing or "penal" suffering on the part of an innocent person. Suffering which is not necessary for the ends of government will or may be remitted. Here it is that the deterrent theory of punishment, though not formulated by the great lawyer, begins to show its presence and to claim supremacy. Grotius thinks he is still asserting law, justice, punishment. In words he does so. But in logic he has broken with all these. His guiding star, for human or divine justice, is administrative necessity, or rather indeed administrative expediency; for in such calculations moral necessity disappears. Ver-

bally, "penal example" might mean deserved punishment of a wrong-doer when the infliction of punishment is necessary for the good of the State. But penal example in the case of the innocent Christ can only be regarded as a sacrifice to "rectoral justice," which turns out to mean a rectoral expediency that has not even a remote relationship to justice properly so-called. In fact, we have here the naked calculation of Caiaphas: "It is expedient that one man"—one innocent man—"should die for the people."

We agree, then, with some things in Grotius. Or, if not with his conscious theories, we agree with his subconscious feeling that justice, whether in normal administration and government or in the economy of the Christian redemption, cannot be reckoned to scale, as moralism teaches, and as the substitutionary doctrine presupposes. But his solution must be rejected with all possible resolution. Grotianism may be recommended to those who desire to retain the shell of the doctrine and do not care what happens to the kernel; but no informed mind which is truly earnest will tolerate it. We further agree that what Grotius suggests—he does not say it, though some of his followers do; it is indeed the opposite of what his own language affirms—that the salvation which is in Christ does not come about through His bearing the punishment of sin. It comes about, we will add, in a diviner way. We may agree that the sufferings of Christ are in a certain analogy to human punishment, and take the place in the moral history of the world which might have been held by the infliction of penalty as the wages earned by sin. But, while Grotius thinks the death of Christ not too completely a moral anomaly to serve as an inferior yet passable substitute for the punishment of sinners, we must hold that it is incomparably higher and more glorious than punishment—better for man, better in the sight of God, better for the whole moral universe.

And, if we want a word to express this, we may avail ourselves of the old Biblical term sacrifice. In the sacrificial sufferings of the pure and holy Jesus, God is glorified and man is redeemed.

Still further perhaps we might agree with Grotius that the sufferings of Christ will be studied to greater profit in their bearing on human character than in their direct reference to the personal claim of God. But we must beware what kind of influence on the human mind we impute to Christ's sufferings. Grotius thinks of Calvary as a warning, or as an awful example. This is what happens to God's enemies! They get crucified! They go to hell! On selfish grounds it behoves them to lay the warning to heart. It is not in such fashion that the Christian salvation can profit any human soul or any fellowship of redeemed men. Not by scaring us, but by regenerating us; by creating new motives; by breaking our hearts, and infusing into us a contrite spirit; does Christ rescue us.

There is no objection to holding that fear may play a part in conversion. "We mock God if we do not fear." If in terror itself there is an element of conscience, imputing our sufferings to us as justly deserved punishments, then even in terror there may be the moral protoplasm of a Christian heart and life. But this element of promise found in the low beginnings of repentance depends on the presence and on the recognition of *justice* in our sufferings, whether endured in the present or apprehended in a more dreadful future. And that is the element which Grotius drops out—unconfessedly, even unconsciously, but none the less certainly—from his theology of Atonement.

R. MACKINTOSH.



## BEAUTIES OF APOCALYPTIC LITERATURE.

THE literature of Judaic prophecy is not generally credited with beauty. We associate the term "Apocalypse" with gloom and fear and terrible things in righteousness. The mere sound of the word suggests flames of fire and drifting clouds of blackness ; premonitions of doom and warnings of judgment ; the vision of things that are beyond our ken, and the hearing of words which it is not lawful for a man to utter. Longfellow describes the American Civil War as "this dread Apocalypse" ; and, in so doing, conforms to custom. Nothing that is gentle or beneficent or catholic is ever called apocalyptic. That term is reserved for things that may, indeed, have in them majesty, glory, power, sublimity, but that are menacing and therefore unlovely ; wanting in tone and form and tenderness, and therefore wanting in beauty.

But, while this represents an important aspect of the Apocalyptic genius, it does not convey an entirely fair estimate of the Jewish Revelation-books. The writers of these books were possessed of poetic power, and they had, in some degree, the literary spirit ; and authors of whom this can be said are never wholly obsessed by one idea ; nor do they ever fail to decorate their theme, or to illuminate their work with varied colouring. They have an eye for irrelevant beauty and a taste for illogical wanderings. Even if they be fanatics they are yet artists ; although they be messengers on the King's business they are not blind to the wayside flowers or to the glory of the spreading fields. Dante and Milton, for instance, are the most theological of poets, and also the best modern exponents of Apocalypse. But Dante is the author of the *Paradiso* as well as of the *Inferno* ; and *Paradise Lost* is, of all great poems, the most richly

ornamented. The didactic Bunyan is ever a humorist, a poet, and an artificer in words ; and while he is a preacher of justification by faith, he tells us of Mr. Valiant who died with pride in his sword and his gifts and his courage—Mr. Valiant for whom “ all the trumpets sounded on the other side.” Hence we would expect to find something more than a message of doom in the Jewish books ; nor is this expectation disappointed. The idea that this literature is wholly one of gloom and fire is due to the fact that it has been read mainly by persons who have had an eye to controversial ends ; systematic people who have studied it as the servants, not of literature but of dogma.

Now, in considering the subject thus suggested, the difficulty is not so much a matter of material as of method. One might, for instance, adopt the purely literary standpoint and confine attention to felicities of expression, rhythm and imagery, without regard to thought and teaching. But this mode of treatment would be apt to involve us in some confusion, might be very quotational, minute and wearisome, and would be out of place in the discussion of writings which are characteristically religious and ethical. The better plan will be to consider the more attractive aspects of apocalyptic doctrine, trusting to discover beauties of language and imagination as we go upon our way.

## I.

Following this method, then, we may note, first, the higher things in the *ethical teaching* of the Jewish prophets. Much has been said about the faults of this teaching—its vengefulness and venom, its legalism, its habit of regarding all men as righteous who belong to a certain party, and all men as unrighteous and reprobate who are without the party wall. But, while these charges are possibly true in a certain degree and sense, they may yet be advanced with a

wrong intent, may be urged and accepted in an untruthful spirit.

(a) Vengeful, for instance, the Apocalypses are. They sound the trumpet of judgment ; they abound in pictures of perdition ; and they comfort Zion with a prophecy of the day when she shall be uplifted to heaven, and shall see with rejoicing her enemies beneath her in Gehenna. It is to be remembered, however, that this is true of Christian as well as of Jewish Apocalypse. The *Revelation of St. John* strikes the same note as do *Enoch* and *Baruch* ; and the predictions of judgment in the Synoptic Gospels contain no suggestion of pity or compassion. After all, retaliation and retribution are an aspect of the moral order, and an aspect that always appeals to parties or nations that suffer oppression, cruelty and insult. Down-trodden humanity in every age cries for vengeance from under the altar of God ; it longs to hear the voice of the Son of Man in judgment ; and it listens for the footsteps of the Avenger. If in this it be in error, yet is its error " of the truth-finding sort." It is an echo, however distorted, of an authentic word of God. And, when it is not heard, there is something wrong with the soul.

(b) It is said, again, that the Apocalyptic seers, unlike the older prophets, were legalists, sold under the law, in bondage to tradition. But this is a very indefinite charge, not easily stated. " Legalist " is an old familiar term of reproach in controversial theology ; and it has seldom been used effectively. It has never produced much result when employed against Roman Catholics or Socinians or " Ritualists." Its weakness is its vagueness. There is a sense in which all religion is legalist in that it is moral, in that it " with august submission bows to the laws that outlast us all." There is also a sense in which no religion is legalist, since all devout people confess dependence on God and the grace that He

bestows. When, therefore, this ancient accusation of "legalism" is laid against Apocalypse, we wish to know what it means. If it means that the Jewish teachers exalted the Mosaic Law and spoke of it with reverence, then we may agree that it is true. Thus, even *Fourth Ezra* says, "We who have received the Law and have sinned must perish. . . . The Law, however, perishes not but abides in its glory." But, while we admit this, we have to grant also that Jesus declared that no jot or tittle should pass from the law till all was fulfilled. We may concede, further, that some of the Jewish books, like *Jubilees*, affirm that the law is essential to salvation, and that it is identical with the moral order which is everywhere and always incumbent upon all creatures. Yet even this teaching has truth in its heart, since Wordsworth rightly says that by the law of Duty even "the stars are kept from wrong and the most ancient heavens are pure and strong." If this, then, be all that is meant by the charge of Legalism, it is well deserved; but if anything more than this be intended, we may venture our dissent. I can find no suggestion, for instance, in any Apocalypse, of a desire to enforce the Rabbinic elaborations of the Mosaic code. Even the *Book of Jubilees* emphasises only two of the law's requirements—circumcision, and the ordinance of the Sabbath. The *Testaments* anticipate our Lord's own doctrine in the command—

"Love the Lord through all your life,  
And one another with a true heart" (Dan. v. 3).

And one discovers nowhere in any of these books the kind of formalism denounced by Jesus. Indeed, there are many sayings which are inconsistent with anything that can properly be denoted as an unspiritual or mechanical idea of salvation.

Thus, *Fourth Ezra* reiterates the statement that the saved are "such as have works and faith towards the Most High";



and this is also the teaching of the *Apocalypsis Mosis*, which declares that Adam was saved by the pure mercy of God. After Adam's death, Michael says : " God, and we angels also, rejoice with this righteous soul." In the same sense, *Enoch* promises a blessing to all who present an offering " with faith and patience," and even Baruch exclaims :

" Who can hope to come to those things,  
Unless he is one to whom Thou art merciful and gracious ? "  
(II. Bar., lxxv. 5.)

Also, it is to be remembered that the distinctive characteristics of the Apocalyptic mind forbade any real servitude to the word of a carnal commandment. The Jewish Mystics emphasised the doctrine of Fore-ordination ; they believed that their lives and destinies had been appointed for them before the foundation of the world ; and men who are possessed with this conviction can never feel themselves to be truly dependent on any observance, or in slavery to any tradition. Secure in the strength of the divine decree, they are not at the mercy of human power, whether political or religious, whether of Church or of State. No doubt, these Jewish seers, alike as Moralists and as Patriots, magnified the law and made it glorious. But the language they used regarding it was neither definite nor servile ; nor do they shew, as a rule, any interest at all in the minutiae of ceremonial. Moreover, they claimed to be endowed with inspiration from on high ; they held themselves to be of the order of Moses and Isaiah ; and, this being so, it was impossible for them to be legalists in any other sense than that they revered the Statutes of their Faith. Above all, they were concerned with visions and revelations of the Lord ; their imaginations lived amid the glories and terrors of the unseen world ; they inhabited a region of symbol and mystery and hidden meanings, far removed from the ways of those who live by rule and walk the barren paths of

mere convention. In short, they were Mystics ; and mystics of every age and of every faith are able to reconcile conformity with independence, and obedience with liberty—are God's free men. For instance, St. Francis and à Kempis and Tauler, and all the mediæval mystics, questioned no dogma and rejected no ceremony of their Church, yet had their being in a spiritual realm that transcended all these ; and so also the Jewish seers conformed to current religious custom, yet (to use their own language) " feasted on sweet bread from the starry heavens." They were of the prophetic race, they were remote from the rule of arid formalism, they were, in effect, the crypto-evangelicals of Judaism. Thus, in the *Assumption of Moses*, the great Lawgiver declares to Joshua : " Not for any virtue or strength of mine, but of his own good pleasure have his compassion and longsuffering fallen to my lot " (xii. 7).

(c) Now, all this ought, surely, to be kept in mind when we come to consider the unquestionable truth that the Jewish writers often declare a conception of righteousness that seems external and partisan. Their doctrine of justification is entirely eschatological. The great Day of Judgment to which all things move is the Day of Vindication for the Good Cause. But the vindication of the Good Cause implies the justifying of all who support or promote that Cause. Hence, in the visions of the great Assize, we see men standing before the throne in multitudes, and being judged in the mass, as parties and nations. The righteous are those who belong to the right side. Whether they constitute the whole of Israel or only a part of it, they are the elect and chosen Society, pre-ordained to glory and honour, not because of their personal qualities but in virtue of their belonging to the victorious army. This is the Apocalyptic Gospel, and it does not seem to encourage a very searching or spiritual morality, or to imply a keen sense of personal

responsibility to God. It would be a mistake, however, to regard it with great dogmatic seriousness, or to suppose that it was meant to depreciate the idea of individual holiness. Partly it is to be accounted for by the ancient habit of taking as the religious unit, not the separate man, but the society. According to ancient thought, the separate man owed all he had to the organism of which he formed a part, and it was as a member of that organism that he was related to God ; and this is a doctrine that has a truth in it which the Christian Church has always recognised. In the main, however, this custom of reckoning that men were justified as members of a corporate body was due to the object which the Jewish prophets had in view. Their desire was to deliver a message for the times, to encourage those who awaited the Kingdom of God, to strengthen a party in an hour of storm and stress. Hence, their evangel had little to say about the character and destiny of the individual, as such ; it was concerned rather with the character and destiny of the elect people. Whenever party spirit is strong, especially when political and religious interests intermingle, we find a tendency to identify goodness with party allegiance, and to say that those are righteous who are in the right. In Spenser's *Faerie Queene*, Mary of Scots and the Roman Church are all hideousness and corruption ; Elizabeth and the Anglican Church, all glory and spotless purity of soul. To the Roundheads, all Royalists were " malignants " ; in Bunyan's *Pilgrim's Progress* only Puritans are saved ; and, in the eyes of the Scottish Covenanters, the soldiers of the King were " the hosts of ungodly." In every crisis, in short, where the first necessity is the triumph of an idea, personal qualities are not extremely emphasised. And it is along this line that we must chiefly look for an explanation of the manner in which Apocalyptic writers (*First Enoch* and the *Psalms of Solomon*, for instance)

predict salvation for all who are of their own opinion, and speak as if every one were justified whose cause was just. To suppose that they had no higher ethic than this would be to assume a psychological absurdity. They were religious men ; and all religious men know that there is an inner law to be obeyed, and a Judge to be faced in the secret places of the soul. Moreover, their writings prove that they held deeper and wiser and more catholic thoughts than appear in their formal message.

Thus, *Baruch* speaks of " the Judgment of the Lofty One who has no respect of persons " (xiii. 8).

The *Testament of Levi* says : " Work righteousness, therefore, my children, upon earth, that ye may have it as a treasure in heaven " (xiii. 5).

In *Second Enoch* we read :

" Walk, my children, in longsuffering, in meekness, in honesty . . . in faith and in truth, in reliance on promises ; (alike) in illness, in abuse, in wounds, in temptation, in nakedness, in want ; loving one another ; till ye go out from this age of ills to become inheritors of endless time " (lxvi. 6-8).

And the *Testament of Gad* says : " Love one another from the heart ; and if a man sin against thee, speak peaceably to him . . . and if he repent and confess, forgive him. . . . And, though he deny it and yet have a sense of shame when reproved, give over reproving him. . . . But if he be shameless and persisteth in his wrongdoing, even so forgive him from the heart and leave to God the avenging " (vi. 3-7).

(d) But the most vital and most significant question that we can ask ourselves about these books, in their ethical aspect, is whether they display the spirit of a broad humanity. Do they shew any interest in life for its own sake ; any sense of its perennial pathos, mystery, beauty ; any love for men



as men, whether they be saints or sinners ? These things are always to be found in real literature. They form part of the unfailing power of the Old Testament ; they are expressed in many haunting lines and phrases in the classics of Greece and Rome ; Shakespeare is their supreme exponent. When we ask whether they are to be found in the Apocalypses, we are on the way to pronounce a verdict, not only as to the literary value, but as to the ethical status of these books. For it is evident that without humanity, without "the sense of tears in mortal things," without a love of mankind that transcends all distinctions whatsoever, there can be no real insight into the problems of conduct, no sure standards of judgment, no power of framing a moral code that is at all times fit for law universal. And it cannot be denied that the Jewish mystics are somewhat lacking in the qualities we have in view. They are often too narrowly moralistic to be wisely ethical, too exclusively religious to be adequately human, too partisan in mind to be reliable in judgment. Nevertheless, it would be unfair to say that they never display the spirit of the humanist, never shew that they are touched with the feeling of our infirmity, never recognise the pitifulness of human destiny. In *Second Enoch*, for instance, we are told that, in the region of the heavens where the Watcher angels dwelled, Enoch heard no praise of God. He asked why there was silence in this heaven, and was told that the Watchers could not sing for sorrow at the lot of their brethren in torment. Enoch, having vainly interceded for the condemned ones, exhorted the silent choirs that it was their duty to praise God, whatever His judgment might be. Whereupon the angels broke into song again, but "very pitifully and affectingly." This is a true touch of pathos, and reveals the understanding mind which knows that the punishment of sin is pitiful even when it is righteous. It is

remarkable that there is nothing like this in the *Apocalypse of St. John*.

Again, there is a strain of very tender humanity in that quaint and beautiful work *The Books of Adam and Eve*. There is fine imaginative insight, for instance, in their account of the wonder with which the infant race of man beheld the first approach of pain and death. As Adam lay adying he said to his sons, "My children, I am crushed beneath the burden of trouble": and they said to him, "Father Adam, what is trouble?" (*Apoc. Mos.* v. 5).

When the time of Cain's birth draws near Adam prays for Eve, and God sends twelve angels to comfort her. Adam's last words to his wife are full of faith: "God will not forget me, but will seek his own creature. And now arise and pray to God till I give up my spirit into His hands who gave it me. For we know not how we are to meet our Maker, whether He be wroth with us, or be merciful and intend to pity and receive us" (*Apoc. Mos.* xxxi. 4).

Of a like beauty is the prayer of Eve, when her end comes, that she may be where Adam is: "Just as in our transgressions we were led astray and transgressed thy command, but were not separated. Even so, Lord, do not separate us now" (xlii. 6-8). All this is Apocalypse; but it is also humanism. It harmonises with the spirit expressed in the *Letter of Aristeas*, which says that the true friend of man is one who remembers that the life of man is full of pain. "If you understood everything, you would be filled with pity, for God also is pitiful" (208).

But it is, of course, in the *Sabathiel-Ezra Apocalypse* that the sense of life's pathos and mystery is most clearly expressed. And there it is uttered with an intensity that is not surpassed even in the Old Testament. The multitudes of men "are counted as smoke, are comparable unto the flame; they are fired, burn hotly and are extinguished."

Israel is the beautiful thing which God has chosen, "out of all the flowers of the field, this one lily"; yet Israel is withered away. The mind of man is itself his curse and his unrest; "It had been better if the dust itself had been unborn, that the mind might not have come into being from it." The promise of immortality is indeed the supreme sorrow, since it means for the multitude of men only darkness, judgment and Gehenna. "What doth it profit us that we shall be preserved alive, yet suffer great torment?" This is pessimism indeed; but it is the pessimism that is rooted in compassion, a compassion for men so great as to inspire the poet to revolt even against the decrees of God.

(e) It thus appears that the Apocalyptic prophets are not really open to the charge of a bare legalism, or of being without imaginative sympathy, or of failing to enforce an individual ethic. Their chief moral defect was that they rested all their hope of future good in a violent revolution brought about by the sudden intervention of God with His destroying hosts. In this they shewed a certain want of faith, and a failure to understand the method of the Most High in His government of the world. They over-estimated the power of catastrophe and force to achieve spiritual ends. They appear to have thought that bloodshed and massacre were good things, if only they were wrought by the swords of angels, and that final peace and blessing could be attained through wrath and slaughter. In this, it seems that they greatly erred. But, even here, it may be that we misunderstand their meaning through fastening our minds on the mere fashion of their military symbolism. The imagery of mysticism has always a spiritual and eternal, as well as a literal and temporary, meaning. And it is possible that the Jewish seers, in all their terrible pictures of the heavenly armies and their mission of fire and blood—it is possible that they meant only to say that goodness was stronger than evil

and would prevail ; and that this victory would come about, not through human strivings, or any arm of flesh, but through the act of God, the mighty working whereby He is able even to subdue all things unto Himself.

## II.

(a) When we turn our attention to that element in the Apocalyptic literature which pertains to *spiritual faith and hope* we find much that is crude and violent, but much also that is lovely and of good report. Perhaps the most beautiful and significant feature in the religion of these books is the importance that is attached to the practice of *Intercession*. Intercessory prayer is the law of the whole spiritual universe ; in the lower world and in the heavens, among angels and men, in this life and in that which is to come. Death does not remove the soul from the reach of it, and it is not certain that even the great Day of Decision will be the end of its power. Enoch intercedes three times for the fallen angels ; <sup>1</sup> intercession is the perpetual office of Gabriel ; <sup>2</sup> the saints pray for men even after the Judgment.<sup>3</sup> Judas Maccabæus causes petitions and sacrifices to be offered for the souls of his men who have died in sin.<sup>4</sup> The last wish of Adam is that his wife shall pray for his soul ; and it is through the intercession of angels that Adam after death is placed in Paradise to endure purifying punishment that he may be prepared for a glorious resurrection.<sup>5</sup>

(b) And this is not only a beautiful feature of Apocalyptic religion, it has wide theological significance. For instance, it modifies very much our conception of the extent to which Apocalypse asserted the transcendence and remoteness of

<sup>1</sup> I. En. xii.-xv., II. En. xxxv. 7.

<sup>2</sup> I. En. xl. 6.

<sup>3</sup> I. En. xxxix. 3-5.

<sup>4</sup> II. Macc. xii. 38-45.

<sup>5</sup> *Books of Adam and Eve* xxxv. 1-2.



God. We are told by many scholars that this type of Jewish thought regarded the Creator as removed from His creatures ; dwelling apart, and communicating with men only through intermediate beings. But one may be permitted to question this view. It is true that God is represented in these books as seated aloft in the highest heaven ; but this is just the pictorial, Apocalyptic way of saying that He is above all and over all, blessed for ever. It is true also that a great deal is said about angels ; but Jesus Himself believed in angelic ministries, and yet God was not far off from Jesus. It is true that the pessimism of the Enoch writers seems to imply that the Almighty had deserted the world ; but then, these writers were not logicians or systematic thinkers. No ancient writers were systematic after the fashion of Aquinas or Calvin. Philo, for instance, teaches clearly that God is infinitely removed from the creation ; which He did not even create Himself, but brought into being through the Logos. Nevertheless, he asserts over and over again that God is nearer to us than breathing, that He dwells in the soul, that He hears all our petitions and knows all our thoughts.<sup>1</sup> And the Jewish mystics, unlike Philo in many ways, resembled him in this. They certainly asserted strongly the sovereignty and lonely majesty of God, but they did not mean to say that He was unable or unwilling to dwell with men. Why, one of their favourite thoughts is that He will Himself appear in the great Day of Revelation and will live henceforth among His people, receiving them as into a great Father's house. And this is plainly inconsistent with any Deistic conception of transcendence, or with the idea that fellowship with His creatures would be a humiliation of the Divine Glory. Above all, it is clear that these writers, had they been Deists, could not have insisted on the supreme value and efficacy

<sup>1</sup> e.g. *De Gig.* 12. *De Sob.* 13. *Quod Deterius*, 42, etc.

of intercession. Enoch had direct access to the Most High and spoke with Him face to face ; and Eve saw straight into heaven, and beheld the soul of her husband in Paradise and the merciful hand of God outstretched to save him. The Apocalyptic universe was a Temple of prayer, whose chiefest glory was the offering of unselfish petition for every creature : and such a universe is certainly one in which God is, not only over all, but in all and through all.

(c) The general doctrine of God presented in these books has of course a hard, a savage, side to it—as when it is said : “ Ye sinners, your Creator shall rejoice at your destruction.” But it has another and fairer aspect. He is called “ the Father of Light ”; “ the Lord of Spirits ”; “ the Lord God Almighty ”; “ the Invisible One who seeth all ”; “ the Saviour ”; the “ All-Wise.” He is the “ Author of Beauty ” and of all good things ; “ the Bountiful ”; the “ Benefactor of the whole world ”; “ He who is blessed forever.” Even New Testament Apocalypse has no more perfect sense of the Divine Majesty than is to be found in these Jewish books. St. John saw no more splendid visions of the Most High than were given to Enoch. “ The Great Glory sat on (His Throne) and His raiment shone more brightly than the sun and was whiter than snow.” “ Ten thousand times ten thousand stood before Him ; yet He needed no Counsellor.” Consider also this saying of the Patriarch Enoch, concerning the burden of the prophetic office :

“ You look upon my eyes, the eyes of a man . . . but I have seen the eyes of the Lord.

“ You see, my children, the right hand of a man that helps me, but I have seen the Lord’s hand filling heaven as He helped me.

“ You see the compass of my work, like your own, but I have seen the Lord’s limitless and perfect compass, that has no end.

“ You hear the words of my lips, but I have heard the words of the Lord. . . .

“ Who can endure that infinite pain ? ” (II. Enoch xxxix. 4–8.)

Nor are more intimate thoughts of Him left unexpressed :

"We needs must love God the Father, the Wise, the Everlasting."

"I was beset with hunger, and the Lord Himself nourished me."

"I was alone, and God comforted me."

"I was sick, and the Lord visited me."

"I was in prison, and my God shewed favour unto me" (Sib. Or. V. 60: Test. Jos. i. 5-9).

(d) The security with which the Jewish mystics rested their faith on a God immediately apprehended is, indeed, shewn by their failure, as a rule, to accentuate the idea of a Messiah. Of all the Enoch writings only the *Similitudes* has any full Messianic doctrine. The *Visions of Enoch* no more than recognises that doctrine. The remaining books of this series omit it altogether. Besides the *Similitudes of Enoch*, only the *Testaments* and the *Psalms of Solomon* present the figure of the Anointed One as essential to the great Drama of Redemption; though, of course, he appears in parts of IV. *Ezra* and II. *Baruch*. The ruling idea of Apocalypse was not the personal Messiah, but the Kingdom conceived as a pure theocracy, a direct Reign of God. In its typical visions of the Age to come, God Himself is the Judge, Redeemer and Ruler of men. Yet there is profound religious genius in the conception of the Messiah that was sometimes attained by Jewish prophecy. That conception is, indeed, not wholly without foreshadowings of the Christian belief. In the *Testament of Benjamin*, for instance, it is predicted that "a blameless one shall be delivered up for lawless men, and a sinless one shall die for ungodly men" (iii. 8).<sup>1</sup> In the *Visions of Enoch*, also, the Messiah is figured under the likeness of a bull, which later is changed into the similitude of a lamb (I. En. xc. 38);<sup>2</sup> and this seems to suggest that the great Deliverer will put off the aspect of power and terror and put on that of quietness

<sup>1</sup> Not a Christian interpolation.

<sup>2</sup> For defence of this reading see Charles' note in *Apocrypha, etc.*, of O.T.—The lamb afterwards becomes "a great animal." The symbolism is obvious.

and meekness. In one of the older parts of IV. *Ezra* we are told that the Messiah will die at the close of His earthly reign, along with all men then living (vii. 29) ; and though there is no suggestion here of vicarious suffering, there is the idea of the Christ sharing the lot of mortality and of His death being a prelude to the coming of the Consummation. But, however this may be, the Jewish seers had certainly achieved a Messianic doctrine that was in some respects an advance upon that found in the Old Testament. They saw, as greater prophets had not always seen, that the Redeemer of the Chosen must Himself be free from sin ; that the Judge of men must be more than man ; that He who should establish the everlasting order on earth must Himself issue forth from that eternal Kingdom which is forever hidden in God. Hence the vision of the Pre-existent Son of Man, the Vindicator, the Holy One, the Divine Christ, the spotless Priest and King, descending from heaven with hosts of angels, to judge and to rule and to bless, in almighty power, in perfect wisdom and in spotless purity of soul. That such a vision should have been given to these unknown prophets of Judah is one of the marvels of history and of divine revelation. It is true that the Messiah of Enoch's dreams, as of St. John's, displays no mercy towards those who are without the Kingdom, but it is also true that He is full of grace and tenderness in His relations with the heirs of glory.

" His countenance had the appearance of a man, and his face was full of graciousness, like one of the holy angels."

" Before the sun and the signs were made,  
Before the stars of the heaven were created,  
His name was named before the Lord of Spirits" (I. En. xlviii. 3).

" And with that Son of Man shall (the righteous) eat,  
And lie down and rise up forever and ever" (I. En. lxii. 14).

" He proclaims unto thee peace in the name of the world to come,  
For from hence has proceeded peace from the foundation of the world. . . .



With Him shall be their dwelling place and with Him their heritage,  
And they shall not be separated from Him forever and ever and  
ever" (I. En. lxxi. 15-16).

(e) Yet, it is not in their accounts of the Messiah, but in their predictions of the Consummation itself and the glories of the age to come, that the Jewish mystics reveal the full measure of their power. These are commonly regarded as gloomy writers; yet they are not depressing writers, for they are full of life. They were probably happy men, for they did their work not only with zeal but with zest. They had the love of highly vitalised natures for clear sounds and bright colours, for vivid, forceful, splendid things. Whether they were depicting the terrors and majesties of the Great Day, or the wonders of the unseen state, or the sufferings of the lost, or the blessedness of the redeemed, their energies never flagged, their interest did not wane, their confidence did not fail. Especially is this true of them when they turn their thoughts to the Beatific Vision and the things which God hath reserved for them that love Him. Whenever they approach this aspect of their message, even when they speak only of the passing of this present order that the new order may appear, they are inspired with freedom and beauty of speech.

"For the youth of the world is passed . . .

And the pitcher is near to the cistern,

And the ship to the port,

And the course of the journey to the City,

And life to its consummation" (II. Bar. lxxxv. 10).

An equal power, though of a different kind, is shewn in those prophecies of the Advent and Judgment which are so familiar to us through their New Testament parallels. Their greatness is sufficiently attested by the appeal that they made to the minds of Jesus and His Apostles.

As to the Apocalyptic vision of the Kingdom itself, the only fault to be found with it is that it is generally somewhat

narrow, aristocratic and exclusive in its character. When we consider the enthusiasm, the care, the lavish poetic colouring that are devoted to the describing of the New Jerusalem, our admiration is somewhat dulled by the reflection that this New Jerusalem was to be but a small thing after all—the inheritance of Jews only, perhaps of no more than a fraction even among them. So limited an idea of the end to which Creation moves seems, perhaps, more pitiful than great, nearer to the ridiculous than to the sublime. But this narrowness of view was really no essential of Apocalypse. The *Testaments* declare over and over again that the Kingdom will be universal, that during Messiah's reign all sin will perish, and that all the Gentiles will be saved, nay, that even the Israelites will be judged according to the best moral attainment of the Pagan world. In the *Books of Adam and Eve*, also, the divine promise to Adam is: "I have said unto thee that dust thou art and unto dust shalt return; behold, now I speak unto thee of Resurrection. Thou shalt rise again in the Resurrection *with all that are of Thy seed.*" This is the promise of a universal Resurrection of blessedness, and implies a universal kingdom. Moreover, it is to be remembered that the Apocalyptic vision transcends its own logical limitations, and that its symbolism, like all poetry and all beautiful things, is of limitless meaning and has eternity in its heart. (This is a matter that ought to be kept in view when we are considering the prophecies of St. Paul, and seeking to determine their possible sweep.)

But, however this may be, it is certain that the imagery of immortal hope contained in the Jewish books has never been surpassed, nor is ever likely to be outgrown. Even the early Christian writers living in the splendour of faith's bright morning felt no need to invent any new expression of their thoughts about the incorruptible inheritance reserved

for them in heaven. Nay, there are treasures of symbolism in the Apocalyptic writings which the apostolic teachers never used. It is, indeed, difficult to think of any happy or lovely thing in nature or human life that is not used by these mystics of Judah to set forth the joys of the redeemed. The riches of the old world are exhausted to embellish the world to come. Trees and flowers and fruits, green fields and harvest-homes, rivers and sunshine and starlight and the melodies of nature ; the splendours of kingly palaces, of shining raiment, of silver and gold and precious stones ; the pleasures of feasting and fellowship, of ease after labour, victory after battle, peace after pain, "port after stormy seas," of deepening knowledge and widening service, and abounding youth,—all these, and many other earthly goods, are made the symbols of things to come. Nor is there any want of moral and religious elevation even in the most material and concrete of the Apocalyptic pictures. Righteousness and holiness, communion with God and His Son, increasing likeness to the Messiah, ministry and adoration and praise—these are the essence of immortality, and these are the crown of eternal life.

"And they shall have been clothed with garments of glory,  
And these shall be the garments of life from the Lord of Spirits  
And your garments shall not grow old,  
Nor your glory pass away before the Lord of Spirits" (En. lxii. 15-16).

"And the righteous one shall arise from sleep,  
And walk in the paths of righteousness,  
And his path and conversation shall be in eternal goodness and grace . . .  
And he shall walk in eternal light" (En. xcii. 3).

"And they shall be changed into every form they desire,  
From beauty into loveliness,  
And from light into the splendour of glory" (II. Bar. li. 10).

"For you is opened Paradise, planted the Tree of Life ;  
the future age prepared, plenteousness made ready ; a City

builted, a Rest appointed ; good works established, wisdom restored ; the evil root is sealed up from you, infirmity from your paths removed ; and death is hidden ; corruption forgotten, sorrows passed away ; and in the end the treasures of immortality are revealed " (IV. Ezra viii. 52-54).

I have tried thus, briefly, to recall some of the more attractive and benignant aspects of this old literature. The faults of it are apparent to all men ; but its great qualities are not always recognised. A singular dislike and even contempt are apparent in the attitude towards it of many Christian writers. And it is surprising that this should be the case ; nay, it is more than surprising that men who stand on the ground of our historic faith should find it in their hearts to belittle books to which that faith has been so great a debtor. In the hopes which Apocalypse expressed, the early Christians lived and died. In its imagery and symbolism, all our fathers bodied forth their thoughts of immortality ; in the world which it portrayed the ancient and mediæval believers had their being ; by its teaching all the doctrines of the Gospel have been coloured ; to its influence, far more than to that of Pagan inheritance, are due those ideals of worship which still prevail throughout the greater part of Christendom. Above all, it expresses a tradition that was dear to the heart of Jesus ; who was acquainted with some of its books ; who spoke in its language ; who consecrated by His use its simple forms and ancient imagery. In Apocalypse, then, it would be a strange thing if we found no beauties, and a pitiful thing if we discovered no truth.

J. H. LECKIE.



## THE DIVINE JULIUS.

JULIUS CAESAR was the Alexander of Roman History. There is the same element of meteoric success—and the same element of tragic failure. And the passage from the one to the other has the same twofold character in both, the sudden end of life, followed by the collapse of a scheme founded upon a wrong method. Both were succeeded by a dynasty of autocrats, Alexander by several such dynasties; but these autocrats built upon a more solid foundation and soon worked out for themselves a more or less stable system, destined only after some centuries to go the way of all autocracies. The hellenistic kingdoms, indeed, were on the whole fortunate to fall to such a conqueror as the Roman, who with a not unhealthy contempt for his new subjects or so-called allies mingled a reverence for Greek art and literature.

The history of the Diadochi, or successors of Alexander, and more especially their relation to the growing power of Rome, was a subject much neglected even when the study of classical Greek most flourished; and for what may we hope now? Yet without much attention to this history, who shall understand the *praeparatio evangelica* for the world-mission of Christianity? Saul, steeped in the Old Testament and in the tradition of the rabbinical schools, and ready to discourse from morn till eve upon Moses and the prophets (*Acts* xxviii. 23) is yet a citizen of no mean hellenistic city, and the wide world listens to a Greek orator, and understands the glad tidings from

Palestine ; moreover he proclaims himself a Roman, and none dare touch him. It is the law of imperial Rome that saves him, only to do him to death later ; to Alexander he owes more, the very possibility of his apostolate. Rome thus upheld what Alexander had let fall, and by incorporating in her empire the truly hellenised (or may we say, hellenisticised ?) parts of his conquests stemmed the advance of the oriental. Later, the hellenistic portion of the Empire was separated off, and long survived the shattering of its yoke-fellow, only to perish in a more tragic end. Old Rome had in her turn conquered her conquerors, and civilised the West ; but New Rome could make nothing of the devastating Turk. To-day we revenge her ruin, but cannot revive her corpse. The failure of Alexander was never seen so lurid as now ; but the fair fruit of Caesar's failure is heroic France, the daughter of a Rome turned to Christ.

Nevertheless Caesar did indeed fail, and that in much the same way as Alexander, for in both cases the root of the evil was probably to be sought in Egypt. Both plunged into a world of oriental pageantry, of political and religious absolutism, and were dazzled by the superhuman glory to which it called them. They did not understand that from a political and religious point of view this was an inferior culture, that to govern free Macedonians or Romans was a nobler thing than to be master of a multitude of slaves ; that if the ruler claimed divinity, any religion worthy of the name must fight down that claim, or itself become a mere apanage of the court. The story of Alexander has been told by the present writer in the *EXPOSITOR* for February, 1913. His successors took up his claim to divinity, no less than to military absolutism, but with far greater caution, so that the outward form, and even the general spirit, of their despotism varied according to the

mentality of their respective subjects.<sup>1</sup> The Egyptian expected most; the Macedonian would tolerate least. And the Macedonian, be it remembered, for all that his land had been so drained of its man-power to furnish soldiers and colonists, fought best in the hour of trial; to live in Egypt, as in Asia Minor, was to cease to be a man. When we find the hellenistic despot established once more in New Rome, he is still all too ready once again to put his hand upon things divine.

Alexander's imagination was fired by his visit to Ammon, but Caesar's by the spectacle of the hellenistic god-despot, and most of all, likely enough, by contact with Cleopatra and the Ptolemies, such as was afterwards the bane of Antony. The demagogue fighting an oligarchy almost of necessity, as Aristotle saw, becomes a tyrant; and the only form of absolutism that Caesar could know was based on godhead. Was it wise to go to such a length? Caesar, with as little sympathy for religious as for constitutional ideals, was scarcely likely to ask himself that question. Overwhelming force and overwhelming popularity—these he sought and attained; and did they not point him to the goal? Yet there was sterner stuff about him than he knew; the Roman senator was soon to turn to grovelling, like the Athenian citizen worshipping Demetrius, but as yet even the unprecedented clemency of the tyrant was intolerable. They turned and rent him, vainly hoping to move back the clock of history. They could not expect in the man to destroy the system, since system as yet there was none; but it was now to be evolved by one more statesmanlike than the slain. Julius Caesar long occupied the very first place in the tale of Rome; but in the drier light of modern investigation it is plain that he must resign

<sup>1</sup> In this connexion I may refer to my article on "The Diadochi and the Rise of King-Worship" in *The English Historical Review* for July, 1917.

it to his adopted son. The public agitator, the successful general, the would-be god-despot, is not to be compared as a historical figure with that frail man, prudent far beyond his years, who revered his memory and carried on his name, yet understood but little of the handling of troops, and distrusted the mob. Augustus was before all things a statesman, and played his cards well ; Antony was no match for him, being but a plain soldier, in so far as he was not a debauchee. No further mistake of the grosser kind was made. Augustus veiled his supreme power, and made a pretence of sharing it with the senate ; his godhead he tempered also, according to the class of subjects called upon for veneration. It was least obtrusive at Rome. And yet in this case too we must ask, was it wise ? For Augustus, as for many of the worldly wise before and after, religion was but a department of politics ; the use he made of it was at bottom profoundly cynical, and he did not understand that, like Alexander and the Diadochi, he was levelling western freedom down to oriental servility, and identifying loyalty with sentimental agnosticism. When the real thing came upon the scene, a religion that was a living and divine fire, the system upon which he had bestowed such painful care would burn, in the day of the Lord.

Mr. Edward Fiddes, in an article treating of “ The Beginnings of Caesar-worship,” <sup>1</sup> has concentrated in the main upon the Roman precedents for the cult. His admirable treatment of the subject may too easily escape notice, since those with which it is published deal with more recent topics ; but it is important to show, as he has done, that in the case of Caesar, as with Alexander, the imported notion of personal divinity might to some extent be regarded

<sup>1</sup> In *Historical Essays*, edited by Professors Tout and Tait (Manchester University Series).



as the culminating point of a home development. And in whom should it culminate better than in Caesar ? Naturally it was chiefly the heroes of the popular party that had been idolised ; and to Marius, Caesar was actually related by marriage. Yet in such traces of worship as we find, may we not suspect Greek influence ? It was too strong ever to be distinguished sharply from what was more strictly the evolution of the native religion. What Roman literature or Roman religion would have been apart from the overpowering domination of a decadent Greece, it is difficult to say. At all events religion suffered as much as literature gained ; in the latter the great models could be studied, whereas the former was more dependent upon living discourse and environment. The simple awe of the earlier Roman was shocked by the Greek's impudent familiarity with his gods, and subverted by the doubts of his philosophy ; the assault was too overwhelming to allow of patient thought or reconstruction. The wonder is, not that the Roman owed so much to the Greek, but that he did not owe far more ; to the end he retained much true greatness that he could never have derived from the *Graeculus esuriens*. And so even in this matter of the prostitution of religion to ruler-worship, it is not without some relief that we see Augustus' efforts to avoid offence. Nevertheless in a sense he was pulling down with one hand what he was building with the other. That very mentality which stuck at calling a ruler plain god, was a valuable asset if he really meant to build up again the national religion. In so far as there was anywhere a vestige of true religion, there he could expect opposition ; where his plans were most readily accepted, there he could be sure that the effect was little more than skin-deep. Perhaps it would have been worth Mr. Fiddes' while to bring out more at length the forces opposed to king-worship, as to

kingship itself; a task not without a meed of glory for the old Roman religion, a twin institution to the Roman law, offspring of the same deep-set *gravitas*.

But in matters of philosophic or religious thought the up-to-date Roman, ignoring the simple strength of his native tradition, prided himself upon submitting to the tutelage of the ever-plausible Greek; and to the Greek his political ruler was by this time almost of necessity divine. Nor was this mere matter of abstract doctrine. Long before the yoke was firm upon it, the hellenistic world had seen where lay the true power. The light burst upon them when Titus Flamininus defeated Philip of Macedon in 197 B.C., and repeated a rather old trick of the Diadochi in declaring the Greek states "free." Doubtless it really meant something to them, and there was genuine enthusiasm; later on an oppressive proconsul was likely to receive at least as much worship as a just and kind one. The first temple to Rome itself was erected by the Smyrnaeans in 195 B.C., and was followed by other such. Titus Flamininus himself received worship at Chalcis in 191 B.C., after having persuaded Manius Glabrio not to punish the town for the support which it had given Antiochus. Plutarch in his life of Flamininus (chap. xvi.) tells us that they dedicated their gymnasium to him, along with Heracles, and also the temple to Delphian Apollo, who in this case was naturally the sharer of the honour. They appointed him a special priest, and he quotes from their hymn:

Sing, maidens,

Great Zeus, and Rome, and Titus also, and the Good Faith  
of the Romans.

The Good Faith (*Πίστις*) of the Romans seems to be a goddess invented for the occasion. Thus Flamininus is a *σύνναος θεός*, a cult-sharer, both to Rome and to Greek gods. Again, in 167-6 B.C., after the final subjugation

of Macedon, Prusias, King of Bithynia, prostrated himself before the Senate and hailed them as Gods Saviours (Polyb. 30. 16). What need to carry on the sorry tale? The pace grew hotter and hotter, most of all when the despotic short-service governor arrived. Cicero reckons it to his own credit that he declined temples, although the Roman law expressly allowed them! (Cic. *ad Att.* 5. 21. 7 : *ad Q.F.* 1. 1. 9).

To come now to Caesar himself. Mr. Fiddes has shown how the Roman nobility of the later republic devised for themselves divine origins; and Caesar, in his funeral discourse over his aunt Julia, who was the wife, significantly enough, of Marius, claimed for her, and consequently for himself also, descent from the ancient king of Rome, Ancus Marcius, and by the Julii from the goddess Venus. "He had scarcely crossed the Rubicon before an officer in his camp jestingly alludes to him in a letter to Cicero as the *Venere prognatus*,<sup>1</sup> and a day or two later Cicero himself is telling Atticus<sup>2</sup> that the cities of Italy are welcoming Caesar as a god."<sup>3</sup> *Venus Genetrix*, too, was the watch-word in the two supreme battles of Pharsalus and Munda.<sup>4</sup> In the East, needless to say, his divinity was amply recognised; to the Ephesians in 48 B.C. he is not merely "high-priest (*i.e.* *Pontifex Maximus*) and emperor (how else may one translate *αὐτοκράτορα*?) and consul for the second time," but also "the God Manifest,<sup>5</sup> descended from Ares and Aphrodite (meaning of course Venus once more), and the common saviour of human life."<sup>6</sup> Elsewhere we find

<sup>1</sup> *Ep. Fam.* viii. 15.

<sup>2</sup> *Ep. ad Att.* viii. 16.

<sup>3</sup> Fiddes, *Beginnings of Caesar-worship*, p. 15.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. W. Warde Fowler, *Julius Caesar*, p. 9.

<sup>5</sup> I have discussed this latter title with some care in the *Irish Theological Quarterly* for July, 1919: "Ruler-worship in the Bible."

<sup>6</sup> Dittenberger, *Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum*, ed. 2, No. 347 (C.I.G. 2957).

him called "god and emperor and saviour of the world."<sup>1</sup> But indeed there is no need to look to the provinces for the development of the cult; the Roman Senate itself was zealous (and abject) enough. It would be tedious to enumerate all the honours paid him even at Rome, that more or less directly implied divinity; it may suffice to touch upon the chief. The fullest account of them is to be found in Dio Cassius, but there is corroboration enough in other authorities to satisfy us that in the main his story is true.

We may begin with the honours paid him after his victory over the Pompeians in Africa (46 B.C.), honours which we are assured would have been ampler had he allowed it (Dio Cassius xliii. 14). The senate was not backward in adulation, but even Caesar, while lacking the surer instinct of Augustus, could not but see that his popularity might suffer. According to Dio Cassius, his statue was set in Jupiter's temple upon the Capitol, with the inscription, *ἡμίθεός ἐστι*. This is a curious title, but appears to be guaranteed in its Latin form, *Caesari emitheo*, by the reference to Baebius Macer made by Servius on Vergil's ninth Eclogue. This statue represented the "demigod" with the world beneath his feet. But a bad omen, an accident to his chariot on the first day of his fourfold triumph, sent him clambering up the steps of Capitoline Jove on hands and knees—forgetting, as Dio rather drily remarks, the statue and inscription he had put inside that temple; but later he removed the inscription. After his further victory over the Pompeians in Spain, however, matters went much further. Appian, in his second book on the Civil War, and Suetonius, no less than Dio, expatiate upon the honours paid him, some of them explicitly divine. His statue, for example, was to be in all the temples of Rome, by those

<sup>1</sup> C.I.G. 2369, quoted in *Beiträge zur alten Geschichte*, No. 1 (Leipzig, 1901): *Zur Geschichte der antiken Herrscherkulte*, by Ernst Kornemann.



of the gods ; it seems to have been as a tribute to his divinity that a third priestly college of Luperci was instituted and named the Julian (Dio Cassius xliv. 6 : Suetonius, *Caesar*, 76) ; Dio tells us (xliii. 5) that his statue in the temple of Quirinus bore the inscription, *To the Invincible God* ; Appian seems to be referring to the Senate when he says (*Bell. Civ.* p. 494) that many temples were voted in his honour, but it must be confessed that this seems a little doubtful, though Suetonius' mention of temples and altars in the plural might be alleged in support of it.

The climax, according to Dio (xliv. 6), was when the senate decreed outright that he should be called Jupiter Julius, and that a temple should be erected to him and to his Clemency, apparently a new goddess now summoned into being ; Appian (*ibid.*) adds that the two were to be represented as clasping hands. The corresponding priesthood was invested with peculiar dignity, and conferred upon Mark Antony—a fact which Cicero at a later date had no mind to let him forget (*II Philipp.* 43 : *XIII Philipp.* 19). For at the time of Caesar's death the temple had not yet been built, and therefore Antony did not enter upon his office. When he did so some years later, it was by way of compliment to Augustus (Plutarch, *Antony*, 33). Plutarch, indeed, found this temple well deserved, by reason of Caesar's mercy to his foes (*Caesar*, 57) ; and even Cicero, breaking his silence to return Caesar thanks for the pardon of Marcus Marcellus, passed with suspicious rapidity from mention of Caesar's "unwonted and unheard of clemency" to that of his "incredible and almost divine wisdom" (*Pro. M. Marcello, ad init.*).

The "Liberators," having murdered Caesar, knew not what to do further, at a time when strenuous action was imperative, if they were to forestall a Caesarean reaction. As things were, not merely the soldiers, but the city rabble,

revered his memory. An altar was set up where his pyre had been (Dio, xliv. 51 ; Appian, *Bell. Civ.*, pp. 521, 527 ; Suetonius, *Caesar*, 85 ; Cicero, *I Philipp.* 2 ; *II Philipp.* 42 ; *ad Fam.* ix. 14), and sacrifices were offered thereon as to a god ; but the consul Dolabella overturned it, thus winning praise—short-lived enough—from Cicero, his father-in-law. Cicero probably saw clearly enough whither such a worship would tend ; but he committed a fatal blunder in breaking with Antony, and thinking he could use Octavius, a mere lad of eighteen, as his tool. The real danger lay in the latter, Caesar's appointed heir and bearer of his name. Who could have thought there was such statecraft in the boy ? Yet he too understood from the beginning the tremendous significance of that worship, and upheld it tenaciously. He encouraged the notion that the comet which appeared shortly after Caesar's death signified the latter's apotheosis, believing also, as the elder Pliny (*Hist. Nat.* ii. 25) tells us, that it was a presage of his own power ; and his was doubtless the zeal that moved the Caesarean triumvirate to build the temple to Caesar where pyre and altar had been (Dio xlvii. 18 ; Appian, *Bell. Civ.*, p. 521), and to obtain the official consecration of him by the senate (*Corp. Inscript. Latin.* i. 626 ; ix. 2628 ; Servius on Virgil's 5th Eclogue). At a later time he arranged that the Romans of the two provinces of Asia and Bithynia should erect temples to Rome and " the Divine Julius," thus associated for worship, in Ephesus and Nicaea respectively, while the natives did the like for Rome and himself, also associated, in Pergamum and Nicomedia (Dio li. 20). This, as Dio well notes, was the beginning of provincial emperor-worship. But the distinction he enforced was part and parcel of his general policy of avoiding any shock to Roman feelings ; for in Rome itself, as Suetonius tells us (*Augustus*, 52) he obstinately refused to allow the worship of himself.

And yet Suetonius' words are perhaps less than the truth, for even there Augustus cultivated less direct ways of implying divinity, such as the very name given him. Tacitus' statement (*Annals*, xv. 74), that divine honours are not paid to an emperor before his death, is only another example of the blindness of that historian to everything outside Rome.

Julius Caesar has been fortunate in his biographers, so far as our own speech is concerned: in J. A. Froude, who excelled in form, and Mr. Warde Fowler, who excels in matter. Both appear to be dazzled to some extent, like Mommsen, by their hero. No doubt it is well that the story of a life should be told with sympathetic feeling; but history demands that the less pleasing side of the truth should not be hid. Is it possible to take Mr. Warde Fowler quite seriously, when he presents December, 62 B.C., as the time when Caesar began to work in earnest "for the salvation of the state . . . to carry out the ideas which the Gracchan democracy had initiated"? (*Julius Caesar*, p. 91.) No doubt he passed a few good laws in his consulship; but only at the expense of abolishing law and order itself, so that henceforth the constitution itself was the chief source of danger to him. Nor can we find any single clue to his conduct, save reckless craving for power. He left the world in chaos. "It is safer," says Professor Pelham, "to resign ourselves to a frank confession that we have no satisfactory clue to Caesar's views for the future, even assuming that he had been able to form any."<sup>1</sup> Nor again should his clemency blind us to the fact that he waded through slaughter to his throne. Was this necessary?

<sup>1</sup> *Essays on Roman History*, p. 27. Like many others, I owe to Prof. Pelham's memory the grateful acknowledgment of his stimulating interest in post-graduate work; it was he who turned my attention to ancient ruler-worship, a subject I have found in many ways peculiarly instructive

The might-have-beens of history make thin ice. This much, however, one is tempted to suggest: if honest Pompey had been convinced that the salvation of Rome lay in his founding a dynasty, and if he had possessed the adroitness of Augustus—two large *if's*—then the passage from republic to empire might have been bloodless. The constitutional history of the principate must begin with the enormous powers wielded at one time or another by Pompey.

These are matters more personal to Caesar; but a failure to bring out to the full the story of his divinity, however reluctant a biographer may be to do so, is a failure which almost inevitably entails a complete misapprehension as to his significance in political and religious history. As in the case of the Diadochi, divinity meant on the civil side irresponsible and ultra-Tudor absolutism; there can be no lawful appeal from a god. And what can be more significant in the history of religion degraded, than the spectacle of the whole civilised world bound for three centuries to recognise its god in one who was essentially a military despot? Truly one Apocalypse seems almost too feeble a counterblast. But this was where Caesar left the world; had he lived longer, what we know of him points to larger demands, not to repentance. Too little attention had been paid to this startling phenomenon by students of ancient religion, though there are signs that the perspective will be better adjusted.<sup>1</sup> For until this takes place, that lesson cannot be understood, so pregnant with meaning for our own century: "Render to Caesar the things that are Caesar's; and to God the things that are God's."

CUTHBERT LATTEY.

<sup>1</sup> Perhaps in this connexion a word of praise may be allowed for the Catholic Truth Society, *Lectures on the History of Religions*, wherein the writer (more than ten years ago) was invited to contribute a lecture on *Ancient King-worship*.



*JESUS THE WORKMAN.*

IN this paper it may seem that the boundary has been passed which separates our own special standpoint <sup>1</sup> from that of theology. But that is not the case. The life of Jesus will be treated here in accordance with the rules of historical method. I shall make the attempt to describe the economic position from which the founder of the Christian religion entered into the Greco-Roman world. It is an illusion to suppose that the case of Judæa was entirely different from that of the other Roman provinces. There rose in Palestine, as there rose all round the Mediterranean coasts, brilliant new cities, new centres of civilization. Caesarea on the coast was a foundation of Herod the Great in honour of Augustus. There the harbour, the breakwater looked seaward, but they were matched on land by a theatre and an amphitheatre. Tiberias, on the western coast of the Sea of Galilee, was built by Herod Antipas in honour of Augustus' successor. It contained a royal palace which, with its treasures of classical art, would recall to a traveller the buildings of Rome and Alexandria. Samaria, itself, the old capital of the northern kingdom, was renamed Sebaste—the Greek equivalent for Augustus—in honour of Augustus, by Herod the Great who built a wall round the city and erected a temple for the worship of Augustus. In Jerusalem itself Herod indeed refrained from raising pagan temples. But he built a theatre. His palace, with its marble colonnades, its baths and gymnasia, testified to the king's love for the culture of the empire. Hence when he entered upon the erection of the third temple, along with the traditional forms of the central buildings,

<sup>1</sup> The substance of this paper was presented to a meeting of the Nottingham branch of the Classical Association.

there were to be seen long colonnades, surrounding the very courts of the temple, Solomon's Porch for example, and recalling by their classical forms the rising flood of Greek influence against which Judaism waged perpetual war. What held good of the temple at Jerusalem also held good of the local synagogues. The forms of the doorways, and other ornaments of the buildings, generally showed foreign influences. Palestine, therefore, like the other provinces of the Roman empire, was covered with cities and buildings which would seem far less strange to a traveller of to-day—supposing that he could be transported across the ages—than the squalid eastern villages which haunt the old sites.

But the Jew was not gifted with artistic genius. The Jews, like their neighbours to the north, the Phœnicians, displayed little or no originality in craftsmanship. If the Temple of Herod imitated Greek traditions of architecture, its predecessors, the Temples of Solomon and Zerubbabel, displayed the art of Babylon. Hence we must not exaggerate the contrast between foreign influence and Jewish culture which on the side of craftsmanship was deplorably barren, and therefore dependent upon, and reflecting, foreign influences.

But the erection of the huge number of new buildings which marked in Palestine the commencement of the Christian era, could not have been carried through without the help of native labour. To take a special and instructive instance, “when Herod undertook the rebuilding of the temple he was obliged to intrust all work within the inner courts to the priests, as Gentiles were not permitted to enter.”<sup>1</sup> It follows from this that there were Jewish workmen even among the ranks of the priests. Much more therefore must we take account of those Jewish workmen who were not priests.

<sup>1</sup> Murray's *Bible Dict.* 878.

Let us now turn to the two passages in which reference is made to the trade which Jesus followed. According to Mark, Jesus is described as a "*tekton*," according to Matthew He was known as "the son of a *tekton*." Now "*tekton*" is translated "carpenter" in the English versions. But there is good reason for reconsidering this translation. In the first place, in Palestine the same workman was both carpenter and mason.<sup>1</sup> Hence we really require some word which shall cover both meanings. The Latin uses a general word *faber*, which is very close to our English "workman." I have followed the Latin precedent. For some reasons the word "builder" would be more happy. But in English it suggests the master builder. However, we might keep in view this alternative rendering. For our word "architect" is really the master builder, the chief *tekton*.

I do not indeed suggest that we should give up entirely the translation "carpenter," but only that alongside of that meaning we should lay the necessary emphasis upon the other meaning, namely "mason." Curiously enough, in later Greek, *tekton* is used with the exclusive meaning of mason.

In my next suggestion there is room for misunderstanding. The fact that Jesus is called in Matthew's gospel the son of a carpenter, may indeed mean that Joseph was a carpenter or mason. For generally in the East a son follows the trade of his family. But there is a Jewish turn of speech by which one who pursues an occupation is called the son of that occupation. Hence the phrase in Matthew, "Is not this the son of the builder?" may after all be equivalent to Mark's, "Is not this the builder?" But although the persons who followed a given occupation

<sup>1</sup> The ambiguity of *tekton* is repeated in the Latin *faber tignarius*. Gaius is quoted as saying: "*Fabros tignarios dicimus non eos duntaxat qui tigna dolarent sed omnes qui aedificarent.*" Dig. 50, 16, 235.

were thus clearly marked off, it would be inaccurate to expect in Palestine the close unity of workmen upon which to-day the trades unions rest ; a union which we could find in the ancient Jewish guilds of Alexandria. There, indeed, in the great synagogue the different trade guilds had their separate places and seats. And when a poor journeyman arrived, he took his place among the members of his guild and this supported him until he found work.<sup>1</sup> Here the Jew of the dispersion showed his indebtedness to his Gentile neighbours. In fact, one of the most striking characteristics of the Roman empire was the number of collegia, "colleges," or unions of every kind. These colleges of which the associations of Jewish workmen in Egypt are typical examples, anticipated our mediæval guilds.

It is a curious fact, however, that the Jewish people has never taken kindly to handicraft. The inhabitants of Palestine to-day follow the trades of their ancient forefathers, so we are told, with scarcely an improvement. The great works of architecture of which we read, bear no stamp of national genius. Foreign influences, Phœnician, Babylonian, Persian, Greek, Roman have swept over Palestine. They leave their traces in ruined buildings, or broken pottery, or metal ornaments. But hitherto the Palestinian has fallen back into his primitive uses when the stranger has left him. The Jew lacks the skill of the craftsman. His brain is developed out of all proportion to his hands. This circumstance is probably related to his preoccupation with the law.

Nowhere is this national characteristic more intimately revealed than in the fourth chapter of Genesis. The Jew has never taken to farming. Hence the writer of that chapter looked back with regret to the old pastoral life, when the nomad patriarchs lived in tents and followed

<sup>1</sup> Delitzsch, *Jewish Artisan Life*, 29.



their flocks. Consequently we can understand why in his thoughts the first shepherd Abel was murdered by the first farmer Cain. The passover and its successor, the Christian Eucharist, retain the tradition of these primitive ages, in which the shepherd sacrificed one of his flock to his God.

But not only was the farmer condemned in the person of his earliest ancestor. To Cain, the first murderer, were also traced, through Tubal-Cain, the origins of all workers in metals, the engineers and all who make iron or copper tools, machinery, coins, and so forth. The scribe of the Jewish kingdom, to whom we owe this old philosophy of history, denied to these first workmen the knowledge of God as an object of worship and reserved it for Enosh the son of Seth.

Five centuries later the Alexandrian scribes in like spirit looked down with contempt, perhaps not unmixed with jealousy, upon the powerful and wealthy guilds of workmen who worshipped in the great synagogue of their city. And this feeling found expression in the "Wisdom of Jesus the Son of Sirach." "They shall not be sought for in public counsel nor sit high in the congregation: they shall not sit in the judges' seat, nor understand the sentence of judgment: they cannot declare justice and judgment: they shall not be found where parables are spoken."<sup>1</sup> Plato had put into the mouth of Socrates a similar opinion.<sup>2</sup> "I went," said the philosopher to the artisans. . . . "Because of their skill in their own trades, they claimed each one of them to be especially wise about the great things of life." And Socrates detected, we are told, so great a discord between their pretensions and their real wisdom that it obscured the actual knowledge which they gained in their craft. And indeed the Greeks tended to despise all the mechanical arts in comparison with farming.

We can now understand the note of contempt which we

<sup>1</sup> xxxviii. 33.

<sup>2</sup> *Apol.* viii.

catch in the question "Is not this Jesus the workman?" Nor will it surprise that Celsus, the brilliant critic of the Christian religion to whom Origen replied, threw in the teeth of the Church the fact that their founder was a mechanic.<sup>1</sup>

But there was an opposing school among the rabbis. The study of the law was only to be pursued alongside of a manual calling. "All Torah without work must fail at length and occasion iniquity." It became quite an affectation to engage in hard bodily labour, so that one rabbi would carry his own chair every day to college, while others would drag heavy rafters or work in some such fashion. "Skin dead animals by the wayside, and take thy payment for it, but do not say, I am a priest. I am a man of distinction and work is objectionable to me."<sup>2</sup> It was quite in the order of things, therefore, that Jesus should have been a builder's workman and that Paul should have been a tentmaker. At the same time it remained true that "The wisdom of the scribe cometh by opportunity of leisure, and he that hath little business shall become wise." Milton, in a striking passage, records his indebtedness to those whose work had made it possible for him to enjoy and use his leisure. Knowledge is a jealous mistress and will scarcely brook a rival.

Keeping this warning in view, we may take note of some of the sayings of Jesus, which can be understood better if we remember that He was both a mason and a carpenter. We shall watch Him in the double capacity of workman and rabbi. To this extent at least He remains in a genuinely Jewish tradition.

But in so far as Jesus came into contact with the classical architecture of His time, He was affected by a genuinely

<sup>1</sup> Origen, *Contra Celsum* (Spence), vi. p. 299.

<sup>2</sup> Edersheim, *Jewish Social Life*, 193.

scientific tradition. Certainly as we look back, the scientific knowledge of Vitruvius appears extremely limited, but the historian of science will correct our narrow view. Compared with their contemporaries, the architects of Greece and Rome at the Christian era had at their disposal a really considerable amount of accurate knowledge. And the practical application of this knowledge in the methods of building brought even the ordinary workman into contact with the science of his directors. There is no need to exaggerate the intellectual value of such manual training and the use of materials which was involved. But we may argue from the experience of those missionaries who have combined with their spiritual propaganda technical instruction. Civilisation takes its colour from the crafts over which it has command. And in the work of His trade Jesus saw spread before His eyes in an intimate manner the kingdoms of the then world. As a working builder He was lifted out of His purely Jewish surroundings, and could exercise some of that spiritual detachment which made of Him the Figure of universal man.

These considerations gain in scope if we apply them to Joseph. There is a further possibility which applies to Joseph over and above the fact of his being a carpenter and mason, and so taking part in the great architectural undertakings which filled so large a place in the economic life of that first century of our era. At this point I find with pleasure that my main thesis has been somewhat anticipated. I quote from Dr. Bruce's commentary on Luke ii. 3.<sup>1</sup> "Feune quotes with a certain amount of approval the view of Schneller (*Kennst du das Land*) that Joseph was not a carpenter but a mason, and that Bethlehem was therefore his natural home, being the headquarters of the craft then as now." We have learnt, however, to think of the tekton as *both* carpenter and mason.

<sup>1</sup> *Expositor's G.T.*, vol. i.

How natural to think that if Bethlehem was the headquarters of the craft of Joseph, he should have gone to "his own city," *patriam* as Jerome should have translated it rather than *suam civitatem*. Jesus was indeed of Bethlehem. The removal of Joseph to Nazareth was doubtless determined by the conditions of his trade. Like the modern English artisan whose tenancy of his home only averages forty weeks—so I am told on very high authority—he moved about, and went north to share in the work which after the completion of Herod's great undertakings in Jerusalem, offered itself in Galilee. The desolation of Galilee caused by the warfare which preceded the accession of Archelaus,<sup>1</sup> called for artisans to repair the ruin, and explains the removal of Joseph northwards.

But neither Joseph or Mary would forget the years of Bethlehem. And I see an allusion to those years in the first recorded saying of Jesus. "Did you not know that I must be on my father's work?" in that temple to whose building, we may fairly assume, Joseph as carpenter or mason made his individual contribution. This was only the first of the occasions in which Jesus showed His interest in the temple buildings. His disciples acted upon their knowledge of this characteristic and made a point of showing Him the temple buildings.<sup>2</sup> He made a point of seeing everything and with a workman's eye. There is no need with the commentators to suppose that His mind was entirely occupied with the moral and religious suggestiveness of the scene. The carving of the capitals in the fine eastern colonnade of the great temple court suggested to Him the plants which furnished the craftsman with his models, and it was the artist not less than the moralist who emphasised the inferiority of the stone copy to its original.

<sup>1</sup> Josephus, *Antiq.* xvii. 12.

<sup>2</sup> Matt. xxiv. 1.



But His daily work in the north was probably on humbler lines. We may suppose that He worked on the synagogue buildings which had suffered in the wars, or on the new synagogues which arose by the generosity sometimes even of a pagan.

Forget for a moment the prophetic vocation of Jesus, and watch the artisan as he passes from one district to another. The fancy of commentators has wreathed round this simple fact with superfluous imagery. The common need of a livelihood took Jesus to places where there was plenty of work. There He made a home for His mother and brothers, first at Capernaum then in Phœnicia. He had His own house τὴν οἰκίαν,<sup>1</sup> and for a time He seems to have confined Himself to His craft. How far He continued to work at other places which He visited, Cæsarea Philippi for example, cannot be determined with certainty.

The builder reveals himself conspicuously in many of the sayings. First there is the need to count the cost before engaging on the work.<sup>2</sup> But the towers (πύργοι) of which we read were not necessarily monumental structures. Pausanias even applies the term πύργος to the hut of Timon, and this is in accordance with the usage of Hebrew. Probably it meant a farmhouse. With oriental and classical frankness He refers to a necessary convenience,<sup>3</sup> as a builder of to-day would refer to our own sanitary appliances. As to the main building He draws a moral from the choice of a good foundation. And then He gives a spiritual turn to this whole range of details when He compares Simon to the stones which doubtless He had used in building the new synagogues of Galilee. It helps the reader who comes across the sheepfold, the vineyard, the door, to imagine the

<sup>1</sup> Mark vii. 24.

<sup>2</sup> Luke xiv. 28.

<sup>3</sup> Matthew xv. 17; Mark vii. 19. This paper turns the scale, I think, against the alternative translations of ἀφεδρῶν.

mysterious Jewish workman who said : " Raise the stone, and thou shalt find Me. Cleave the wood, and there am I."

Not the Galilæan peasant of Renan, but an entirely different figure, now presents itself. The artisan who by long preparation became a rabbi and appealed to the spiritual insight of His hearers, enters into the current not only of Jewish life but also of that Greco-Roman civilisation which still encompasses the modern world, like a richly embroidered garment. Jesus, therefore, whatever our ultimate thoughts are about Him, presents Himself to us as the new man, one who rises above, and overcomes His economic setting. He thus gives a meaning to that transition from pastoral life and agriculture to town industry, a transition which some historians limit to the industrial revolution of the eighteenth century in England. By the standard which He sets up we may measure the modern prophets of industry. He is indeed a modern of the moderns. The to-morrow of the Apocalypse is now a to-day.

One further word is needed. The artisan of Nazareth was the child born to the artisan of Bethlehem. This geographical touch is confirmed by our linguistic inquiry. Once more fresh evidence strengthens our belief in Luke.

FRANK GRANGER.

### *THE ADDITIONS IN THE ANCIENT GREEK VERSION OF JOB.*

JOB, like Jeremiah, was in the ancient Greek version much shorter than the present Hebrew text. It has been estimated that, in spite of some additions, Jeremiah in Greek is shorter by an eighth than in Hebrew, and that in Job the net deficit is even greater. But whereas in Jeremiah, in such an edition as Swete's, in which the verse enumeration

of the Hebrew as well as of the Greek text is given, these omissions in the Greek strike the eye, they are in Job entirely concealed. For the defects of the ancient Greek version as compared with the Hebrew text were according to plan made good in Origen's Hexapla by interpolating Theodotion's version of what had been left untranslated in the earlier version; and it is this combination of the ancient Greek version and the version of Theodotion that has been reproduced in all existing MSS. and in all editions of the Greek. In all editions (except Grabe's) and in most MSS. the two distinct elements in this combination are in no way distinguished; but in a few MSS. the diacritical marks by which Origen distinguished what was added from Theodotion to the earlier version have been (imperfectly) perpetuated; and in the Sahidic version we have a translation of the Greek made before that version had received the additions from Theodotion.

Now it is true that *some* uncertainty remains, and probably always will remain, with regard to the *exact* extent of the ancient Greek version, and as to the precise limits of the passages interpolated from Theodotion in existing Greek MSS. and editions. But to a far larger extent the interpolated matter can be eliminated with certainty: and for this reason it is greatly to be regretted that in Swete's edition the interpolated matter is in no way distinguished from the text of the ancient version. This, it is true, follows from the *plan* of that edition, but results in a very imperfect fulfilment of its *aim*. The plan of that edition was to reproduce the text of "the great Vatican MS. with its lacunæ supplied from the uncial MS. which occupies the next place in point of age or importance."<sup>1</sup> Since, for Job, the Vatican MS. (B) is complete, Swete's text of this book is a simple transcript of that MS. with the variants of  $\aleph$  A and C.

<sup>1</sup> H. B. Swete, *Introduction to the Old Testament in Greek*, p. 190.

The aim of the edition is implicitly indicated in these words of Dr. Swete : " For a text formed in this way no more can be claimed than that it represents on the whole the oldest form of the Septuagint to be found in any one of our extant MSS." <sup>1</sup> But can it really be claimed that an edition which offers a text adulterated with more than 15 per cent. of alien matter represents even on the whole an older form of the text than a MS. such as the Codex Colbertinus which distinguishes, even though imperfectly, the alien matter from the original text ? In the interests of the admirable aim of the edition it is to be wished that for this book the plan had been so far modified as to indicate the matter marked as alien in this important cursive MS. or omitted from the ancient Sahidic version. The Larger Cambridge edition will of course, in its critical apparatus, give the evidence of Greek MSS. and of versions of the LXX for the interpolations from Theodotion ; but what is really required for convenience of study is a text in which these interpolations are distinguished by difference of type or transferred to a parallel column. At present, whatever edition we may use, a most inconvenient hunt is required to determine whether a particular verse in any printed text of Job formed part of the ancient version or was subsequently added to it from Theodotion or elsewhere.

On the significance of the short text of the ancient Greek version in relation to the existing Hebrew text much has been written : it has been argued that the Greek version represents the extent of the original Hebrew work, and that the existing Hebrew text has arisen through subsequent expansion ; on the other hand, it is more largely held that the Greek was an abbreviated version of a Hebrew work that was originally, as it is now, longer. In the first case the minus of the Greek merely means, so far as the Greek

<sup>1</sup> *Ib.*



version is concerned, that that version was complete and, in this respect at least, faithful ; but in the alternative case the minus of the Greek represents the most outstanding *tendency* of the version : it would be the work of a translator who found the original too long and greatly abbreviated it. Into this question I will enter no further now ; I refer to it by way of approach to another feature of the version which it is my present purpose to discuss, viz., the matter present in the Greek version and absent from the Hebrew text. This plus of  $\mathfrak{C}$ —by which symbol I will refer to the Greek version—is much less extensive than the minus ; and it is differently distributed, occurring mainly in the prose story with which the book opens and closes, whereas the minus is mainly to be observed in the speeches or verse parts of the book. If, then, the same translator is responsible both for omitting from and adding to the work he was translating, we may conclude that he found the speeches over long, but the story over short. Such an appreciation of the different parts of the book on the part of an ancient reader is by no means improbable, and could be paralleled by much in the subsequent use of and attitude towards the book ; but whether it is a correct or complete explanation of the origin of the ancient Greek version is another question, which must be approached through a closer examination of the plus of  $\mathfrak{C}$ .

The additional matter in  $\mathfrak{C}$  may be divided into two classes : (1) that consisting of small additions of a word or two or a clause ; (2) two longer passages, one after ii. 9, the other after the last word of the Hebrew text. Here, too, xix. 4a (Swete) is perhaps best classified.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> A third class of additions in the existing conflate text consists of passages in Hebrew rendered twice in  $\mathfrak{C}$  : in some of these cases one of the renderings is directly attested to be an interpolation (from Theodotion) : and in most if not in all cases of double translation, though some of them (iv. 12, xxvii. 18) are already in the Sahidic version, it is probable that one only

Relatively to what is found in some other books, additions of the first class are not extensive, and if these alone were concerned it might safely be said that the translator showed comparatively little tendency to expand his text. Merely idiomatic additions such as *ἄνθρωπος τις* (i. 1) instead of *ἄνθρωπος*, which would be a sufficient rendering, may be disregarded. The distinction between these and really material additions is not always perfectly clear,<sup>1</sup> and there are other additions certainly or probably involved in some of the very paraphrastic renderings that occur in the Greek text. But allowing for these considerations, the following is an approximately complete list of clear material additions: the italicized words and letters represent the additions, the rest is sufficient of the context to make the nature of the additions plain:—

i. 1, 9. Avoiding *every* evil deed.

i. 5. Job offered burnt offerings . . . and *one young bullock as a sin offering* (περὶ ἁμαρτίας) *for their souls*.

i. 21. The Lord gave, the Lord hath taken away: *as it seemed good unto the Lord, so it hath come to pass*.

i. 22, ii. 10. In all this *that happened to him* (cp. xlii. 11a) Job sinned not *in any respect before the Lord*. Cp. xlii. 11.

ii. 10. Eliphaz the *king of the Temanites*, Bildad the *tyrant of the Shuhites*, Sophar the *king of the Minæans*.

belonged to the ancient version. As an example x. 4 may be cited: here the first line השני בשלך is not rendered at all; the second line אַם כְּרֹאֵת אֲנוֹשׁ תִּרְאֶה is rendered twice, (1) ἢ ὥσπερ βροτὸς ὄρα καθορᾷ; (2) ἢ καθὼς ὄρα ἄνθρωπος βλέψη; of these the second is asterisked (i.e. marked as an addition) in the Syro-hexaplar and in Jerome's Latin version of ❸, and is absent from the Sahidic version. So in xxxiii. 6 מִחֲמַר קִרְצָתִי גַם אֲנִי is rendered (1) ἐκ πηλοῦ διήρτισαι σὺ ὡς καὶ ἐγώ, (2) ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ (πηλοῦ) διηρτίσμεθα. For other double translations see ii. 13 (of גְּדוֹלָה), iv. 12b (= iv. 12bc ❸), ix. 3 (of יַעֲנִי), x. 13b (?), xxvii. 18 (of כַּעַשׁ), xxxvii. 21b (= 21bc ❸: b is absent from the Sahidic).

<sup>1</sup> For example, γαστρός μητρός μου in iii. 10 is merely an idiomatic rendering (cp. R.V.) of בִּטְנִי (paraphrased in xix. 17 by παλλακίδων μου; but in iii. 12A μαστοὺς μητρός μου is an addition not required by the sense. Cp. xxxviii. 8 ἐκ κοιλίας μητρός αὐτῆς. In i. 12 δίδωμι and in i. 20 τὴν κόμην are scarcely more than idiomatic additions. Similarly διότι λέγεις in xxxiii. 9, πῶς γὰρ λέγεις in 12, and λέγεις δέ in 13 may be considered merely idiomatic (cp. R.V. in 9).

- v. 4. His children are crushed at the gates of *inferiors*.  
 v. 27. But know thou thyself *if thou hast done aught*.  
 vii. 16. For I shall not live for ever *that I should be patient* (cp. vi. 11).  
 vii. 19. Until I swallow down my spittle *in grief*.  
 xi. 20. At the end Cod. A adds *παρ' αὐτῷ γὰρ σοφία καὶ δύναμις*, i.e.  
 xii. 13a (+ γάρ).  
 xiii. 25. As a leaf driven *by the wind*.  
 xv. 28. *May he enter* into uninhabited houses.  
 xxiv. 4. ἐξ ὁδοῦ δικαίας.  
 xxxi. 9. Unto a woman of *another man*.  
 xxxiii. 23. *If he think in his heart to return to the Lord* and he declare unto man.  
 xxxviii. 1. *After Elihu had ceased speaking*, the Lord said to Job through storm and clouds (cp. xl. 1 (b)).  
 xli. 5 (xl. 24 (29)). Wilt thou bind it *like a sparrow* ?  
 xlii. 5. By the hearing of the ear I heard thee *formerly*, but now.  
 xlii. 10. And when he prayed to the Lord, *he forgave them their sin*.  
 xlii. 11. *Eating and drinking*.  
 xlii. 16. And after . . . Job lived one hundred and seventy years : *and all the years that he lived were two hundred and forty*.

The character and, substantially, the extent of these minor additions are now before us. The question remains : Are they due (1) to the free activity of the translator ; or (2) did they exist in the Hebrew text rendered by the translator ; or (3) have they found their way into the Greek text in the course of its transmission ? An obvious instance of (3) is xi. 20. Between (1) and (2) it is seldom possible to decide *with certainty*. Some of these additions *might* quite well rest on a Hebrew text, even though it were unlikely, as in most cases it is, that such a Hebrew text was the original text of the book.<sup>1</sup> And if it is difficult or impossible to prove that

<sup>1</sup> Very few of these "additions" have ever been claimed as representing the original text. Gunkel (*Schöpfung u. Chaos*, p. 50), and Beer in Kittel's Bible tentatively, so claim xl. 24 (29)=E.V. xli. 5 ; but even this is very doubtful. "As a sparrow" no doubt forms an excellent parallel term to "as a bird" in the previous line ; but it is not required ; for the ver. in Hebrew (and E.V.), without the addition, presents an admirable parallelistic scheme (a.b. | a'c : see my *Forms of Hebrew Poetry*, p. 72)—better in fact than that produced by the addition (a. b | a'. b'. c). So also

the additions existed before the version, it is in most cases equally difficult to prove that they did not. In ii. 11 *τύραννος* is a term that seems more likely to occur in a Greek addition to the book than in a Greek translation of a Hebrew addition; and yet though the term occurs far the most frequently in books of the Greek Old Testament that do not rest on a Semitic original but were written in Greek (Wisdom, 4 Macc.), it does also occur occasionally as a translation, chiefly of unusual terms, in other parts of the Old Testament.

Granting, however, what is doubtless nearest the mark, that even all these additions were freely added by the translator, and not based on any Hebrew original, they do not indicate any great tendency on the part of the translator to make material as distinct from merely idiomatic additions to the text of the book he was translating, and scarcely prepare us for the long additions now found in chaps. ii. and xlii. Are these longer additions the work of the original translator? To the discussion of the passages in question, and first of that in chap. xlii., I now pass.

The book of Job closes with the words, "And Job died old and full of days"; after these words in *Æ* there follows a

the rhythm, if, as is probable, it is 2 : 2, would be turned by the addition into the less probable 2 : 3 (cp. *Forms*, 176 ff.). Rhythmical considerations tell also against the originality of the "additions" in v. 4, 27, vii. 16, 19, xxxi. 9. But for the present purpose of determining the tendency of the *version*, it is not necessary to determine the *original* text. The question is : how far is it possible or probable that any of these "additions" in *Æ* existed previously in Hebrew even though not original there; and possibility, in such cases as i. 5, 21, xlii. 16, at least there seems to be. In two or three cases the additions might be due to a desire to supply a parallel term : so in xl. 24 (29)—if this is not really a case of double translation—xv. 28, and xiii. 25 (where יבִּט being *paraphrased* by *φερομένω ὑπὸ πνεύματος* may have led to adding ὑπὸ ἀνέμου to κινούμενον (= *נָדָה*). Such a tendency is not in itself improbable since Jewish writers employed parallelism in Greek compositions (cp. *Forms*, p. 32) : but it must be remarked that the translator of Job certainly spoils by paraphrase or abbreviation more parallelisms than he improves or creates.



passage which may be translated as follows : But it is written that he will rise with those whom the Lord will raise up. This (man), according to the statement of the Syriac book, dwelt in the land of Uz, on the borders of Idumea and Arabia, and his name was formerly Jobab.<sup>1</sup> Marrying an Arabian woman, he begat a son whose name was Ennon : his own father was Zare, one of the sons of Esau, and his mother was Bosorra, so that he was the fifth from Abraham. And these are the kings that reigned in Edom, over which country he also ruled. First, Balak the son of Beor, the name of whose city was Dennaba ; and after Balak Jobab, who was called Job ; and after him Asom the ruler (ὁ ὑπάρχων ἡγεμών) from the Temanite country. After him came Adad, the son of Barad, who smote Midian in the plain of Moab, and the name of his city was Gittaim. The friends who came to him were Eliphaz, of the sons of Esau, king of the Temanites, Bildad the tyrant of the Shuhites, Sophar the king of the Minæans.

This passage does not appear to be all of a piece ; for (1) the statement about Job's sharing in the general resurrection, and the genealogical and political details are singularly different in character ; and (2) between the two intervenes the reference to the " Syriac book." If the statement about the resurrection and the remainder are of diverse origin, not both and perhaps neither originally formed part of the version. It has been suggested that the statement about the resurrection is of Pharisaic or Christian origin.<sup>2</sup> If of Christian origin, it is not the work of the translator of the

<sup>1</sup> The meaning of the awkward Greek sentence is not altogether clear, and the translation above a makeshift : the Greek runs, οὗτος ἐρμηνεύεται ἐκ τῆς Συριακῆς βίβλου, ἐν μὲν γῇ κατοικῶν τῇ Αὐστρίδι ἐπὶ τοῖς ὁρίοις τῆς Ἰδουμαίας καὶ Ἀραβίας· προσηγορεύετο δὲ αὐτῷ ὄνομα Ἰωβάβ. Another view of the meaning would be expressed by translating, This is translated out of the Syriac book. Dwelling in the land of Uz . . . his name was formerly Jobab.

<sup>2</sup> Swete, *Introduction to the Old Testament in Greek*, p. 256.

book ; if of Pharisaic origin, it *might* be, even though we do not with Graetz bring down the date of the translation to the lifetime of Rabban Gamaliel <sup>1</sup> (1st century A.D.). But it is sometimes said that this statement cannot come from the translator, because (1) the translator does not express the belief in a future life in xix. 25 : and yet (2) γέγραπται, which introduces the statement, refers to xix. 25. If both these reasons are valid, it may be taken as proved that the statement is a later addition to the translation. It must however be recalled that though, curiously, in view of the subsequent history of interpretation, it is at least possible and even probable that the translation of xix. 25 does not refer to resurrection, but to a restoration to bodily health, yet the belief in an after life finds expression elsewhere in the translation, and that where it is certainly absent from the Hebrew original : “ If a man die, will he live again ? ” asks the Hebrew text sceptically in xiv. 17 ; but the translator turns the sceptical question into a dogmatic affirmation, ἐὰν γὰρ ἀποθάνῃ ἄνθρωπος, ζήσεται. The mere fact therefore that the added clause refers to a future resurrection of Job does not render it in any way incompatible with the translator’s theological belief. But how is the γέγραπται to be explained ? Scarcely as referring to the rendering of xiv. 14 just alluded to, which speaks indeed of a future life for man in general, but not of any resurrection of Job in particular. But does xix. 25, even if understood of resurrection, quite satisfy the γέγραπται ?

<sup>1</sup> In the Talmud (*Shab.* 116a ; *j. Shab.* xvi. 1) R. José is cited as the authority for a story that once when Gamaliel was sitting on the Temple steps there was brought to him a translation of the book of Job and that he ordered a mason to bury it under a course of bricks. The phrase used is ספר איוב תרנום (in the Jerusalem T., כתוב תרנום). Graetz in the *Monatsschrift*, 1877, pp. 83 ff. (cp. *Geschichte der Juden*, iii. 358) argued ingeniously rather than convincingly that this Targum must have been our ancient Greek version then just completed. Others identify this Targum of Job with the “ Syriac book ” of the Appendix to Job : see Zunz, *Die Gottesdienstliche Vorträge*, pp. 62, 80 : cp. Dillmann’s *Hiob*, 361.

What is written there, on that interpretation, is that Job will rise, but nothing is said there of his resurrection forming part of any general resurrection. That γέγραπται refers to xix. 25 has probably been assumed for lack of any satisfactory alternative explanation. It would more naturally refer to what was written in some other book ; yet no such book, if it ever existed, has survived.

The remainder of the Appendix appears, or at any rate has often been understood, to be described as based on the " Syriac Book " : it is also most intimately connected with a passage (Eus. *Præp. Ev.* ix. 25) excerpted by Alexander Polyhistor (c. 80-40 B.C.) from the *Judaica* of Aristeas. Either Aristeas made use of the Appendix, or the Appendix is based on Aristeas. In the former case the Appendix was already attached to the Greek Job as early as about 100 B.C. On the other hand, if the Appendix is based on Aristeas, it at once follows that it is not from the hand of the translator, for the Greek version of Job (apart from the Appendix) was certainly used by Aristeas : in this case the literary stages are these : (1) Greek version of Job (without the Appendix) ; (2) Aristeas using (1) as his source ; (3) Appendix based on Aristeas and added by a later hand to the Greek version. For this Freudenthal<sup>1</sup> argued elaborately and acutely ; and to meet the difficulty that the Appendix itself appeals, certainly not to Aristeas as its source, but, apparently at least, to the " Syriac book," he suggests that the Appendix, which contains some details not in Aristeas, was derived partly from Aristeas and partly from the " Syriac book," and that the latter only is mentioned as likely to carry more weight. But is this explanation satisfactory ? A closer examination does not greatly favour it. For the Appendix consists of (1) the data common to it and Aristeas, viz., the names and titles of Job's three friends, that his former name

<sup>1</sup> J. Freudenthal, *Hellenistische Studien*, 136 ff.

was Jobab, that his mother's name was Bosorra, and that he lived in the land of Uz, on the borders of Idumæa and Arabia (Aristeas, κατοικεῖν δὲ τοῦτον ἐν τῇ Αὐσιτιδὶ χώρα ἐπὶ τοῖς ὄροις τῆς Ἰδουμαίας καὶ Ἀραβίας; Appendix, ἐν μὲν γῇ κατοικῶν τῇ Αὐσίτιδι ἐπὶ τοῖς ὀρίοις τῆς Ἰδουμαίας καὶ Ἀ.); (2) a list of certain rulers of Edom including Job; and (3) other data, viz., that Job's wife was an Arabian, that their son's name was Ennon, and that Job's father was Zare the son of Esau, so that he himself was fifth from Abraham. Now by the hypothesis (1) is not from the Syriac book, but from Aristeas; and further (2) is not from a *Syriac* source, for this list of Edomite kings agrees far too closely with the *Greek* version of Genesis to have been derived—whether by Aristeas or the compiler of the Appendix—from any other source; note (1) these clauses repeated *verbatim* from the Greek of Genesis xxxvi. 31–35—καὶ οὗτοι οἱ βασιλεῖς οἱ βασιλεύσαντες ἐν Ἐδωμ, and Ἀδαδ υἱὸς Βάραδ ὁ ἐκκόψας Μαδιαμ ἐν τῷ πεδίῳ Μωαβ, καὶ ὄνομα τῇ πόλει αὐτοῦ Γεθθαιμ; (2) the identical Greek forms of the names in the two places—Βαλακ, Βεωρ, Δενναβα, Ιωβαβ, Ασομ, Αδαδ, Βαραδ and especially Γεθθαιμ (= תַּיִם in Gen.); (3) the use in both passages of ἡγεμῶν, the rendering in Genesis of the peculiar term מְלָכִים for the Edomite chiefs. There would thus remain only the meagre third group of details as the total possible gleanings of the annotator from the “Syriac book”; and even from this, if we may adapt one of the most interesting suggestions in Freudenthal's discussion, we must deduct the name of Job's father as having been in the original text of Aristeas, though omitted by the excerptor Polyhistor. And thus the one and only real detail unaccounted for apart from the Syriac book is the name of Job's son Ennon, for that Zare's wife was an Arabian and Job the fifth from Abraham are simple inferences. Is it probable that the annotator names a source from which



he obtained only a single one, and that not the next mentioned, of the numerous details which he has here brought together ?

Even if we regard the Appendix as anterior to, or the source of, Aristeas, still not much of it appears to admit of, still less to require, a Syriac source. As before we must hold that the list of kings comes from the *Greek* version of Genesis ; and two further details seem to be inferences from the same version, from a Greek and not from a Semitic source : the identification of  $I\omega\beta$  and  $I\omega\beta a\beta$  is easier than of **איוב** and **יובב** ; and the false inference that Bosorra was the name of Jobab's mother follows naturally from  $I\omega\beta a\beta$   $\nu\acute{\iota}\delta\varsigma$   $Zapa\acute{\epsilon}\kappa$   $Bosoppas$  taken to mean Iobab son of Zara by (his wife) Bosorra, whereas the Hebrew **בן זרח מבצרה** means of course son of Zara from (the town of) Bosrah.

We might thus the more confidently question whether the writer really intended to cite the Syriac book as his source for any of the following details, if it were possible to give his words any other probable meaning. But it must be admitted that the alternative view of them—at least as they now read—is not more probable. On this view reference to the Syriac book has nothing to do with what *follows*, but with what *precedes*, and the sentence means : This, viz., the foregoing translation, is translated from the Syriac book, i.e. is a Greek version of the Hebrew text of Job. If this *were* what was intended, then the sentence is a kind of colophon, and what follows a subsequent addition.

On the whole, then, while I cannot share the certain conviction of some that the Appendix is based on Aristeas, or of others that the Syriac book is the Hebrew text of Job—in either of which cases the Appendix is almost or quite necessarily later than the translation—or again the view of others that the Syriac book is an Aramaic Targum containing Haggadic elements, I feel it more precarious to treat the

Appendix as the work of the translator than to treat it as not such. "The two notes at the end of the Greek Job (xlii. 17abc)," as Swete observes (p. 256), "scarcely profess to belong to the book."

What now can be said of the only other considerable addition <sup>1</sup> to the Hebrew text in the Greek version, viz. the additional words of Job's wife in ii. 9? Is this also from another hand than that of the translator? Or just on this one occasion did the translator allow himself to expand his text considerably? Instead of the terse record of the Hebrew text, "Then said his wife unto him, Art thou still holding fast thine integrity? curse God, and die," G offers us this: "And after the lapse of a long time his wife said to him, How long wilt thou endure, saying, Behold I wait a little longer, expecting the hope of my salvation? For behold my memorial has perished from the earth, sons and daughters, the pangs and travails of my womb, with whom in vain I grew weary with troubles. And thou thyself sittest in rottenness of worms, spending the night in the open. And I go from place to place and from house to house as a hired servant waiting for the sun to set that I may cease from my troubles and pains which now constrain me. But say some word against the Lord and die."

It has generally and rightly been held that this lengthier speech of Job's wife formed no part of the original Book of Job: it is out of harmony with the brevity so characteristic of the Prologue. It is, however, over severe to describe it in itself as "flat and worthless" (Di.); the mere fact of expansion betrays a defective taste, but if that is to be overlooked the speech itself is not so ill-conceived. But if the speech is not part of the original work, whence and how did

<sup>1</sup> The two lines of xix. 4a explicating *πλάνος* in xix. 4 are also an addition with no very exact parallel in the remainder of the version and dissimilar in character alike to the additions in ii. 9 and after in xlii. 17.

it find its way into the Greek version ? The conjecture has been hazarded <sup>1</sup> that it is derived from the same Syriac book or Aramaic Midrash from which it has been supposed that the Appendix is derived. If so, the work in question contained very different kinds of matter. But more probably the speech is of purely Greek origin, the work of one familiar with the Greek version of Job, but probably not the translator himself. We might suppose indeed that the translator was familiar with the entire book before he began to translate it, and that he might therefore frame an expansion at this early part of his translation containing correspondences with the subject matter of subsequent parts of the book ; such correspondences there certainly seem to be : for as the wife here laments her hard life as a servant toiling day after day for hire and waiting eagerly for sunset to give her release from her daily toil, so in his speeches Job compares himself to a hired servant eager for the shades of evening when he will receive his pay and gain a respite from his toil (vii. 2, xiv. 6) ; again Job's wife, speaking of her children as the pangs and travails of her womb, recalls the phrase used later in the book of the calving hinds, " they cast forth (ὧ ἐξαποστειλεῖς) their pangs " (xxxix. 3)—a phrase for which commentators have commonly sought a parallel in Ovid while overlooking that nearer to hand in this Greek addition to the Book of Job. All this might be explained by familiarity with the as yet untranslated Book. But it is not so easy to imagine the translator anticipating in this speech the curious phrase ἐν σαπρίᾳ σκωλήκων which he subsequently employs as a kind of double rendering of רמה *worms* in vii. 5, " My flesh is clothed with worms " (לְבַשׁ בְּשָׂרִי רִמָּה, φύρεται δὲ μου τὸ σῶμα ἐν σαπρίᾳ σκωλήκων).

The suspicion thus raised that the Greek-writing author of the speech of Job's wife is not the translator, but another

<sup>1</sup> G. Beer, *Der Text des Buches Hiob*, p. 11.

familiar with the Greek version of Job, is strengthened when we observe that in this short passage several ideas are expressed by words occurring nowhere in the translation, but there expressed by different words. Thus a person serving for hire is *μισθωτός* in the translation (vii. 2, xiv. 6), but in the speech *λάτρις*, a word found nowhere else in the LXX.<sup>1</sup> Trouble or toil is twice expressed in the speech by *μόχθος*, a word which occurs nowhere in the translation of Job, and is relatively rare elsewhere in the LXX. except in Eccles., where it renders some twenty times the Hebrew *לָמַד*, a word which occurs frequently in Job, but is there rendered by *πόνος* (iii. 10, v. 6), *ὁ ὕναι* (iv. 8, vii. 3, xv. 35), *κόπος* (v. 7, xi. 16), *κακά* (xvi. 2). It is therefore not through any lack of opportunity that the translator of Job avoids *μόχθος*, which the composer of the speech employs.<sup>2</sup> "Outside," "in the open air," the speech expresses by *αἶθριος*, the translator by *ἔξω* (xxx. 32). The same difference in the work of two different translators is illustrated by 1 Esd. ix. 11, *στήναι αἶθριοι*=Ezr. x. 13. *στήναι ἔξω* (*וַיִּתְּנֵם* as in Job xxx. 32). Apart from these two passages *αἶθριος* is confined to Ezek., where it is somewhat differently used. *Διανυκτερεύειν* is in the LXX. as in the New Testament a *ἅπαξ λεγόμενον*: the trans-

<sup>1</sup> The usage is the more noticeable inasmuch as *λατρεύειν*, *λατρενός* *λατρεία* are used in the LXX. exclusively of sacred service.

<sup>2</sup> The vb. *μοχθεῖν* is also absent from Job: this, too, is rare in the LXX. except in Eccles., where it renders *לָמַד* a dozen times. It is worth noting that the later Greek translators several times substitute *μόχθος*, *μοχθεῖν* for another word in the LXX. Thus Symm. substitutes *μόχθος* for *πόνος* in Ps. ix. 35, Hab. i. 13, for *κόπος* in Ps. cxxxix. 10 (and perhaps lxxii. 16), and *μοχθήσεις* for *ἐν κόπῳ* in Job iv. 2. Theod. substitutes *μόχθος* for *λύπαι* in Gen. iii. 18, for *κόπος* in Ps. lxxii. 16, and *ἐμόχθησεν* for *οὐ δυνήσεται* in Ps. xxvi. 15. Aquila substitutes *μόχθος* for *κόπος* perhaps in Ps. lxxii. 16, *μοχθοῦν* for *ἀγῶνα παρέχειν* twice in Isa. vii. 13, *μεμοχθηκυῖαν* for *ἡσθένησα* in Ps. lxxvii. 10, and *ἐμόχθησεν* for *οὐ δυνήσεται* in Prov. xxvi. 15, *ἐμοχθηρώθησαν* for *φαῦλα* in Job vi. 25. On the other hand these later versions substitute another word for the *μόχθος* of the LXX., several times in Eccles., and also in Isa. lv. 2, lxi. 8.



lator of Job might, had he wished, have used the word to render  $\eta\lambda$ , particularly in xxxi. 32, but he preferred  $\alpha\upsilon\lambda\acute{\iota}\xi\epsilon\iota\nu$ .  $\Pi\lambda\alpha\nu\omega\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\eta$  of the wanderings of Job's wife would be a sufficiently common word (cp. xxxviii. 41), but the variant  $\pi\lambda\alpha\nu\acute{\eta}\tau\iota\varsigma$  is no doubt the true reading, and this is another  $\acute{\alpha}\pi\alpha\chi$   $\lambda\epsilon\gamma\acute{o}\mu\epsilon\nu\omicron\nu$  in the LXX, the masc.  $\pi\lambda\alpha\nu\acute{\eta}\tau\eta\varsigma$  occurring also but once (Hos. ix. 17). Lastly we may notice the very rare use of the article in the phrase  $\epsilon\acute{\iota}\varsigma\ \tau\acute{o}\ \kappa\epsilon\nu\acute{o}\nu$ , for which the LXX offers but a single parallel (Jer. xxvi. [xlvi.] 11) and that doubtful, for there is a variant without the article. The translator uses  $\epsilon\acute{\iota}\varsigma\ \kappa\epsilon\nu\acute{o}\nu$  (without the art.) in xxxix. 16, and more frequently  $\delta\iota\acute{\alpha}\ \kappa\epsilon\nu\acute{\eta}\varsigma$ : cp. also  $\epsilon\acute{\iota}\varsigma\ \kappa\epsilon\nu\acute{\alpha}\ \kappa\alpha\acute{\iota}\ \mu\acute{\alpha}\tau\alpha\iota\alpha\ \acute{\epsilon}\kappa\omicron\pi\acute{\iota}\alpha\sigma\epsilon\nu$  in xx. 18, with  $\epsilon\acute{\iota}\varsigma\ \tau\acute{o}\ \kappa\epsilon\nu\acute{o}\nu\ \acute{\epsilon}\kappa\omicron\pi\acute{\iota}\alpha\sigma\alpha$  in the speech.

These half dozen uses, unique at least so far as the Book of Job is concerned, within what is the equivalent of some four short verses, appear to constitute about as strong an argument as is possible in such a case in favour of regarding the speech as written by some one other than the translator. Certainly the speech is relatively early, for there is no trace of its absence from any of the versions or MSS. of the LXX.; but for early additions no other kind of evidence is available than that which I have here offered, and of its kind the evidence must, I think, be admitted to be weighty.

We have now concluded our survey of the additions in the Greek text of Job; we have found that there is great reason to question whether either of the longer additions is original in the version; and that it is *possible* that some of the shorter additions rest on matter present in the Hebrew text of the translator, though absent from the existing Hebrew text; others are doubtless due entirely to the translator; but on the whole he cannot be said to show any considerable tendency to make material additions to his text.

One or two more general considerations arising out of this

study may be added. The additions, especially the two longer additions, furnish proof of the early interest in and study of the book, though more particularly of the Prologue and Epilogue. The two longer additions are made, the one to the Prologue and the other to the Epilogue, and the other additions are perhaps relatively more frequent in these than in other parts of the book. At the same time the speech of Job's wife seems to betray a fairly close study of the Dialogue as well as of the story of Job. On the whole, however, it may be said that the additions indicate a greater interest in the story than in the discussions of the Book.

Yet though the interest was primarily in the story of Job, there is no clear evidence (but rather the reverse) that those who wanted to enlarge and fill out the details of the story had or could have had recourse to popular sources. In other words, there is no proof to be obtained from these additions that any folk story or folk book of Job was circulating in Egypt after say about 100 B.C. ; and if the "Syriac book" of the Appendix was really an Aramaic Midrash it may be added that there is no indication that this had drawn on popular sources. On the other hand, students represented by these translators or supplementers were driven back, in order to satisfy their desire for fuller details, to the study of the book itself, and more widely of the Bible in Greek. Thus they were led by the words of the later law to conclude that Job must have offered a sin-offering as well as a burnt-offering, and from the genealogies in the (Greek) Genesis that Job was identical with Jobab and consequently a king of Edom ; and from the last inference it was no very bold step to give to his three friends a corresponding rank, though why, while Eliphaz and Sophar appear as kings, Bildad appears only as tyrant is a mystery hitherto unsealed.

G. BUCHANAN GRAY.

### ST. PAUL THE CO-OPERATOR.

ONE of the earliest of Trades Union journals—*The Mechanics' Weekly Journal*—took as its motto, in the days when Trades Unionism was struggling for the right to exist, “They helped every one his neighbour, and every one said to his brother, ‘Be of good cheer.’” You might take that as expressing Paul’s attitude towards co-partnership in gains and pains. There is no doubt he was an apostle of Co-operation, “born out of due time.” He believed in Profit Sharing. Did he not expressly say that “the husbandman that laboureth must be the first to partake of the fruits” ? (2 Tim. ii. 6). He believed strongly in industrial fellowship. There is a word (*συνεργός*) he uses eleven times to express it. It defines his relationships, now with Timothy, now with Aristarchus and his group, now with Euodias, Syntyche, and Clement, now with Prisca and Aquila. The A.V. plays upon it with delightful variety :—now it is “work-fellow,” or “companion in labour,” or “fellow-helper,” or “helper”; but always it really carries one meaning (R.V.) :—“fellow-worker.”

But that word is only introductory to a whole fascinating group which define Paul’s life as always, everywhere, under all conditions, a life of intensely realised relationship. No life ever lived was probably richer in, more dependent upon, more fully expressed by, relationship. One might say Paul was the apostle of sanctified collectivism as against individualism. His whole thought of all industry in the kingdom of God is of a social function, a “labour co-partnership,” a spiritual fellowship. He is the apostle of spiritual synthesis. In fact the *σύν* is everything with him. It enters into his whole conception of the kingdom. Christian life is to him essentially, vitally, constantly, a life of rela-

tionship towards men which finds its source and spring in relationship to God.

I. *Life in the Church* is life in a fellowship which has manifold aspects, like the wisdom of God itself. (Eph. iii. 10). The men and women with whom he toils are not only "fellow-workers"; they are *σύνδουλοι* (Col. i. 7; iv. 7), "fellow-slaves" to the same Master, who, because they "love" Him "will not go out free." They are also "fellow-citizens with the saints" (*συμπολίται*—Eph. ii. 19), in "one blest communion, fellowship divine," and, therefore, for warring Zion, "the Church militant here on earth," "fellow-soldiers" (*συστρατιῶται*: Phil. ii. 25; Philem. 2), like Epaphroditus and Archippus. They are "fellow-partakers" also of a grace sufficient for each new need (*συγκοινωνοί*: Phil. i. 7). Sometimes, in the varying fortunes of the war, they are "fellow-prisoners," as Andronicus and Junias, Aristarchus and Epaphras, were (*συναιχμαλώτοι*: Rom. xvi. 7; Col. iv. 10; Philem. 23), "taking their part in suffering hardship," not only with one another but with the Gospel itself according to the power of God (*συγκακοπαθέω*: 2 Tim. i. 8; ii. 3). One is even a "yoke-fellow" (*σύζυγος*: Phil. iv. 3), which Renan boldly translates, regardless of the masculine, "ma chère épouse," resting on Clement of Alexandria's suggestion that it is Paul's wife who is alluded to. He had some excuse, apart from its romance (almost the outline of a Millet picture) because the older Latin verse has "dilectissime conjux," "dearest partner." The fellowship is not confined to service or suffering; it relates to all the experiences of the present and to all the hopes of the future. They are "united imitators" of the same life-model (*συμμιμηταί*: Phil. iii. 17). They "joy and rejoice with one another" (*συγχαίρω*: Phil. ii. 17-18), as the members of the same Body suffering with or honoured together (1 Cor. xii. 26), or as the true love



which "rejoiceth with the truth" (1 Cor. xiii. 6). They are "fitly framed and knit together" (*συναρμολογουμένη*: Eph. ii. 21), like the porches, courts and towers of some vast Temple—"each several building" in the same vast edifice well cemented together; where the thought is not of a completed, but of a progressive, work, a "framing together of the structure ever more closely and firmly" (Moule, *Camb. Comment. Eph.*). "The spiritual union of the saints needs but to be believed and realised to tell more on their actual closeness of connexion"—surely a helpful thought, especially for the present moment, when the desire for union is taking more and more practical and progressive shape. Or they are like joints and limbs in the same living body (*συνμβιβαζόμενον*: Eph. iv. 16), where, again, the present participle indicates a process actually going on, wherein the body, vitalised from and by the Head, is evermore acquiring a deeper and truer contact of part with part, a more harmonious ("fitly") inner union and action (Moule), of which the living, energising Spirit is the Source.

So, if they suffer together, they also "strive together" (*συναθλούντες*: Phil. i. 27; iv. 3), "in one spirit," "with one mind," for the common aim (like eager wrestlers at some Olympic games), for the overthrow of error, and the triumph of the faith of the Gospel; and the fellowship is not confined to common labour, but is powerful in common prayer (*συναγωνίσασθαι*: Rom. xvi. 30). Beyond labour and suffering alike is the common triumph. For, if they suffer with Him and with one another, it will be as joint-heirs with Him and others (*συμπάσχομεν, συγκληρονόμοι*: Rom. viii. 27) that they will be glorified together (*συνδοξασθῶμεν*). Beyond the stress and strife "the crowning day is coming by and by."

“ Then from the dawn it seem'd there came, but faint  
 As from beyond the limit of the world,  
 Like the last echo born of a great cry,  
 Sounds, as if some fair city were one voice  
 Around a king returning from his wars.”

But Paul's synthesis is wider than visions of a Judaistic Church, of a blessing bound by pride of race or pride of grace. Its glory is that it is coextensive with a world. There is the mighty *σύν*, thrice repeated, that comes sweeping in from the great deeps of the love of God ; like some resistless tidal wave that obliterates the sand heaps and landmarks, and fills the landlocked harbour with the freshness of the outer sea. There is nothing, even in Paul the Co-operator, more splendidly inspiring, more divinely uplifting for hope and service, than that matchless description of his mission—to make known that the Gentiles are “ fellow-heirs ” of the same kingdom, “ fellow-members ” of the same body, “ fellow-partakers ” of the same promise in Christ through the Gospel. (*συγκληρονόμα, σύσσωμα, συμμέτοχα* : Eph. iii. 6). For here Co-operation reaches its goal in the vast “ Co-operative Commonwealth,” and “ the kingdoms of this world have become the one “ kingdom of our Lord and of His Christ.” This is the “ Coming Unity ” wherein “ Christ is everything in everything ” (Col. iii. 11), and all men, no longer “ strangers from the covenants of promise,” are become “ kinsmen ” (*συγγεναί* : Rom. ix. 3, etc.) indeed.

II. But equally striking is St. Paul's emphasis of our *life of relationship to God*. That life is defined throughout as life in Christ and with Christ, deriving all its grace and resource and strength from this fact of union ; and faith is simply *the co-operation on our part* which makes the union effective in all its grand results. Every experience, humbling as well as uplifting, is to be shared with Him. He is the whole great Secret of the Christian's life and character. Thus

the three great facts of Death and Life and Kingship with Christ are linked together in one passage as steps in one experience which, belonging first to Christ, belongs necessarily to His own people. It is one of the Five Faithful Sayings of the Pastoral epistles, precious coin-current of the Primitive Church, passed from lip to lip and heart to heart. "Faithful is the Saying: For if we died with Him we shall also live with Him" (συναπεθάνομεν, συζήσομεν: 2 Tim. ii. 11, 12), "if we endure we shall also reign with Him" (συμβασιλεύσομεν). "There is no Christ for us, separate or separable from Christ in us" (Du Bose. *Gosp. acc. to St. Paul*, p. 178). Faith is an actual partnership in experiences which are His first only that we may share them afterwards. We are thus made "one and the same plant with Him" (Godet, *in loco*) (σύμφυτοι: Rom. vi. 5) in the likeness both of His death and His resurrection. "Not a case of death to sin passes in the Church which was not already included in the death of Christ . . . not a spiritual resurrection is effected within the Church which is not Christ's own resurrection" (Godet), "reproduced by His Spirit in the heart which has begun by uniting itself to Him in the communion of His death." We have even been "crucified with Him" (συνεσταυρώθη: Rom. vi. 6; Gal. ii. 20), for "the docile acceptance of the Cross is the only pathway to communion in the life of the Risen One" (Godet, *Rom.* i. 411). We have also been "buried with Him"—that was the saving meaning of our baptism (συνταφέντες: Col. ii. 12). We have been "quickened together with Him," "raised with Him," "made to sit with Him in heavenly places." Mark the splendid progression in the words—the shining staircase of an ever fuller intimacy with our crucified but triumphant Lord (συνεζωοποίησε, συνήγειρε, συνεκάθισεν: Eph. ii. 5, 6). (And cp. Col. ii. 12–13; iii. 1 for parallels.) His resurrection and Ascension are the pledge not only of the future bodily,

but of the present spiritual, resurrection and ascension of His people. The Father has willed that we should be conformed (*συμμόρφους* : Rom. viii. 29) to the image of His Son, and that involves the closest fellowship, in suffering and triumph alike, so that even "the body of our humiliation" may ultimately become like unto "the body of His glory" (*σύμμορφον* : Phil. iii. 21). The Spirit of the Risen Lord is, through the synthesis of faith, the invariable co-operating force maintaining the union. He helps our infirmities (*συναντιλαμβάνεται* : Rom. viii. 16). He aids our prayers. He bears witness with our spirits (*συμμαρτυρεῖ*) that we are the children of God, affirming thus, within, the reality of the relationship.

We have taken here only one small particle of Paul's writings and let it speak for itself. But a drop of ocean is still a part of ocean, however small. We have been peering into the deep things of God. And the tiny word reveals the abiding dependence, the divine sufficiency, the close human fellowship of the Christian's life. That life has no completeness of its own. It cannot even find lasting peace in a purely personal salvation. Fellowship, divine and human, is its essential, invariable keynote. Life in Christ is, and must be, life in relationship. Its unit is not self but Christ, and Christ in the Great Society with its community of service and sacrifice. Co-operation is not accidental or external; it is vital and essential to the Christian.

T. A. GURNEY.



*R. W. DALE AND THE FACT OF THE ATONEMENT.*

It is possible that the system upon which these studies are written does unusual injustice to Dale. The contribution which he seeks to offer goes much beyond the establishment of a distinction between fact and theory. At the same time Dale is the greatest historical protagonist of the distinction in question. His title-page with its quotation from Anselm implies an interesting parallel between his own proposed distinction and Anselm's treatment which, in mediævalist and Catholic fashion, contrasts what we grasp by simple faith—this is Dale's "fact"—with what we grasp by "understanding"; Dale's "theory." In the mediæval writer, theory wears the aspect of an intellectual luxury. It satisfies curiosity—the higher scientific curiosity, it is true, yet a thing confined to the world of intellect. The religious life of faith, moving on under God's mercy towards eternal salvation, is emphatically declared to be independent of theory. Dale attaches more value to right theory for the purposes of practical Christianity. Or at any rate he has a strong persuasion of the danger of wrong theories.

If Anselm in a sense represents a distinction similar to Dale's, we can name other predecessors. Ritschl quotes one Carpov, an orthodox divine with Wolffian affinities in philosophy, who held that the death of Christ must be added to the list of revealed mysteries, unintelligible but vital. After some vacillations of which Principal Franks gives an interesting record,<sup>1</sup> the mediæval mind—under the guidance of Albert the Great and his even more illustrious pupil St. Thomas—had settled down to the persuasion, 1st, that Theism is a rational certainty; 2nd, that the distinctive

<sup>1</sup> The suggestions of Alexander of Hales are curious; Franks, I., pp. 228, 229.

theological dogmas of the Triune deity and of the person of the Saviour rest exclusively upon revelation—reason being unable either to prove antecedently to revelation, or to understand subsequently. In spite of daring efforts by Duns and the later Nominalists to bring more or to bring everything into the region of what is rationally unvouched but authoritatively revealed, the Vatican council has embodied the Thomist view among the dogmas of the Church of Rome. One who does not wear the spectacles of Romanism or of the older Protestant tradition may be pardoned for uttering a grave protest against such delimitation of the frontiers between “faith” and “reason.” Does it not make revealed doctrine the merest *caput mortuum*? The word of life when so treated becomes a fossil.

A name much more important for the British mind has to be added. Approaching the subject under the guidance of other philosophical prepossessions, Bishop Butler describes Atonement with technical differences of language but full identity of meaning. He calls it not a revealed mystery, but a fact regarding whose inner nature we are left in the dark. Scripture has given no explanation of the great sacrifice. To speculate on the point would be equally presumptuous and useless. For “neither reason nor analogy” would prepare us to believe in the saving effects of the “interposition of Christ.”<sup>1</sup> This is substantially the same attitude as Anselm’s or Dale’s, stated in terms of an empiricist philosophy; though it is more negative in its outlook towards theory.

The same extreme position has been repeated in our own time, with characteristic beauty of expression and depth of feeling, by Dr. R. F. Horton; first in an address delivered to the Summer School of Theology at Mansfield College in

<sup>1</sup> *Analogy*, part II., Conclusion. This is stronger even than the corresponding statement in chap. v.

1892,<sup>1</sup> then in the volume entitled *Faith and Criticism*. In Dr. Horton's treatment there is much more of the open vision of redeeming love than we can trace in that of the great eighteenth century apologist. Yet technically they occupy the same ground. Here, of course, we are chiefly concerned with Dale's formulation. What shall we say of it ?

Let us inquire, to begin with, what the "fact" in question is. In scriptural language—St. Paul's, but, if we believe that great master of the Christian mind, pre-Pauline too—the fact is this, that "Christ died for our sins." In Dale's language, the fact implies "some direct relation between the death of Christ and the forgiveness of sins." One may question whether Dale's words cover the whole ground. Just and needful as it is to emphasise forgiveness, one doubts whether exclusive emphasis upon it is fair either to the teaching of the Bible or to the instincts of the Christian heart. But in any case Dale is right on the main issue. Our "fact" cannot be a mere event in the record of human history—the execution of a religious teacher from Galilee outside the walls of Jerusalem. It is a fact of unending spiritual significance—the death of the Saviour of the world.

But Dale's concessions, if we may call them so, are pushed further. Salvation, he insists, is dependent on the fact that Christ died, but not inevitably or universally upon the saved man's recognition of the fact. So long as a man recognises Christ as Saviour, he is within the circle of blessing. This is a quite astonishingly liberal and large-hearted position to be enunciated by so marked an evangelical and so strong a dogmatist; but Dale was too deeply rooted and grounded in the gospel to feel the nervousness which forces lesser men to insist upon extreme claims on behalf of ortho-

<sup>1</sup> It evoked indirect but unmistakeable protest from Principal Fairbairn.

doxy. Conceivably, Dale ought to have gone even further. It is worth consideration whether even conscious faith in Jesus Christ is necessary to personal Christianity. Humble trust in a God, clearly known or dimly felt to be highest righteousness and perfect love, may be Christian wherever it occurs—may indeed be regarded as the vital heart of Christianity. But when we bring the other faiths of mankind into comparison with the religion of the Bible (Old Testament or New) how little of trust do we find, and how very little of humble trust ! Whatever sporadic workings of the Spirit of redemption may elsewhere appear, the Saviour of the world is the creator for the world of those streams of living water—humility, penitence, faith in God.

Of course, in speaking thus, we imply that Dale's affirmations are essentially true. To praise a Christian for being large-hearted, if his liberality were exercised at the cost of God's truth, would be folly indeed. There are difficulties, with which we must try to deal later, regarding Dale's very sharp contrast of fact and theory. But, whatever reserves may be necessary in view of such unexplored difficulties—will Dale's critics dare to say that he was wrong ? Can any child of man who responds to the grace of Jesus Christ—who loves, who trusts, who follows Him—can any such a one be unsaved for lack of a correct estimate of Christ's death ? His error involves loss to him, unquestionably ; but does it disinherit him outright ? And if indeed he is saved, how else can he be saved than by Christ's death ? Assuredly Dale is right ; it is the fact of Christ's death that saves the world, not our adequate recognition of its underlying *rationale*.

We may hope to throw some light upon the problem of fact and theory by examining parallels in other regions. To whom does beauty mean most—to the art-critic who can dissect and analyse the grounds of æsthetic pleasure, or to unsophisticated intuition, which simply enjoys what is good



and turns away by instinct from what is unworthy? There is something very attractive in the thought of an art-lover of the second type. Further, does science help the artist? Or will there not always be danger, as with Goethe and perhaps with George Eliot, that the scientific impulse may kill the imaginative? And is there not risk of a connoisseurship which will treat works of art as specimens for a museum, and when it has pigeon-holed them will find no more enjoyment in contemplating them?

The case is not dissimilar when we turn to consider religion. It is one of the difficult tasks of an educated piety to-day to read Christ's words of life and feel their force, rather than diverge into the labyrinth of the Synoptic problem. And to whom does religious truth belong most securely—to the master-minds of Christian thought, or to "babes"? Is it really true, as Jesus once affirmed, that little children are most at home in the Kingdom of God? And do we want our young children to be experts in orthodoxy?

We thank God for the gifts of intellect. Its pleasures are high, and even its perils are worthy. But we bless God with a fuller heart for those simplicities which are profound and for those profundities which are so simple. As I write, I have in my recollection, from thirty-five years back in my life, a Scottish peasant offering prayer at a week-night service in the little town of Douglas in Lanarkshire. Already my own mind was occupied with the great problems of this doctrine of Atonement. But I felt that George Wilson went right home to the heart of truth in a way which I could not then achieve, and now I feel I can hardly hope ever to compass it. There were others in that little fellowship, which I was serving for a short time, who were cut more closely to the regulation pattern. I do not speak against them. They were respected by their neighbours, and did no discredit to conventional faith or godliness. But this man "had learned

in Nature's school," or in the Spirit's. He was no critic ; he was no modernist : but St. Paul and the Epistle to the Hebrews had shown him the heart of Christ and of the God and Father of our Lord in the heavenly places. He knew the permanent things of the gospel. Its essential faith and hope and love lived in him and blossomed and bore fruit. Of course he had his New Testament. And the New Testament is full of great affirmations regarding God and the Christian salvation. But on the other hand, the New Testament is nowhere occupied with truth apart from life. And, of all the difficult unsolved problems which the New Testament bequeathed to after ages, this peasant Christian knew and needed to know nothing. Such knowledge would only have injured the perfect beauty of a simple, dignified, holy and happy child of God. Not Calvinism and not the Shorter Catechism had made him what he was, but higher and purer springs.

In spite of such thoughts, one will hope that in the end

Mind and soul according well  
May make our music as before,  
But vaster.

The Kingdom of God is not governed by any monotonous Act of Uniformity. For its full perfection, it will need childlike representatives of instinctive piety, but also those who while "children in malice" are "in understanding, men." One will hope that even art-criticism may emerge from the conceit of enlightenment, and become the minister of a fuller æsthetic enjoyment.

There is need to correct the sharp contrast between "fact" and "theory," like the other sharp contrast between the "knowable" and the "unknowable," insisting rather upon continuity and slow gradations. We have not full noon upon one side of an imaginary line, and midnight just across it. What is certain shades off into what is probable, then

doubtful, then improbable, and finally into what is meaningless. We must not calculate more places of decimals than our data warrant. Plainly, the Christian Society as a whole is more in need of theological theory than is any individual member of the society. Probably too different minds have different capacities for exact detail, and also—what is vitally significant in religion—different capacities for keeping theology in touch with personal godliness. There is danger in suggesting excuses like this for dogma-spinning. Pious conservative minds can always hang practical corollaries upon any authoritative positions which they accept. That is only a seeming verification of dogma at the bar of practice ! At its best it is an innocent blunder ; at its worst it is a trick. Nevertheless positions which are liable to misunderstanding and abuse may yet be true. And if our theology were more cautious, more really reverent, more experimental, and less swollen with dead traditional stuff, there would not be such difficulty in connecting its theories with the central things in the Christian life.

Accordingly, we may feel entire confidence in rejecting the hard antithesis between fact and theory. Apologetic must necessarily give its “reasons for the hope that is in it” ; and every Christian must in good measure be an apologist to-day. Moreover Dogmatic itself is just Apologetic restated in firmer tones. Principal Franks would go so far as to affirm that Dale simply contrasts one vaguer theory with other theories drawn out into fuller detail. That is rather an extreme statement. It might be more correct to say that some element of theory, some apprehension of meaning, attaches to every fact which enters the world of human knowledge ; else it were no fact at all, but at the most—*sit venia verbo*—a “statistic.” When we contrast “fact” with “theory” we contrast certainty with what is uncertain. The “hypothesis” as such stands lower even than theory ;

on the other hand the "working hypothesis" lays claim to a strong pragmatic verification. Again, fact contrasts with theory or hypothesis as the real with the mere symbol useful to science for calculation or to faith for suggestion of the indefinable. But, once again: Fact is the whole truth of ascertainable and valid theory in contrast with the half lights and one-sidednesses which play so great a part in philosophy and theology. The real is not the unknowable; rather it corresponds to the perfect wholeness of knowledge. Still, we who are imperfect may get nearer to reality by preserving a strong sense of the defectiveness of all the theories with which we have to work. For we know in part, and we prophesy in part; and yet we know the true God, and live the eternal life.

A theory is never a fact any more than a relation is, as has rashly been said, a quality. But qualities are only manifested in relations—relation between thing and thing or between a thing and the human sensibility. And a fact is only available for knowledge if we construct theories of its meaning—always imperfect, but always capable of correction and growth. Accordingly, fact is never exhausted in theory or lost in theory; at the same time, it can never be divorced from theory. To adapt a well-known formula: theories without facts are "empty," and facts without theory are "blind." It is the sense that all facts in which God is concerned are "more than . . . our little systems" which leads to the opinion, untenable as we must judge it, that theory and system can and ought to be banished.

We turn now from the mere separation between fact and theory to summarise very briefly the peculiarities of the special theory for which Dale stands. They are somewhat as follows:

First: there was an original *a priori* relation between



Christ as the eternal Logos of God and moral law. That law was His personal institution. He was peculiarly wronged by its infringement and peculiarly interested in its rehabilitation. Why is it strange if *He* intervenes ?

Secondly : Christ as the Divine Word was also in a unique *a priori* relation to mankind—not merely by incarnation. This is, as one passage in Dale frankly owns, the central thought of F. D. Maurice's theology ; only, while in Maurice it passes for the whole truth regarding Atonement, and almost regarding God—viz., men and Christ are one indissolubly, from creation onwards—with Dale this mystic relationship forms part of a complex structure of doctrine. And while—like Schleiermacher—Maurice, with his Alexandrian pre-occupations, hardly knows what to say about the death on Calvary, Dale very well knows that Christ died for our sins. Whatever may be shaken, he feels that that stands firm. Still, this second aspect of Logos theology is held to bring Atonement nearer to our powers of belief.

Thirdly : Christ's Atonement makes provision not merely for standing but for character. R. C. Moberly would strike out this part of Dale's construction, as inconsistent with what seems to him most distinctive and—shall we add ?—most dislikable in Dale. But why should we expurgate Dale's book of its noblest element ? Atonement is said to be immoral ; Dale rejoins, It is the one fountain of deep and pure goodness in our sinful race.

Finally : when we consider that Christ does not inflict upon a stranger but personally endures the penalty of a broken law, the last shadow of moral difficulty is thought to disappear from our faith.

These thoughts place us in the presence of a powerful mind, and—what is greater still by far—of a deeply Christian heart. And yet it is hardly by a cumulative set of pleas in arrest of judgment that we shall vindicate the faith in

Atonement. With all his high qualities, Dale must have chosen a wrong way of approaching his august theme. A better theology must restate the problem and remodel the solution.

R. MACKINTOSH.

### *JESUS AND NATHANAEL.*

THERE is a numerous company of religious people—very useful people and very effective in their way—who nevertheless spend nearly all their time sighing by the chilly waters of Jordan, and seldom dare to do more than sip the wine of Cana. They keep lingering about the door of entrance to the new life in Christ, and leave the richly furnished rooms of the House of the Spirit unexplored. We have no quarrel with them for insisting that repentance unto life covers the whole ground of religious experience. “Repentance,” says Professor Macgregor, “is not an incident which can be left behind. . . . A Christian man in old age may still be making discoveries which render him ashamed of his complacent ease, and force him thus to attempt some new beginning.” The real quarrel with these mournful pietists is that they insist that repentance is an experience which must follow a certain definite and stereotyped form. Most of us, alas, do have to pass through the lowlier and gloomier gateways of repentance. Man is a gregarious animal. We go astray like sheep—follow-my-leader through the same gap in the hedge—and like sheep we have to return. Yet within this broad fundamental sameness of experience there are endless differences. And the experience of none of us gives us the right to dictate what the experience of a neighbour has to be. And there *are* souls born into the world, who are what Augustine finely calls *animae naturaliter*

*Christianae* ; and their experience of finding Christ lies poles apart from that of the man who trembles and weeps in the repentance-baptism of Jordan.

The city of God lieth foursquare ; and there are gates leading into it on all the four sides. On the east four gates and on the south four gates, as well as those on the north and the west. Gates fronting the dawn, out of which young souls sometimes come with hope and purity still shining in their eyes. Gates facing the warm and sunny lands, with roads leading thereto which are paths of joy. We do not all travel by the bleak, forbidding, tempest-harried roads that lead to the gates that face the north. Thank God, there are the gates that face the sunset and the way of shadows, but, thank God also, we do not all wander till the evening calls us home.

Here is a soul that reached the city of the King by way of the gates that face the dawn—Nathanael, or as we may without much hesitation name him also, Bartholomew. Such souls have been named the “once-born” souls. It is a striking and suggestive name, but it is not a completely happy name. “Ye must be born again.” It was Jesus who said so ; and we dare not challenge His right to say it. But regeneration—no, let us not use the ugly word, so burdened and spoiled by centuries of man-made theological dogma—*rebirth* is not the minutely standardised process so many over-confident exponents of the evangel describe it to be. Birth—the mysterious coming of new life into the world—is not mechanical, not bound by any rigid law, like the law of gravitation. It is free, spontaneous, and original in every single instance ; new creations endlessly diversified. And ‘rebirth’—spiritual rebirth ? You cannot put the fetters of human logic about the movements of spiritual life. It is mysterious as the wind rustling in the tree-tops—here, there, yonder, dying, gone ! No doubt the spring

winds that waken the year's new life on the surface of the earth are often stormy, blowing under clouds, and full of rain and wild cries ; but often it is just a breath, soft and warm, and low. The tender breath of the Spirit fanning the closed eyes is all that is needed to call some souls to spiritual awakening. How many retailers of half-baked theology, when they talk about regeneration, ever remember that when Christ said " Ye must be born again," He was just repeating in another form that gravely tender word of His : " Except ye become as a little child ye cannot enter the kingdom " ? Except ye become lowly, trustful, receptive, simple, the gates of the unseen Realm do not fold back for you.

Must we all lose our childlikeness before we reach the experience of being born again ? God forbid that we should call that any necessary part of His plan.

" A simple child  
That lightly draws its breath,  
And feels its life in every limb,—  
What can it know of death ? "

A simple child-like soul whose eyes have not been seared with the world's offending dust—what can it know of the bitter, tearful death of a terrible repentance ? " My turning to the Lord Jesus," said Cæsar Malan of Geneva, " might be likened to a mother rousing her infant from slumber with a kiss." ' Once-born ' ? No, not once-born, but gently re-born—that is what we prefer to call such souls as these,—kissed into spiritual awakening by the dawn-winds of God that herald the rising of the Sun of Righteousness.

Such, we are convinced, was Nathanael, a guileless soul—so Jesus said. Perfect ? O no, not perfect. He had his faults ; prejudices, which are usually the younger brothers and sisters of unconscious vanity, and a certain spiritual pride. Cana was a tiny, unimportant place. And Nazareth



was but a big overgrown village. Neither of them had any political or commercial importance. And places in that position often make up for it by cultivating an immense self-importance. They were quite near each other. And despising one's neighbour is an easy and very seductive method of trying to exalt one's own dignity. People in a small place "know all about each others' affairs, but entirely ignore each others' opinions." And villages which are neighbours are like human beings; a deep-rooted jealousy often exists between them. So all Nathanael's local prejudices were up in arms in a moment when it was suggested to him that Nazareth was the home of the Holy One of God. His jealousy flung a withering light on his dreams. It is evident that for years he had been longing for the coming of the God-sent Man. Often and often Philip and he had exchanged their hopes and confidences about it. But Nazareth? Could anything good come out of that insignificant place? "Come and see," said Philip. And Nathanael obeyed—smiling a little sceptically perhaps. But he went: he was willing to learn. That is the child-soul, "teachable and mild." He had a long way to travel yet before he reached the perfect vision, and he knew it; this was the deepest conviction of his heart,—stronger than all his prejudices. Philip had taken the right way with him: not argument and not rebuke, but experience, is the best remedy for prejudice; and Nathanael was yearning for spiritual experience.

Now observe the dramatic moment of Nathanael's approach, and listen to the voice that speaks: "Behold an Israelite indeed, in whom is no guile!" To offer praise like that with the first breath of greeting—and to such a susceptible soul too,—does it not sound somewhat injudicious from the lips of the Master, not at all what we would expect from His holy wisdom? And listen to the response:

“Whence knowest Thou me?” Does it not sound like the naïve question of a self-complacent soul, surprised, caught off its guard, by the sudden, unexpected flattery? ‘No guile—true! but how do you know?’ He seems to have accepted Jesus’ estimate of him without demur. An unconscious touch of spiritual pride there often is, indeed, in men who grow up naturally into the way of goodness: the moral aristocrats of mankind. Yet we have no hesitation in saying that that is the most superficial reading of the story. Jesus’ greeting is not ill-advised flattery; and Nathanael’s response is not child-like conceit. “Whence knowest Thou me?” asked Nathanael. “I saw thee under the fig-tree,” said Jesus. And it is in that word that the clue to the inner secret of the story lies hid.

What lies behind the word? To say that Jesus is trying to startle Nathanael into faith by a demonstration of omniscience is folly. Jesus was no magic-monger. He was not here claiming to possess in His mortal flesh the power to annihilate distance, and to have His eyes in every place beholding the evil and the good. Jesus had passed the tree. The accidental interchange of glances between two human beings is often mysterious enough: it may contain all the potentialities of heaven or of hell; but it is not magical. What then did Jesus mean? ‘It was that glimpse I got of your face that revealed your soul to me,’—this much at least He meant Nathanael to understand. But how could a word so natural as that immediately have brought Nathanael to Jesus’ feet in adoration? We answer by asking another question. What was it that was happening in the soul of Nathanael hidden beneath the fig-tree’s drooping, leafy boughs? Are we content with the conventional view that it was the case of a devout Jew at prayer and meditation? If that were all that Jesus saw, the story must remain as mysterious as ever to us. The

sight of a man sitting beneath his own fig-tree in his own garden fulfilling the religious law, when the synagogue-trumpet sounded at the hour of prayer, was far too common to be the proof of so unusual a character: "an Israelite indeed in whom is no guile." That simple sight alone could never have prompted Jesus to such a word; nor could such a word based on a fact so ordinary ever have brought Nathanael to the feet of Jesus.

The French artist Tissot has suggested another reason. The fig-tree in the village square was the usual place of assembly for the youths and maidens of a Jewish village when the toil of the day was done. There they danced to the rustic piper's tune. Tissot's suggestion is that Nathanael had been overtaken by some evil impulse there at the village gathering-place, some bad passion: envy, jealousy, anger, lust; and after a sharp struggle had overcome the temptation. Jesus had been a witness of the struggle, and remembered the youth's face when Philip brought him. And *that*, thinks the artist, is the reason for Jesus' prompt word of commendation.

The suggestion does carry us a step nearer to the inner secret of this story. It could not have been merely to Nathanael's character Jesus was referring when He called him "guileless Israel"; it must have been to a definite crisis, a moment of mental anguish in his soul. Consider then for a moment. It was not away in Cana, in the quiet and seclusion of his home, that Jesus saw Nathanael. It was not amid the music and the laughter beneath the fig-tree in the market-place. It was far away down by the banks of the Jordan; it was amid the stern excitement of the Baptizer's revival movement. Nathanael was among the longing souls who had come there seeking for the light beneath the fiery prophet's preaching. He had witnessed the surging, swaying crowd. He had listened to the strong

cries of souls in the agony of repentance. He had seen the long line of converts stoop tremblingly beneath the Baptizer's hand. Friend after friend he had seen emerge from the stream, new men, confident, serene. Think of the situation in which he found himself. He had longed with all his might to share their experience. But no wave of shame or sorrow had swept through his soul. He must have wondered and wondered if God had forgotten him. He, who had longed so for God, seemed like to be passed by. What was the reason? Was he unfitted for the blessing? What could be wrong? Surely it must have been in such a state of mind that he had wandered away alone; and beneath the solitary fig-tree wrestled long in an agony of prayer. Alone, but for a single Stranger who had slowly passed the place of his struggle, and glanced at him for a moment through the leafy fig-boughs with great searching eyes. Nathanael had forgotten all about that half-interruption till this moment. And now that he had come with all the burden of his unanswered questions hidden behind the mask of his face, but burning in his eyes, he heard a voice, warm, winning, comforting, full of calm assurance, speaking the very word his soul needed to hear: "Behold an Israelite indeed, in whom is no guile."

The words carried him back to a moment in a very human story in the ancient Hebrew scriptures, and to a memorable scene that took place close by the Jordan waters, at a spot not far removed from where Nathanael met his Lord. He thought on Jacob returning to his father's home after the long years of exile caused by his own crookedness and guile, Jacob wrestling through the long night-dews by the brook Jabbok, wrestling till the breaking of the day, ere his crooked conscience made its peace with God—ere Jacob the supplanter, the man of stealth and guile, became Israel the Prince of God. Nathanael had been thinking his was a



case like Jacob's ; only for him it had been a fruitless wrestling, with no divine, releasing word to bring it to an end. And lo ! here was a voice falling upon his troubled spirit, the serene decisive voice of One who surely knew, saying, " Put away your anguish, your torturing despair, dear soul. You have been wrestling with a spectre, an unreal phantom. God does not require from you the terrors of the death-struggle of repentance. You do not need to be changed from Jacob to Israel : you know nothing of Jacob's guile. Decision you must make indeed, but the fierce wrestling by the brook of decision is not for you."

" Whence knowest Thou me ? " The fire leapt in Nathanael's eyes as he asked his excited question. " You have read my case. Whence come those strangely winged words ? Is it true ? Is it true ? Are you really the messenger sent to speak God's answer to my cry ? " And then once again came the glance of the great searching eyes that Nathanael had seen through the fig-tree leaves. And Nathanael remembered. And the light began to dawn. . . . How much can the heart give by a look ? How much can the soul give by a glance out of pure eyes ? Mark Rutherford somewhere tells how the memory of a passing glimpse of a woman's face in the street came back to him a thousand times in after life, and its sacred beauty judged him and redeemed him. . . . The memory of that passing glance as he wrestled beneath the fig-tree became for Nathanael now the beginning of God's answer to his agony of prayer.

" Whence knowest Thou me ? " And Jesus said, " Under the fig-tree I saw it all. I know. I am very sure." God's call to you is only that of a Friend fulfilling a promise which you have not forfeited. Come. I offer you the goblet of heavenly joy from the hand of God. Your longing and your hopes have been the blowing of God's Spirit on the eyes of your half-awakened soul ; and still those eyes are dim with

dreams of day. Look ! It is the dawn, the dawn—for you ! Your day has come, your festal day, the day of the mating of your soul. Come. She has found her Bridegroom. And Nathanael kneeled and said, “ Master, Thou art the Son of God, the King of Israel.”—“ Thou art the Holy One who shares God’s secrets ; therefore I name Thee His Son. Thou art the God-sent Man—sent most surely to speak God’s liberating word to me. Thou hast called me Israel. I name Thee King, King of my soul, King of Israel. Master, I believe.”

So this soul by nature Christian came at last with gladness to its own.

Surely it is time for us to acknowledge that Christ has sanctioned and blessed this way of entrance on His friendship, His kingdom. And any soul who has worried and worried about the genuineness of his religious experience, and about his right to the personal friendship of Christ may hear this tender tale for his comfort. Soul, thou hast had thy holy aspirations, thy hopes, thy heavenly dreams,—of that much thou art sure. Cease to imagine thou hast had no title to those dreams, because thou hast not passed through the grim gate some would appoint for thee. Do not darken and sadden thy dreams, vainly lingering by the river, sighing, and dipping, and sighing again. Arise, take the hand of friendship the Master offers with a smile of good cheer. He does not say thou art unsmirched ; He says only thou art not so thrawn and twisted that thou must needs be heated in the sevenfold furnace of remorse, and bent back on the anvil of a fierce repentance. But he says there is more, far more, to follow. The order for thee is not, first, repentance, and then my company. But, first, my company ; and then, as the light grows stronger and stronger while thou walkest with me ; as thou comest to understand my suffering, my agony, my death upon the Cross—the cost of

God's forgiveness,—one by one, the hidden things, the faults, the weaknesses, the failures, the prejudices, the follies, the conceits will be brought to light, and in that holy light refined away. Thy penitence can only be born in my light, and only perfected in heaven.

Come, for I need thee, says the Master. There is room in my Kingdom for the "once-born" Israels, the guileless Nathanaels. There is work, great work, for them to do. One searching look of sympathy and understanding has brought thee to my feet adoring. But the best for thee is yet to be. Have I not said, "To him that hath shall be given"? The holiest visions are for them of purest heart. I need thee, Jesus says, to dream fresh dreams for my Church, that she may be inspired for nobler service. . . .

Have we read the story aright? Is there hesitation about reading into the Master's greeting to Nathanael an allusion to the old-world tale of Jacob? Will it be said that the Master could not possibly have made room for any variations in the manner of the soul's entrance to His Kingdom? Then listen to the ending of the story: "Verily, verily I say unto thee, hereafter ye shall see heaven open, and the angels of God ascending and descending upon the Son of Man." Heaven open and the angels ascending and descending! O, the Master is determined we are to be left under no misapprehension of His meaning. He insists on taking His new-won disciple back to Jacob's story. He repeats His assurance, crowning it with a glorious promise. "Not the brook Jabbok, but Bethel—that is what God has in store for you! Not the long wrestle in the darkness of doubt and despair; but the ladder of light reaching down from the throne of God to the place of your dreams." And note the significant addition. The disciple is not called on to travel to Bethel in solitude. The Christ is now his companion. He takes him into His company. It is where He is

that the clean soul touches the foot of the stairway of light that reaches to God's throne. The angels of God are ascending and descending—on the Son of Man.

J. A. ROBERTSON.

*"THE SAINTS"—SOME NOTES ON NEW TESTAMENT AND PRESENT ENGLISH USE.*

I. WHO are the saints? I put the question recently to an intelligent Christian woman, member of a Protestant Church. Her reply revealed that as she understood it three more or less related ideas were involved in the word: (1) People who live exceptionally close to God; (2) People who have gone to heaven, in general; (3) More specifically, apostles, Church fathers, and other outstanding men of God who figured in the earlier history of Christianity. For her personally the first idea was fundamental, but she recognised that usage sanctioned the others as well.

My impression is that a questionnaire on the subject would yield a large majority of answers very similar to this. Some very likely would show familiarity with only one of the three uses of the word referred to above, others with two, and some with all three. Very few answers, I imagine, would reveal ideas other than these. I am assuming that the questionnaire would be sent to people such as the rank and file in Britain and America.

But what about the New Testament saints? We meet with them sixty-two times, according to the Moulton-Geden data—40 times in Paul (counting all thirteen epistles), fourteen times in Revelation, four times in Acts, twice in Hebrews, once in Matthew and once in Jude. In a large majority of these passages it is perfectly clear that the *ἄγιοι* are just the Christians, that is to say that the word is



used as a collective and inclusive designation for members of the Christian communities. Typical passages are Acts ix. 13, “Lord, I have heard from many of this man, how much evil he did to Thy saints at Jerusalem”; Romans xii. 13, “communicating to the necessities of the saints”; 2 Corinthians i. 1, “with all the saints that are in the whole of Achaia”; Revelations xxii. 21, “The grace of the Lord Jesus be with the saints,” etc.

This is undoubtedly the prevailing use in the New Testament. But are present-day readers of the English versions likely to so understand the word? Of course they are not. It has very different connotations for them, as we have seen. If we compare the prevailing New Testament use with (1) above we find, at least, an overwhelming difference in emphasis. The person whom we speak of as “saintly” may be a member of a Church, probably is, but in applying the designation we do not have such a matter as church membership particularly in mind: it is *character* that we emphasise. With the New Testament writers the opposite was true. That a “saint” had, or should have, a Christ-like character they no doubt assumed; but in applying the name it was membership in a Christian group, not character, that had the place of prominence in their thought.

A comparison with (2) yields similar results. To be sure the idea of saints in glory is found in the New Testament, especially in Revelation, but in the main it is to living Christians that the name is applied. Doubtless even the author of Revelation did not think of the saints in heaven as having become saints only after their departure from the present life. On the contrary he calls them by this name in heaven because they had already borne it on earth. As to (3) it is scarcely necessary to remark that such titles as “St. Paul,” “St. Peter,” “St. John,” etc., are not to be found in the New Testament—except in headings that date

from a much later time than the books to which they are attached. The saints of the New Testament (*i.e.* of the great majority of passages) were not an *ecclesiola in ecclesia*—whether of living or of dead: they were the full membership of the *ecclesia* itself.

In short, "saints" is an unfortunate translation for the Greek *ἅγιοι* in the New Testament. Cheyne has a pertinent remark on the subject in his article on "Saint" in *Encyclopaedia Biblica* (iv. 4241):—"In NT the EV uses 'saints' often of Christians. It may be a convenient term; but if ideas are to be translated, 'God's people' would perhaps be a better rendering, with a marg. 'holy ones—*i.e.*, consecrated ones.'"<sup>1</sup> This is good, but it is a pity that the point is not treated at greater length. As it stands the remark is worthy of more attention than it is likely to get. I think perhaps it would not be an unfair criticism to say that the scholarly writers of our Bible dictionary articles, standard commentaries, and Biblical "helps" in general, are all too prone to neglect important points in *comparative* grammar and lexicology—if I may adapt those terms to my present use. The reason is probably because these scholars themselves are so habituated to the use of the Greek or Hebrew text, as the case may be, that these points scarcely come within their ken. But with the majority of those who use their books it is quite otherwise. There is no sort of help which they need more than help in understanding the many differences between the Greek or Hebrew modes of expression and those of their native tongue.

<sup>1</sup> *The Twentieth Century New Testament* has various renderings for *οἱ ἅγιοι*: "God's People," "Christ's People," "your fellow-Christians," etc. This is at any rate a serious attempt to "translate ideas," and is to be commended as such. Similar locutions are employed by Weymouth, and by Kent in *The Shorter Bible*. One wonders why Moffatt, in his invaluable *New Translation*, always renders with the conventional "saints."

II. To come back to the saints, we should not fail to add that in a small minority of the New Testament passages a more or less close approach to the modern usage is to be seen. Reference has already been made to the fact that the saints of Revelation rather frequently prove to be Christians who have departed from the earthly life. The martyrs, in particular, have this name applied to them. Thus in Revelation xvii. 6, “ And I saw the woman drunken with the blood of the saints, and with the blood of the martyrs of Jesus,” the second clause is evidently explanatory of the first. The same use appears in xviii. 24, “ And in her was found the blood of prophets and of saints, and of all that have been slain upon the earth.” (Cp. also xi. 18 ; xvi. 6 ; xviii. 20.) Colossians i. 12 may be cited as an example of a similar use in Paul ; “ . . . the Father, who made us meet to be partakers of the inheritance of the saints in light.” (Cp. Eph. i. 18 ; 1 Thess. iii. 13.)

The origin of (3), in the first paragraph above, is presumably to be seen in the usage which these passages reveal. The idea that Christians of exceptional character or achievement, now gone to their reward, were saints in a peculiar sense is far from being a dominant idea in the New Testament ; but the germ is here, and how it grew and developed in later centuries is well known to every student of church history.

No doubt the usage seen in the passages last quoted served also as a starting point for (2). It may be that in such a passage as Colossians i. 12 the writer has *all* departed Christians in mind. Thus far this idea and (2) are parallel. But there is also a difference. The New Testament has nothing analogous to such an expression as “ my sainted mother,” which means my mother who has gone to heaven and *ipso facto* has become a saint. This development has probably been influenced by hymnology. Cp. e.g. “ The

saints above, how great their joys, And bright their glories be" (Watts), "And let us rest beneath Thy feet, Where saints and angels live" (Sir Henry Baker), etc. I do not mean to suggest that the hymn writers themselves necessarily thought of the term saints as applying only to Christians in heaven. The point is that their language tended to create such an impression in the popular mind.

As for (1), with its emphasis on character, scarcely more than a couple of passages yield ideas at all parallel: Ephesians v. 3, "But fornication, and all uncleanness, or covetousness, let it not even be named among you, as becometh saints"; 1 Peter i. 15, "But like as he who called you is holy (*ἅγιος*), be ye yourselves also holy (*ἅγιοι*) in all manner of living." (Cp. Rev. xxii. 11.) In modern usage (1) is perhaps mainly a metaphorical development from (2) and (3). If we undertake to analyse "She is a saint if ever there was one," we must presumably take it to mean "Her character is worthy of comparison with that of apostles and martyrs, and others who have passed to their great reward."

III. I venture a few further remarks, still having to do with the saints but along a little different line.

It is interesting to note how Paul's thought and language continued to be influenced by the inherited conception of *ἅγιοι* as a designation for the people of Israel. That Paul's own use of the term was not thus limited is clear enough. It is not for a moment to be supposed that "all the saints that are in the whole of Achaia" (2 Cor. i. 1), or "all the saints in Christ Jesus that are at Philippi" (Phil. i. 1) were Jews. (Cp. also Rom. i. 7; 1 Cor. i. 2; Col. i. 2, etc.). Yet he tells the Gentile Christians whom he addresses in Ephesians ii. 19 that they are now "*fellow-citizens with the saints.*" They are *naturalised* saints in other words—not having been born Jews. The same point of view



crops out in his rather frequent references, in several letters, to the contributions which he was receiving for the needy Christians in Jerusalem. In 2 Corinthians what he has to say about this matter occupies two whole chapters. Those for whom the collection is intended are referred to repeatedly as “the saints” (viii. 4; ix. 1; ix. 12), but we have to look elsewhere for the information that the Christians of Jerusalem specifically are meant. Out of a total of seven or eight references to “the saints” in connection with this offering, in Romans, 1 Corinthians, and 2 Corinthians, there is only one in which the expression is expanded to “the saints that are at Jerusalem” (Rom. xv. 26). Evidently the Jewish Christians of the mother Church were “saints” *par excellence* in this early period, somewhat as the martyrs were at a later date. It would seem that this idea must have been familiar in the Gentile Christian circles to which Paul wrote, as well as to Paul himself.

IV. A comparison of the number of references to the “saints” in the different Pauline epistles is not without interest. The figures are as follows: 1 Thessalonians 1, 2 Thessalonians 1, Galatians 0, 1 Corinthians 6, 2 Corinthians 5, Romans 8, Ephesians 9, Philippians 3, Colossians 4, Philemon 2, 1 Timothy 1, 2 Timothy 0, Titus 0. These figures bring to our notice two outstanding facts. The first is that in his earlier correspondence Paul used the term in this sense scarcely at all, while in late years he employed it with increasing frequency. It is open to question whether there is really a single example in the earliest group of letters. The two listed are 1 Thessalonians iii. 13, and 2 Thessalonians i. 10. Both passages have to do with the Parousia, and it is rather more than probable that in both cases *angels*, not Christians, are the “holy ones” meant. (Cp. Zech. xiv. 5.) This interpretation is widely accepted for 1 Thessalonians iii. 13, and there are

weighty reasons for applying it to the other passage as well. At all events it should be recognised that if *ἄγιοι* here means "Christians" it is practically an isolated example, as far as this group of letters is concerned.

In the second group (1 Cor., 2 Cor., Rom.) our figures show 19 occurrences of the term. This is in a total of 1,125 verses, or an average of one to 59 verses. The total for the third group (the Prison Epistles) is 18 in 379 verses, or an average of one in twenty-one verses. In other words the use here is nearly three times as frequent as in the second group.

The evidence afforded by the *salutations* of the different letters is quite in line with that gathered from the data of the letters as a whole. In 1 and 2 Thessalonians only the "church," and in Galatians the "churches" are addressed. In the opening verses of the Corinthian letters the "church" and the "saints" both appear. In the later correspondence (excepting Phm.) the "saints" are in each case saluted, no special mention being made of the church. (Cp. Lightfoot's note on Col. i. 2.)

The second fact brought out by the figures is that this increasing use of *ἄγιοι* does not extend into the so-called Pastoral Epistles. Here we have a total of 242 verses, with only a single use of the term. Of course no sweeping conclusions are to be drawn from this. It may fairly be urged that the different purpose of these writings—and in particular the fact that they are addressed to individuals instead of to Christian groups—are factors in the case. Yet I think that the relative non-use of *ἄγιοι* in the Pastorals is worthy of the brief notice which I have given it. It adds its bit to the overwhelming weight of evidence against Paul's authorship of these epistles in their present form.

V. The single reference to the "saints" in the Gospels

(Matt. xxvii. 52-53) has been the subject of much discussion, both in ancient and modern times. In connection with the narrative of the Crucifixion it is said that “the tombs were opened; and many bodies of the saints that had fallen asleep were raised; and coming forth out of the tombs after his resurrection they entered into the holy city and appeared unto many.” Who were these saints? One of two answers has usually been given: (1) The word is used in the Old Testament sense, *i.e.*, they were departed Israelites; (2) They were people who had known of Jesus’ birth and believed in His Messiahship, but had not lived to see His ministry; *e.g.*, Anna, Simeon, Zacharias and Elizabeth. To regard the incident as legendary—as do commentators as conservative as Bruce and Meyer—does not dispose of this question. The author of the Gospel believed it to be historical, and he must have had some particular class of “saints” in mind. The writer of the article “Saints” in Hastings’ *Dictionary of Christ and the Gospels* seems to adopt the second answer given above as his own. But that a writer belonging to the second generation of Christians should use *ἅγιοι* in this way, without explanation, is all but incredible. Meyer understands that Old Testament saints are meant and this is much more probable. But what is to hinder us from concluding that the use of *ἅγιοι* here is just the common New Testament use? Such a view involves the author, or editor, of the Gospel in an anachronism to be sure, but that would not be an unheard of thing. Does not Shakespeare speak of a clock striking in Julius Cæsar’s time?

VI. The reference to “saints and widows” in Acts ix. 41 is curious. What is meant is probably the local Christians in general and the widows particularly. The Twentieth Century New Testament renders, “the widows and others of Christ’s People,” which is perhaps about as near it as

we can get. The single occurrence of *ἅγιοι* in the Pastorals already alluded to, affords another example of the association of saints and widows. In this passage are enumerated certain marks of one who is "a widow indeed." Among them is, "if she hath washed the saints' feet." We might at first suspect that the saints here were outstanding figures in the Church, to have washed whose feet would be a work of special merit. But the context is rather against such a view. In short, the use of the term "saints" in both these passages is just the usual New Testament use. The question of who the "widows" were is puzzling enough, but it does not concern us here.

FRANK EAKIN.



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